Dissenting Opinion: Field, Harlan, Brown, JJ. tion was well calculated to confuse the jury and mislead their judgment. 2. The witness Leonhardy was also allowed, against the objection of the plaintiff, to state that there was knowledge. among the people in the vicinity of the placer claim of the plaintiff, at the times he visited the country, as to the existence of a vein or deposit of mineral underneath the claims. He testified that there was such knowledge at those times; that wherever they, the people, sunk, there they found mineral, without stating what or where people sunk or the character of their developments, the knowledge being evidently no more than an opinion or belief which parties in the vicinity had formed on the subject. The witness Reed was allowed to state that there was a general understanding that there was a vein under the placer claim. Of the inadmissibility of this kind of evidence to establish the existence of a valuable vein or lode of mineral and knowledge of it by the patentee on his application for the patent, it would seem there could be no question. The opinions and belief of the neighborhood do not show knowledge of the existence of a lode or vein of valuable mineral. On this point we have an express adjudication in the case of Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Reynolds, when it was here at October term, 1887, 124 U. S. 374, 384. It was there held that mere belief as to the existence of a valuable lode, founded even upon investigation as to the character of the ground, did not amount to knowledge under the statute. "The statute speaks," said the court, "of acquiring a patent with a knowledge of the existence of a vein or lode within the boundaries of the claim for which a patent is sought, not the effect of the intent of the party to acquire a lode which may or may not exist, of which he has no knowledge. Nor does it render belief, after examination, in the existence of a lode, knowledge of the fact. There may be difficulty in determining whether such knowledge in a given case was had, but between mere belief and knowledge there is a wide difference. The court could not make them synonymous by its charge and thus in effect incorporate new terms into the statute." Purchasers from a patentee holding the instrument of the Dissenting Opinion: Field, Harlan, Brown, JJ. general government conveying to him fifty-six acres and a fraction of an acre of valuable mineral ground are not to be deprived years subsequent to their purchase of nearly one-fifth of it, or, indeed, any portion of it, because his neighbors at the time or subsequently residing near the premises believed that there was a vein or lode under the surface of his claim which he ought not to have. To sustain the admission of such beliefs or opinions in evidence against the patent would be to take from that instrument of the government all the peace and security which it is supposed to give to its possessor in the enjoyment of the property it transfers to him. An unlocated lode claim, existing only in the impressions and beliefs of neighbors or others, and not in knowledge founded upon discovery and exploration, does not seem to me to have any element of property or validity as a basis of a defence to proceedings to obtain a patent from the government. 3. The testimony received of conversations of the same witness with Stevens, as to the latter's opinion in 1887 of the existence of a large body of metal "underlying all the ground there," referring to ground where he had employed men to work, would seem to be subject to still greater objection, for it was not shown that the ground referred to embraced the premises in controversy. Leonhardy testified that in the spring of 1877 Stevens came to his house and told him that the country, referring to the ground upon which his men were at work, was good, the best mineral country he ever saw, but that if he told the men he had employed so, they would leave him as soon as they got there and go on their own hook; and again, that he had found an immense body of mineral underlying all that ground there, that he had shipped many tons which had paid him a handsome profit, and that he was going to secure the ground and begin very heavy operations. It does not appear, however, what operations he did commence, if any, or what interest he then had in the "ground there" beyond that of a prospector and explorer, or that he ever made any mining location himself, or acquired any title to any mines except by the purchase mentioned from the patentee. Nor does it appear that he possessed any special knowledge of the Dissenting Opinion: Field, Harlan, Brown, JJ. character of the mines. He had only an impression and theory that the land was rich in mineral. Without making the many possible allowances admissible for inaccuracies and exaggerations of the witness respecting statements made eight years before, there is nothing in what Stevens is reported to have said to him of the mineral richness of the country that can possibly affect the validity of the patent of the government to the patentee, Moyer, of other and different land. The only other testimony introduced to connect Stevens with the patentee, and to show that Moyer, the patentee, had knowledge of the existence of any lode before his application for the present patent, is that of the witness Norris, who said that Moyer, the patentee, told him, not stating the time or place, that he, Moyer, was going to get a placer patent for Mr. Stevens, who was afraid that miners would adverse him, and he wanted Moyer to get the patent for him, not mentioning of what land such patent was to be had. It subsequently appeared that this alleged conversation had reference to a different claim than that of Moyer-to that of Wells and Moyer. It would be a waste of time to argue that such statements, if made, do not even tend to prove any such knowledge of a lode within the claim, for a disregard of which in his application one-fifth of the rights acquired by the patent can be defeated, years after the patent has been issued, the property gone into the hands of third parties, who have put up extensive works, and incurred large expenditures in its development. Frail, indeed, would the support of a patent be if testimony to such vague and loose conversations of a party not interested in the land in controversy at the time as owner could be received to impair the title of a bona fide purchaser from the patentee of the government, as the plaintiff in this case was. And yet, referring to it, the court below instructed the jury that it tended to prove knowledge of the existence of a lode equally in Moyer, the patentee, as it did in Stevens, thus assuming that it did prove such knowledge by Stevens; that no distinction could be raised between them; and that if the jury found that the existence of a lode was known to Stevens, they might find upon the same evidence that it was known to Moyer, the patentee. Dissenting Opinion: Field, Harlan, Brown, JJ. The record in this case affords a good illustration of what may be expected if loose testimony of the character mentioned can be received upon a trial of this kind. It contains a mass of hearsay testimony, irrelevant gossip, geological impressions of the neighborhood, and loose recollections of miners of what had transpired years before or of what they believed to exist, all mingled together and admitted by the court as going to prove the existence of a lode and knowledge of its existence on the part of the placer applicant. If out of such materials. a patentee can be deprived of his property years after the issue of a patent, that instrument will be worse than useless to him. It will prove a delusion and a snare, luring him on to large expenditures, only to make more complete his ultimate ruin. It will afford no security against mere surmises, suppositions and beliefs, but leave him to be overwhelmed by them. In my opinion the judgment should be reversed and a new trial awarded. On the 25th April, 1892, it was "Ordered by the court that the mandate in this cause be stayed; that notice be given to counsel for the defendant in error that an application for a rehearing has been made; and leave is hereby granted counsel on both sides to file printed briefs on or before the first day of the next term of this court upon the question whether a rehearing should be granted and the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded." IRON SILVER MINING COMPANY V. MIKE AND STARR GOLD AND SILVER MINING COMPANY. (No. 2.) BREWER, J. Case No. 3, between the same parties, presents the same questions, and the same judgment of affirmance will be entered therein. FIELD, J., dissenting. This case presents the same questions which are considered in the case of a similar title, No. 2, just decided, only that the former relates to the Goodell lode claim and the latter to the Gardener lode claim. The two cases were tried together upon the same testimony, subject to the same objections and exceptions, and the instructions given by the court were so worded as to apply to both. I dissent from the judgment in this case for the reasons expressed in my dissent from the judgment in the former case. Statement of the Case. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE BROWN Concur in this dissent. Mr. L. S. Dixon and Mr. Ashley Pond for plaintiff in error. Mr. James McKeen and Mr. Frank W. Owers were on their brief. Mr. T. M. Patterson for defendant in error. SULLIVAN v. IRON SILVER MINING COMPANY. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO. No. 7. Argued November 20, 23, 1891.- Decided February 29, 1892. A placer patent conveys to the patentee full title to all lodes or veins within the territorial limits, not then known to exist; and mere speculation and belief, based, not on any discoveries in the placer tract, or any tracings of a vein or lode adjacent thereto, but on the fact that quite a number of shafts, sunk elsewhere in the district, had disclosed horizontal deposits of a particular kind of ore, which, it was argued, might be merely parts of a single vein of continuous extension through all that territory, is not the knowledge required by the law. As the judgment in this case rests upon a sound principle of law, this court affirms it, although it was put, by the court below, upon an unsound principle. THIS was an action of ejectment, commenced in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado on the 5th day of March, 1883, by the defendant in error. The complaint alleged that on the first day of January, 1883, plaintiff was the owner and in possession of a tract of land in Lake County, Colorado, known as the Wells and Moyer placer claim, consisting of 1934 acres, the description of which was given in full; that while so in possession, and on the 2d day of January, 1883, the defendants entered upon a certain portion, which was fully described, being about ten acres, and wrongfully seized and detained the same. In their answer the defendants set forth that the plaintiff held title to the placer claim by a patent |