That it would be possible to hear a destroyer making 18 knots at a distance of about 16 miles under most favorable listening conditions, with the listening apparatus installed, but that conditions at Provincetown were far from favorable. Rough weather, character of bottom, speed of submarine, etc., sometimes make detection of propeller sounds practically impossible. That the approximate heading of a submarine submerged with two periscopes showing can not be estimated very closely. That about the only thing to be distinguished about a submarine submerged with periscopes out is the feather or wake made by the periscope as it comes through the water at the surface. He believes it is always the practice of submarine officers to keep a lookout all around the horizon while running at periscope depth and that it is taught throughout the submarine service that the greatest danger is the possibility of a collision while running submerged. That from his personal acquaintance with the commanding officer of the S-4, Lieut. Commander R. K. Jones, he considered him to be very cautious and careful, and at times overly cautious in the performance of duty.

That it is absolutely necessary for the person controlling the movements of a submarine, in order to avoid collision, to have some idea of the course and speed of the other vessel. He read from the Atlantic Coast Pilot Chart for January, 19128, a legend as follows:

"United States submarine warning and submarine distiniguishing and warning flag is hoisted on the tender of parent ship of United States submarines to indicate that_submarines are operating in that vicinity, which consists of a rectangular red flag with white center on which is a profile of a torpedo in black. Launches accompanying submarines also fly this flag. Vessels seeing this signal should give such vessels a wide berth and keep on lookout for submarines."

The witness stated that the practice of flying this flag does not now prevail when a submarine is operating independently. That the S-8 on her trials sent out only a radio to the Navy Department at Washington indicating her arrival at Provincetown. That when running the trials on S-8 he swept the whole horizon with the periscope on an average of once a minute and that he was looking ahead and on each bow two-thirds of the time. That the trial course under consideration is in the fairway for vessels entering Provincetown. That Provincetown is not a steamer lane as he understands it.

That the trial officer, Lieutenant Commander Callaway, had told him that Provincetown was the best range on the coast. That the trial range at Provincetown he considers to be the safest and most satisfactory place to conduct trials on submarines. That since the war submarines have improved greatly in allaround efficiency and ability to take care of themselves and that since that time the submarine warning flag has not been used.

That the Submarine Manual places a high degree of responsibility on a submarine and her commanding officer. It is entirely his responsibility as to how he handles his boat. That there is no need for a vessel to pass close to the range buoys to enter Provincetown Harbor. He believed that in the case of the S-4 had she carried soda-lime the period of life of the crew would only have been extended three to five hours longer.

Commander E. W. Strother, United States Navy, commanding submarine division 12, of which the S-4 was a unit, was called as a witness. He stated that his flagship was the tender Bushnell, which was in Portsmouth Navy Yard at the time of the accident. That he had been in command of the division about a year and a half. That the S-4 had just completed an overhaul and repair period at Portsmouth the day before her trials and was in first-class material condition. That he has inspected the S-4 a number of times and found her well administered and her commanding officer to be excellent and very careful. That there were four officers attached to the S-4, namely, Lieut. Commander R. K. Jones, commanding officer; Lieut. J. A. McGinley, executive officer and navigator; Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Weller, chief engineer; and Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Fitch, torpedo officer. That the station of the commanding officer would normally be at the periscope. That the executive officer and the chief engineer would be in the control room and that the torpedo officer would be in the torpedo room. That on December 17 the Bushnell was in Portsmouth Navy Yard with three of her submarines administering to their needs.

That the trial course at Provincetown is not in a steamer lane and that there is a general absence of ships there. That it is a favorable location for a trial course. That he considered it would probably be more pleasant to hold trials in warm weather and in warm water but that submarines do not operate always under ideal conditions and in training for war service, the waters in which the submarine operates can not be fixed. That it is endeavored in handling and

operating submarines to operate them in all kinds of weather during all times of the year. That the submarines at the school at New London operate all the year around except when the river is so full of ice that they can not go out to dive. That the tests which the S-4 was holding at Provincetown were not being made under any unusual operating conditions. He gave the story of what happened on the Bushnell, upon receiving word of the accident Saturday afternoon. That he was ashore and was gotten by telephone about 5 o'clock. A hurried conference between the commandant and the various officers in authority at Portsmouth outlined what they thought should be done while the Bushnell was getting up steam and preparing to leave for Provincetown. All available divers were assembled with diving gear. The tug Wandank was called by radio and ordered to drag for the S-4. The S-8 was called by radio and told to return to Provincetown. The Bushnell left Portsmouth at 7 p. m., having on board special equipment and officers from the navy yard and from other craft there. Commander Saunders, Construction Corps, who is an expert on rescue and salvage work, also in the design of submarines was on the Bushnell. She arrived at Provincetown at 1.15 a. m., Sunday. Having used the radio considerably en route, had a conference upon arrival, with the commanding officers of the Wandank, S-8, destroyer Paulding, and Coast Guard boat which had been watching the position where the S-4 sank.

The seas were so heavy upon arrival at Provincetown that the Bushnell could not lower a boat and had to go inside the harbor to hold a conference.

The Coast Guard shore boat continued to drag all night with grapnels. She got the S-4 once but lost her again. This was the only boat that could operate outside the range that night. Buoys had been placed in the evening close to the wreck. When the Falcon arrived bringing Admiral Brumby, the commander of the force, about 7 a. m., he took charge of the situation. The scene of the accident during the night was being covered by searchlights from mine sweepers Lark and Mallard which vessels, with the S-8, remained at anchor in the vicinity of the wreck.

The S-8 reported she could hear nothing from the S-4 during the night and that at daylight when the Bushnell proceeded to the wreck they had still heard nothing. About two o'clock Sunday afternoon when the first diver went down, the S-8 reported that she heard distinct tappings from the S-4.

The Bushnell did not have on board divers qualified for the depth of water in question. The Falcon had such divers and proper equipment.

The Bushnell remained at Provincetown all during the rescue and salvage work, close to the wreck, and acted as a depot, supply and repair ship for the force engaged in the work. The S-4 had been in commission since 1919. If the Bushnell had gone to Provincetown with the S-4 she would have remained in the harbor during the trial and acted as a place for the Board of Inspection to work from and in which to live. If she had gone to Provincetown with the S-4 she could not have done the work she was to do for the other submarines in Portsmouth. There were six submarines attached to the Bushnell. The tender can not be with them all during their operations. He stated as an example how impracticable it would be for a tender to be with any submarine that was operating since at New London when the division was diving during the fall each boat had a different area to work in, the area covering many square miles. He explained the difference between a tender and a rescue ship.

It is frequently the case that a submarine may have two or more officers attached to her, qualified to command the vessel. All submarine officers are graduated from the Submarine School and are able to perform and practice all different duties on board. The S-4 had two officers qualified to command and another one who was to have qualified very soon. Other trial courses he had been familiar with were in traffic lanes such as the one near San Pedro, Calif. In operation with the fleet, the submarines operated independently or in groups. of two or three boats in a section, and that during this time the mother ship or tender was stationed probably 40 to 50 miles away. The submarines did not see her from the time they left for the maneuver until they returned some days later.

When the S-4 left the Portsmouth Navy Yard on December 16 she had no items of work uncompleted which had to do with the safety of the vessel.

Lieut. Commander Leroy Reinburg, United States Coast Guard was called as a witness and stated that

He was commander of division 3 of the Coast Guard destroyer force, operating in New England waters. The Paulding was one of the ships of his division. He told the court the duties of the Coast Guard destroyers in their normal work.

The duties were numerous and that prevention of smuggling and rum-running was included.

The individual destroyers work in certain areas in accordance with orders given just previous to their sailing from port and inspect all shipping they see or suspicion. They steam at reasonably high speed in order to cover the territory in a reasonable time and that 20 knots is about the average speed for his destroyers on this duty. The Paulding was assigned an area which took in all of Massachusetts Bay and the shore of Cape Cod. There were four other destroyers of the division at sea the day of the accident. The area assigned was to be covered in one day. A vessel which was known to be a notorious offender had been seen in the vicinity of Cape Cod a short time before and if the Paulding had steamed at a low speed such as 10 knots he would not have finished covering his area on that day as ordered.

The commanding officer of the Paulding has served in the division under his command for three years and has performed his duties in an excellent manner. He considers the commanding officer of the Paulding to be one of the best seamen in the Coast Guard and was commended last winter for some rescue work in a northeast gale.

The Coast Guard Regulations require the commanding officer to maintain proper lookouts and the custom is to have on the bridge, while under way, one commissioned officer, a chief petty officer, a quartermaster, a lookout and a man at the wheel and that at times when maximum visibility prevails, the station of the man on lookout is aloft in the crows nest. On the day of the accident he had the lookout on his ship, inside the screens, on the bridge on account of it being a very cold day and a rather high wind.

He stated that he had been operating around Boston for 34 months and did not know that submarines were operating in the waters around Provincetown submerged. He has seen them in that area but always on the surface. He has never seen submarines in this area submerged. He has seen them submerged around New London. He understands that the area around New London is a submarine area and expects to see them there. He has never discussed the question of submarines with his officers. He has heard of submarines operating on the surface unaccompanied by a mother ship. He is familiar with the chart of Provincetown Harbor and the fact that the measured mile exists there for the use of the Navy.

Mr. Edward Ellsberg, chief engineer of the Tidewater Oil Co. of New York, was called as a witness. He stated that

He had previously been a lieutenant commander, Construction Corps, United States Navy, and as such had been in charge of the salvage work on the S-51 and that immediately upon hearing of the accident to the S-4, had volunteered his services and had enrolled in the Naval Reserve on December 18 and proceeded immediately to Provincetown.

He told the court of his duties in connection with raising the S-51, which was a similar job to the one on the S-4. He was actually in charge of the operations on the S-51 and received letters of commendation and the distinguished service medal for his work in connection therewith.

The submarine is a type peculiar to the Navy and has no place in the merchant marine. The salvage operations in connection with them are peculiar to the Navy. A study of the problem in this country and abroad shows definitely that there is no salvage company that could do the work that is required for raising submarines at sea and in this country in particular, no commercial salvage concern has had any such experience. No commercial concern has any equipment that is adaptable to submarines outside of harbor waters.

In the case of the S-51 a certain commercial company bid on the job and included in the contract that they wrote up that the Navy must furnish all equipment and that all the company would furnish was one tugboat, four divers, and wreck master.

One commercial concern worked on the S-51 job the first week but they were unable to do anything. As a result of their experience they came to the conclusion that if they attempted the job they could not use the equipment they had and desired the Navy to obtain the equipment for them. Their need and use for such equipment was so rare that they would get no adequate return from it on other jobs. They had four divers, only one of whom had previously gone down to the depth in which the S-51 lay (120 feet).

Navy divers have considerable advantage over commercial divers in that they are usually torpedo men or machinist mates by trade and understand naval vessels. Nearly all of our divers have served on board submarines and are

acquainted with these particular vessels. They also have a much higher average of intelligence and can be trusted to look out for themselves and use initiative. He has met very few divers in civil life who are in that same class.

He stated that he was familiar with the art of deep-sea diving and had made a study of it. He had learned to dive in deep water on the S-51 job. He had carefully studied the record of every submarine sinking of every navy in the world that was available. He had written for publication by the Navy Department a full report of the salvage operations on the S-51. He is thoroughly familiar with all salvage and rescue devices on our submarines.

He arrived at Provincetown on a destroyer from the Boston Navy Yard Sunday night and was with some difficulty gotten on board the Falcon by means of the Coast Guard lifeboat, which was the only boat able to live in the seas at that time. The Falcon was at this time moored over the wreck and had had divers down Sunday afternoon and evening. At the time he got on board Diver Michaels was unconscious and in the compression chamber. Weather conditions were at that time decidedly too bad for diving to be attempted. Early Monday morning Michaels was still very weak and the weather not improved; in fact diving was quite out of the question. Admiral Brumby, on the advice of the doctor and other officers, decided to take Michaels to Boston with the Falcon in order to save his life and return to Provincetown the same evening. He learned the conditions as found by the divers on the S-4 and that there were signs of life in the torpedo

room.

He heartily agreed with Admiral Brumby, Captain King, Commander Saunders, and Lieutenant Hartley of the Falcon in the decision to try to lift the whole boat first by means of blowing the ballast tanks. There was a chance to bring the submarine to the surface, which in the end was the only possible way to get any men out of her alive. He gives considerable testimony concerning valves, air lines for salvage and rescue purposes; also the qualifications of the divers, their training, care, etc., also the story of the divers in their remarkable work on the S-4, the very bad conditions with which they had to contend, etc., a complete story of the operations on the S-4 during the first week or so, and the reasons therefor.

He explained carefully, the reasons for every move made, including the consideration of all sorts of ideas and schemes; states that tunnels were started for passing chains under the bow on Thursday forenoon; gives considerable data regarding facilities of commercial salvage companies and how they compare with the equipment owned by the Navy; states that in commercial savlage work there is never any element of rescue involved; that in cases of marine disaster, rescue operations such as apply to submarines do not similarly occur in merchant vessels. He gives reasons why this is the case, and why a submarine is the only type of vessel which can sink and still have people alive in her; that Navy personnel furnishes the most efficient facilities for rescue operations in the case of submarine disaster; gives the facilities and provisions the Navy, makes for training divers and keeping submarine rescue equipment on hand. That the efficiency of a first class diver in 100 feet of water as to doing work is from 0 to 25 per cent of what he could do on the surface. That the divers who are engaged in the operations on the S-4 represent the best diving efficiency in the country at this time. That all of the equipment that was available was delivered at Provincetown as soon as physical conditions permitted. As to the promptness of the initiation of rescue operations after the accident he says, "I carefully examined all of the messages, letters and reports that were sent in connection with this accident, and in my judgment very speedy action was taken to mobilize and send to that point all the ships and material that would have been of the slightest benefit." He tells about the use of pontoons for rescue and salvage work; that pontoons arrived at Provincetown long before they were actually needed.

He tells at great length about the details of a diver's work in deep water, his equipment, etc.; how long divers can stay down; how many can be used at a time, etc.; how the rescue vessel Falcon is used in connection with this sort of work. He states that people in this country whether in or out of the Navy who know most about salvage and rescue work, and who were most competent were all on the scene of the disaster before he got there, that is Sunday night. He compares the adequacy of rescue and salvage devices and equipment belonging to the United States Navy with that of other navies. Discusses salvage ships; that is, vessels designed to lift sunken submarines by means of cranes or other mechanical means such as the German vessel Vulcan; discusses all sorts of safety devices, such as lifting eyes, rescue helmets, telephone marker buoys, etc. He states that no submarine of any nation in the world sunk in such a depth of water has been

raised by the efforts of her own crew, except the cases where the submarine was undamaged; that there is no vessel better qualified for rescue and salvage work than the Falcom; that the rescue operations at Provincetown were dependent to a great extent totally upon the Falcon; that the Falcon arrived on the scene of the disaster promptly; that the leading salvage company in the United States is the Merritt, Chapman & Scott Co. of New York; that the most effective way of salvaging submarines is by pontoons; that a vessel of about the size of the Falcon is the best type for rescue vessels in submarine work.

Lieutenant Commander Bayliss, commanding officer of the destroyer Paulding, and an interested party to the proceedings, took the stand at his own request, and was shortly afterwards named as a defendant; stated that he had been going to sea since 1902 in sailing vessels and various merchant ships, and has been in command of vessels since 1919; has been in the Coast Guard since 1907; that no limits were placed upon him as to the speed of his ship while on patrol duty in Massachusetts Bay. He stated that on the afternoon of the accident, as it was getting a little late, he considered 18 knots necessary to cover his area before dark; gave a summary of his duties while patrolling, the size of his crew, and the duties of the individuals on board. He stated that it is required by law to have a lookout at night, but that a lookout is not required during the day; that there was no lookout on this day assigned as such; that the visibility was good; that it was overcast and blowing freshly from the northwest. The sea outside was quite rough and that inside there were considerable number of whitecaps. He gave all the details of the accident as he saw them from the bridge of the Paulding, and the measures that were taken to buoy the spot afterwards, also regarding the distress signals which he sent out immediately; says he is not familiar with submarines and he has seen very few of them operating along our coast; that after lowering a boat the Paulding proceeded into the harbor, since she was leaking very badly; says that the weather for a couple of days after the accident continued very bad, making boating practically impossible; that the Paulding had a draft forward of 10 feet 4 inches and aft 9 feet 10 inches.

Rear Admiral L. A. Bostwick, United States Navy, president of the board of of inspection and survey, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., was called as a witness. Lieut. Commander W. F. Calloway, who lost his life on the S-4, was a member of the above board of inspection and survey, and was carrying out the standardization trials under the direction of Admiral Bostwick. The witness gave the duties of Lieutenant Commander Calloway in connection with this work; showed the orders from the Navy Department under which the board was operating; gave the status of Mr. Ford, a civilian draftsman, assistant to Lieutenant Commander Calloway, and who also lost his life in this accident; gave the previous service and record of Lieutenant Commander Calloway, showing that this officer was an experienced submarine officer; showing the order under which the tug Wandank was operating, under the direction of Lieutenant Commander Calloway; states that had Lieutenant Commander Calloway desired the Wandank to act as station ship off Provincetown while S-4 was conducting her trials, he could have so directed her, states that the seasons of the year has little or nothing to do with the standardization trials on the Provincetown course; that the records show the standardization trials of 49 submarines which have been held in this place distributed over the various months of the year; that training in the Navy is not limited to any particular time of year or any particular kind of weather. In his judgment Provincetown is not in a sea lane; that the particular trials course in question is considered to be probably the most desirable course we have for submarines and small vessels. In his opinion the trials held by the S-4 did not require submergence below periscope depth, and that the submarines should have clear view of the horizon at all times. He explained what these standardization trials are and why it is necessary to hold them.

Ensign G. M. Phannanmiller, United States Coast Guard destroyer Paulding, was called as a witness. This officer was the officer of the deck at the time of the collision. He states that he has had three years' and eight months' service in the Coast Guard, was at the Coast Guard Academy three years, and was then assigned to the Paulding, February, 1928. He says that he has had considerable experience as deck officer when cruising at 18 knots.

That he had seen one submarine off Cape Cod during this time and off New London. That he had never seen submarines in submerged condition with periscope showing. He had received no special instructions regarding submarines. Says he knows the general appearance of a submarine and also the appearance of a periscope. Says that if he saw a submarine operating submerged at periscope depth he would not know instinctively what it was, but that he would know after looking at it for a second.