be preferred by a Council, who, in the wanton exercise of authority, were disposed to transgress all bounds?

The next objection which I am bound to notice, is given in the report: "Let us suppose that an officer of the militia in Upper Canada, after an action, was to order that the persons taken in that action should be put to death on the field. I can conceive it possible, in a state of exasperation and conflict with the people of the neighbouring States, that the Assembly might applaud that conduct, and might require that it should be the rule and not the exception,-that all invaders of their territory should be treated in that manner, and that the parties should be put to death without trial. Supposing that to be the case; could the Government of this country adopt such a rule? Could the Secretary of State for the Colonies sanction such a rule, and not decide, as my honourable friend the under-secretary has done, that the practice should meet with his decided reprehension?"

Now, my Lord, admitting that such a case might occur once in half a century, under the new system, let me remind your Lordship that it has already occurred under the old. If it is to have any weight, the fact of its occurrence in a Province in which the Executive Council is irresponsible and the Colonial Secretary is in the exercise of his full powers, makes in favour of my argument; while I have a right to deny, until proof is furnished, that it could occur, if matters were more wisely ordered, and a more rational system established, by which all temptations to foreigners to make inroads into British Provinces, speculating upon the disaffection of the people, would be removed. But, my Lord, life has been taken under your system-"death" has been inflicted "without trial," illegally, as you infer-and has any punishment followed? Have the laws been vindicated? No!. Then why not? Simply, I presume, because your beautiful mode of government has produced such a state of things in a British Province, that the ministers of the Queen dare not bring the man charged with this high offence to trial. Under a system of responsibility, by which the population were left to manage their domestic affairs, I hold that no such violation of law would be likely to ocurr, and, that if it did, investigation would be as safe, and punishment as certain, as though a crime had been committed in Middlesex, or Surrey.

I have thus disposed, my Lord, of the military questions; and, as I have left Her Majesty and her representatives in full control of the army and navy and of the militia force of British America, and have asserted no claim of the Colonists to interfere with foreign treaties and diplomatic arrangements affecting the empire at large; I think, if peace be not maintained with foreign states, the punishment for offences strictly military be not awarded, the blame will not rest with the Executive Councillors, who are to exercise no jurisdiction over these matters, and cannot be responsible if others fail in their duty.

Let me now turn to another class of objections, arising out of our Colonial and foreign trade. "Again," says your Lordship, "neither could this analogy be maintained with regard to trade between Canada and the mother country, or Canada and any other country. How then can you adopt a principle from which such large exceptions are to be made? If you were to do so, you would be continually on the borders of dispute and conflict; the Assembly and the Executive, on the one hand, requiring a certain course to be pursued, while the Governor, on the other hand, would be as constantly declaring that it was a course he could not adopt; so that, instead of furnishing matter of content and harmony in these Provinces, you would be affording new matter for dispute and discontent if you were to act upon this supposed analogy." Now, my Lord, I feel it my duty to state, that you may take from any part you please to select, of England, Ireland, or Scotland, two hundred thousand persons, and among them you will not find a larger number than are to be found in Nova Scotia, well informed as to the degree of authority in matters of trade, which, for the good of the whole empire and the preservation of the advantages in which all are to participate, it is necessary to confide to the care of the Sovereign and the

wisdom of the Imperial Parliament. The great corporations of London, of Bristol, and of Liverpool, do not presume to interfere with these, except by petition and remonstrance, neither do we. Each of these cities has the right to levy small duties within their own limits, for matters of internal regulation or to aid public improvements; and these rights they exercise, in common with us, when they do not contravene any British statutes necessary for the protection of the trade of the empire. But, if it can be shown that a law bears unequally upon London or Halifax, and that a flagrant case of hardship exists; or if the industry of any portion of the people, either in England or the Colonies is taxed, while no corresponding advantage is reaped by any other portion; or that,if reaped, it is an unfair and illegitimate advantage,—an appeal is made to Parliament. We have hitherto been contented, although not directly represented in that Assembly, to abide the result of that appeal; or to pass bills, taking our chance of their being assented to in England. The same thing would occur, even if the Executive Council was responsible; for, upon this point, there is no part of our population prepared to set up absurd or irrational claims. If Parliament should undertake to legislate directly against our interests; to cut up our commerce, and prevent the growth of domestic industry; and, after fair notice and ample proof of injury, were to persist in such a course; why then a state of things would arise, which similar policy produced elsewhere, in other times, and upon the results of which either responsible or irresponsible Councils would exercise but little influence. But, as political economists at home are every day becoming convinced that the more liberty they afford to the Colonist to conduct his commercial operations the greater will be his demand for British manufactures; and as, under the guidance of this enlightened policy, the laws of trade and navigation are annually becoming less restrictive, it is not probable that difficulties, which were never insuperable, will all of a sudden admit of no rational remedy; or that the boundaries of Colonial and Imperial authority, now so well understood, and the recognition of which is so easily enforced, will often be called in question on either side. If the Colonists assert rights which do not belong to them, and persist in their contumacy, disturbing solemn treaties and setting acts of Parliament at naught; why then they have broken the social compact, it is a case of rebellion and they must be put down.

Let us reduce the difficulty to practice, for the purpose of illustration. Suppose that both branches of the Legislature pass a law by which a heavy duty is laid on British broadcloths, and those from the United States are admitted duty free; and that the Executive Council, being responsible, advise the Lieutenant-Governor to assent to it. Such an absurd piece of bad faith as this could never be attempted in the lower Provinces; for public opinion would never sanction any interference with the general laws, not intended to remedy abuses, or that struck at Colonial without promoting British prosperity; nor would any changes be popular which violated the fraternal comity by which British subjects everywhere are bound to encourage and protect each other. But I have supposed the law passed and presented. The Governor would say in this case, as he now invariably says-as your Lordship admits he must say, if urged to provoke a foreign war: “Gentlemen, you are exceeding your powers. To legislate for your own advantage is one thing; to legislate directly against your brethren at home, for the advantage of foreigners, is another. This bill must be either modified or rejected, or reserved for Her Majesty's assent before it can go into operation." If the parties urging it persisted, a dissolution might be tried, and an appeal to British subjects, in a case where the Governor was clearly right and his advisers wrong, would never be made in vain; particularly when aided by the Constitutional opposition, which, under a system of responsibility and manly competition, would exist in every Colony. But if it failed; and such an almost impossible thing were upon the cards, as that a majority could be found in Nova Scotia to sustain such an act, or anything bearing a resemblance to it, then a case would have occurred for the interference of the Imperial authorities, who should'

say to us frankly: If you will come into unnatural and hostile collision, the weakest has the most to fear.

Had your Lordship been as familiar with the mode of dealing with such subjects as most Colonists are who have watched the proceedings of Colonial Assemblies, you would have been satisfied that no danger was to be apprehended from violent collisions about matters of trade. When a new duty is proposed in Nova Scotia or a reduction suggested, the first question asked on all sides is, Will the proposition violate the letter or does it even run counter to the spirit of the Imperial Acts? If it does, In eight cases out of ten, the person bringing the measure forward drops it, on being assured of the fact. In the ninth case, where a doubt exists as to the policy and wisdom of Imperial legislation it is found, on inquiry, that the clause which seemed to press upon us, originated in a wide view over the whole field of commerce, which British statesmen, often better than others whose positions afford fewer advantages, are enabled to take and that its repeal would inflict an injury and not confer a benefit. The tenth case is perhaps one in which the Imperial Parliament, either from haste, or prejudice, or insufficient information, has committed an error in political economy, or inflicted a wound upon Colonial without benefiting British industry. In this case (and they only occur once in a great while) no one ever dreams, that, as your Lordship expresses it, the Imperial Legislature is to be "overruled" by that of the colony. We never doubt but that an appeal to the good sense and the justice of our brethren over the water will be successful. A bill is passed, perhaps, to meet the difficulty; and an explanation of the facts and reasoning in which it originated, is sent with it, in the form of an address to the throne, and in most cases is found to be successful.

This is the mode at present. What reason is there to suppose that it would be much changed, if we had an Executive Council, whose powers and responsibilities did not extend to matters of general commerce, already provided for by Imperial legislation? If we are so fond of violent conflicts and factious opposition, what hinders us from indulging our propensities now? Shall we be less considerate the more kindly we are treated? Shall we have less respect for Imperial legislation, when we see that it leaves us the entire management of our domestic affairs and only deals with those great interests which transcend our authority and are beyond our control? Suppose twelve Nova Scotians, who are not responsible to any authority under Heaven, are made accountable to the rest of their countrymen, shall we have a man the more for forcible resistance than we have now-or a gun,a pike, a bomb, or a barrel of powder?

I have thus, my Lord, gone over the arguments urged by your Lordship in the speech of the 3rd of June. I have omitted none that appear to me to have the slightest bearing upon the great question at issue, and I trust I have given to each a fair and satisfactory answer. I have written not only under a solemn sense of duty, but with a full assurance that sophistry, woven around this question, either on one side of the Atlantic or the other, would be torn to shreds in the conflict of acute and vigorous minds now engaged in its discussion. Had your Lordship, in announcing the decision of the Cabinet, forborne to state the reasons upon which that decision was founded, Í might, like counsel at the bar under similar circumstances, have felt myself compelled to acquiesce in a judgment, neither the justice nor the policy of which I could fathom. But when the arguments were stated, and when I saw a question involving the peace and security of six extensive Provinces, and the freedom and happiness of a million and a half of British subjects, disposed of by a mode of reasoning which I knew to be deceptive and unsound,-when I saw, in fact, that the parties claiming their rights were to be turned out of court, with all the arguments and all the evidence on their side, I felt that to remain silent would be to deserve the social and political degradation which this unjust decision was to entail on my countrymen and myself; to earn the Helot mark of exclusion from the blessings of that Constitutional freedom, which our forefathers struggled to bequeathe; and which we should never

cease to demand, as a patrimony that runs with our blood, and cannot be rightfully severed from our name.

JOSEPH HOWE.

CXL

JOSEPH HOWE TO LORD JOHN RUSSELL

[Trans. J. H. Chisholm, op. cit.]

My Lord, The business of factious demagogues of all parties is to find fault with everything, to propose nothing practical, to oppose whatever is suggested, to misrepresent and to defame. The object of honest and rational politicians ought to be to understand each other to deal frankly, abhoring concealment, that mistakes may not be made about facts, terms or intentions; to deal fairly, giving credit for a desire to elicit truth, and a wish to weigh in a just balance both sides of every question. Having put before you such evidence as I hope will lead your Lordship's mind to the conclusion that the system by which the North American Colonies are at present governed, must be abandoned, it is not improbable that your Lordship may inquire what it is that we are desirous to substitute for that system? The demand is a reasonable one. The party who seek this change are bound to prove that they have a safe and intelligable remedy for the evils of which they complain. If I cannot show your Lordship that, without endangering the authority of the mother country over her Provinces, weakening the constitutional powers of the Crown, or trenching on the high privileges and wide range of duty assigned to the Imperial Parliament, a better form of government than that which I am anxious to overturn-one more nearly conforming to the practice and spirit of the Constitution, as understood at home-to the wants and peculiar situation of these Colonies, and less repugnant to the feelings and prejudices of Englishmen everywhere, can be established, then I must quit the field of argument, and cannot complain if your Lordship adheres to your own opinions.

From what has been already written, it will be seen that I leave to the Sovereign, and to the Imperial Parliament, the uncontrolled authority over the military and naval force distributed over the Colonies; that I carefully abstain from trenching upon their right to bind the whole empire, by treaties and other diplomatic arrangements, with foreign states; or to regulate the trade of the Colonies with the mother country,and with each other. I yield to them also the same right of interference which they now exercise over Colonies and over English incorporated towns; whenever a desperate case of factious usage of the powers confided, or some reason of state, affecting the preservation of peace and order, call for that interference. As the necessity of the case, the degree and nature of this interference, would always be fully discussed by all parties concerned, I am not afraid of these great powers being often abused, particularly as the temptations to use them would be much lessened if the internal administration were improved.

The Colonial Secretary's duties should be narrowed to a watchful supervision over each Colony, to see that the authority of the Crown was not impaired, and that Acts of Parliament and public treaties were honestly and firmly carried out; but he should have no right to appoint more than two or three officers in each Province, and none to intermeddle in any internal affair, so long as the Colonial Government was conducted without conflict with the Imperial Government and did not exceed the scope of its authority. This would give him enough to do, without heaping upon him duties so burdensome and various that they cannot be discharged with honour by any man, however able; nor with justice or safety to the millions whose interests they affect. His responsibility should be limited to the extent of his powers; and as these would be familiar to every Englishman,

exposure and punishment would not be difficult, in case of ignorance, incapacity or neglect.

I have shown, in the illustration drawn from the city of Liverpool, that most Governors come out to Colonies so ignorant of their geography and topography, climate, productions, commerce, resources and wants; and above all, of the parties, passions and prejudices which divide them; and of the character, talents and claims of the men by whom the population are influenced and led, that for the first six or twelve months they are like overgrown boys at school. It is equally clear, that while the business of government must move on, and the administration commence from the day on which the new Governor arrives, the schoolmasters, from whom all his facts are derived from whom he gathers his views of internal affairs, and his impressions, not only of different parties, but of individuals in each party, are the irresponsible Executive Councillors, whom the present system calls around him; and who, possessed of such advantages, rarely fail, before he can by any possibility escape from their toils, to embroil him with the popular branch of the Legislature, and the mass of the people by whom it is sustained.

Now let us suppose, that when a Governor arrives in Nova Scotia, he finds himself surrounded, not by this irresponsible Council, who represent nothing except the whims of his predecessors and the interests of a few families (so small in point of numbers, that but for the influence which office and the distribution of patronage give them, their relative weight in the country would be ridiculously diminutive), but by men who say to him: "May it please Your Excellency, there was a general election in this Province last month, or last year, or the year before last, and an administration was formed on the results of that election. We, who compose the Council, have ever since been steadily sustained by a majority of the commons and have reason to believe that our conduct and policy have been satisfactory to the country at large." A Governor thus addressed, would feel that at all events he was surrounded by those who represented a majority of the population; who possessed the confidence of an immense body of the electors, and who had been selected by the people who had the deepest interest in his success, to give him advice and to conduct the administration. If he had doubts on this point-if he had reason to believe that any factious combination had obtained office improperly, and wished to take the opinions of the country; or if the Executive Council sought to drive him into measures not sanctioned by the charter; or exhibited a degree of grasping selfishness which was offensive and injurious, he could at once dissolve the Assembly and appeal to the people: who here, as in England, would relieve him from doubt and difficulty; and, fighting out the battle on the hustings, rebuke the Councillors if they were wrong. This would be a most important point gained in favour of the Governor; for he is now the slave of an irresponsible Council, which he cannot shake off; and is bound to act by the advice of men, who, not being accountable for the advice they give, and having often much to gain and nothing to lose by giving bad advice, may get him into scrapes every month, and lay the blame on him. The Governors would, in fact, have the power of freeing themselves from thraldom to the family compacts, which none of them can now escape by the exercise of any safe expedient known to our existing Constitutions. It will be seen, too, that by this system, whatever sections or small parties might think or say, the Governor could never, by any possibility, become, what British Governors have of late been everywhere, embroiled with the great body of the inhabitants over whom he was sent to preside. The Governor's responsibility would also be narrowed to the care of the Queen's prerogative, the conservation of treaties, the military defence, and the execution of the Imperial Acts; the local administration being left in the hands of those who understand it, and who were responsible. His position would then be analogous to that of the Sovereign-he could do no wrong in any matter of which the Colonial Legislature had the right to judge; but would be accountable to the Crown, if he betrayed the Imperial interests committed to his care.