Puslapio vaizdai
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for a year, the country rang with protest. Extravagance! Looting the treasury! But to-day we are spending more than a third of that amount on rats alone. Our rat bill averages about $3.65 a year for every man, woman, and child in the United States.

What about this bright-eyed, bewhiskered boarder who is costing more than one third of what, not many years ago, was sufficient for running the entire Federal Government.

The rat population of the United States just about equals the human population. In several American cities there are slightly more rats than human beings, but on farms and plantations rats far outnumber people.

The rat is an unqualified bandit supported by an indulgent people.

The rat damages and destroys all sorts of grains both in fields and in barns, domestic poultry, particularly small chicks, wild birds and their young, eggs, fruits, vegetables, flowers, bulbs, shrubbery, boxed and bagged staples of every kind, and food-stores everywhere. The rat is a marauding invader of pantries, cellars, grocery stores, meat markets, general markets, bakeries, and stables. In return for all that the rat destroys, the only thing he gives us is a little hide for glove-leather. Rather a high price for our rat-skin gloves!

But the rat's depredations do not end with edibles. The rat wantonly destroys books, papers, leather goods, clothing, and fabrics of every sort. These he destroys partly for the starch, paste, or glue they may contain, partly for material for his nest, and partly, it may be, from pure vandal instinct.

But the rat's greatest sin is his spreading of disease. The rat carries in his infected body intestinal parasites like the tapeworm, and is the effective transmitter of trichina and, most dangerous of all, bubonic plague, which in recent centuries has snuffed out millions of lives.

When we consider those two fundamental problems, high cost of living and health, we face the rat at every turn. He runs like a septic specter through our national life. With bubonic plague in Europe, every ship that docks at an American port may be a threat to health

and life.

Plainly, the rat must not be permitted to land.

But the rat is already here. What are we to do about it? First of all, every American who owns house, store, granary, warehouse, bakery, barn, or market, can and should begin a private war on rats. And, second, the American Government can, as indeed is planned, begin a comprehensive and unremitting anti-rat campaign. There must be no armistice between science and the rat. The slogan for such a war has already been stated by the awakened city of Pensacola. When Pensacola was threatened with bubonic plague, forces were mobilized, and the city thought and talked of little else than the plague and its sinister agent, the rat. The three planks in the city's program were in themselves an effective slogan: (1) Build him out; (2) Starve him out; (3) Kill him out!

Build him out! Every building in the United States should be made ratproof. The Government should make a wide-spread propaganda in behalf of this. Architects and building associations can help much in actual construction.

Starve him out! The rat-proofing of all markets, granaries, and warehouses will shut the rat off from his accustomed food reserves.

Kill him out! Shut off from food stores, the rat will grow bolder and wander into the open before he starves. When he comes into the open, we should have the trap set. Meanwhile we should hunt him in his secret haunts.

More and more we are forced to realize our great need of scientific and engineering minds in Washington. When will politics become realistic and condescend to the prompt and effective handling of practical problems-problems like that of the rat and his relation to waste and disease! Of course we go through the motions of handling such problems, but when will the glacial leisureliness of governmental action. burst the bonds of red-tape and become businesslike!

Politicians still hug the delusion that a campaign cannot be won save by ardent shouting about tariff and isolation. Let them try one campaign on practical matters!

OVERHAULING THE COURTS IN EGYPT

ECAUSE the outcome of curB rent negotiations in Egypt be

tween the Milner Commission and the Egyptians will exert profound ultimate influence upon British policy in Ireland and India, it is worth while to go more fully into detail in our consideration of Egyptian affairs than popular interest of the moment might dictate. Last month, in our general discussion of the progress of the Milner Commission's work, we passed lightly over the rumored doing away with the "capitulations" and promised a more detailed discussion later of the interesting and important matter of judicial reform in Egypt. This editorial purposes a contribution toward that discussion.

The judicial system of Egypt, legacy from the days when Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire, is complicated and cumbersome. There are four outstanding types of courts in the existing judicial system of Egypt: (1) native courts; (2) religious courts; (3) consular courts; (4) mixed courts.

The native courts exercise jurisdiction over all cases involving natives only, except cases of family law and succession. These latter are under the jurisdiction of the religious courts. The code of the native courts was announced in 1883. The code is based on French law. There are a few Englishmen on the bench of the native courts, but the bench is predominantly Egyptian, of course. The official language of this branch of the judiciary is Arabic.

The religious courts constitute a typical Mohammedan institution, being found in all Mohammedan countries. Before European influence began to leave its mark upon the administrative life of the Mohammedan world, the religious courts were the only courts. Since Egypt is largely Mohammedan, the courts of the Mohammedan religion are the most important. The Mohammedan religious courts exercise jurisdiction over all natives in issues of succession and over religious law, with the exception of instances where all the parties in dispute are members of the same sect. In such cases the issue goes before the patriarchate tribunal of the sect.

The consular courts of the foreign countries having interests and nationals in Egypt betray their origin and normal function in their name.

The mixed courts give the point of departure for the real "story" involved in the present agitation for Egyptian judicial reform. To explain them we must go back to 1535, when Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire. At that time the Turkish Government was anxious to encourage trade between France and Turkey. As a sort of trade bait, the Turkish Government granted certain special privileges to France. These privileges consisted in granting to France jurisdiction in commercial matters in which French subjects were involved. This was the beginning of a long list of like concessions to other European powers. As the Ottoman Empire declined in power, the European appetite for jurisdiction grew until finally the Ottoman Empire found that what had begun as a few concessions granted for trade purposes had developed into a system which made foreigners virtually outside the reach of Turkish law. Foreigners had secured so many privileges or "capitulations" that they could not be brought under local jurisdiction, but were subject only to the codes of justice of their own countries, administered through their own consular courts.

Egypt, as part of the Ottoman Empire, naturally fell heir to this judicial system, with so much of its jurisdiction signed away to foreign powers. Even after Egypt had achieved virtual independence from Turkey, that is, in the nineteenth century, these capitulations were greatly extended. Ultimately fifteen powers enjoyed these special privileges.

These "capitulations" could not but result in license to foreign adventurers who wanted to flout justice. In the tragic days of Ismail the abuse of these foreign privileges was great. Finally, in 1875, the Egyptian Government succeeded in gaining the permission of the fifteen powers enjoying the benefits of the "capitulations" to organize the mixed courts.

The mixed courts represent a compromise between the desire,f the Egyptians

to regain control of their judicial system and the desire of the foreign powers to avoid casting their interests and people under exclusively native jurisdiction. The bench of the mixed courts holds representatives of all the powers enjoying the capitulatory rights and twentytwo native judges. The official languages of the mixed courts reflect their mixed personnel. French, Italian, English, and Arabic are used. Like the code of the native courts, adopted in 1883, the code of the mixed courts rests upon French precedent. The jurisdiction of the mixed courts extends over foreigners in virtually all issues save family, succession, and criminal cases.

The mixed courts have greatly relieved the consular courts, reduced abuses, and made for a better brand of justice. But the consular courts still hold wide jurisdiction. They still bring to their dockets all family and succession cases in which foreigners are involved, all issues between subjects of the same power, and virtually all criminal mat

ters.

If there was ever any truth in the adage that "too many cooks spoil the broth," it is true in the case of the Egyptian judiciary. If Egypt is to approach a more nearly self-governing status, a thorough overhauling of the judiciary is absolutely essential. If Egypt is to face the future under some modified form of protectorate, still judicial reform will be imperative. Reform of such a tangled system will be no easy matter. Long-established traditions and a multitude of special interests will stand in the

way.

The rights of fifteen countries must be considered. But the broad lines of the reform lie fairly clear.

It will probably be good politics to tamper with the religious courts as little as possible. A new penal code must be drafted. Up to the present time, the consular courts have administered their own penal codes in cases where foreigners were involved. A common penal code to apply alike to all nationals and natives is desirable.

The consular courts should be relieved of most if not all of their jurisdiction. The mixed courts should be reorganized, their jurisdiction extended to cover the cases heretofore handled

by the consular courts. These courts should be equipped to handle all cases in which non-Egyptian parties figure. Such a policy will probably be necessary, at least in the period of transition while Egypt is achieving full and effective independence, for foreigners will doubtless rebel at the idea of going under exclusively native jurisdiction. And, of course, the best legal brains available should be brought to bear upon improvement of the administration of the native courts.

It will be interesting to watch the Milner Commission handle this problem.

UNCLE SAM FLIRTS WITH IMPERIALISM

ILIPINOS suspect an imperialist

dagger in the roseate promise of prosperity made by the proponents of the Merchant Marine Law of 1920, which carries with it a clause providing for the extension of the coastwise laws of the United States to the Philippine Islands. Elsewhere in this issue José P. Melencio, an alert and highly intelligent young Filipino, states the case against the law from the point of view of the islanders. Every American who is jealous of the reputation of the United States for political sincerity will read with rising anger his just indictment of this latest bit of long-range legislation which is strangely reminiscent of Spain in her palmiest colonial days.

It is needless to reiterate here the provisions and the inevitable effects of the law; these are ably stated in Mr. Melencio's paper. It is sufficient to state that the law looks towards a monopoly in favor of American bottoms, making it virtually impossible for other than American ships to ply between American and Philippine ports, making the Philippines a virtual adjunct of the Federal territory in the interest of American commerce.

There is not the shadow of an argument to prove that such an arrangement will redound to the advantage of the American people in general, even if we were ready to legislate regarding the Philippines solely upon the basis of our own self-interest. The benefits will go to a few ship-owners. The ultimate

result will be the checking rather than the stimulation of the economic development of the Philippines. It will raise rather than reduce prices, the eternal sin of monopolies. The legislation smacks of a coward's reluctance to enter frank and fair competition with other nations in matters of service and rates.

The law was tactlessly passed. Decent courtesy should have suggested consultation with the Filipinos prior to the enactment of the law. The law is in unqualified violation of the letter and spirit of the Jones Law of 1916, which was the promise, in honor given, that the policy of the United States would be to work toward Philippine sovereignty as quickly as practicable. For this generosity we now propose to substitute an economic imperialism.

The law represents not only dishonest politics, but bad business judgment. The chances are that it will in the long run reduce rather than increase American profits on Philippine trade. If, as seems likely, this law results in an increase of carrying rates, the time will come when goods from Europe can be sold at a lower price in the Philippines than American goods. Philippine selfinterest will then turn to Europe, and both in matters of import and export American business will suffer. Commerce between the Philippines and the United States in the beginning represented only about five per cent. of the commerce of the islands; today it represents about sixty-five per cent. That gratifying increase has been achieved under a régime of generous promises of future independence. Will it hold or be increased under a policy that threatens the islands' economic independence and throws cold water on the Filipinos' national aspirations?

Many interests opposed to the prompt granting of independence to the Philippines have been saying that the islands should first achieve economic stability and independence before asking political independence. Now these same interests would make economic independence impossible. What are they driving at? Is this law only a subterfuge masking an imperialist purpose? The contention of these interests has never been true. Political independence, a decent measure

of national ability granted, is the best possible inspiration to economic activity and advance.

We need to realize the indisputable fact that mutual political confidence and understanding will make for greater economic intercourse between the Philippines and the United States; that distrust and misunderstanding will make for a diminishing economic intercourse.

The Philippine Islands have been mounting rapidly in economic efficiency. The national bank of the islands has made an unprecedented record in banking history since the islands received the boon of political autonomy. Since the passage of the Jones Law, the foreign commerce of the islands has been much more than doubled. The per-capita monetary circulation of the islands has been about trebled. Per capita taxation has been increased. There has been a gratifying increase in the number of domestic corporations and partnerships, as well as agencies and branches of world-famed foreign concerns doing business in the islands. Large engineering concerns have been organized with extensive capitalizations. Life insurance companies have been organized. Inter-island shipping has been greatly developed. developed. The cocoanut-oil business has been ably prosecuted. Scores of Filipino export and import firms have been organized. Other commercial and industrial adventures fill in the details of a picture of business ambition and administration that is highly gratifying to every well-wisher of the Filipinos.

Public improvements, magnificently begun by American officials, have been consolidated and carried on by the Filipinos. The development of latent resources has been ably undertaken. All the aspects of a well-rounded and well-conducted government are appear

ing.

The current legislation by the American Congress strikes a body blow at all this by paralyzing the hopes and aspirations of the Filipinos for complete economic and political independence.

The Merchant Marine Law of 1920, as it applies to the Philippine Islands, is a perfect example of long-range legislation, which is always amusing when it is not tragic in its effect. This law

represents not only the successful campaign of special interests, but it illustrates effectively how the parochial minds of certain American congressmen are unable to visualize the effect in the Philippine Islands of legislation passed in Washington. It recalls a story told of the long-range administration of the Philippine Islands by the Spanish Government.

Shortly after cable communications were established between Spain and the Philippine Islands, it was a common occurrence for the Ministerio de Ultramar (the Overseas Ministry, or Colonial Department) to receive cable messages from the captain-general of the islands, reporting sporadic insurrections or banditry, and asking for orders. The pompous officials in Spain knew little of conditions in the islands, but they felt the obligations that the dignity of their office. imposed upon them. At all costs, they must sustain the impression of statesmanlike decision.

For weeks the Ministerio de Ultramar had been receiving cablegrams to the effect that the insurrectos were destroying government property in the province of Batangas, or that the pulahanes were rising in Samar. In each and every case the Spanish minister knowingly cabled instructions for suppressing the incipient rebellion or punishing the lawless bandits.

A species of ant, the anay, had been causing great trouble in the islands.

These ants would destroy whole buildings by eating the heart out of timbers, sills, and beams, leaving only a hollow shell. The ant became a menace not unlike the menace of the rat discussed earlier in these columns. One day the captain-general cabled the Ministerio de Ultramar that the anay had destroyed the provincial building at Tacloban, and asked what he should do about it. The humblest native of the islands would have known that the anay were ants, but the dignified official in far-away Spain was a superb example of ignorance in high places of imperial politics. him there was no difference between the anay and the pulahanes. He thumped the tables, called a secretary to him, and shouted:

To

The Captain-General of the Philippines has cabled that the anay have destroyed the provincial building at Tacloban. It seems that my stern measures against the pulahanes last week have taught no lesson to the anay. I shall teach the anay, I shall teach all bandits and rebels in the islands, that the strong arm of Imperial Spain must be respected. Cable the captain-general that I order him to send two squadrons of cavalry against the anay and to give them no quarter.

The Merchant Marine Law of 1920 is another case of chasing ants with cavalry, another case of long-range legislation.

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