He adheres to the view that only the Particular is real. He is thus the exact opposite of Spinoza. The application of his philosophy to Natural Science belongs principally to his followers, particularly Newton.

Newton imitates Locke in his caution in asserting general principles. In treating of the attraction of gravitation, as a force acting from the periphery towards the centre, he is careful to insist that it is to be considered as a mere mathematical, and not as an actual physical force. Otherwise, indeed, it would contradict the vis inertia, which he lays down as the first law of Bodies. He remarks that it cannot be physical, because the centres of bodies are only mathematical points. But this is inconsistent with his law of reaction; it is necessary to make of this another innate force. But if these forces were only mathematical, and the centres only mathematical points, then the different masses of bodies would make no difference in their gravitating force. And if gravitation were only attraction towards the centre, then it would act only between bodies related as centre and periphery, and not, for instance, between two planets.

The mathematical demonstration plays, therefore, altogether a secondary part here. These are only hypotheses supported empirically, and in reality supposing physical forces. The demonstration only makes clear what was found before. Newton, indeed, inclined to assume actual physical forces as existing in matter, and this was done by his successors, who called his system dynamic, in opposition to that of Descartes. This tendency of Newton may be seen, for example, in the Questions appended to his Optics.

Materialism (which is most distinctly presented in Miraband's Système de la nature,) is a necessary consequence from Locke's principles. No Truth being admitted, except that perceived by the senses, nothing but Matter can be real. All spiritual things, therefore, are imaginary; moral freedom is a delusion; to overcome the appetites and selfish impulses at the command of duty is quixotic enthusiasm. Nothing really exists except Matter and Motion, and these are necessarily connected; Matter moves by its own energy, motion being implied in its nature. It is not necessary, therefore, to have recourse to any foreign principle, as God, for instance, to explain the laws of Nature.

But it is not shown by Materialism that the so-called forces of Nature do really belong to Matter of itself. The idea of Matter is not shown to imply the existence of these forces; it is merely passive still, in this system as in the others, and must receive these forces from without. It may be true that organized Matter requires or shows inherent forces; but why should it be organized? There is still something presupposed and unexplained, and whether we call it God, or chance, matters little.

Leibnitz objects to the mechanical and mathematical notions of Matter prevalent in his day. If Matter be considered as mere Extension, and having only mathematical qualities, then mass could make no difference, and the largest body could be impelled by the smallest; Extension being entirely indifferent to Motion. Forces of attraction, &c., in this case, are merely miracles. Material Being, he says, thus presupposes immaterial, simple substances, or Monads, having each an inward force, which he calls the power of Representation (Vorstellung);—not that each monad is conscious, and thus properly a soul-but that they differ only in degree, namely, in the clearness or confusion of their representation, the highest degree belonging to the personal or conscious Monads, or souls, properly so called. Representation, therefore, is here to be understood not as notion or conception, but in the general sense of the representation of multiplicity in unity. As immaterial principles, and purely active, the monads cannot act upon each other, but each is a world by itself. The organization of the Universe is therefore a harmony preëstablished by God.

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The monad is thus an ideal principle; yet being created with a certain amount of Being, it is thus far material; namely, in relation to the Absolute Substance, or God. As there is no reality other than the monads, and as they are immaterial, Matter cannot be material. They cannot be aggregated, and thus the notion of Matter, and of aggregation, must be a confused one, and the existence of matter must depend on the rudeness of the perceptive faculties. Leibnitz's Idealism, therefore, is incomplete. It does not dispose of Matter, but merely substitutes one kind of Matter for another. For the monads being necessarily in a degree passive, evidently involve a material nature. Thus he falls back into the atomistic theory, and allows the whole of the mechanical system to remain, under another name.

A more extreme Idealism is that of Berkeley. According to him, Spirit can be affected only by Spirit, and not by Matter. Ideas, therefore, cannot be derived from the material world. Yet they are not formed by the mind itself, since we do not produce images at will, and since there is an independent connection among them. They must therefore be immediately implanted in our mind by God. Generalization, or any action of the mind in cognition, is therefore impossible; we are merely passive to God's influence. This, however, does not explain the reality of knowledge; this remains an uncomprehended miracle and matter of faith.

Hume. As Berkeley makes knowledge mere passivity to the Absolute Spirit, or God, so Hume on the other hand dwells on the impossibility of discovering any necessity in our knowledge of outward things. Both unite in denying the connection of Subject and Object in one cognition.

Hume says that all knowledge resting on facts, and not on the

mere relations of ideas, must depend on the connection of cause and effect. It is thus only that we generalize. Now we cannot prove this relation a priori, since the idea of Cause does not include that of the Effect. It is only by experience, by long custom and the association of ideas, that we get the notion of Cause and Effect, as necessary antecedence and consequence. We can therefore only believe, but not know Reality, and this belief rests not on proof or reasoning, but only on habit and impression.

The dynamic conception of Nature; Kant. The former postulate, that the mind can know objects directly, is now no longer admitted. An antithesis has been formed between Thought and Being, as Subject and Object; and it is denied that these two can come together; that the mind is conversant with objective reality. Only subjective knowledge is conceded. Philosophy, at the time of Kant's Critique, was therefore Skepticism.

The question with which Kant opens his Critique of Pure Reason "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?"— that is, judgment in which the predicate is not involved in the idea of the subject was equivalent to an inquiry as to the possibility of knowledge in general. That the mind cannot know any thing purely objective, absolutely foreign to itself, was now clearly felt. What things are in themselves, apart from our perception of them, Kant allows we can never know. Leaving such a consideration, then, out of the question, and considering objects only as phenomena, how is it possible to have any real knowledge? That we have such knowledge is evident as a matter of experience, for we form many judgments, for example, of mathematical truths, with a perfect conviction of their entire necessity, which could not result from even the most extensive experience and where experience is not possible. For instance, that all outward material things exist in Space and Time, is a truth that cannot have been derived from Experience, since Experience could not in the first instance have been possible without it; and, moreover, surpasses in certainty all results of Experience.

As to such truths, therefore, skepticism is not possible; and the question is how they are possible? Kant answers this question by saying that all such truths relate to the constitution of the mind itself; to the subjective forms, under which objects appear to us. These forms are in so far objective that they are fitted for the perception of phenomena, which Kant does not doubt are really the appearances of actual things. On the other hand, Nature, to us is only the complex of sensuous phenomena, and thus penetrated by the action of the mind. In all real knowledge these must concide, the Understanding, as the mind adapted to the perception of things; and phenomena, as the Object adapted to being perceived. Each of the various functions of the understand

ing, accordingly, has always a relation to its employment in Experience, and corresponding to these functions are the categories in which all possible judgments as to phenomena are embraced. The understanding thus creates the laws of nature. Nature being to us only what it must appear according to the laws of the understanding.

There is thus no direct cognition of actual things by the mind, but only a knowledge of general rules. Reason does indeed form ideas as to what things are in themselves, apart from actual experience and above it; but these ideas give us no objective knowledge, and have no power to know concrete truth,— or, in Kant's language, they have no constitutive, but only a regulative power and if sought to be applied to concrete or actual truth, they are illusive and transcend their sphere, causing contradictions.

In Nature, therefore, we can know only the abstract general rules that must govern phenomena if they are perceived. Thus our philosophical knowledge extends only to the possibility of nature, and not to actual nature. Particulars we can know only empirically.

When we come to specific, concrete things, then, we are left to the same skepticism as before. Thus, in Kant's Dynamics, for example, the two opposing forces acting in nature, and whose neutral unity he makes to be the essence of Matter, rest on a mere postulate; and in this, moreover, he is inconsistent with himself, since to know the essence of Matter would be to know things as they are in themselves.

The difficulty is, that Kant started with the supposition that Subject and Object must necessarily be synthetically and really distinct and opposite. Thus their union in knowledge is supposed in advance to be impossible. Philosophy is thus confined to the Subject, and the Object is rendered purely unknowable. All this is a mere postulate; he does not show, for example, why Space is necessarily merely subjective, and so on of the other subjective forms and functions. The Categories, again, and the forms of judgment in which the subjective and the objective come together, are merely postulated, and the possibility of such a union is not explained.

The second part of Dr. Schaller's work closes with a short review of Kant's school-of whom he says only Fries is of importance and a few words on the relation of Kant's Philosophy of Nature to empirical science.

Fries attempted improvements upon Kant, but these improvements consist only of popularizing some of the difficult points — in which process they lose their meaning and importance. Thus he would consider phenomena as really the manifestation of things themselves :- he recommends self-examination, and a philosoph

ical Anthropology, as the foundation of philosophy (coinciding here with M. Willm). Theory in Natural Science he thinks extends only to general principles, and is to be used practically by way of hypotheses, which are to be tested by experiment, &c.

The applications of Kant's philosophy by empirical naturalists, and others, Dr. Schaller says have been confined to a formal application of the categories and the like, without much understanding of the philosophy itself. In the form in which Kant left it, the philosophy of Nature was too abstract to be fit for immediate application. On the other hand, the great importance which the law of Polarity has attained in empirical science, although perhaps not owing at all to any direct influence of Kant, yet shows a remarkable parallelism with his great principle of two opposite forces as constituting the essence of Matter; and the Physics of the present day stands in the same relation to that of the preceding period, as Kant's philosophy to the philosophy of that period.

We have thus hastily sketched the outline of the first two parts of Dr. Schaller's book, thinking to give the reader in this way a correcter notion of it than in any other. But it is not thus that any justice can be done to its merits, which consist not merely in the excellence of its general views, but also in the masterly precision and thoroughness of the details. It is not merely an elegant compendium, like M. Damiron's Essay, nor a thorough and able analysis, like that of M. Willm; - in a word, it is not the work of a learner or a disciple, but of a master. We await with impatience the appearance of the remainder of the work, as well as of his "Naturphilosophie," which he speaks of as in process of preparation.

2.-Rest in the Church. By the author of "From Oxford to Rome." "What resource hath the archer when in the hour of conflict he desireth to discharge the arrow, and findeth his bow-string broken?"-[Arab Proverb.] London: Brown, Longman, Green, & Longmans. 1848.

THIS work seems to be written by a scholarly young woman, full of benevolence and piety. The first lines of the Preface contain the gist of the whole book:-"There are those who walk in their own way till the light that was in them has become darkness." The whole book is a call "to that Duty which is the first commandment of the Church, and the single law of Peace,-Obedience to External Authority." But it is less the author's purpose "to illustrate the curse of Independent Will, than to point out the blessedness of Reverence, and Patience, and Trust." The