The practice with all seafaring people is to expect a warning of that nature. All people that go to sea have no other warning. Senator ODDIE. You are familiar with the buoy list? Commander BAYLIS. Yes. Senator ODDIE. And the buoy list gave notice that these buoys were used to mark a trial course for the Navy? Commander BAYLIS. Yes, sir. Senator ODDIE. Was not that notice that they might have been used by submarines? Commander BAYLIS. Yes; it states that they are submarine trial buoys. Senator ODDIE. Under the circumstances, would it not have been likely that a submarine might have been operating there submerged? Commander BAYLIS. It would indicate that this trial course was used by submarines, but it would not be any indication that they were operating submerged, unattended, unless notice had been given. We have received notice of submarines operating south of Montauk, and have been requested to keep clear of those areas. Of course, New London is a submarine base, and they operate there frequently. But if this was a test course, as I understand it, it seems only the right thing to do that a warning of some kind must be displayed; because this is a harbor of refuge, it is used by coasting vessels, and may be used by foreigners, etc., who would not have that information; and they are accustomed to receive these warnings. This accident-which I interpret to be just fate-could have happened to you or to a foreign ship that came in, or any vessel at all who would have had no warning whatever. Senator ODDIE. That completes my questions. I do not think there is anything further. Have you anything that you would like to put in the record? Mr. CUNNINGHAM. No, sir. Senator ODDIE. Will you get for the record the data I asked you for? Commander BAYLIS. Yes, sir. Senator ODDIE. The committee thanks you, Commander Baylis, for coming before us and giving this testimony. Commander Hoover, you have some data that the committee has requested you to secure. Commander HOOVER. Yes, sir. Senator ODDIE. I will ask you to put that in the record now. STATEMENT OF COMMANDER J. H. HOOVER, UNITED STATES NAVY-Resumed Commander HOOVER. The committee has asked that I submit certain official correspondence relating to the S-4 disaster and in connection with further criticisms of the Navy, made by Representative Griffin, of New York. The letters in question are as follows: CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS, NAVY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, House of Representatives. MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The inclosures deal with criticisms of the Navy with respect to submarine safety, rescue, and salvage appliances sent by Representative Griffin, of New York, to your committee members. Special reference is made to the S-4 disaster, the inference being that had the S-4 been equipped with all of the devices mentioned and had the Navy owned salvage or lifting vessels such as those in Germany had at the end of the war, the results of the collision between the S-4 and Paulding would have been quite different. The most important result to be desired is the saving of lives. The Navy Department believes this to have been problematical in the extreme in this case and testimony by the country's best talent before the Senate Committee for Investigation of the S-4 disaster now in session brings out conclusively that no safety devices nor salvage apparatus known to be of practicable use anywhere in the world would have saved a single life under the conditions obtaining at Provincetown at the time of the accident and succeeding days. The Navy Department feels that Mr. Griffin has drawn erroneous conclusions from the replies to his questionnaire received from our naval attaches abroad. It may be of interest to discuss briefly the items he mentions in the inclosed letter: (a) Germany has no submarines; nor has she had any since 1918. The statement that many of her submarines were fitted with lifting eyes before the war signifies little. We, too, had submarines fitted with lifting eyes. The vessels at that time were small and the whole problem quite different from what it is to-day. Both of the German salvage vessels referred to were destroyed after the war, being considered to be of insufficient value to the Allies to warrant retention. We favor the combination of a rescue and salvage vessel, equipped with the most modern diving apparatus and specially trained divers. The vessel is also fitted to handle pontoons with which a damaged submarine of any size can be raised, we believe, more quickly and efficiently than by any other means. It is significant that the British have no lifting vessels; nor does France contemplate building any more craft of this description; this in face of the fact that she has submarines much heavier than the capacity of her largest "lifting dock." The reason for the evidenced lack of faith in this method of submarine salvage lies in the inability to use a surface lifting vessel for handling such heavy weights in anything but sheltered and absolutely still water. (b) The separate compartment air inlets reported by the British, we believe, refers to their new submarines. Recent United States submarines also have these fittings, and they are likewise to be installed in older types in the near future. (c) The telephone buoys reported as being in use by the French and Italian Navies were also used by United States submarines at one time. Their use was discontinued, however, upon recommendation from the submarine personnel afloat. Our experience in the use of these buoys has led us to the conclusion that in order to be theoretically effective there should be one in each compartment of the submarine (six or more), and that since the chances of their being of any practicable important use are so remote, we are not justified in sacrificing the large amount of valuable space and weight they would occupy in our submarines to the necessary exclusion or reduction of other more important material or military features. (d) Automatic or self-contained diving apparatus is available for use in United States submarines, though to date its practicable application for submarine rescue work in deep water has not been satisfactorily demonstrated. Exhaustive research has been carried on for some time in this connection, and some recent results seem to indicate that we may yet find a reasonably safe method whereby entrapped personnel may be enabled to escape from a submarine at considerable depth. The exit locks for escape purposes reported by the Italians to be installed in their new construction are also fitted to the more modern United States submarines and will, of course, be continued in our new construction. In regard to the S-4 (and this applies equally to almost all of our present submarines), it must be borne in mind that she was designed in 1916. Methods of construction and devices which are commonplace to-day were not known at that time. Unlike a surface ship, very little of importance can be done to improve or change a submarine after it is once built. Again the S-4 was not of sufficient size to have incorporated in her all the appliances which are easily installed in newer and larger vessels. Consequently, it is unreasonable and unfair to class such old vessels with new construction and by comparisons deduced criticise the Navy's submarine activities and design. Sincerely yours, C. D. WILBUR. Hon. CURTIS D. WILBUR, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Doubtless you have all of the information contained in the letter inclosed herewith from Congressman Griffin, anent safety devices for submarines, but it occurred to me that you might be interested to glance at what he is apparently sending to all members of our House Naval Affairs Committee. Sincerely yours, A. PIATT ANDREW. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MY DEAR COLLEAGUE: I address you as a member of the committee on submarines of the House Naval Affairs Čommittee. If you have not read my remarks in the Congressional Record of May 17 on pages 9276-79, I would deem it an honor if you would do so at your earliest convenience. I think you will be interested in the subject because I included a questionnaire, which I forwarded, through the courtesy of the State Department, to our naval attaches in Berlin, London, Paris, and Rome, with the replies thereto, showing that the foreign navies are better equipped with submarine safety devices than our own, thus confirming my charges made at the time of the S-4 disaster. The German Navy, for instance, equips its submarines with grappling rings, marker buoys, air inlets and diving chambers, and further has built two salvage vessels with a lifting capacity of 1,200 tons. If we had such a vessel the S-4 could have been lifted bodily, as her dead weight was 1,000 tons. You will recall that she was actually lifted with six pontoons having a lifting capacity of 480 tons. In the British Navy we find the British submarines are equipped with a separate salvage air inlet to each compartment. The French submarines are equipped with telephone buoys and a separate air inlet for each compartment. In addition to that they have folding life boats and automatic diving apparatus. The French Navy has three lifting or salvage docks with a lifting capacity of from 500 to 1,000 tons. In the Italian Navy all sumarines of new construction will have two teleopone signal buoys, one at the bow and the other at the stern. Each compartment is provided with separate air inlets and two exit locks for the escape of the crew, one at the bow and the other at the stern. Even the turret is so constructed as to serve as an exit lock. I will appreciate it if you will be good enough to cooperate and use your influence to have some action taken on the Butler resolution before the adjournment of Congress. With best wishes, ANTHONY J. GRIFFIN. The committee has also asked me to give them a little more information about the pontoon situation. As I stated previously, we are to have five sets of pontoons, one situated on the Atlantic coast, one in the Canal Zone, one on the Pacific coast, one in the Hawaiian Islands, and one in the Philippines. Each set consists of 10 pontoons of 80 tons lifting capacity each. The question was asked as to why only one set was assigned to the Atlantic coast, and what we expected to do should a V boat sink, which is of two or three thousand tons displacement, and what we expected to do should two submarines sink at the same time. In answer to these questions I will say that Admiral Hughes authorizes me to inform the committee that the department does not feel justified in recommending the building of any more pontoons than stated above. Each set costs between $150,000 and $200,000. With each set there is a rescue and salvage vessel, which also is a matter of considerable expense. Regardless of the amount of money available, the department would not recommend the providing of any more of this equipment at this time. Constant improvements in submarines will, it is hoped, enable them to better avoid casualties, and take care of casualties should they occur. In the V boats we have so many more compartments and appliances for the use of the crew, which should enable them to maintain considerable buoyancy within the boat. The remaining weight would be handled by the pontoons. The department feels that it can not logically provide for every conceivable combination of circumstances, and that the pontoons and rescue vessels now under way will fulfill our needs in this regard to a reasonable extent for some time to come. The committee has asked that data be placed in the record regarding the amount that the trial course at Provincetown has been used by submarines in the past two or three years. Data on file in the Navy Department indicate that for the two and a half years preceding the S-4 collision, submarines were actually using the standardization course on about 55 separate days, and that they were operating in and out of Provincetown on other trials and tests for about 38 days more. Thus, as far as we can determine, there have been submarines operating out of Provincetown on trials about 10 per cent of the time. The committee desires some information in regard to soda lime in submarines, and as to its efficiency in prolonging life. Expert witnesses before the naval court of inquiry testified that concerning the six men in the torpedo room, had they remained quiet they would, in the normal amount of air contained therein, have lived between 65 and 72 hours. From the time of the accident until the last signals were heard from these men, about 72 hours elapsed. In regard to the men entrapped in the engine and motor room, under the conditions as stated above, they should have lived about 38 hours. Some points brought out in connection with the use of soda lime and oxygen may be of interest. Without soda lime to purify the air— that is remove the CO2 from the air-oxygen is without value. The effects of CO2 are doubled if the pressure in the compartment is doubled. About 10 per cent by volume is a lethal amount of CO2 in the air; that with 100 pounds of soda lime properly used in the torpedo room of the S-4 the six men might have lived 33 hours longer. The naval court found that the allowance list of the S-4 provides for 50 pounds of soda lime per man, and that it was available for issue at the navy yard, Portsmouth, from which the S-4 departed but two days before the collision; but that because of its strong corrosive effect and the difficulty of stowing it on submarines, mostly for emergencies, the value of such large quantities is considered by many submarines officers to be outweighed by its objectionable features; that the use of soda lime was developed as a war need, where submarines went on a station or patrol, and were forced to remain submerged for many hours for safety. By the use of soda lime they could remain down for several hours longer. Soda lime is primarily a war allowance. A rescue allowance is indeterminable; 104672-28--21 that there were no evidences of soda lime having been on board the S-4, and it is believed that she carried none at the time of the accident. The committee has expressed a desire to know why and under what circumstances the Secretary of the Navy reversed the decisions of the court of inquiry in regard to the responsibility of Lieut. Commander R. K. Jones and the blame attached to Rear Admiral F. H. Brumby. The court found as follows: The court finds that the commanding officer of the United States submarine S-4, the late Commander R. K. Jones, United States Navy, and the commanding officer of the United States Coast Guard destroyer Paulding, Lieut. Commander John S. Baylis, United States Coast Guard, are jointly responsible for the collision between the Paulding and the S-4, and that serious blame was incurred by them. Rear Admiral Frank H. Brumby, United States Navy, has been in command of the control force, including all submarines in the Atlantic, since August 1, 1927, and was in command of the forces employed in rescue operations on the S-4 from December 18, 1927, until such operations were discontinued. Rear Admiral Frank H. Brumby's testimony before this court showed that he had not the familiarity with the essential details of construction of submarines and the knowledge of rescue vessels, and the knowledge of the actual work being carried on by his subordinates necessary to direct intelligently the important operations of which he was in charge. While the plans he approved, conceived by an expert staff of which Captain King was the senior, were logical, intelligent, and were diligently executed with good judgment and the greatest possible expedition, yet Rear Admiral Brumby failed to contribute that superior and intelligent guidance, force and sound judgement expected from an officer of his length of service, experience and position. The court therefore recommends that Rear Admiral Frank H. Brumby, United States Navy, be detached from the command of the control force. That the late Lieut. Commander R. K. Jones, United States Navy, was the regularly ordered commanding officer of the S-4. He was seen by the commandofficer of the Wandank shortly after the S-4 started to make the standardization run on the afternoon of the collision; and had anything occurred during the trials to incapacitate the commanding officer for the active command of the S-4 it is probable that the submerged trials would have been immediately suspended. That when found by the divers the body of Lieut. Commander R. K. Jones, free from injury, was found nearest the control bulkhead. This is the point from which the danger was most threatening, and therefore the post that the commanding officer would occupy. All available evidence showed that the late Lieutenant Commander Jones was actively in command of the S-4 at the time of the collision. There was no evidence to the contrary. That the evidence further shows that the Paulding must have been in range or view of the periscope of the S-4 for at least six minutes before the collision; that under both the rules of the road and the submarine doctrine, it was obviously the duty of the commanding officer of the S-4 to keep clear of the Paulding. The fact of the collision shows that he did not dicharge his duty in this respect. There was no evidence before the court to indicate any responsibility for the collision on the part of any officer or man on the S-4 except the commanding officer. The evidence before the court, direct, presumptive, and circumstantial, was sufficient in its opinion to fix responsibility for the collision upon the commanding officer of the S-4, the late Lieut. Commander R. K. Jones. A general finding by the court that the responsibility for the collision rested upon the S-4 rather than upon any individual on that ship, thereby necessarily distributing the responsibility throughout all of its officers and men, or that no one on the S-4 was responsible for the collision, would have been contrary to the evidence, and an evasion by the court of the duty with which it was charged under its orders. In regard to Rear Admiral Frank H. Brumby, United States Navy, the court states that after careful consideration of testimony given before the court by Rear Admiral Frank H. Brumby, United States Navy, the court was of the opinion that his testimony showed that he had not the familiarity with the essential details of construction of submarines and the knowledge of rescue vessels and the knowledge of the actual work being carried on by his subordinates, necessary to direct intelligently the important operations of which he was in charge. |