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Commander HOOVER. It was. Senator ODDIE. So that would not have been available, because the men in that compartment were drowned immediately?

Commander HOOVER. In this case it would not have been avail


Senator ODDIE. It would not have been available in this case. because that compartment was flooded and the men were drowned immediately.

Commander HOOVER. On each of the larger submarines we have three or more of these hatches or escape chambers.

Senator ODDIE. Of the later type?

Commander HOOVER. Of the V class. It is not considered to be feasible to put any more of these chambers on the small submarines. Mr. Griffin goes on with his questionnaire as follows:

(5) Whether or not submarines are provided with releasable rafts, boats, or chambers by which the crew can escape.

(6) Whether or not a diving helmet, or diving apparatus, known as the Draeger diving rescuer, or any similar device is adopted.

(7) Whether or not there is at the present time, or in contemplation, salvage vessels of the catamaran type by means of which a submarine can be lifted from the bottom.

(8) If such vessels are in commission, please state their tonnage, their length, and their lifting capacity.

(9) It will be appreciated if you will mention any instance when, and the circumstances under which, such vessels were put to use, and whether they proved effective, giving the tonnage and the net lift or weight of the vessels involved.

The embassy in Berlin replied as follows in answer to the above questions:

(1) In peace times grappling rings, eyelets, or shackles were attached to the hulls of most of the submarines. During the war they were removed from many on account of the additional weight.

(2) Such buoys were employed on the submarines in peace times and were part of the normal installation. During the war they were firmly secured so as to prevent their becoming loose and thus disclosing the position of the submarine to an enemy ship.

(3) Air inlets could not be installed for each compartment of the submarine, but on the later submarines there was an air inlet in the forward compartment, the midship compartment and the after compartment all well separated. These air inlets had cocks which could be operated both from the interior and the exterior of the hull.

(4) An air chamber was provided in the larger submarines, but they were not used in any salvaging operations. The loss of space entailed by the installation of such a diving chamber restricted their number to one for the larger submarines. (5) No.

(6) Yes; one for each member of the crew, distributed proportionately in the compartments to the number of men normally in that compartment.


(7) Before the war the Vulkan was built and was used during the war. Cyclops was not completed until 1918. After the war the Vulkan was sunk and the Cyclops was turned over to England. These vessels were especially built for submarine-salvaging work.

(8) A description of these vessels can be obtained from Jane's Fighting Ships, 1914 or 1915. The Vulkan was approximately 2,000 tons' displacement, and lifting capacity of about 500 tons. The Cyclops was about 2,800 tons' displacement, with lifting capacity of 1,200 tons.

Senator ODDIE. Is the Cyclops the ship that was sunk?
Commander HOOVER. They were both sunk.

(9) During the war the Vulkan salvaged six sunken submarines from varied depths from 11 to 30 meters. In none of the operations were any of the crew saved through the operations of the Vulkan. Most of the installations for attaching salvaging devices had been removed from the submarines in order to save weight, and it was therefore necessary for the divers from the Vulkan to pass

slings around the hull. After the submarine was located and operations possible by divers it was possible to lift the submarine in nine hours and less. The success of operations from the Vulkan depended upon the ability of the divers to locate the wreck and to commence salvaging operations. The time lost in locating the wreck and passing the slings was always too long to enable the submarine to be raised in time to save any of the personnel. On December 7, 1917, submarine B-84 was sunk in the Baltic Sea in 30 meters of water under conditions almost identical with those obtaining when the S-4 was sunk. The sea was heavy and wind was force 9. It was impossible for the divers to operate, and no salvaging operations were possible until the weather moderated. By this time all the personnel of the submarine had perished.

The British reply to the questionnaire was as follows:

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the department's instruction No. 1315, February 21, 1928, regarding safety devices and salvage appliances in use in foreign navies, and to state that the questionnaire contained therein was promptly referred by the naval attaché to the appropriate authorities of the admiralty, and a reply, dated March 26, 1928, has been received, of which the pertinent portion is quoted, as follows:

"I beg to inform you that as regards question 3 a salvage air inlet (or, as it is termed 'divers' connection') is fitted to each main compartment of the submarine. Each inlet is independent of the rest and supplies air only into the compartment in which it is fitted.

"The answers to all the other questions are in the negative."

The reply from the French is as follows:

(1) The French Navy no longer uses grappling rings, eyelets, or shackles attached to the hull of submarines for lifting purposes.

(2) The French Navy uses a telephone buoy which can be released from the interior of the submarine.

(3) In each compartment there exists an air inlet.

(4) No submarine is provided with a diving chamber.

(5) Submarines have folding life-boats that are placed on the bridge (Berton system).

(7, 8, 9) There exist three lifting docks with cables, the characteristics of which are the following:

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Up to the present time the dock at Cherbourg (700 tons) has been used only once, to lift the Gustave Zede (850 tons), which had sunk, no crew being on board, in one of the basins of Cherbourg.

The construction of other salvage vessels is not contemplated.

The Italian reply is as follows:

(1) The new submarines will be equipped with grappling rings to which can be applied a lifting force equal to 35 per cent of surface displacement of the submarine.

(2) All submarines of new construction will have two telephone signal buoys, one at the bow and the other at the stern. The buoys will be supplied with telephone, an apparatus for luminous signals, and a salvage air inlet.

(3) Submarines in construction will have a salvage air inlet with outside connections for use of the divers which can furnish air from the exterior into the internal compartments of the submarine.

(4) Submarines now building will have two exit locks for the eventual escape of the crew, one at the bow and the other at the stern; the turret will be so constructed as to serve also as an exit lock.

(5) Detachable cabins (Cavallini and Belloni type) were devised several years ago for the escape of the crew and experiments were made; these cabins, however, have never been applied for reasons of encumbrance and of weight.

(6) It is not contemplated to assign a diving apparatus to each man for the time being.

(7) The Royal Navy does not possess salvage vessels of the double hull or catamaran type.

(8) The only salvage vessel owned by the Royal Navy is the pontoon Anteo, capable of lifting 400 tons. It was used only during the war for raising at Taranto a sunken Austrian mine-laying submarine. There has been no further occasion

of employing it.

Senator ODDIE. Is that all?

Commander HOOVER. Yes, sir; that is all.


Senator ODDIE. I will ask Admiral McVay to make a statement at this point as to what the Appropriations Committee has done regarding the appropriation for the investigation of safety devices by the Navy Department.

Admiral MCVAY. There are 4,000 suggestions in the Navy Department from various people who have safety devices for submarines under consideration. The Secretary of the Navy has requested. $20,000 for the purpose of expense, including contracts for the services of experts in connection with research and investigations of safety devices and appliances for submarines. That has been passed by the Budget.

Senator ODDIE. And that has been included in the deficiency bill? Admiral MCVAY. It has been presented to the committee.

Senator ODDIE. Admiral, in case that item is carried in the bill, and the bill becomes law, what will the effect be? I think a few remarks from you right at this point would help us very much.

Admiral MCVAY. The effect will be, of course, that the Secretary of the Navy will order a board to study the various suggestions made by these people, and those which are worthy of investigation will be thoroughly investigated to the extent of bringing people from abroad if necessary to get whatever available advice on the subject there is. Senator ODDIE. It will be only by the best talent the Navy possesses?

Admiral MCVAY. Yes, sir; it will.

Senator GERRY. It will call in outside experts, will it, Admiral? Admiral MCVAY. Yes, sir.

Senator GERRY. That is the purpose of it, is it not?

Admiral MCVAY. The purpose of it is to call in outside experts. Senator GERRY. Admiral, have you such a board as you did have during the war, of consultants who were not naval officers but internationally known experts?

Admiral MCVAY. There is a Naval Advisory Board of architects. Senator GERRY. During the war and prior to the war we had a board. Mr. Addison was on it, I recollect; and men of that stamp. It simply acted as an advisory committee.

Admiral MCVAY. Yes, sir.

Senator GERRY. An advisory committee to the department, and passed on different suggestions of an experimental nature.

Admiral MCVAY. That was during the war; just prior to our entry into the war, and during the time we were in the war. It was called the Naval Consulting Board, and is still in existence and has annual meetings in New York. It meets annually on armistice day. Mr. Thomas Edison is the president of the board. Mr. W. L. Saunders,

of the Ingersoll-Rand Co., is chairman of the board, and Thomas Robbins, president of the Robbins Conveying Belt Co., of New York City, is secretary of the board.

Senator ODDIE. Has the Coast Guard something more to put in the record?

Captain WHEELER. I wish to make a brief statement regarding the difficulties which I experienced during the war in sighting periscopes even when looking for them with all possible effort. I was escorting freight convoys from England to the Mediterranean over a period of approximately 15 months. We had numerous attacks, there being a difference of opinion as to how many. We counted 13, but the department did not accept that many. There were a number of sinkings and we sighted one periscope and one conning tower to the best of my recollection. More than half of the attacks were in broad daylight. We would seldom see anything except the torpedo or its explosion. The difficulty of seeing a periscope was only too well recognized.

Senator ODDIE. How far were the submarines from the ships that they attacked when they discharged the torpedoes?

Captain WHEELER. In the majority of cases we did not know because we never saw the submarines at all, but the one case in which we saw the conning tower he fired from very close, then he dived under the vessel and through mismanagement the conning tower showed for an instant.

Another case, a case in which I saw a periscope clearly, was in the Mediterranean. He fired probably from a distance of three or four hundred yards. We saw the submarine signal on the freight vessel after she had fired and sighted the periscope immediately after, making all possible speed to head her off, and the periscope disappeared from the scene. I think he fired from about three or four hundred yards that time. That was a perfectly smooth day in the Mediterranean. I merely wished to illustrate the difficulty when we had a maximum of lookouts aloft and were using all possible efforts.

Senator ODDIE. Have you anything further, Mr. Cunningham? Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I have just a few remarks. Some moments ago you mentioned the matter of the change of course of the Paulding, but before taking that up I would like to mention a few things with respect to Commander Bayliss of the Coast Guard. As Admiral Billard so well pointed out on the day of the hearing at which he was present, the Coast Guard is very much concerned with the question of whether or not Commander Bayliss is to be held responsible for this terrible catastrophe. Unfortunately, and it is regretted very much, in order to show why we think Bayliss was blameless. it has been necessary to discuss certain matters really within the province of the Navy Department; but they were mentioned only because it was necessary to do so to bring out the fact that we think that in view of those circumstances Bayliss was not responsible.

The Coast Guard cooperates with the Navy not only in time of peace, but in time of war, and the necessity of bringing out matters within the province of the Navy is deeply regretted by the entire Coast Guard. Bayliss is not an ordinary officer of the Coast Guard. He is a most efficient officer-in fact, he is an extraordinary officer. He is one of those somewhat unusual men-in this day and age

who has never touched a drink in his life, nor has he ever smoked in his life. He is an ideal, efficient officer, and knowing this and knowing how careful he is the Coast Guard has rallied vigorously to his defense. Commander Bayliss feels very keenly the fact that he was involved in this disaster. All of the men and officers of the Coast Guard, of course, feel the same way.

Now, the question arises as to the change in course.

Senator ODDIE. The committee requested a brief statement as to the qualifications, training and ability of the commander of the S-4, which was placed in the record in justice to him; and in all fairness we should have for the record a similar statement regarding Commander Bayliss who commanded the Paulding; so if you will prepare that it will be placed in the record.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I will do that. I might add this: The Coast Guard knows that the Navy is a highly efficient organization. Of course we concede also that the Coast Guard is an efficient organization. In fact I know of my personal knowledge, having served with the Navy during the war, that it is a wonderful organization, and I regret very much to have to say anything that might sound like a reflection on that organization.

I might say this about the change in course. The Paulding, on the day of the collision, was following the course prescribed by the United States Coast Pilot. The Paulding was on that course and out in the fairway, and was on the course followed by vessels generally when approaching Provincetown Harbor. At no time was any change of course made that was not to be expected of a vessel approaching Provincetown. Just before the periscopes were observed, the order was given to turn to the left 5°.

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However, before the rudder had a chance to take hold in the water, according to the testimony before the naval court of inquiry, the submarine periscopes were discovered, and immediately the command was given "Hard right.' As already stated, this change of course was to be expected of any vessel approaching Provincetown. Now, what was this highly efficient officer of the Coast Guard doing at the time of the collision, and just prior thereto, as he was approaching the inner trial course? Like the good, efficient commanding officer that he was, on approaching a harbor, he was on the bridge, and he was up there for the express purpose of seeing that the course was clear of obstructions, etc.

Like the good efficient officer that he was, before entering the harbor he stepped back for five seconds to examine the chart to see if the water was sufficiently deep inside for his vessel to proceed, and, as Commander Baylis told me, before stepping into the chart house he had looked down over the course in which the vessel was proceeding, down along the line of the buoys.

Now, the officer of the deck; what was he doing? He was piloting by the buoys, and that is the customary thing, particularly there where the water is so deep. He was naturally looking out for the safety of the vessel, and watching ahead and ahead only in the course on which he was proceeding.

In the third place, we have the chief quartermaster who was doing nothing but looking ahead.

As to the fourth man on the bridge, he was stationed between the panels of the bridge on the port side, maintaining a lookout over the course ahead.

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