United States authorities of a vessel "within the limits of Alaska Ter- ritory, and in the waters thereof and within the civil and judicial Dis- trict of Alaska, to wit: within the waters of that portion of Behring Sea belonging to the United States and said district, on waters navi- gable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden," and charg- ing that "the said vessel and her captain, officers and crew were then and there found engaged in killing fur seals within the limits of Alaska Territory and in the said waters thereof, in violation," etc. The find- ings of fact followed this description, and described the act complained of as done "within the waters of Alaska." No request was made to have the findings made more specific as to the place where the offence was committed. The vessel being condemned, the claimants appealed to this court. The appeal was duly entered and docketed, and was then dismissed on application of the appellant, who applied for leave to file an application for a writ of prohibition to restrain the court below from enforcing the sentence or the decree of condemnation. Leave being granted, the petition was filed, and it is now Held, (1) That the legal inference from the findings of fact is, that the act took place within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(2) That an appeal lay to this court from the decree of the District Court; (3) That, the District Court having found the facts, this court would be
limited, on appeal, to the consideration of the questions of law pre- sented by the record;
(4) That the District Court on the pleadings and facts found had jurisdic- tion of the case, and the petitioner might have prosecuted an appeal; and that the appeal taken was insufficient for petitioner's purposes, because of his neglect to have included in the findings the exact locality of the seizure;
(5) That for this reason the writ of prohibition should not issue: the court resting its denial of it on this ground, although it might have placed it upon the well settled principle that an application to a court to review the action of the political department of the government, upon a question pending between it and a foreign power, and to deter- mine whether the government was right or wrong, made while diplo- matic negotiations are still going on, should be denied. In re Cooper, 472.
BILL OF REVIEW.
See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 1.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 13;
EQUITY, 3;
JURISDICTION, B, 7.
CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY.
1. As the bill of exceptions does not purport to contain all the evidence, and as no request was made for a finding of fact as to the actual fact of the killing of the seals and the seizure of the vessel, the rulings in Ex parte Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, are decisive of this case, and it is followed. The Sylvia Handy, 513.
2. The case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, reviewed and adhered to, and its application in cases decided in the state courts considered. Budd v. New York, 517.
3. Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224, cited and followed. Hoyt v. Latham, 553.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 2;
MAILS, TRANSPORTATION OF STATUTE, B, 1.
CASES DISTINGUISHED OR EXPLAINED.
1. Ex parte Dubuque & Pacific Railroad, 1 Wall. 69, distinguished from this case. Smale v. Mitchell, 99.
2. The decision in Chicago &c. Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 explained. Budd v. New York, 517.
3. United States v. Langston, 118 U. S. 389, distinguished from this case. Dunwoody v. United States, 578.
When the trial court has, in its general charge, given the substance of in- structions requested, there is no error in refusing to give them in the language requested. Erie Railroad Co. v. Winter, 60.
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.
See JURISDICTION, B, 3.
1. Passengers on railroad trains are not presumed or required to know the rules and regulations of the company, made for the guidance of its conductors and employés, as to its own internal affairs. Erie Railroad Co. v. Winter, 60.
2. Plaintiff bought a ticket in Boston entitling him to a passage over de- fendant's road. At the time he informed the ticket agent of his wish
to stop off at the Olean station, and was then told by the agent that he would have to speak to the conductor about that. Between Bing- hamton and Olean the plaintiff informed the conductor that he wished to stop over at Olean and the conductor, instead of giving him a stop- over ticket, punched his ticket and told him that was sufficient to give him the right to stop over at Olean, and afterwards to use the punched ticket between Olean and Salamanca. He made the stop, and taking another train to Salamanca, presented the punched ticket, informing the conductor of what had taken place. The conductor refused to take it and demanded full fare. The payment of this being refused the conductor stopped the train at the next station and ejected him from it, using such force as was necessary. Held, (1) That he was rightfully on the train at the time of his expulsion; (2) That the con- ductor had no right to put him off for not paying his fare; (3) That the company was liable for the act of the conductor; (4) That the passenger had a right to refuse to be ejected from the train, and to make a sufficient resistance to being put off to denote that he was be- ing removed against his will by compulsion; (5) That the fact that under such circumstances he was put off the train was, of itself, a good cause of action against the company, irrespective of any physical in- jury he might have then received, or which was caused thereby. Erie Railroad Co. v. Winter, 60.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A. OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. Section 3894 of Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of September 19, 1890, 26 Stat. 465, c. 908, which provides that "no letter, postal card or circular concerning any lottery and no list of the drawings at any lottery and no lottery ticket or part thereof shall be carried in the mail, or delivered at or through any post-office, or branch thereof, or by any letter-carrier"; and that no newspaper "containing any advertisement of any lottery" "shall be carried in the mail, or delivered by any postmaster or letter-carrier"; and that "any person who shall knowingly deposit or cause to be deposited anything to be conveyed or delivered by mail in violation of this section . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misde- meanor, and on conviction shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year," is a constitutional exercise of the power conferred upon Congress by Article I, sec. 8 of the Constitution, to establish post-offices and post-roads, and does not abridge "the freedom of speech or of the
press," within the meaning of Amendment I to the Constitution. In re Rapier, 110.
2. An ordinance of a city, imposing, pursuant to a Statute of the State, a license tax, for the business of running any horse or steam railroad for the transportation of passengers, does not impair the obligation of a contract, made before the passage of the statute, by which the city sold to a railroad company for a large price the right of way and franchise for twenty-five years to run a railroad over certain streets and accord- ing to certain regulations, and the company agreed to pay to the city annually a real estate tax, and the city bound itself not to grant, dur- ing the same period, a right of way to any other railroad company over the same streets. New Orleans City & Lake Railroad Co. v. New Orleans, 192.
3. Sec. 3894, Rev. Stat. as amended by the act of September 19, 1890, 26 Stat. 465, c. 908, is constitutional, under the decision in Ex parte Rapier, 143 U. S. 110. Horner v. United States, No. 1, 207.
4. The statute of New York of May 26, 1881, (Laws of 1881, c. 361,) imposing a tax upon the corporate franchise or business of every cor- poration, joint-stock company or association incorporated or organized under any law of the State or of any other State or country, to be com- puted by a percentage upon its whole capital stock, and to be ascer- tained in the manner provided by the act, when applied to a manufactur- ing corporation organized under the laws of Utah, and doing the greater part of its business out of the State of New York, and paying taxes in Illinois and Utah, but doing a small part of its business in the State of New York, does not tax persons or property not within the State; nor regulate interstate commerce; nor take private property without just compensation; nor deny to the corporation the equal protection of the laws; nor impose a tax beyond the constitutional power of the State: and the remedy of the corporation against hardship and injus- tice, if any has been suffered, must be sought in the legislature of the State. Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 305.
5. The cases respecting state taxation of foreign corporations reviewed. Ib. 6. The act of the legislature of Michigan of June 28, 1889, (Public Laws of 1889, pp. 282,283,) fixing the amount per mile to be charged by rail- ways for the transportation of a passenger, violates no provision in the Constitution of the United States, so far as disclosed by the record in this case. Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Wellman, 339. 7. A legislature has power to fix rates for the transportation of passengers by railways, and the extent of judicial interference is protection against unreasonable rates. Ib.
8. Courts should be careful not to declare legislative acts unconstitutional upon agreed and general statements, and without the fullest disclosure of all material facts. Ib.
9. Whenever, in the pursuance of an honest antagonistic assertion of rights there is presented a question involving the validity of any act of any
legislature, State or Federal, and the decision necessarily rests on the competency of the legislature to so enact, the court must determine whether the act be constitutional or not; but it never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the leg- islative act. lb.
10. An act of the legislature of New York (Laws of 1888, chap. 581) pro- vided that the maximum charge for elevating, receiving, weighing and discharging grain should not exceed five-eighths of one cent a bushel; and that, in the process of handling grain by means of floating and stationary elevators, the lake vessels or propellers, the ocean vessels or steamships, and canal boats, should only be required to pay the actual cost of trimming or shovelling to the leg of the elevator when unload- ing, and trimming cargo when loading; Held, that the act was a legit- imate exercise of the police power of the State over a business affected with a public interest, and did not violate the Constitution of the United States, and was valid. Budd v. New York, 517.
11. Although the act of New York did not apply to places having less than 130,000 population, it did not deprive persons owning elevators in places of 130,000 population or more, of the equal protection of the laws. Ib.
12. Although it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without his consent, that principle has no application to a suit by one government against another government. United States v. Texas, 621.
13. The exercise by this court of original jurisdiction in a suit brought by one State against another to determine the boundary line between them, or in a suit brought by the United States against a State to determine the boundary between a Territory of the United States and that State, so far from infringing, in either case, upon the sovereignty, is with the consent of the State sued. Ib.
14. The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two Houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress; and when the bill thus attested receives the approval of the President, and is deposited in the Department of State according to law, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress is complete and unimpeachable. Field v. Clark, 649.
15. It is not competent to show from the journals of either House of Congress, that an act so authenticated, approved and deposited, did not pass in the precise form in which it was signed by the presiding officers of the two Houses and approved by the President. Ib. 16. Congress cannot, under the Constitution, delegate its legislative power to the President. lb.
17. The authority conferred upon the President by section 3 of the act of October 1, 1890, to reduce the revenue and equalize duties on imports,
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