shall be vested in He shall hold his * Constitution, Art. Succession of Cabinet officer 1. The executive power.-The executive power a President of the United States of America. office during the term of four years. * II, sec. 1. 2. Commander in Chief-Cabinet-Pardoning power.-The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States; he may require the 'The Executive Power.-The executive power is vested in a President, and, as far as his powers are derived from the Constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other Department, except in the mode prescribed by the Constitution through the impeaching power. (Kendall v. U. S., 12 Pet., 524, 610; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 166.) Execution of the laws.-The President is required to see that the laws are faithfully executed, but he is not obliged to execute them himself. (IV Opin. Att. Gen., 515; Williams v. U. S., 12 Pet., 524, 610.) The President speaks and acts through the heads of the several Departments in relation to subjects which appertain to their respective duties. (Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet., 498, 513; Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U. S., 755; Runkle v. U. S., 122 U. S., 543, 557.) As a general rule, the direction of the President is presumed in all instructions and orders issuing from the competent Department. (VII Opin. Att. Gen., 453.) In a matter which the law confides to the pure discretion of the Executive, the decision of the President, or proper head of Department, on any question of fact involved is conclusive, and is not subject to review by any other authority in the United States. (VI Opin. Att. Gen., 226 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr., 137, 166.) The President can not be restrained by injunction from executing a law of Congress. (Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall., 475; Bates v. Taylor, 11 S. W. Rep., 266.) Powers as Commander in Chief.-As Commander in Chief he is authorized to direct the movements of the land and naval forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy. He may invade the hostile country and subject it to the sovereignty and authority of the United States. But his conquests do not enlarge the boundaries of this Union, nor extend the operations of our institutions and laws beyond the limits before assigned to them by the legislative power. (Fleming v. Page, 9 How., 603, 615.) The power of command and control reserved by the Crown was placed by the Constitution in the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the Executive Departments upon any subject relating to the duties of their respectice offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. Constitution, Art. II, sec. 2. 3. Term of office. The term of four years for which a President and Vice-President shall be elected shall in all cases commence on the 4th day of March next succeeding the day on which the votes of the electors have been given. Sec. 152, R. S. 4. Succession of Vice President.-In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall hands of the President. (Street v. U. S., 24 Ct. Cls., 230; 25, id., 515, 113, U. S., 299. See also, the chapter entitled The Employment of Military Force.) May form military governments in occupied territory.—As an incident of the exercise of belligerent rights, the President may form military and civil governments in the territory of the enemy occupied by the armies of the United States. (Cross v. Harrison, 16 How., 164, 190, 193. The Grapeshot, 19 Wall., 129, 132.) He may also institute temporary governments within insurgent districts occupied by the national forces. (Texas v. White. 7 Wall., 700, 730.) May establish courts in occupied territory-Limitation.-The courts established or sanctioned in Mexico during the War by the commanders of the United States forces were nothing more than the agents of the military power, to assist it in preserving order in the conquered territory and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and property while it was occupied by the American armies. They were subject to the military power, and their decisions were under its control whenever the commanding officer thought proper to interfere. Neither the President nor any military officer can establish a court in a conquered country and authorize it to decide upon the rights of the United States, or of individuals in prize cases, nor to administer the laws of nations. (Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How., 498, 515. The Grapeshot, 9 Wall., 129, 132.) For authority to employ secret agents in time of war, see Totten v. U. S., 92 U. S., 105, 107. For powers and duties of the Executive in connection with the Army, the Militia, and the Army Regulations, etc., see the chapters so entitled. The constitutional power of the President to command the Army and Navy, and of Congress "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces are distinct; the President can not, by military orders, evade the legislative regulations; Congress can not, by rules and regulations, impair the authority of the President as Commander in Chief. (Swaim v. U. S., 28 Ct. Cls., 173.) When a law is passed for the regulation of the Army which does not impair the efficiency of the President as Commander in Chief, he becomes, as to that law, an executive officer, and is limited in the discharge of his duties by the statute. (McBlair v. U. S., 19 id., 528.) The pardoning power.-A pardon is an act of grace proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court. (U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150, 161; Coke, 3d Inst., 233.) The power which the Constitution confers upon the President to grant pardons can not be controlled or limited, in any manner, by Congress. (Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., 333, 380; U. S. v. Klein. 13 Wall., 128, 147; IV Opin. Att. Gen., 458; 19 id., 476.) Delivery and acceptance.-The pardon is a private though official act. It is official in that it is the act of the Executive; it is private in that it is delivered to the individual and not to the court. It must be pleaded, or brought officially to the knowledge of the court, in order that the court may give it effect in any given case. There is nothing peculiar in it to distinguish it from other acts. devolve on the Vice-President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. Constitution, Art. II, sec. 1, par. 5. 5. Succession of Cabinet Officers.-In case of removal, death, resignation, or inability of both the President and Vice-President of the United States, the Secretary of State, or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of the Treasury, or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the Secretary of War, or if It is a deed to the validity of which delivery is essential, and the delivery is not complete without acceptance. It may be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered, and, if rejected, there is no power in the court to force it upon the individual. (U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150.) Effects. Subject to exceptions therein provided, a pardon by the President restores to its recipient all rights of property lost by the offense pardoned, unless the property has, by judicial process, become vested in other persons. (Osborn v. U. S., 91 U. S., 474; V Opin. Att. Gen., 532.) Power to mitigate and commute.-The President may, by an exercise of the pardoning power, mitigate or commute a punishment imposed by any court of the United States. (Ex parte Wells, 18 How., 307; In re Ross, 140 U. S., 453.) In mitigating the sentence of a naval court-martial the President may substi tute a suspension for a term of years without pay for an absolute dismissal from the service, as suspension is but an inferior degree of the same punishment. (I Opin. Att. Gen., 433.) Conditional pardons.-The language of the Constitution is such that the power of the President to pardon conditionally is not one of inference, but is conferred in terms, the language being "to grant reprieves and pardons," which includes absolute as well as conditional pardons. Under this power the President can grant a conditional pardon to a person under sentence of death, offering to commute that punishment into an imprisonment for life. If this is accepted by the convict he has no right to contend that the pardon is absolute and the condition of it void. (Ex parte Wells, 18 How., 307; Osborn v. U. S., 91 U. S., 474; U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150.) When a pardon is granted with conditions annexed the conditions must be performed before the pardon is of any effect. (Waring v. U. S., 7 Ct, Cls., 501.) One who claims the benefit of a pardon must be held to strict compliance with its conditions. (Haym v. U. S., 7 Ct. Cls., 443; Scott v. U. S., 8 id., 457.) The condition annexed to a pardon must not be impossible, unusual, or illegal; but it may, with the consent of the prisoner, be any punishment recognized by the statutes or by the common law as enforced by the State. (Lee v. Murphy, 22 Grat. (Va.), 789.) Time of exercise. The President of the United States has the conditional power to pardon as well before trial and conviction as afterwards; but it is a power only to be exercised with reserve and for exceptional considerations. (VI Opin. Att. Gen., 20; 1 id., 341; 2 id., 275; 5 id., 687; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., 333; Dominick v. Davidson, 44 Ga., 457; 5 Blair v. Com., 25 Grat. (Va.), 850.) It is competent for the President to grant a pardon after the expiration of the term of sentence, thereby relieving from consequential disabilities. (Stetler's case, 1 Phil., IX, 38; Com. v. Bush, 2 Duv. (Ky.), 264.) The loss of rights of citizenship does not attach to those deserting the military or naval service in time of peace, after August 22, 1912. (37 Stat. 356.) For this act see page 1052. Limitation upon the pardoning power.-The Constitution gives to Congress the power to dispose of the public property and to the President only the power to pardon crimes; and the President, having no title to forfeited property, can not restore it, though he may pardon the offense which caused the forfeiture. Property confiscated by judgment to the United States is beyond |