to avoid acts of aggression unless an actual state of war existed. As there was no invasion to repel, and as his march into the Mexican territory in time of peace would be an act of aggression, he prudently waited for further orders.

Under these circumstances, and considering that all was now ready for commencing hostilities, the administration deemed it on the whole most prudent to wait the result of the proposed negotiation to be opened at Mexico, measures for that purpose having already been taken. If our claims could be bartered for California, it would not be necessary to compel Taylor to march to the Rio Grande. We have seen that the order to Taylor to invade the territory of the Rio Grande, the requisitions upon five States for troops, and the instructions to Taylor how and on what pretences to commence the war, and to capture Metamoras, &c., were all previous to the appointment of Slidell; and therefore, that the actual march to the Rio Grande and the war that ensued, were only the resumption of a policy that had merely been suspended to allow time to ascertain whether California could possibly be obtained by negotiation. The suspension, however, was brief. We have already noticed the avowal of Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, that in case of the refusal of Mexico to receive Mr. Slidell, "nothing can remain but to take the redress of the injuries of our citizens, and the insults to to our Government, into our own hands," in other words, to go to war. On the 12th January, 1846, the first dispatch was received from Slidell, from which it appeared probable that, although the Government had not yet refused to receive him, it would enter into no negotiation with him, except in reference to Texas. Of course there was no hope of a cession of California; and the very next day peremptory orders were sent to Taylor to ad

vance to the Rio Grande; an order unquestionably dictated by the avowed determination we have mentioned.

It seems, therefore, that the Government resolved on war professedly for two causes; 1st, The injuries to our citizens, all of which were estimated in dollars and cents. To collect a few millions of alleged debts, it acknowledges it willingness to commence the work of human slaughter, and that, too, at the very moment when no less than six States of the Union were indebted in the prodigious amount of $52,000,000, of which they paid neither principal or interest. The very idea of collecting two or three millions of dollars by spending a hundred or more in murdering the debtors, is so utterly absurd and diabolical, that we must be excused from believing Mr. Buchanan when he pretends that such was the intention of the Cabinet. The second cause assigned is little less credible. The insults to our Government which were to be revenged by killing Mexicans, are the imputations of bad faith cast by their rulers upon the Government at Washington for its conduct towards Texas; imputations which, however disagreeable, were unhappily supported by facts, and which had already been most abundantly repaid with insult and injury. The acquisition of California, and the extension of slavery, afforded motives for war which the pretended causes assigned by Mr. Buchanan failed to supply.

It was not sufficient that Taylor should march to the Rio Grande; the Secretary tells him, "points opposite Metamoras and Mier, and the vicinity of Laredo, are suggested for your consideration." The object was to provoke a collision, and, if possible, induce the Mexicans to attack our forces; and hence the

American standard was

to be insultingly displayed in the immediate vicinity and in full view of these Mexican towns. It would be hard

indeed if our troops, stationed in the suburbs of these three places, did not bring on a quarrel, and thus enable Mr. Polk to announce to Congress that "War existed by the act of Mexico."

General Taylor, in pursuance of orders, commenced his march into the Mexican territory. Not an American, not a Texan was to be found South of Corpus Christi. After proceeding through the desert about one hundred miles, he met "small armed parties of Mexicans who seemed disposed to avoid us."

On approaching Point Isabel, a Mexican settlement, and the site of a Mexican Custom House, he found the buildings in flames. At the same time he received a protest from the "Prefect of the Northern District of Tamaulipas" against his invasion of a territory which had never belonged to the Colony seized upon" (Texas), an invasion of which no notice had been given to the Government of Mexico, and for which no reason had been assigned. The protest concluded with assuring Taylor that, so long as his army" shall remain in the terrritory of Tamaulipas, the inhabitants must, whatever professions of peace you may employ, regard you as openly committing hostilities, and for the melancholy consequences of these they who have been the invaders must be answerable in the view of the whole world." The inhabitants of Point Isabel fled before the invaders, and sought refuge in Metamoras. Taylor announced to his Government, that he considered the conflagration of Point Isabel "as a decided evidence of hostility." To understand the purport of this declaration of opinion, it must be recollected that in his orders of the 13th January, 1846, he was instructed that, should Mexico assume the character of an enemy "by a declaration of war, or any open act of hostility towards us, you will not act merely on the defensive."

On the 28th March, Taylor, without having met with the slightest opposition, planted his standard on the bank of the Rio Grande. On the 6th April he wrote home that the guns of his battery "bear directly upon the public square of Metamoras, and within good range for demolishing the town; their object cannot be mistaken by the enemy;" and he tells the Secretary of War, "the Mexicans still retain a hostile attitude, and have thrown up some works to prevent us from crossing the river."* No declaration of war had been issued on either side, and the

During the progress of this invasion, and while the army was before Metamoras, various letters from the officers found their way into the public journals. A few extracts from these will be found instructive. "West of the Nueces the people are all Spaniards. The country is uninhabitable excepting the valley of the Rio Grande, and that contains a pretty dense population, and in no part of the country are the people more loyal to the Mexican Government.'

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Camp opposite Metamoras, April 19th, 1846. Our situation here is an extraordinary one. Right in the enemy's country, and actually occupying their corn and cotton fields, the people of the soil leaving their homes, and we with a small handful of men marching, with colors flying, and drums beating, right under the very guns of one of their principal cities, displaying the starspangled banner as if in defiance under their very nose, and they with an army twice our size at least, sit quietly down, and make not the least resistance, not the least effort to drive the invaders off. There is no parallel to it." Capt. Henry, the writer of this letter, seems not to have been aware that he was in the United States, and that the people of the soil were his fellow-citizens.

Another officer writes, 21st April, "Our flag waves over the waters of the Rio Grande, and we have a battery of eighteenpounders that can spot anything in Metamoras." To understand this last operation, it must be recollected, that the city was on one bank, and the American fort on the other. Captain Henry, of the U. S. Army, in his " Campaign Sketches of the War in Mexico," says, that on the evening of the day the army reached the river opposite to Metamoras, "I walked down to the bank, and found it lined with citizens (on the other side), attracted, no doubt, by the arrival of so many strangers. Strolling along, and seeing some genteel-looking young ladies upon the bank, I took off my hat, and saluted them with Buena Senoritas.' The river at this point was so narrow, that I could have thrown a stone across it."-p. 68.

Mexicans, although they saw their country invaded, and a battery planted within good range for demolishing the principal city in that part of their Republic, had not fired a musket, yet General Taylor chooses to style them “the enemy," and asserts that they retain a hostile attitude.

Five days after our arms had thus threatened and insulted Metamoras, General Ampudia reached the city with reinforcements, and immediately addressed a letter to the American General, complaining that his advance to the Rio Grande had "not only insulted but exasperated the Mexican nation," and requiring him within twentyfour hours to remove his camp, and retire beyond the Nueces; adding, "If you insist on remaining upon the soil of the department of Tamaulipas, it will clearly result that arms, and arms alone, must decide the question." As Taylor had been sent to Tamaulipas expressly to produce this very result, he took occasion of this letter to hasten the desired crisis. The Mexicans had shown a forbearance amounting almost to pusillanimity. Should this forbearance continue, and the enemy remain on the other side of the river, how could the war be commenced? He must wait for some pretext for crossing the river to attack them. The fact that the inhabitants of Point Isabel had fired their own houses, would hardly justify him in bombarding Metamoras. He chose therefore to consider Ampudia's notice to quit as an hostile act, but not one to be resented with powder and shot. He therefore resorted to an expedient which would compel Ampudia to fire the first shot, and thus, according to the wishes of the Cabinet, to make the intended war, one of defence, war by the act of Mexico." There were two American armed vessels at Brazos Santiago, and these he ordered to blockade the mouth of the Rio Grande, thus cutting off all commuication with Metamoras by sea. Soon after a vės

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