ish the logical perfection of all the mind pas de tracer les règles, mais qui les met lui already knows, leading thereby to all at-même en pratique et donne l'exemple avec le tainable knowledge. The mind can never précepte."* penetrate causes; there are facts forever M. Cousin then quotes the four rules placed beyond its conception; its boun- given above as constituting the Method of daries are fixed, and fixed by its own nature. Des Cartes, which, he says, is precisely But within the limits of its power, a logical that of Bacon. In this, as it seems to us, perfection is possible-is necessary. No he has been led away by analogies, and one doubts for an instant, that as we know cheated himself with verbal resemblances. many facts, and yet by not being able to Had the language been verbatim the same reduce them to their special laws, and those in both authors, we should still have pointspecial laws to more general laws, these ed to their works in confutation; and we facts are merely facts to us, and not science; cannot conceive how M. Cousin should not so also have we many ideas which are isola- have seen the essential difference of the ted and barren from want of orderly ar- nature of the evidence required by the two rangement, from want of proper co-ordina-thinkers: Des Cartes demanding no more tion to other ideas; and could these ideas than a clear conception; and Bacon deonce attain their logical perfection (i. e., manding a patient induction from carefully complete precision, and established relation ascertained phenomena. This distinction amongst each other), all knowledge would will be more fully manifested in Spinoza. then be but a matter of regular development M. Cousin overlooked Bacon's constant of one method; precisely, as in the physi- and energetic denouncement of ontology cal world, when once all the laws were dis- as producing nothing but "cobwebs of covered, the task of reducing every fact, learning, admirable indeed for the fineness new or old, under its separate law, would of thread and work, but of no substance or be the sole aim of philosophy. profit;" while with Des Cartes ontology was the alpha and omega of all science. Yet M. Cousin subsequently says, "Bacon et Des Cartes sont comme les deux pôles opposes du xvii. siecle: leur rapport, leur est commune." M. Cousin thinks that bepoint de réunion est dans la méthode qui leur cause both recommend Caution, Analysis, and Synthesis, that therefore their method must be the same, though directed to different objects; a misconception, we think, of the very nature of Method, which is not an instrument (like the hand) that can be applied to all matters indifferently, but a path of transit, leading only to one end, and from which to wander is to fall into error. There are many roads, but there is only one leading to the truth. This Des Cartes attempted, and the rules he laid down for that purpose are admirable, though more easily prescribed than followed. The same may be said of Bacon's rules. Let us remark, however, that the Method of Bacon, though not without a certain resemblance in its language to that of Des Cartes, is radically opposed to it in spirit. As the latter adopted the à priori road, and started from generals to descend to par ticulars, so Bacon reversely adopted the à posteriori, and started from particulars to ascend gradually, and not per saltum, to generals. This opposition is not more visible in their writings than in their tendencies and results. From Des Cartes sprang Spinoza, Malebranche, De la Forge, Arnauld, Leibnitz, Wolff, Kant, Hegel, &c.: from Bacon the whole school of scientific men, the materialists, Scotch physiologists, and political economists. Plain as these tendencies are plain as are the distinctions of the two Methods, there have not been men wanting to confound them. Thus M. Victor Cousin, who has given consider able attention to the history of philosophy, says "Voyons maintenant ce qu'a fait notre Des Cartes. Il a précisément établi en France la même méthode que l'Angleterre a voulu attribuer exclusivement à Bacon; et il l'a établie avec moins de grandeur d'imagination dans le style, mais avec la superiorité de précision qui caractérisera toujours celui qui ne se contente We have noticed this point because we Bacon still prevalent, in spite of the vague regret to see a want of just appreciation of and extravagant eulogies poured forth from time to time on this our greatest thinker. It was his merit to have built no system. Convinced that systems were anticipations of the result of long and laborious inquiry, and seeing that the one thing then needful was a Method by which the inquirer should be led to the truth, he directed his vast intellect to the development of one which succeeding generations have been guided by. He did not promulgate a science, but "Cours de Phil.," tome ii. leçon 3. 營 + Metodos, as Coleridge points out, means, both etymologically and philosophically, a path of transit. the conditions of all science. His own con- | hand? "The mind has a yearning which tributions to science were insignificant; makes it dart forward to generalities that his knowledge on many points was inaccu- it may have something to rest in ; and after rate; his application of his own precepts a little dallying with experience becomes was imperfect; but his perception of the weary of i:" and to correct this yearning connexion and condition of all sciences, was Bacon's object. was such as even at the present day to fill the mind with astonishment. To return from this, we hope not unne cessary, digression, the reader will appreA celebrated writer in the "Edinburgh ciate the effect of Des Cartes' writings on Review," in an article on Bacon which ex- Spinoza when they fell into his way, espe cited some attention, has pronounced the cially if he recalls the critical period at aim and scope of his writings to be distin- which Spinoza first met with them. He guished from ancient philosophy by being was then striving to solve for himself the useful," his aim was to supply our vulgar inexplicable riddle of the universe. He wants." This, it must be owned, is neither had penetrated deep into the science of the distinguishing characteristic of Bacon, the Cabbala; he had been assisted by the nor the aim of any science, except in a learned Morteira; but wise in all the wis very subordinate degree. The art of navi- dom of the Jews, he was still at an immeagation is unquestionably useful, and is a surable distance from the desired solution. product of the science of astronomy; but Des Cartes captivated him no less by the neither that, nor any other use to which boldness of his logic than by the independ astronomy may be applied, was the aim of ent nature of his method, which sought astronomers. There are higher wants than truth in the inner world of man, and not in our "vulgar" ones; there are other motives the outward world, nor in the records of than utilitarian ones; there are other crav. authority. He studied with avidity; but ings than those of the senses: and these he soon found that there also the riddle reare the cravings of the intellect. Science mained unsolved. He found the fact of owes its origin to the appetite for intel- his own existence superfluously demonlectual food; and to satisfy that appetite it is still pursued. Other uses flow from it, but do not thereby constitute its aim. Health results from exercise, but enjoyment is the motive; and the nerves stimulate to that enjoyment, as the mind stimulates the philosopher to seek truth.* Having characterized Bacon's philosophy as that of Utility, the reviewer proceeds to combat his claim to that Method which the world has eulogized. There could be no merit, it is said, in inventing such a Method, because every one always reasons, though unconsciously, on the strict principles of induction; it was practised before it was known. We answer: is the law of Association of Ideas no discovery because ideas were associated before it was discovered? We answer further: is there no difference between the Baconian, or complete, induction, and that of the hasty unconscious reasoner ;-between seeking the conditions of arriving at the truth, and accepting such as spontaneously offer;-between an experimentum crusis, and data immediately at strated; but the far greater existence in which his own was included-of which the great All was but a varied manifestationof this he could find no demonstration. Cogito, ergo sum is irresistible, but Cogito, ergo Deus est is no syllogism. The solution of the problem of the τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕ—the one immutable Being on whom all things depend, had still to be discovered. Spinoza, therefore, leaving Des Cartes, asked himself-What is the noumenon which lies beneath all phenomena? We see everywhere transformations perishable and perishing; yet there must be something beneath which is imperishable, immutable; what is it? We see a wondrous universe peopled with wondrous beings, yet none of these beings exist per se, but per aliud: they are not the authors of their own existence; they do not rest upon their own reality, but on a greater reality-on that of the to ev, xaι to nav. What is this reality? This question, successively asked by every thinker, and to which philosophy has * Let us be just, however. The reviewer, though "Water" of Thales to the "Absolute" of only stammered forth replies-from the relying on Utility as Bacon's characteristic, afterwards says that ancient philosophy concerned itself Hegel-this question, Spinoza thought, with the impossible, and Bacon's with the possible. could not be answered by the idea of PerTo this we agree; but it was incumbent on the fection. No: the great reality of all excritic to show how ancient philosophy was impos-istence is Substance. Not substance in the sible, and where the chasm between the possible and impossible commences; this he did not attempt. Nov. Org., aph. 20. gross and popular sense of "body" or our being," as his motto, he undertook to matter," but that which is substans-trace the relations of the world to God and which is standing under all phenomena, to man, and those of man to society. His supporting and giving them reality. What "Tractacus" and "Ethica," were the great is a phenomenon?-an appearance, a thing results of that endeavor. perceived a state of the perceiving mind. Having mastered this first principle of all But what originates this perception-what science, he proceeded to demonstrate it; changes the mind from its prior to its pre- and very properly adopted the method of sent state? Something, external and extrin- the mathematicians. To this demonstrasic, changes it. What is this something? tion we are about to lead our readers, and What it is, in itself, we can never know: only beg of them a little steady attention because to know it would bring it under and a little patient thought, convinced that the forms and conditions of the mind, i. e. they will then have little difficulty in findwould constitute it a phenomenon-un- ing their way in this abstrusest of all subknown, therefore, but not denied-this ens jects. We shall translate some portion of -this something, is; and this Kant calls the "Ethica" with the utmost care, because noumenon. This Spinoza calls Substance. we think it every way advisable that the All science, as all existence, must start reader should have Spinoza's own mode of from one principle, which must be the statement, and thereby be enabled to watch ground of all. What is this commence- his method of deducing his conclusions ment-this agn? Perfection, replies Des from his premises. The work opens with Cartes. No, says Spinoza, Perfection is eight an attribute of something prior to it. Substance is the agzn. Des Cartes, in common II. DEFINITIONS. sence of which involves existence; or that, the nature of which can only be considered as existent.* A thing finite is that which can be limited (terminari potest) by another thing of the same nature, e. g., body is said to be finite because it can always be conceived as larger. So thought is limited by other thoughts. But body does not limit thought, nor thought limit body. with most philosophers, had assumed a I. By Cause of itself I understand that, the esduality he had assumed a God and a real world created by God. Substance, to him, was by no means the primal fact of all existence; on the contrary, he maintained that both Extension and Thought were Substances; in other words, that mind and matter were distinct independent Substances, different in essence, and united only by God. Spinoza affirmed that both Extension and Thought were no more than Attributes; and by a subtle synthesis he reduced the duality of Des Cartes to his own all-embracing unity, and thus arrived at a conception of the One. The absolute Existence-the Substance (call it what you will) is God. From Him all individual concrete existences arise. All that exists, exists in and by God; and can only thus be conceived. Here, then, thought he, the mystery of the world begins to unfold itself to the patient thinker; he recognises God as the fountain of life; he sees in the universe nothing but the manifestation of God; the finite rests upon the bosom of the infinite; the inconceivable variety resolves itself into unity. There is but one reality, and that is God. Such was Spinoza's solution of the problem: upon this he felt he could repose in peace, and upon this only. To live with God-to know God with perfect knowledge, was the highest point of human development and happiness; and to this he consecrated his life. Taking the words of St. Paul, "In Him we live, move, and have III. IV. V. VI. By Substance I understand that which is in itself, and is conceived per se: that is, the conception of which does not require the conception of any thing else as antecedent to it. By Attribute I understand that which the mind perceives as constituting the very essence of Substance. By Modes I understand the accidents (affec tiones) of Substance; or, that which is in something else, through which also it is conceived. By God I understand the Being absolutely infinite; i. e., the substance consisting of infinite Attributes, each of which expresses an infinite and eternal essence. Explication. I say absolutely infinite, but not suo genere; for to whatever is infinite but not in suo genere, we can deny infinite Attributes; but that which is absolutely infinite, to its essence pertains every thing which implies essence, and involves no neVII. That thing is said to be free which exists gation. by the sole necessity of its nature, and by This is an important definition, as it gets rid of the verbal perplexity hitherto felt relative to an "endless chain of causes." The doubter might always ask the cause of the first cause in the series; but here, by identifying cause and existence, Spinoza very properly annihilates the sophism. itself alone is determined to action. But do not correspond with the Spinozistic systhat is necessary, or rather constrained, tem. In the above axiom it is not meant which owes its existence to another, and that there are no effects manifested to us acts according to certain and determinate of which we do not also know the causes causes. VIII. By Eternity I understand Existence itself, in as far as it is conceived necessarily to follow from the sole definition of an eternal thing. it is not meant that a man receiving a blow in the dark is not aware of that blow (effect), though ignorant of the immediate cause. What is meant is, that a complete These are the definitions: they need not and comprehensive knowledge of the effect long be dwelt on, but must frequently be is only to be obtained through a complete recurred to hereafter; above all, no objec-If you would know the effect in its totality and comprehensive knowledge of the cause. tion ought to be raised against them, as un-in itself-you must know also the cause usual or untrue, for they are the meanings in its totality. This is obvious; for what of various terms in constant use with Spi noza, and he has a right to use them as he is an effect? An effect is a cause realized; pleases, provided he does not afterwards it is the natura naturans conceived as natudepart from this use, which he is careful ra naturata. We call the antecedent, cause, not to do. We now come to the seven AXIOMS. 1. Every thing which is, is in itself, or in some other thing. II. That which cannot be conceived through another-per aliud-must be conceived per se. III. From a given determinate cause the effect necessarily follows; and vice versa, if no determinate cause be given no effect can follow. IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on the other. VI. A true idea must agree with its original in nature (idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire.) VII. Whatever can be clearly conceived as non-existent, does not, in its essence involve existence. and the sequent, effect, but these are merely relative conceptions; the sequence itself is antecedent to some subsequent change, and the former antecedent was once only a Causation is change; when the change is comsequent to its cause; and so on. pleted, we name the result effect. It is only a matter of naming. But inciting this change, causing it as we say, there is some power (cause) in nature; to know this effect, therefore, that is, not merely to have a relative conception of our own condition consequent on it, but to comprehend this power, this reality, to penetrate its mystery, to see it in its totality, you must know what the effect is, and how it is; you must know its point of departure, and its point of destination; in a word, you must transcend the knowledge of phenomena, and acquire that of noumena. In a popular sense we are said to know effects, but to be ignorant of causes. Truly, we are ignorant of both-and equally ignorant. A These axioms at once command assent, knowledge of sequences we have, and of if we except the fourth, which, because it nothing more. The vital power determinis ambiguous, has been thought absurd;ing these sequences we name, but cannot but the truth is, that the opposite concep: tions now prevalent respecting cause and effect, prevent a real appreciation of this axiom. Mr. Hallam goes so far as to say, This is what Spinoza implicitly teaches; "It seems to be in this fourth axiom, and and had Mr. Hallam attended only to what in the proposition grounded upon it, that the very next axiom proclaims, viz., that the fundamental fallacy lurks. The rela-things have nothing in common with each tion between a cause and effect is surely something perfectly different, from our perfect comprehension of it, or indeed from our having any knowledge of it at all; much less can the contrary assertion be deemed axiomatic." "" There is a want of subtlety in this criticism, as well as a want of comprehension of Spinoza's doctrines; and we wonder it never suggested itself that the modern notions of cause and effect Introd. to Lit. of Europe, iv. p. 246. know; we may call it attraction, heat, electricity, polarization, &c.; but, having named, we have not explained it. other, cannot be understood by means of each other, i. e., the conception of one not involving the conception of the other-he would have understood Spinoza's meaning: for, if effect be different from cause, then its conception does not involve the concep tion of cause; but if it be the same as cause, then does the one conception involve that of the other; ergo, the more complete the knowledge of the one, the more complete the knowledge of the other. The reader will bear this in mind when studying Spinoza. We will now proceed to the PROPOSITIONS. PROP. I. Substance is prior in nature to its acci- Demonstration. Per Definitions 3 and 5. tributes, have nothing in common with each Demonst. This follows from Def. 3; for each Substance must be conceived in itself and through itself; in other words, the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other. PROP. III. Of things which have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other. Demonst. If they have nothing in common, PROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are is nothing in nature except Substance and its modes (per Axiom 1, and Def. 3 and 5); now this Substance not being produced by another is self-caused. Corollary 2. This proposition is more easily to be demonstrated by the absurdity of its contradiction--for if Substance can be produced by any thing else, the conception of it would depend on the conception of the cause (per Axiom4*), and hence (per Def. 3) it would not be Substance. to exist. PROP. VII. It pertains to the nature of Substance Demonst. There exists but one Substance of the same Attribute; and it must either ex- Scholium I. I do not doubt but that to all in some other thing (per Axiom 1), that is (per Def. 3 and 5), there is nothing out of who judge confusedly of things, and are ourselves (extra intellectum) but Substance and its Modes. There is nothing out of not wont to inquire into first causes, it will ourselves whereby things can be distin- be difficult to admit the demonstration of guished amongst one another, except Sub- Prop. 7, because they do not sufficiently stances, or (which is the same thing, per distinguish between the modifications of Def. 4*) their Attributes and Modes. Substances, and Substances themselves, PROP. V. It is impossible that there should be and are ignorant of the manner in which two or more Substances of the same nature, things are produced. Hence it follows, or of the same Attribute. Demonst. If there are many different Substances that the commencement which they see they must be distinguished by the diversity natural things have, they attribute to Subof their Attributes or of their Modes (per stances; for he who knows not the true Prop. 4). If only by the diversity of their causes of things, confounds all things, and Attributes, it is thereby conceded that there feigns that trees talk like men; that men is nevertheless only one Substance of the same Attribute; but if by their diversity of are formed from stones as well as from Modes, then Substance being prior in order seeds, and that all forms can be changed of time to its Modes, it must be considered into all other forms. So, also, those who independent of them; that is (per Def. 3 confound the divine nature with the human, and 6), cannot be conceived as distinguish-naturally attribute human affections to ed from another; that is (per Prop. 4), there cannot be many Substances, but only one Substance.-Q. E. D. PROP. VI. One Substance cannot be created by another Substance. Demonst. There cannot be two Substances with the same Attributes (per Prop. 5); that is (per Prop. 2), that have any thing in common with each other; and therefore (per Prop. 3) one cannot be the cause of the other. Corollary. Hence it follows that Substance cannot be created by any thing else. For there * In the original, by a slip of the pen, Axiom 4 is referred to instead of Def. 4; and Auerbach has followed the error in his translation. We notice it because the reference to Axiom 4 is meaningless, and apt to puzzle the student. God, especially as they are ignorant of how these affections are produced in the mind. But if men attended to the nature of Substance, they would not in the least doubt Prop. 7; nay, this proposition would be an axiom to all, and would be numbered among common notions. For, by Substance they would understand that which exists in itself, and is conceived through itself; i. e., the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge of any thing antecedent to it. But by modification they would un Here the potency and significance of Axiom 4 begins to unfold itself. †The reader will bear in mind the result of Des Cartes' philosophy, if he would fully seize Spino |