you instances in which the question has been raised, whether a particular office should or should not be a Parliamentary office; and some in which different offices have been deliberately removed from the one into the other class. The question how many of the public officers in Nova Scotia ought to be regarded as political, is one to be determined on the general principles I have before laid down, and with reference to various considerations arising from the peculiar exigencies of the public service, and the finances and social state of the colony. The practical end of responsible government would be satisfied by the removability of a single public officer, provided that through him public opinion could influence the general administration of affairs. Without quite assenting to the too modest estimate which your present Council have given of the resources of the province, I admit that the smallness of the community, its want of wealth, and the comparative deficiency of a class possessing leisure and independent incomes, preclude it from, at present, enjoying a very perfect division of public employments. Small and poor communities must be content to have their work cheaply and somewhat roughly done. Of the present members of your Council, the Attorney-General and Provincial Secretary, to whom the SolicitorGeneral should perhaps be added, appear to me sufficient to constitute the responsible advisers of the Governor. The holders of these offices should henceforth regard them as held on a political tenure. And, with a view to that end, the Provincial Secretary should be prepared, in the event of any change, to disconnect from his office that of the clerkship of the Council, which seems to be one that should on every account be held on a more permanent tenure. It is possible that in the event of any change being rendered necessary by the course of events in the Provincial Parliament, the party succeeding to power might insist on increasing this number of political offices, by adding to the list of those to be so regarded. In case such a question should arise, I must leave it to your discretion, on a view of various local and temporary circumstances, which I am unable at present to appreciate, to form your own decision with respect to any such demand. I should feel no objection to somewhat increasing the number of political offices (for instance, by appointing a financial secretary and a responsible chief of the department of public lands and works), should the expense of doing so, without injustice to those now in the public service, be found to be not more than the colonial revenue would conveniently bear. But I rely on your using your influence to resist that disposition, which a party succeeding to power often exhibits, to throw open the various offices of emolument to their friends, without sufficient regard to the mischiefs thereby permanently entailed on the public service. And it is but due to what I have seen of the conduct of the principal advocates of responsible government in Nova Scotia, to express my reliance on their public spirit and sober estimate of their country's position and interests, as the most effectual safeguard against any abuse of power. There is another safeguard which, even with the less considerate members of any party, you will, I think, find sufficient to protect the public interests against any great disposition unnecessarily to place offices hitherto held on what has practically been a tenure of good behaviour, on one of a more precarious nature. However desirous the people of Nova Scotia may be to establish the principal of responsible government, they would I feel assurd, shrink from effecting any reform, however just or necessary, at the cost of injustice to individuals. Now, when individuals have engaged in the public service under a belief, sanctioned by custom, that they obtained a tenure of their offices during good behaviour, it would be most unjust to change that tenure to one of dependence on a parliamentary majority, without ensuring_them a provision that would make up for the loss of official income. I think that the consideration that the grasping at any particular office would necessitate the provision of an adequate pension for its occupant, will be a salutary check on any disposition to carry party government beyond its just limits. This condition must be applied to the removal of those public officers who now have seats in your Executive Council, unless where they have clearly accepted office on an understanding to the contrary effect. I cannot suppose that the necessity of providing the requisite pensions will be deemed by the Assembly an unreasonable accompaniment of the establishment of parliamentary government. And hereafter I think it would be proper to recognise as an invariable rule, that no person should without such provision be deprived of any office (except upon the ground of unfitness or misconduct), unless he had accepted it on the distinct understanding that it was to be held virtually, as well as nominally, during pleasure. I entertain a strong conviction that the adoption of such a rule will be found conducive not only to the interests of the holders of offices, but also to those of the public, and to a true economy of the public money. As I have already observed, it is impossible to expect that men of superior capacity will devote themselves to the public service unless they are assured that their employment will be permanent, or are offered emoluments so large as to make up for the uncertainty of the tenure by which they are enjoyed. If the emoluments of public employment are small, and its tenure at the same time uncertain, a strong temptation is given to the holders to endeavour to make up for these disadvantages by irregular gains, and thus to give rise to practices equally injurious to the community in a pecuniary and in a moral point of view. You will observe that, in the preceding observations, I have assumed that those only of the public servants, who are to be regarded as removable on losing the confidence of the Legislature, are to be members of the Executive Council. This I consider to follow from the principles I have laid down. Those public servants, who hold their offices permanently, must upon that very ground be regarded as subordinate, and ought not to be members of either house of the Legislature, by which they would necessarily be more or less mixed up in party struggles; and, on the other hand, those who are to have the general direction of affairs exercise that function by virtue of their responsibility to the Legislature, which implies their being removable from office, and also that they should be members either of the Assembly or of the Legislative Council. But this general direction of affairs, and the control of all subordinate officers, it is the duty of the Governor to exercise through the Executive Council; hence the seats in that Council must be considered as in the nature of political offices, and if held in connexion with other offices must give to these also a political character. This, however, leads me to observe, that if only two or three of the principal offices are to be regarded as political, it may very probably be advisable to assign salaries to two or three of the Executive Councillors as such. The Executive Council has duties of a very important character to perform; those duties, and the defects in the manner in which they had then generally been discharged I find thus described in a confidential despatch which the late Lord Sydenham, then Mr. P. Thomson, addressed to Lord J. Russell, from Halifax, in the year 1840: "The functions of the Executive Council, on the other hand are, it is "perfectly clear, of a totally different character. They are a body upon "whom the Governor must be able to call at any or at all times for advice; "with whom he can consult upon the measures to be submitted to the "Legislature, and in whom he may find instruments, within its walls, to "introduce such amendments in the laws as he may think necessary, or to "defend his acts and his policy. It is obvious, therefore, that those who "compose this body must be persons whose constant attendance on the "Governor can be secured; principally, therefore, officers of the Govern"ment itself; but, when it may be expedient to introduce others, men hold"ing seats in one or other House, taking a leading part in political life, "and above all exercising influence over the Assembly." "The last, and, in my opinion, by far the most serious defect in the “Government, is the utter absence of power in the Executive, and its total "want of energy to attempt to occupy the attention of the country upon "real improvements, or to lead the Legislature in the preparation and adop"tion of measures for the benefit of the colony. It does not appear to "have occurred to any one that it is one of the first duties of the Govern"ment to suggest improvements where they are wanted. That the constitu"tion having placed the power of legislation in the hands of an Assembly "and a Council, it is only by acting through these bodies that this duty can "be performed, and that if these proper and legitimate functions of Gov"ernment are neglected, the necessary result must be, not only that the "improvements which the people have a right to expect will be neglected, "and the prosperity of the country checked, but that the popular branch of "the Legislature will misuse its power, and the popular mind be easily led "into excitement, upon mere abstract theories of government, to which "their attention is directed as the remedy for the uneasiness they feel." In this view of the proper functions of the Executive Council I entirely concur; but I greatly doubt whether they could be adequately discharged by a Council composed of only two or three persons holding offices in the public service, and of gentlemen serving gratuitously. It is hardly possible to expect that those so serving should devote any large portion of their time to their public duties, and it therefore appears to me highly desirable that salaries should be assigned to at least one or two seats in the Executive Council. On such terms as these, which I have thus detailed, it appears to me that the peculiar circumstances of Nova Scotia present no insuperable obstacle to the immediate adoption of that system of parliamentary government which has long prevailed in the mother country, and which seems to be a necessary part of representative institutions in a certain stage of their progress. I have thought it due to you to enter thus fully into the practical difficulties to be encountered in giving effect to those general principles which, in my despatch of the 3d of November, I laid down for your guidance in the selection of your responsible advisers. I am in hopes that the present despatch will leave you in no doubt as to the course to be pursued by you in the event of any changes of which you may anticipate the contingency. I owed it to you to make myself clearly understood on this point; and I trust that what I have now said, will be regarded by your Council as amounting to such a declaration of my views as was requested by them in their letter of the 30th January. [Trans. T. Walrond, Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin, 2nd Edn., London, 1873.] Several causes co-operate together to give to personal and party interests the overweening importance which attaches to them in the estimation of local politicians. There are no real grievances here to stir the depths of the popular mind. We are a comfortable people, with plenty to eat and drink, no privileged classes to excite envy, or taxes to produce irritation. It were ungrateful to view these blessings with regret, and yet I believe that they account in some measure for the selfishness of public men and their indifference to the higher aims of statesmanship. The comparatively small number of members of which the popular bodies who determine the fate of provincial administrations consist, is also. I am inclined to think, unfavourable to the existence of a high order of 1 For Elgin's rule in Canada, see Bourinot, Lord Elgin, and G. M. Wrong, Lord KK Elgin, principle and feeling among official personages. A majority of ten in an assembly of seventy may probably be, according to Cocker, equivalent to a majority of 100 in an assembly of 700. In practice, however, it is far otherwise. The defection of two or three individuals from the majority of ten puts the administration in peril. Thence the perpetual patchwork and trafficking to secure this vote and that, which (not to mention other evils) so engrosses the time and thoughts of ministers, that they have not leisure for matters of greater moment. It must also be remembered that it is only of late that the popular assemblies in this part of the world have acquired the right of determining who shall govern them-of insisting, as we phrase it, that the administration of affairs shall be conducted by persons enjoying their confidence. It is not wonderful that a privilege of this kind should be exercised at first with some degree of recklessness, and that, while no great principles of policy are at stake, methods of a more questionable character for winning and retaining the confidence of these arbiters of destiny should be resorted to. My course in these circumstances, is, I think, clear and plain. It may be somewhat difficult to follow occasionally, but I feel no doubt as to the direction in which it lies. I give to my ministers all constitutional support, frankly and without reserve, and the benefit of the best advice that I can afford them in their difficulties. In return for this, I expect that they will, in so far as it is possible for them to do so, carry out my views for the maintenance of the connexion with Great Britain and the advancement of the interests of the province. On this tacit understanding we have acted together harmoniously up to this time, although I have never concealed from them that I intended to do nothing which may prevent me from working cordially with their opponents, if they are forced upon me. That ministries and oppositions should occasionally change places, is of the very essence of our constitutional system, and it is probably the most conservative element which it contains. By subjecting all sections of politicians in their turn to official responsibilities, it obliges heated partisans to place some restraint on passion, and to confine within the bounds of decency the patriotic zeal with which, when out of place, they are wont to be animated. In order, however, to secure these advantages, it is indispensable that the head of the Government should show that he has confidence in the loyalty of all the influential parties with which he has to deal, and that he should have no personal antipathies to prevent him from acting with leading men. I feel very strongly that a Governor-General, by acting upon these views with tact and firmness, may hope to establish a moral influence in the province which will go far to compensate for the loss of power consequent on the surrender of patronage to an executive responsible to the local Parliament. Until, however, the functions of his office, under our amended colonial constitution, are more clearly defined-until that middle term which shall reconcile the faithful discharge of his responsibility to the Imperial Government and the province with the maintenance of the quasimonarchical relation in which he now stands towards the community over which he presides, be discovered and agreed upon, he must be content to tread along a path which is somewhat narrow and slippery, and to find that incessant watchfulness and some dexterity are requisite to prevent him from falling, on the one side into the néant of mock sovereignty, or on the other into the dirt and confusion of local factions. CLXIV ELGIN TO LADY ELGIN,' 1847 [Trans. T. Walrond, op. cit.] I still adhere to my opinion that the real and effectual vindication of Lord Durham's memory and proceedings will be the success of a GovernorGeneral of Canada who works out his views of government fairly. Depend upon it, if this country is governed for a few years satisfactorily, Lord Durham's reputation as a statesman will be raised beyond the reach of cavil. I do not indeed know whether I am to be the instrument to carry out this work, or be destined, like others, who have gone before me, to break down in the attempt; but I am still of opinion that the thing may be done, though it requires some good-fortune and some qualities not of the lowest order. I find on my arrival here a very weak Government almost as much abused by their friends as by their foes, no civil or private secretary, and an immense quantity of arrears of business. It is possible, therefore, that I may not be able to bear up against the difficulties of my situa tion, and that it may remain for some one else to effect that object, which many reasons would render me so desirous to achieve. CLXV ELGIN TO EARL GREY [Trans. Imperial Blue Books relating to Canada, Vol. XV.] My Lord, Government House, Montreal, I regret to state that rioting, attended with some consequences much to be regretted, though happily with no injury to life, or, except in one instance, to person, has taken place in the city of Montreal during the last few days. I hasten to furnish your Lordship with an account of what has actually occurred, lest you should be misled by exaggerated reports conveyed through the United States. 2. In consequence of the unexpected arrival of vessels with merchandize at the Port of Quebec, it became necessary for me to proceed, on a short notice, to Parliament, on Wednesday last, in order to give the Royal Assent to a Customs Bill which had that day passed the Legislative Council; and I considered that, as this necessity had arisen, it would not be expedient to keep the public mind in suspense by omitting to dispose, at the same time, of the other Acts in which the two branches of the local Parliament had at an earlier period of the session concurred, and which still awaited my decision. Among these was the Act to provide for the indemnification of parties in Lower Canada whose property was destroyed during the Rebellion in 1837 and 1838, with respect to which, as your Lordship is aware, much excitement has unhappily been stirred. 3. I herewith enclose, for your Lordship's perusal, a printed copy of the Act in question, and I shall not fail by the first mail to furnish you with full information respecting its character and objects, the circumstances which led to its introduction, and the grounds on which I resolved after much reflection, to sanction it. No money can be paid under it as indemnity for a considerable period, so that Her Majesty's power of disallowance can be exercised with effect, should Her Majesty be so advised, notwithstanding the course which I have taken. As I am writing this Despatch in haste, with a view to its transmission by way of New York, I shall confine myself for the present to a statement of the proceedings by which the peace of the city has been disturbed. 1 Daughter of Lord Durham. |