The

doubtful honour of becoming the mouthpiece of a tyrannical faction for a period of two years. best men of business, the men of wealth and leisure, the cultivated classes, cannot as a rule be prevailed upon to put themselves forward as candidates for Congress. The natural operation of the suffrage is partly the cause of this, but it must also be referred to the fact that political life in America is not usually an object of ambition with the well-informed classes. The independent member of Congress is not always allowed to state his opinions. If another Webster or Clay appeared in the House of Representatives, he would probably be silenced by a demand for the previous question, or some other device of the majority to silence discussion. In the Reform debates of 1865-67 in the English Parliament, speeches of commanding power and eloquence were occasionally delivered against the popular side. In a similar condition of public feeling in the United States there is scarcely any public man of position who would dare to exercise this freedom of thought and opinion. There he must go with the tide or be washed away. And hence the remark made by an English public writer, during the despotism of Congress in 1866, was profoundly true and just-“ It may be pronounced an absolute impossibility that a man like the late Sir George Cornewall Lewis, capable of seeing two sides of a question, should be returned to Congress." Or, what is the same thing, if he were returned it would be because his consti

CHAP. V. THE ADVOCACY OF SECTIONAL DIFFERENCES. 87

tuents had not detected his impartial faculty, and as soon as they did perceive it they would turn him

out.

What we find represented and advocated in Congress are sectional differences rather than broad and comprehensive principles based upon considerations of the general good of the people." This is of less consequence in America than it would be in England, since the States by their own laws can provide for the social well-being of their inhabitants. They can regulate their own affairs, and place the means of education within the reach of all. Except, therefore, when a question arises which affects all the States, and which no single State, or number of States less than the whole, can control, it is not important that a deputy should do more than protect the interests

23 In the New York Convention which assembled to ratify the Constitution Mr. Hamilton said, "In my experience of public affairs I have constantly remarked, in the conduct of members of Congress, a strong and uniform attachment to the interests of their own State. These interests have, on many occasions, been adhered to with an undue and illiberal pertinacity, and have too often been preferred to the interests of the Union. This attachment has given birth to an unaccommodating spirit of party which has frequently embarrassed the best measures." (Elliot's 'Debates,' ii. 266.) Hamilton was, in some respects, a man of greater sagacity and foresight than almost any of his contemporaries. Few besides himself acknowledged that there was anything to be regretted in the attachment of a member to his locality regardless of the interest of the Republic. Talleyrand told Mr. Martin Van Buren that he regarded Hamilton as the ablest man he became acquainted with in America-he was not sure that he might not add without injustice, or that he had known in Europe."-(See Van Buren's 'Political Parties,' p. 124.)

of his own constituency. But when a crisis does arise which requires the united action of all the members, they have localities so much in mind and the welfare of the community so little, that agreement can only be arrived at by that device which has received the humourous name of "log-rolling." One member votes for his friend's proposition to-day upon the understanding that his friend will return the civility to-morrow. But as the idea of a "nation" grows upon the people sectional affairs will be more and more confined to State Legislatures. And as a natural consequence, power will accumulate in the hands of Congress, and the States must sacrifice some portion of their former functions in order that they may be welded together in a solid body, and thus reveal an unbroken front to the rest of the world.

89

CHAP. VI.

THE JUDICIARY.

CHAPTER VI.

THE JUDICIARY.

THE absence of a well-organised judicial power in the old Confederation was one of its most obvious defects. There was no supreme tribunal to which questions arising between States, or affecting the construction of treaties, could be referred. Each State interpreted as it pleased a compact which assumed to be binding upon all. The derangement of public affairs which such a want of system produced may easily be imagined. There was no certainty that an arrangement entered into between the States would be honourably observed, because, when any of the parties to it became dissatisfied, it was easy to put a new construction upon the agreement, and there was no recognised authority by which the dispute could be adjusted. This deficiency must have been a constant source of inconvenience and embarrassment to each of the members in turn. "The treaties of the United States," said Hamilton, "under the present Constitution are liable to the infraction of thirteen different Legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority

of those Legislatures." The result was that nothing was settled-nothing secured. A covenant was only binding so long as every State chose to acknowledge its validity.

To remedy these inconveniences a Supreme Court was established by the Constitution, and authority was given to Congress to create inferior courts from time to time as occasion demanded.2 In each State there exist courts intrusted with the administration of the local, or State, laws, and a Supreme Court is established over all. The State tribunals decide a cause in the first instance, and if it involves a question which comes within the province of the Federal Supreme Court it may be carried there upon appeal. The system works in a circle-the State Courts, the Supreme Court of the State to decide appeals, and the Federal Supreme Court, which is clad with the exclusive authority to pronounce final judgment on all questions affecting the Constitution, the construction of laws, the interpretation of treaties, and other subjects expressly designated in the Constitution itself. In the appointment of the State judges the principle of conferring office for a short period only is adopted, and thus the control of the Bench has practically fallen into the hands of the majority. In vain the thoughtful class of Americans have warned their countrymen against the mischiefs which must accrue from this degradation of the judicial office.

1 'Federalist,' No. 22.

2 Art. III. sec. 1.