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The different items of extra charge for capital, which we have enumerated amount collectively to a sum of £22,700,000,* leaving out of view the first in our statement, and which, partially at least, may be accounted for in other departments. This sum is lost annually to the earners of money, and added to the stock of those who hold capital without employing it in business. It is a tax paid to the money interest, exactly as the corn-law was a tax paid to the landed interest. It is a tax which we should oppose and endeavour to repeal by the same arguments, and the same means, that were successfully employed against the corn monopoly. The real interests of the country require, quite as much, cheap money as cheap food. They are not less impeded by a monopoly of money, than they were by a monopoly of bread. Free trade in currency is fully as essential to the advancement of the country, and the welfare of the working classes, as free trade in corn; and the extra charge for capital, established by these laws, falls as obviously on the first producers of wealth as the extra charge incurred for bread. The direct tax in all such matters is, however, always less than the indirect. The sums actually paid, as we have stated, fall necessarily and greatly short of the charge on wages or profits. If a trader of any description pays five, six, or seven per cent. for the capital which he borrows, he will charge a similar sum towards expenses on his own capital engaged in his business, and he will necessarily reduce wages, so as, if possible, to leave some profit over this charge. By this view, which is in fact a reality, we shall find that the increased charge on the business of the country, that charge which comes necessarily before wages and profits, is not less than sixty millions annually, in consequence of Sir Robert Peel's restrictions on the currency, of which he seems now to be so mistrustful, that they have no place in his catalogue of “good deeds.”
subject so brief and convincing, in a pamphlet published during this month by an eminent supporter of Sir Robert Peel's general policy, that we insert it here, while we refer to the pamphlet itself, as one in which many facts connected with this question will be found very clearly and ably stated, by a gentleman of the highest literary character, unconnected with business, and whose interest, if he studied his self-interest, would lead him to support a measure that raises the value of money by reducing the price of commodities.* "That the demand for capital to complete the railways which have received the sanction of the Legislature, occurring at the same time when the importation of food occasioned by the Irish famine, and consequent exportation of gold, is most extensive, has very much aggravated the existing distress, may readily be conceded. It is impossible that calls for £500,000 or £1,000,000 a week can go on for any length of time, when credit is short and accommodation difficult, without occasioning a serious derangement of the money market. But would the capital of the country be unable to meet these calls, if the currency were not contracted, and the wealth of Great Britain even in sufficient quantities melted down into the form which constitutes oil for the social and industrial machine? That is te point, and in order to arrive at a right conclusion on the subject, we must examine what the capital of the country has proved equal to in former and present times.
"During the war, when the population of the country ranged from fourteen to eighteen millions, and its exports from forty to fifty millious annually, but when it had a sufficient currency, no less than £600,000,000 was borrowed in twenty-two years by the Government, never at a higher rate than 5 per cent., being on an average about £28,000,000 a-year. In the years 1813, 1814, and 1815, no less than $156,000,000 were borrowed, being at the rate of a million a week for three years, and yet the dearest of these loans was contracted for by Government at £4 15s. 6d. per cent.! Are we to be told that the capital of the country has decreased so much during the last thirty years, that while a million a week was felt as no strain by eighteen millions of British subjects, when continued for three years from 1813 to 1815, payment of the same sum for a few weeks brought eight-and-twenty millions to the verge of ruin in 1817? Has the boasted industry of the Anglo-Saxon race ings, and ruinously contracted its stock during that period? not only accumulated nothing, but merely fed upon its savIf so, it says little for the liberal party and the political economists, who, during the last quarter of a century, have had the entire direction of its affairs, that so deplorable a result should have followed the adoption of their measures.
These evils, however, are ascribed by the friends "In the next place, unequivocal symptoms at the preand supporters of the Currency Laws to the rapid sent day demonstrate that there really is no deficiency in construction of railways. The subject has spread The capital of the country has been greatly enlarged, inour capital, but that all we want is a sufficient currency. out so much in our hands already, that we cannot stead of being contracted, by the recent currency laws; spare space for the refutation of this error, which because the value of money has been increased forty or fifty per cent. Every million has, for every useful or nearises out of a great misapprehension respecting cessary purpose, been turned, by the laws of 1819, 1826, the circulation of money; but during the late and 1814, into a million and a-half. The reality of this war the country raised, without an approach to change-of this vast addition to the available capital of the country, distinctly appears in the current rate of intebankruptcy, double the money for fighting pur-rest, which, as every one knows, anterior to the present poses, to be expended in foreign countries, that crisis, bad fallen to three per cent. The funds were above even the Times calculates to be required annu100 for some weeks they were 103 and 104: the four per cents. were successively changed into 34, and the 33 to 3 ally for four or five years in the construction of per cent., without any difficulty by Government. Is this railways at home. Since the peace there has state of things an indication of diminished capital? Is it been sunk in foreign loans a larger capital than not rather the clearest indication of redundant capital? of a state of things in which the accumulated savings of the is required for investment in new railways at nation during thirty years of peace, have become so consihome, without the apparent and real inconve- derable that they can no longer find a profitable investnience and suffering occasioned from some cause ment at home? In truth, the South American mania of 1825, and the North American mania of 1836, as well as or causes during the past nine months. The the Railway mania of 1815, have all been brought about immense difference allowed by all parties to by the same cause, viz., a plethora of capital in the counexist between a home and foreign outlay, must try, which led men to seek the hazard of foreign undertakings, rather than the certainty of slender domestic profits. not be forgotten when we take these facts "In the third place, if the present state of the money into consideration. There is an argument on this market is considered, it affords the most decisive evidence
We observe, that in printing off the preceding page, the value of property in land, &c., is set down at £250,000,000 instead of £2,500,000,000.
VOL. XIV.NO, CLXIV.
Free Trade and a Fettered Currency. By Archibald Alison, F.R.S.E., author of "The History of Europe during the French Revolution," "England in 1815 and 1845," &c.-Wm. Blackwood & Son, Edinburgh and London.
£8,000,000 for the Irish loans at £3 7s. 6d. per cent. The 3 per cent. funds are now at 88: they have never, during the present crisis, been below 86 per cent. This shows that the rate of interest for durable investments has not yet generally risen to four per cent. But advances of cash by bankers for temporary purposes have risen generally to six, in some cases to ten, twelve, and fifteen per cent.-a state of matters wholly unexampled, even when the nation was expending one hundred and twenty millions a-year, and lending Government fifty millions annually during the war. The capitalist for a durable investment is still glad to get 4 or 4 per cent.; but the money-changer will not let his cash out of his hands for less than six, eight, ten, or twelve per cent. Can more decisive proof be required that capital is abundant even to excess, and currency
scarce even to famine?"
that it is in the Currency, not the Capital, that the defi- | that a smaller circulation will suffice to transact the ciency exists. The Chancellor of the Exchequer borrowed business of the trade in bread than when wheat is 90s.; but Sir Robert Peel has virtually declared that the same amount of money must suffice either with 45s. or 90s. as the standard of wheat. It is idle to suppose that when grain rises in price the circulation may be increased by gold. That is the most unlikely thing imaginable, because when we have dear food we have always extensive imports; and instead of increasing we are reducing our stock of gold. Such has been the operation on the currency of the imports rendered necessary by the late calamitous harvest. Instead of the circulation accommodating itself to the expanded prices of necessaries; it has been, and under the present acts it always will be, reduced in amount as prices rise. Gold has to be exported; and a portion of the paper currency resting on gold has to be withdrawn. We are not permitted, in that case, to fall back on the realised property of the country and the credit that it affords; but we are compelled to dispose of that property on any terms. The principle of Sir Robert Peel, and Mr. Lloyd Jones, and Sir Charles Wood is, that then we must sell manufactures at whatever price they will bring, in order to rectify the Exchequer. This is the policy prescribed by them for the nation. Let us apply it to the transactions of an individual trader, and mark the celerity with which it would place him in the Gazette.
The essential charge made by Sheriff Alison against the laws of 1819, 1844, and 1845, is, that they have turned every million for every useful and necessary purpose into a million and a half. That, however, has not been done by fair enterprise, but by a legislative juggle-by a shifting of the numerals. If Sir Robert Peel's fortune was four hundred thousand pounds before 1819, he has legislated it into six hundred thousand pounds by his bills since that period. According to this view of the case the national debt has virtually been increased by four hundred millions. And who have lost by the change? From whose pockets has this immense bonus on capital been extracted? From those, assuredly, whose entire capital is the price of labour in some of the departments wherein by skill or toil men gain from the world leave to live. The contributors to the great loss which industry has sustained by the legislation of Sir Robert Peel are to be met in all circumstances and places. He opposed the ten hours factory bill; and the humblest worker in a manufactory loses something by his currency measures. He opposed the land improvement bills of Ireland, and its peasantry need to lean on England for relief, partly because of his obnoxious prejudice for gold. There is no man so poor who works and earns, from whom some means have not been drawn to increase these accumulations of capital by this device. It has gone down through its agencies to the most wretched places, where the advocate of sanatory reform, or the teacher of religious truth, almost trembles to enter, and abstracted from desperate penury a tax on its farthings. Where the widow's family meet together, in winter nights, when their work is done, by a dim fire, and beside a humble board, this ingeniously shrouded tax, paid by labour to money, enters and pares away a part of their earnings, or adds to their working hours, that it may fling steadily its stones from every field on the cairns of wealth. The steady grinding agency of this power is not its most remarkable mode of taxing the industrious. Its deficiency of stability is its most pernicious characteristic. It wants sobriety and steadiness in its operations. By endeavouring to fix the amount of circulation without the possibility of fixing the work that the circulation has to perform, it necessarily creates and compels the wildest fluctuations. When wheat is 45s. per quarter, it is obvious
On every occasion when his payments exceeded his cash in hand, if he were creditless and compelled to sell his stock, as advertisers say, ninety per cent. under prime cost, at half nothing, at whatever it will bring, or at a costly sacrifice, either his transactions must be miserably circumscribed, or he would sink into ruin. Such, however, is the national policy supported by the money-monopolists; and their object is to bring, as they often bring, bargains to the warehouses of the most extensive capitalists. There are men who only buy in a crisis, just as there are certain fowls that make the greatest noise in a storm; and noxious birds that dine best from a battle-field. We do not propose in this number to discuss those changes that are evidently requisite in the management of the currency. We have confined our observations rather to a statement of some of the evils caused by the present system. The public are only beginning to learn the characteristics of the currency bills that have been passed since 1818. They see only yet in dim outline the injustice and wrong that has been, and is daily being inflicted on them. They have heard repeatedly the necessity inculcated of keeping faith with the public creditor; but they are only beginning to perceive that there is such a thing as keeping faith with the public debtor. They are learning that there may be a want of faith in increasing the nominal value of money, at a period when the public engagements are very large. They are feeling the exceeding absurdity of wasting capital to obtain a circulating medium which presents no advantages over another that might be obtained for one-sixth of the cost. Reluctant as England is to learn from Scotland, yet many
Englishmen perceive that there must be some advantages in the old Scotch mode of transacting Bank business, which gives a trader interest for every ten pounds that he can throw day by day into his bankers: gives thus to every man who receives money a premium on his exertions to reduce the circulating medium, and transacts an amount of business not proportionably inferior to that of England on one half and less than one half of the proportionate circulation.
The importance of currency reform is everywhere admitted. There is a feeling spreading in all quarters that free trade in money is not less essential to the public comfort than free trade in corn, in cotton, in wool, or in any other commodity. The extent of loss caused by the present system is neither ascertained nor ascertainable; but that does not prevent the conviction from spreading, that now, with the Manchester Free Trade League dissolved, we have yet to make our greatest struggle for free trade; and without any body existing to lead the way in seeking commercial reform, we have yet to accomplish our greatest commercial improvements. With the knowledge that this subject was agitating the electors-was introduced into the addresses of candidates for seats in the Legislature was discussed at meetings for reckoning with old members, and meetings for examining new aspirants-was the subject of question and answer, of speech, of promise, and pledge-Sir Robert Peel, the author of the currency acts, and designedly, or otherwise, a large gainer by the currency acts, was guilty, at Tamworth, in July 1847, of deserting his own natural offspring. As a correct historian, he was bound to have mentioned their existence; but he has nothing to say, and he says nothing respecting them. His silence may be more gratifying than his speech could have been. To the existing system there is a darker omen in his studied neglect of the topic, than in his preparation to recede when he last addressed the House of Commons on the subject. There may be some who suppose that, in the composition of this address, Sir Robert Peel remembered distinctly the Dissenters' Chapels' Bill, but had forgotten the Currency acts, and, if they please, so they may continue to suppose. But the exPremier has not a deficient memory.
A considerable portion of Sir Robert Peel's pamphlet is occupied with arguments to show the propriety of endowing the Roman Catholics in Ireland, if any statesman should ever want to take that step. The ex-Premier by no means says that he is to take the initiative. He does not propose to introduce a bill into the first session of next Parliament on the subject, but he argues the case at great length. We can scarcely suppose that Sir Robert Peel enters on this argument entirely with the view of illustrating what he may believe to be an abstract truth. It is by no means likely that he discusses the topics merely as an exercise in logic. For that purpose the proposal to endow Mohammedanism in one section, and Brahmanism in another division of India, would have answered his purpose equally well.
There is no doubt that Sir Robert Peel had a special object to serve in devoting so much space and time to prove the propriety and justice of endowing the priesthood in Ireland. And when Lord John Russell declared in the London tavern to the London electors that "he did not know that any one means to propose such a measure, namely, this endowment, he also must have known that Sir Robert Peel would not be averse to make the proposal. We have no means of ascertaining how far the London electors are satisfied with the Premier and the ex-Premier's statements, but if they are to be included in one administration, as there is reason to believe, we see every ground to expect from Baron Tamworth in the House of Peers, early in 1849, a very elaborate speech terminated by a string of resolutions on the subject.
Sir Robert Peel's principal argument is, that a nation is not in any way committed to the doctrines which it pays for teaching. The fact is consoling, because we as a nation have been committed to everything in the form of a creed, from the immolations of Juggernaut on the Ganges to the consecration of bells on the St. Lawrence. We teach all manner of doctrines. His second | argument is, that we have gone so far in this course already, that there is little reason for stopping now. "In for a penny, in for a pound," is the concentration of his argument on this head. Weendow already Roman Catholics in several colonies, and Unitarians in Ireland; therefore he says there can be no case of conscience for stopping But there is a case of purse. A sum of £200 per anannum for each of 3000 individuals has been estimated by the friends of this policy as necessary for its effectual practice. The estimate is £600,000 per annum-a serious addition to existing burdens.
Between the people and their rulers there is a remarkable difference on this subject. The people have no interest in maintaining church establishments, except for the value they yield in public instruction. Then rulers have an additional interest in the patronage which they produce. The apparent question agitated on every hustings where there is a popular constituency is, "will we endow the Irish priesthood?" but the real question is, "will we maintain the Irish Church?" This is the view taken of the matter by the Roman Catholics of Ireland. They repudiate the endowment, not because a connexion with the State can necessarily be wrong in their estimation, but because they want to bring down the Irish Church. Peel would stake them to the earth like a stock. ade, to defend the Church and its patronage. They prefer to be free, saying or thinking wisely, "You must endow us, or disendow the Church," and we prefer the latter alternative. That is the real nature of the question; and when one set of Liberals talk of applying all the ecclesiastical property of Ireland to State purposes, and yet say that they will support the Established Church in England and Scotland, do they ever reckon how long Voluntaryism will be exclusively practised in Ireland before its adoption in this country? Would they say three years?
IMPENDING REVOLUTION IN THE DEKKAN.
FORMERLY it would have been a task of much difficulty | drabad province, since Nizam ool Moolk became its vir
to interest the public of this country in any of the passing events, however important, of Indian history. Steam has altered all this. It is now possible to excite as deep a solicitude respecting the revolutions and changes of dynasty which take place within the limits of our Asiatic empire, as it is to awaken public sympathy with any other portion of our stupendous dominions. The chain has become visible which connects the Indian Peninsula with Great Britain. The Overland Mail is one of our habitual necessities, so that we could no more do without fortnightly news from Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, than we can, during the sitting of Parliament, without a daily report of its proceedings.
We are, therefore, induced to direct the attention of our readers, very briefly, to what is now taking place, or is likely soon to happen, in one of the greatest provinces of the Dekkan-the dominions of the Nizam of Ilydrabad. The islands of Great Britain and Ireland comprehend an area of about fifty-seven thousand square miles. His Highness the Nizam's territories consist of about ninetyfive thousand square miles, a very large proportion of which has, at different times, been added to the original province of Hydrabad by the generosity of the East India Company. Throughout this extensive kingdom, anarchy, the most complete, prevails at the present moment: the army, increased unnecessarily, but constantly defrauded of its pay, is in a state of open rebellion; the people, oppressed, pillaged, and denied justice, would gladly take up the same position with the army if they dared; while the subsidiary force, supplied to His Highness by the Company, for the purpose of overawing his own troops, and keeping his subjects in reluctant subjection, is in a state of comparative demoralisation, through the concurrence of various causes, which may, perhaps, be hercafter enumerated.
As another mail must arrive before the present article appears, numerous modifications may be introduced into the internal relations of the Hydrabad State. But the experience of a full century warrants us in maintaining, that nothing can prevent its progress from bad to worse but the pensioning of his Highness, and the substitution of British for Native authority throughout the country. If the disorders which have forced us into the adoption of this opinion were of a lingering character, we might hope that a change of men, bringing along with it, also, a change of measures, would stay the progress of dissolution, enable his Ilighness to recover the ground which he has lost, and spare the British Government the painful duty, long deferred, of stepping in to preserve a numerous and once powerful people from something like social extinction.
tual sovereign in 1724, to prove interesting. Most per-
Nevertheless, the founder of the Nizam's power in the Dekkan was a man of remarkable talent, and mental resources. From the moment he determined to fall off from the emperor, which he did rather in compliance with custom, than in consequence of any original political conception of his own, he had to contend with numerous and great difficulties. All the subtlety, power, and wickedness of the Court he saw swayed against him. But we must not thence infer that he himself was either good or powerless. On the contrary, force, in this struggle, was pitted against force, and villany against villany. In the end, the Soubadhar of the Dekkan's wickedness was triumphant. In self-defence partly, and partly through ambition, he sought to escape from the necessity of obedience to the emperor. Another nobleman was appointed to succeed him. An army was sent to reduce him to subjection. He faced the forces of his prince, as he would have done those of a public enemy, in the field; and his proposed successor having fallen into his hands, in consequence of a brilliant victory, he sent back his head to Delhi, as the most striking reply he could offer to the commands of him who had originally made him Soubadhar.
But no one can have studied the history of Hydrabad without being convinced that its disorders are chronic, that they are inherent in the very constitution of the Government, and that, consequently, nothing whatever can heal them while that wretched modification of evil, Nizam ool Moolk having, by successful rebellion, made polity, is suffered to exist. Unfortunately, there is too himself sovereign of the Dekkan, found his throne engreat a sameness in Oriental history for a detailed narra- circled by multiplied and hourly increasing dangers. Extive of the occurrences which have taken place in the Hy-treme old age was fast creeping upon him. One of his
own sons, in obedience to the immemorial practice of the East, took up arms against his authority in 1740, but was, without difficulty, defeated; after which, strange to say, the father spared his life, and not only so, but treated him kindly. An old prince in the East has always what, in nautical phraseology, is denominated a warm berth. Presuming years to be invariably accompanied by weakness, the Mahrattas invaded the Nizam's dominions, but met, from the energetic usurper, with so fierce a reception, that they were exceedingly happy to be permitted to retire within their own borders, and be free from pursuit there.
In 1748, Nizam ool Moolk died at an exceedingly advanced age, leaving behind him twelve children, six sons and six daughters, every one of whom, from the loose order of succession observed in the East, thought immediately of arriving at the crown, the sons in person, the daughters through their male offspring. Nazir Jung, the rebel of 1740, being in the capital at the time of his father's death, was enabled to make the first trial at wielding the sceptre of the Dekkan. Into the contest and disorders which followed, it would be in no way profitable to enter. The series of events was sufficiently intricate, and the crimes perpetrated were of the most startling character; but this in the East constitutes no novelty. The rule is to behold brother warring against brother, and after the death of each successive sovereign, to see the palace deluged with the blood of his family. No class of persons taste less of the happiness of security than they who aspire to the diadem. From the moment they ascend above the level of private life, they become a mark for the shafts of all other men, and are hunted down like so many wild beasts, their own brethren and near relatives almost invariably leading the chace.
It is not, at present, our purpose to dwell on military details, for which reason we have merely glanced at the struggles which the English and French carried on, for so many years, in this part of India. Not that this wild and irregular war was destitute of interest, or that the men, by whom it was carried on, were unendowed with those brilliant qualities which shed a halo around human actions, and command the attention of posterity; but that our object just now is to describe the disorganisation existing in the Nizam's dominions, and to point out some of the causes which would appear to have led to it.
The Company's first direct connexion with the Nizam took place in 1759, when a treaty was concluded, securing peculiar advantages to both parties. But treaties are seldom kept. In private life, when men enter into contracts they usually design to fulfil them, because before making any engagement, they are careful to understand that benefit will accrue to them by keeping their faith. It is not so with princes or states. The intricacies and complexities of public officers are so great that no man or set of men can look forward and ascertain what course it will be for the interest of his country to pursue, when a few years or even months shall have elapsed; and, therefore, however honest may be the intentions with which the parties contracting enter into treaties, it must depend very much on chance whether in the long run their engagements are or are not fulfilled. This is more especially the case in India, where so multiplied and conflicting are the interests, so complicated the relations, so fluctuating and uncertain the characters of states and men; it is altogether impossible to foresee what turn affairs may take in particular conjunctures, and, therefore, it is difficult for human power to preserve unvarying consistency.
This, if properly considered, will explain many of those anomalies in our Asiatic history about which historians declaim to so little purpose. Most of these writers are little acquainted with politics, either in theory or practice. Learned, perhaps, in the records of past times, but unacquainted with mankind, and with the business of existing dates, they reason like rhetoricians, and too often decide like pedants. We must make great allowances for men acting on the spur of the moment, judging of events amid the turmoil of the battle, or in the obscurity of an atmosphere rendered opaque by intrigue and lies.
A remarkable example of this truth was afforded by the successors of this same Nizam ool Moolk, who, discovering the superior daring and vigour of Europeans, took a number of French officers into their pay, and thus originated that practice which has since proved fatal to so many native princes. There in the Dekkan, as in everywhere else, the rivalry between the French and English immediately displayed itself. The British, impatient of the ascendancy which they saw their neighbours acquiring in the Dekkan, strenuously put in practice every art of which they were masters to counteract their policy and overthrow the fabric of their ambition. On the other hand, the French in Southern India, led by a series of able and unscrupulous adventurers, were no less anxious and persevering in their opposition to us; and for a time their supple manners and national aptitude for intrigue secured them a decided superiority. For more than forty years the contest was carried on at every native Court in India. At the outset the advantage was nearly always on the side of the French; their suppleness of manners, which often amounted to cringing servility, recommending them far more strongly to the classes whose minds they sought to wield, than the proud, haughty, and often im-reign has been placed on the throne by any particular practicable character of the English. Energy, however, is power. In the cabinet and in the field, the genius of France retired before that of Great Britain. Our defeats, equally with our victories, inspired us with the indomitable resolution to persevere, till, in the year 1798, we succeeded in annihilating the last remnant of French power in the Dekkan.
In their transactions with the Nizam, the servants of the East India Company often gave proof of more zeal than discretion. They hurried into compacts, they formed alliances, they conducted treaties, they engaged in wars, the final result of which was that the territories of their ally were perpetually augmented, while his capacity for ruling over them appeared to diminish in the same ratio. Probably it will be thought no crime in an Indian prince to devise the overthrow of the British power. We scarcely, therefore, impute that as an offence to any of the successors of Nizam ool Moolk. But when a sove
person or persons-when through the same influence he has long been maintained in that position-when with persevering zeal and fidelity his enemies, internal and external, have been suppressed—when his revenues have been improved, his foreign relations rendered easy, and his whole condition in every way made better-we think that some degree of gratitude will be regarded as pardon