This, or something approaching to it, not being an unusual condition of politics, it may easily be supposed that few, if any persons, possess sufficient influence to conduct affairs; and from this state of things, it is to be presumed, has arisen the practice in all colonial governments with legislatures, of the governors standing as mediators between parties, yielding and leaning to the popular voice, but resisting it with the authority of their office, when it was manifestly in error.

It must be supposed that had the system proposed by the Earl of Durham been long since adopted, the popular will would have prevailed to a far greater extent than heretofore, and yet most of the practical evils found in the colonies have arisen from measures popular at the time of their enactment.

The preservation of the French language, laws, and institutions, and the consequent perpetuation of the contest between the races, so strongly deprecated by the Earl of Durham, was a popular measure, and must have prevailed even more injuriously, and even destructively, under a responsible government.

The concessions of public lands to U. E. Loyalists and their children, to militia, and other grantees not resident upon the lands, which now form an acknowledged public grievance, were popular measures: the persons who benefited by them being the population of the country, and those who complain of them not being yet arrived.

age

The parliamentary grants for local works, and the disposal of funds by commissioners named by the legislature, and the abuse of this patronare evidently founded upon, and rising out of, the parliamentary influence sought to be made supreme, and are evils which might have been greatly exaggerated, but could not have been lessened by responsible Government. In fact they prove that governors should oftener take the responsibility of resisting the popular voice than they have been hitherto accustomed.

The very change in political sentiments, produced by the constant introduction of new population from Great Britain, shows that legislation in these colonies ought to be conducted with some view to the interests of those not represented in the legislature, but who may soon form the great mass of the subjects of the Crown in America. A responsible cabinet must, however, look exclusively to the party of the day, and in its favour neglect the great future interests of the Province.

In short, local and sectional interests are felt too strongly and directly in elective bodies, in small communities, to permit of consistent legislation on general principles, and the objects to be gained during the short period for which the majority hold their influence, are of too much consequence, compared with distinct general results, to permit of the perfectly unchecked course which would result from responsible government.

Although the points are few in which it is the interest of England directly to interfere with local and internal affairs in the colonies, your Committee are at a loss to conceive how, in a government so independent as this is proposed to be made of England, these few points can by any means be excluded from the control of the local parliament-a disagreement with the cabinet and legislature on the subject of foreign trade,immigration, disposal of lands, or any of the excluded topics, will just as readily induce a stoppage of the supplies, with all the consequences, as any of the questions within the range of local legislature, and if we can suppose cases in which the interests of the empire and that of the colony should be different, it is vain to expect that any set of public servants who should espouse the general interests could continue in authority.

Even in the question of peace and war, excluded alike from local legislation in the several states of America, as in the colonies, we have seen how nearly in the states of Michigan, New York, and Maine, the prevalence of popular opinion produced a terrible national war: how the arm of government was paralysed, and the licentious and outrageous conduct of the populace encouraged by local authorities, because of the influence of this excluded and forbidden question upon the elections of local governors and

local legislatures:-and it cannot be questioned that little more exacerbation of the public mind in Upper Canada, would have caused such a desire for reprisal and retaliation, as would have placed any local responsible cabinet, desirous to maintain peace on the border, in direct collision with the popular voice.

A stronger instance of the necessity for interference in local affairs than the recommendation of the British Government for a merciful course towards the prisoners presented, could scarcely have occurred, for it has justly been observed, that the honour of England would suffer, if life were taken unnecessarily. But to prevent its being taken to a much greater extent than has been permitted, required much firmness in the advisers of the government, and much reliance on their part on the Imperial authorities for support in the humane course recommended by them.

To conclude this subject, your Committee would observe, that so long as England holds sway in the colonies, there will be a majority seeking for power in the Provinces; and a minority for justice and protection, and impartial government. The moment the provincial magnates are made supreme by the proposed system, interference to do justice will be a breach of faith; and let it be recollected, that if England refuse the umpirage between contending parties, there is a power at hand, ready and anxious to join with either, and watching for the favourable opportunity.

From these reasonings, it appears evident, that the expenses of military defence in Canada are not to be avoided by a partial independence, or by anything short of abandonment. These expenses have not been incurred in consequence of any want of popular concessions: they have been caused by the unprincipled and outrageous conduct of the border Americans, which can only be held in check by military defences, or by the influence of British power, upon the American people, through their government.

Referring to the causes of the late insurrection, your Committee would observe, that it is not to be contended, that the influence over the public mind, caused by Sir Francis Head having placed the question at issue in such a light as to show political evils arising from the reform system so strongly as to produce the change in the elections of 1836, could either produce or excuse rebellion. The question at issue involved consequences of vital importance: nor could the rebellion be produced or excused by comparisons made by the public, to the disadvantage of the Reformers. The only pretence amongst all those urged, having any colour of argument, is the alleged corruption at the elections, and the influence then obtained by government. But this pretext seems, upon examination, as unfounded as the others: a people who will permit themselves, in a country in which the elective franchise is so widely diffused, to be bribed or influenced into returning an overwhelming majority to parliament, are not the most likely, therefore, to rise in rebellion against their own decision; and as to the fact of corruption on the part of the government, so far from there being any means of attempting such a course, it is with great difficulty that the government can find the means of carrying on itself, without any such expensive interference with the rights of electors. If the assertion were not too absurd for dispute upon it, reference might be had to the returns from the public offices, and to the proceedings in the Assembly, in which the reformers were invited, in vain, to sustain any one of these accusations, as a full refutation of the charge of corrupt interference influencing the elections.

That dissatisfaction prevailed amongst the defeated party, as in all other cases, is admitted-and that the elected members did not possess the confidence of those who voted against them, was to be expected; but that the successful majority were thereby driven into despair of good government, or were discontented with their own mode of putting members of their own choice into power, is not only contradicted by the argument that the remedy would always be in their own hands, but by the fact of the enthusiastic loyalty with which the populace of the country, chiefly those who formed the majority in the late elections, rallied round the very men and the governor, by whom, according to the complaint of the reformers,

they had been disappointed and betrayed. Your Committee are of opinion, that the proximity of the American frontier-the wild and chimerical notions of civil government broached and discussed there—the introduction of a very great number of border Americans into this Province as settlers who, with some most respectable and worthy exceptions, formed the bulk of the reformers, who carried these opinions so far as disaffection-together with the existence of actual rebellion, and the expectation of a general rising in Lower Canada, emboldened a portion of the minority to rise in rebellion in this Province, in the hope of achieving the overthrow of the Government with foreign assistance.

Is it because reformers, or a portion of them, can command the sympathies of the United States, and of Lower Canadian rebels, that the internal affairs of a British colony must be conducted so as to please them? Where would the colonial government have looked for support and defence,in its time of real danger, had proscription, and discouragement, and disregard, been the portion of those who had shown, at the elections, that they were willing to sacrifice a portion of popular influence, to the great object of retaining British connection?

How painfully must such men be excited,at reading, in Lord Durham's Report, what appears to be a justification of the course taken by the disaffected, without one word of approval of those who risked and endured so much in defence of British supremacy. In what manner, we ask, did the dominant party make use of the occasion, to persecute or disable the whole body of their political opponents? Who were the numbers of perfectly innocent men thrown into prison, and who suffered in person, property, and character? And what severe laws were passed in Upper Canada, under colour of which individuals very generally esteemed, were punished without any form of trial?

That some unauthorized individuals were prone to insult those whom they viewed, at the moment, as a fallen enemy, must have been the case. That the individuals, thus insulted, may have felt themselves aggrieved and annoyed, cannot be doubted-that a great many were thrown into prison (against whom the clearest proof of high treason was in the hands of the magistracy), but who were released without trial, a mercy which they most thankfully accepted, can easily be proved. That they were perfectly innocent, could only have been placed beyond dispute by a trial, but in the cases of the great number of individuals arrested, there were not only good grounds of suspicion, but means of proof of guilt, and it would be far, indeed, from being the interests of the parties themselves to provoke an inquiry.

It is true, that magistrates, sometimes looking to the circumstances of their own immediate neighbourhoods, rather than to the policy of the Government at large, proceeded with more zeal and strictness than the case demanded; but what good reason for complaint has the criminal, arrested for high treason, in the discovery, that the magistrate, by whose authority he is arrested, has a political leaning different from himself?

It is stated, in Lord Durham's Report, that it was generally believed, that the pardon of Samuel Lount, and Peter Matthews,' was solicited by no less than thirty thousand of their countrymen. The number of petitioners -men and women-who petitioned for these criminals, appear, upon examination, to be four thousand, five hundred, and seventy-four; such exaggerations necessarily refute themselves.

It is one of the most distressing effects of the publication of the Earl of Durham's Report, that His Lordship thus seems to condemn the execution of these men. If they really ought to have been spared, the publication of such a sentiment, from one in high authority, cannot restore them, but it must give rise to feelings, on the part of their friends, and their political party (who may never have imagined such a possibility as the escape from punishment of every one of the leaders of a rebellion, which inflicted so much calamity upon the Province), but who will now think 1 Samuel Lount and Peter Matthews took an active part in the Mackenzie RebelThey were executed in April, 1838.

lion.

that, had the Earl of Durham been in this Province, high treason would have been considered much in the same light as a riot at an election.

Your Committee having animadverted on the principal topics in the report of the High Commissioner, beg, ere they conclude, to observe that, as regards Upper Canada, Lord Durham could not possibly have any personal knowledge, the period of his sojourn in that Province being of such very short duration. Your Committee regret that His Lordship should have confided the task of collecting information to a person, who, be he whom he may, has evidently entered on his task, with the desire to exalt the opponents of the colonial government in the estimation of the High Commissioner, and to throw discredit on the statements of the supporters of British influence, and British connection-that he should, in such an attempt have laid himself open to severe censure, was to be expected. Your Committee have, however, through a feeling of respect for Her Majesty's Commissioner, refrained from commenting on his Report, in the terms which they honestly avow they think it merits, confident that their forbearance will meet the desires of your Honourable House, and be equally in accordance with the wishes of the family compact hereinbefore mentioned. All which is respectfully submitted.

Committee Room,

Legislative Council

11th day of May, 1839.

CXXXVI

J. S. MACAULAY,

Chairman.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL ON CANADIAN AFFAIRS, JUNE, 18391 [Trans. J. H. Chisholm, The Speeches and Public Letters of Joseph Howe (2 vols., 1909).]

There is another question upon which I am now going to state an opinion, which question, I think, is of the very greatest importance and upon which Lord Durham has expressed an opinion contrary to that entertained by this House-I mean the question with respect to the responsibility of the individual holding office of Governor in the Province. Lord Durham has stated that an analogy existed between the representative of the Crown in the Colony and the constitutional responsibility of the ministers in this country. He states that as soon as the ministers of the Crown have lost the confidence of the House of Commons in this country they cease to be ministers, and that they could not go on with the government with a constant minority. He adds that it is certainly a most unusual case for a ministry to go on for several months in a minority, and he then attempts to apply that principle to the government of Canada. Now, the resolution of this House on this subject was in these terms: "Resolved, That while it is expedient to improve the commission of the Executive Council of Lower Canada, it is unadvisable to subject it to that responsibility demanded by the House of Assembly of that Province." This House upon my motion came to that resolution, and I must own that there is nothing in this report which has at all, in my mind, shaken the argument by which at the time I supported that resolution. It does not appear to me that you can subject the Executive Council of Canada to the responsibility which is fairly demanded of the ministers of the executive power in this country. In the first place, there is an obvious difference in matter of form with regard to the instructions under which the Governor of a colony acts. The Sovereign in this country receives the advice of the ministers and acts

1 This speech was delivered on the introduction of the Act of Union, 3 June, 1839. It led to the famous open letters addressed to Lord John Russell (see Nos. CXXXVIICXL), which are invaluable in the literature of English political thought.

2 See No. CXXIV.

by the advice of those ministers, and indeed there is no important act of the Crown for which there is not some individual minister responsible. There responsibility begins and there it ends. But the Governor of Canada is acting, not in that high and unassailable position in which the Sovereign of this country is placed. He is a Governor receiving instructions from the Crown on the responsibility of a Secretary of State. Here, then, at once, is an obvious and complete difference between the Executive of this country and the Executive of a colony. The Governor might ask the Executive Council to propose a certain measure. They might say that they could not propose it unless the members of the House of Assembly would adopt it, but the Governor might reply that he had received instructions from home commanding him to propose that measure. How, in that case, is he to proceed? Either one power or the other must set set aside,either the Governor or the House of Assembly; or else the Governor must become a mere cipher in the hands of the Assembly and not attempt to carry into effect the measure which he is commanded by the home Government to do. But if we endeavour to carry out this analogy, there is one case that all the world allows is a case in which it could be applied-I mean the case of foreign affairs. If the Assembly of New Brunswick in the late collision carried on a dispute with the North American States-(Here some interruption occurred which gave rise to cries of "Order, Order.") The subject (continued the noble Lord) is certainly a very important one, and although I may express myself in very inadequate terms yet I do conceive that it is in my opinion one of the most important points contained in Lord Durham's report and one on which I differ with him. I ought to state the grounds of that difference. I say if the Assembly of New Brunswick had been disposed to carry the point in dispute with the North American States hostilely and the Executive Council had been disposed to aid them, in my opinion the Governor must have said that his duty to the Crown of this country and the general instructions which he had received from the minister of the Crown, did not permit him to take that course, and, therefore, he could not agree with the Executive Council to carry into effect the wish of the majority of the Assembly. That is allowed. Does not then this very exception destroy the analogy you wish to draw, when upon so important a point as that of foreign affairs, it cannot be sustained? Again neither could this analogy be maintained with regard to trade between Canada and the mother country or Canada and any other foreign country; how then can you adopt a principle from which such large exceptions are to be made? If you were to do so you would be continually on the borders of dispute and conflict; the Assembly and the Executive on the one hand requiring a certain course to be pursued, while the Governor on the other hand would be as constantly declaring that it was a course he could not adopt; so that instead of furnishing matter of content and harmony in these Provinces, you would be affording new matter for dispute and discontent, if you were to act upon this supposed analogy. But supposing you could lay down this broad principle and say that all external matters should be subject to the home Government and all internal affairs should be governed according to the majority of the Assembly, could you carry that principle into effect? I say we cannot abandon the responsibility which is cast upon us as ministers of this great empire. I will put a case, one merely of internal concern, that occurred only the other day. Let us suppose that a officer of Militia in Upper Canada after an action, was to order that the persons taken in that action should be put to death on the field. I can conceive it possible, in a state of exasperation and conflict with the people of a neighbouring state, that the Assembly might applaud that conduct and might require that it should be the rule, and not the exception, that all invaders of their territory should be treated in that manner and that the parties should be put to death without trial. Supposing that to be the case, could the Government of this country adopt such a rule? Could the Secretary of State for the Colonies sanction such a rule, and not decide, as his honourable friend the Under Secretary had done, that such a practise would meet with his decided