and for other purposes, 26 Stat. c. 1244, pp. 567, 612, to suspend by proclamation the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides, when he is satisfied that any country producing such articles imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other prod ucts of the United States, which he may deem to be reciprocally unequal or unreasonable, is not open to the objection that it unconsti tutionally transfers legislative power to the President, (FULLER, C. J., and LAMAR, J., dissenting ;) but even if it were it does not follow that other parts of the act imposing duties upon imported articles, are inoperative. Ib.
18. The court does not decide whether the provision in that act respecting bounties upon sugar (schedule E, Sugar, 26 Stat. 583) is or is not con- stitutional, because it is plain from the act that these bounties do not constitute a part of the system of customs duties imposed by the act, and it is clear that the parts of the act imposing such duties would remain in force even if these bounties were held to be unconstitution- ally imposed. Ib.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4, 7;
JURISDICTION, B, 6;
TAX AND TAXATION, 2.
In the interpretation of any particular clause of a contract, the court is not only at liberty, but required, to examine the entire contract, and may also consider the relations of the parties, their connection with the subject matter of the contract, and the circumstances under which it was made. Chicago, Rock Island &c. Railway v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad, 596.
Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of Sep- tember 19, 1890, c. 908, (26 Stat. 465,) in regard to the carriage of lottery matter in the mail, it is an offence to cause a lottery circular,
mailed at the city of New York, and addressed there to a person in Illinois, to be delivered to such person in Illinois, by mail, and an indictment for so doing is triable in Illinois. Horner v. United States, No. 1, 207.
2. At common law it was deemed essential in capital cases that inquiry be made of the defendant before judgment was passed whether he had anything to say why sentence of death should not be pronounced upon him; thus giving him an opportunity to allege any ground of arrest, or to plead a pardon if he had obtained one, or to urge any legal objection to further proceedings against him. And if the record did not show that such privilege was accorded to him the judgment would be reversed. Schwab v. Berggren, 442.
3. This rule, however, does not apply to an appellate court, which, upon review of the proceedings in the trial court, merely affirms a final judgment, without rendering a new one. Due process of law does not require his presence in the latter court at the time the judgment sen- tencing him to death is affirmed. Ib.
4. Neither the statutes of Illinois nor due process of law, require that the accused, upon the affirmance of the judgment sentencing him to death, shall be sentenced anew by the trial court. The judgment is not vacated by the writ of error; only its execution is stayed pending pro- ceedings in the appellate court. Ib.
5. The time and place of executing the sentence of death is not strictly part of the judgment unless made so by statute. lb.
6. The governor of Illinois has power under the constitution of that State, to commute the punishment of death to imprisonment for life in the penitentiary. Ib.
7. F. was convicted of murder, in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, and sentenced by that court to suffer the penalty of death. Upon writ of error to the Supreme Court of Illinois, that judgment was affirmed and the day fixed in the original judgment for carrying the sentence into execution having passed, that court fixed another day. After the expiration of the term the accused applied for a cor- rection of the record of the Supreme Court, so as to show that he was not present in that court when the original judgment was affirmed, and another day fixed for the execution. The application was denied upon the ground, in part, that amendments of the record of the court in derogation of the final judgment could not be allowed at a subse- quent term. Held, (1) That the law of Illinois, as declared by its highest court, in respect to amendments of the record, was applicable to all persons within the jurisdiction of that State, and its enforce- ment against the plaintiff in error was not a denial to him by the State of the equal protection of the laws; (2) That due process of law did not require the presence of the accused in the appellate court when the original judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and a new day fixed for his execution. Fielden v. Illinois, 452.
See CONSTITUTIONAL Law, A, 17, 18; STAtute, B, 4.
DISCOVERY.
See EQUITY, 1.
1. Section 354 of Rev. Stat. Dist. Columb., providing that "no person shall be appointed to office, or hold office in the police force [of the District of Columbia] who cannot read and write the English language, or who is not a citizen of the United States, or who shall ever have been in- dicted and convicted of crime; and no person shall be appointed as policeman or watchman who has not served in the army or navy of the United States and received an honorable discharge" was repealed by the act of June 11, 1878, "providing a permanent form of govern- ment for the District of Columbia." 20 Stat. 102, c. 180. District of Columbia v. Hutton, 18.
2. Eckloff v. District of Columbia, 135 U. S. 240, affirmed as to the point that the act of June 11, 1878, 20 Stat. 102, c. 180, supplied to the Dis- trict of Columbia for the first time a permanent form of government in the nature of a constitution.
EJECTMENT.
See JURISDICTION, C, 2.
1. A decree in a suit in equity found that T., an individual defendant, and the remaining assets of a corporation defendant, were liable to the plaintiff for the sum of $10,000 paid by him into the treasury of the company, at the instance of T., for a certificate of stock therein, which company was represented to him by T., who was its president, to be in a flourishing condition, when, in fact, it was insolvent; and dis- tributed $176.24 as the remaining assets of the company, of which $13.24 went to the plaintiff as a credit on his claim for $10,000; and. decreed that T. pay to the plaintiff $10,000, subject to a credit of the $13.24. There was no demurrer to the bill for multifariousness, and no objection taken in the court below for want of equity. The bill set out fraud in T., and that the $10,000 was due to the plaintiff by T. and the company, and required answers to interrogatories, which answers referred to the books of the company for information: Held, (1) To support jurisdiction in equity, there were in the case discovery, account, fraud, misrepresentation and concealment; the objection to the jurisdiction was not taken in the court below; and the case was not
one of a plain defect of equity jurisdiction, under § 723 of the Revised Statutes; (2) The decree was not outside of the case made by the bill, but gave relief agreeable to it, under the prayer for general relief; (3) The evidence sustained the decree, and the report of a master, finding in favor of the plaintiff the facts on which the decree was based, was not excepted to by T. Tyler v. Savage, 79.
2. A court of equity will not aid a party whose application is destitute of conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence, but will discourage stale demands, for the peace of society, by refusing to interfere where there has been gross laches in prosecuting rights, or where long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights has occurred; and in these respects each case must be governed by its own circumstances. Hammond v. Hopkins, 224.
8. A suit in equity being appropriate for determining the boundary between two States, the fact that the present suit is in equity, and not at law, is no valid objection to it. United States v. Texas, 621.
1. On the trial of an action to recover from a carrier freights improperly collected from the consignees on shipments by plaintiff, the plaintiff, who was his own witness, was asked several questions with the apparent design of showing that he had had other transactions with the defend- ant, upon which he was indebted to defendant, and that there was a judgment pending against him in favor of defendant. Held, that these questions were not admissible. National Steamship Co. v. Tug- man, 28.
2. It being shown that a paper was served as a copy of an affidavit on behalf of the defendant, with an order to show cause in the action on trial, it is thereby sufficiently authenticated to enable it to be read in evidence against him, and it is competent evidence on behalf of the plaintiff as an admission by the defendant that the facts stated in the affidavit are true. Ib.
3. Parol evidence of what is said between a passenger on a railroad and the ticket-seller of the company, at the time of the purchase by the passenger of his ticket, is admissible as going to make up the contract of carriage and forming part of it. Erie Railroad Co. v. Winter, 60.
4. In order to justify a court in refusing to enforce a settlement of a quar- rel between the members of a large family, growing out of disputes about the wills of their father and other members of the family, and out of money transactions between brothers and sisters, upon the ground that the settlement was obtained by misrepresentation, active or covert, or that it failed to express the real intent of the parties, the
testimony should establish the fact clearly and satisfactorily; and in this case it is not so established. Chandler v. Pomeroy, 318.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 15; MINERAL LAND.
After the term at which a trial took place has expired, without the court's control over the case being reserved by standing rule or special order, and especially after a writ of error has been entered in this court, the court below cannot allow a bill of exceptions then first presented, or amend a bill of exceptions already allowed and filed. Michigan Insurance Bank v. Eldred, 293.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
1. An administrator, appointed in one State, who, after appearing and having judgment rendered against him as such in a suit in equity brought in another State, the laws of which authorize a foreign admin- istrator to sue there, files a bill of review in the same court to reverse the decree, for the reason that, not being an administrator appointed by the courts of that State, he could not be sued there, is bound by the original judgment against him, if his bill of review is dismissed for want of equity. Lawrence v. Nelson, 215.
2. The general equity jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States to administer, as between citizens of different States, the assets of a deceased person within its jurisdiction cannot be defeated or im- paired by laws of a State undertaking to give exclusive jurisdiction to its own courts. lb.
Where a person is committed in one district, by a United States commis- sioner, for trial in another, the question of his identity cannot be re- viewed on habeas corpus. Horner v. United States, No. 1, 207.
The stealing of distilled spirits from a distillery warehouse by reason of the omission of the internal revenue officers to provide sufficient locks on the doors affords no defence to an action on the distiller's bond to pay the tax due on the spirits before their removal and within three years from the date of entry. United States v. Witten, 76.
« AnkstesnisTęsti » |