true or false in regard to human knowledge, that is, the foundation of the fourth book which we have to examine.

Throughout the whole of the fourth book, as the close of the second, Locke expressly declares that the true or false in ideas. about which all knowledge is conversant, consists in the supposition of a relation between these ideas and their object; and every where also he expressly declares that this relation is and can be nothing but a relation of agreement or disagreement. The idea is conformed to its object, or it is not conformed. If conformed, knowledge is not only possible, but it is true, for it rests upon a true idea, an idea conformed to its object; if the idea is not conformed to its object, the idea is false, and the knowledge derived from it is equally false. pp. 143, 144.

The foundation of Cousin's boasted argument against Locke's theory of knowledge, is laid, as we conceive, in a misapprehension of the meaning which the latter gives to the term idea. Cousin speaks of the objects of ideas, of the conformity or non-conformity of ideas to their objects, etc. This is not the language of Locke. We find no such expressions in the passages referred to. He speaks of objects of thought, but not of objects of ideas. According to him, as we think we have sufficiently shown, an idea is itself the object of thought, or of the mind, in thinking. What then is the object of an idea? Is it the object of an object? Or if an idea is an image, what is the object of an image? Locke does indeed speak of the conformity or non-conformity of our ideas to the reality of things. The objects of our thoughts may be either real or imaginary beings. What then, it may be asked, is the difference between an object and a thing? A thing may be or may not be an object of thought, that is, an idea. If a thing is viewed by the mind exactly as it is, that is, in the language of Locke, if we have an adequate idea of it, then the thing is the idea, the object of thought. If the idea which we have of a particular thing is inadequate, but correct so far as it goes, the thing differs from our idea of it, as the whole from a part. If our idea of a thing includes only some of its qualities, and blends with them others not belonging to it, then the idea, in part, differs from the thing, and partly coincides with it. For what purpose has Cousin, in quoting Locke, rendered "any thing" by "un objet," and "the reality of things" by "leurs objets," if not to justify his own peculiar phrase, the objects of ideas? (See the original, vol. ii. p. 321.)

That the term idea is used by Locke, to signify the thing thought of, or so much of it as is before the mind, and not a mere philosophical image, is evident, from the very chapters from which Cousin has taken his quotations, in laying the foundation of his argument. He there speaks of "ideas that are united in things themselves," " that co-exist in things without us," " that have a real existence without the mind." What occasion was there, then, for the inquiry of Cousin, -" Departing from ideas which are within it, how does the understanding arrive at things without it?"

But it is said, that Locke makes all our knowledge depend on ideas. Now what more does this imply, than that all our knowledge of things depends upon making them the objects of our thoughts; in other words, thinking of them? Has M. Cousin discovered a method of obtaining a knowledge of things without thinking of them?

He

But the most marvelous part of Cousin's argument is yet to come. It indicates a resolute purpose to carry a point. asserts, that if an idea resembles its object, it must be an image; and more than this, that it must be a material image.

If the conformity of the idea to its object is nothing but the resemblance of the copy to its original, to its archetype, I say that in such a case, the idea is taken solely as an image. The idea must evidently be an image in order positively to resemble any thing, in order to be able to represent any thing. See then the representative idea reduced to an image. Now reflect closely, and you will see that every image implies something material. Can an image of any thing immaterial be conceived ? * * * * All knowledge, then, is involved in the following question: Have we, in respect to beings, the ideas which represent them, which resemble them, which are the images, and the material images of them; or have we not such images? If we have, knowledge is possible; if not, it is impossible. Now in point of fact, human knowledge embraces both the external world, and the soul, and God. If, then, knowledge of these objects is possible and real, it is only upon the condition just laid down, namely, that we have of these beings, ideas which represent them, which resemble them, which are images of them, and once again, material images. Have we, then, or have we not, idea-images, material images, of God, of the soul, of the external world? This is the question. Let us first apply it to the external world. It is there, above all, that the theory of Locke would appear most admissible. Let us see what is the soundness and value of it even upon this ground. pp. 147, 148.

Now where has Locke said, that ideas are images, in the sense here represented. Did any one ever before say, that every instance of resemblance is a material image? Cannot one thought resemble another? Do M. Cousin's feelings, one moment, never resemble feelings which he has before had? Did he never hear of two men thinking alike? When he lectures to his two thousand listening auditors, is there no resemblance between their different thoughts? When a Chatham, a Whitefield, or a Webster, sends through an assembly an emotion of terror or of joy, is there no resemblance in the feelings of those who are present? And is every thought which resembles another, a material image ?

M. Cousin's argument is this: "An idea, in order to resemble any thing, must be an image. And every image implies something material. Every idea, therefore, is a material image." He asks: "Can an image of any thing immaterial be conceived?" We ask, Can there be no resemblance of any thing immaterial? Cannot one thought resemble another? If it can, our author's argument is a nullity. Yet upon this brief syllogism, is founded a great part of his reasoning, through two entire chapters. He applies it first to our knowledge of an external world.

The idea of the external world is the idea of body. Bodies are known to us only by their qualities. These qualities are primary or secondary. By the secondary qualities of bodies is understood, you know, those which might not exist, and yet the body itself not cease to exist; the qualities of which we acquire the idea by the sense of smelling, of hearing, and of taste, by all the senses, in short, except unquestionably that of touch, and perhaps also that of sight. The primary qualities of bodies are those which are given to us, as the fundamental attributes of bodies, without which bodies could not for us exist. The eminently primary quality is solidity, which implies more or less extension, which directly implies form. We have the conviction that every body is solid, extended, has form. We are moreover convinced that bodies have the property of causing in us those particular modifications which are called savor, sound, odor, perhaps also the modification called color. Locke agrees to all this; it is he who chiefly contributed to extend in science the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies. It is not our object to go any farther in this distinction. Let us now see how Locke explains the acquisition of ideas of the primary and secondary qualities. p. 148.

The following quotation is then made from Locke :

" B. II. ch. viii. § 11: How primary qualities produce their ideas. The next thing to be considered is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we conceive bodies to operate in."

"§ 12. If, then, external objects be not united to our minds, when they produce ideas therein, and yet we perceive these original qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident, that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies to the brain or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them."" p. 148.

There is perhaps no passage, throughout the Essay of Locke, which has more the appearance of favoring the Peripatetic doctrine of perception, than this. We do not deny, that he may have believed in that theory. But he has very little to say of it. Nearly all which is asserted in the passage now quoted, would be admitted, we presume, even by Dr. Reid, who claims the merit of having entirely demolished the theory of Aristotle. It is now generally believed by philosophers, that in the case of perception, " some motion," occasioned by the external object, " is continued by the nerves to the brain, or the seat of sensation." Mr. Locke, however, says nothing here about images, material images. The only difficulty relates to the word impulse. Does he mean impulse of particles of matter upon our bodies, upon the external organs of sense; or impulse of something in the brain, upon the mind." On either supposition, impulse is not a necessary element in his theory of knowledge. In another place, he distinctly intimates, that it is not "the design of the present undertaking, to inquire into the natural causes and manner of perception." B. II. ch. viii. § 4. In his letter to the bishop of Worcester, referring to the passage quoted above, he observes :

''Tis true, I say, that bodies operate by impulse, and nothing else. And so I thought, when I writ it, and can yet conceive no other way of their operations. But I am since convinced, by the judicious Mr. Newton's incomparable book, that it is too bold a presumption to limit God's power in this point, by my narrow conceptions. And therefore, in the next edition of my book, I shall take care to have that passage rectified.'

Cousin, in applying his argument to our knowledge of bodies, begins with their secondary qualities.

Recollect that according to Locke, all knowledge depends upon ideas, and that there is no knowledge except as far as the idea resembles its object. Now by the acknowledgment of Locke himself, the ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble these qualities; therefore these ideas do not contain any knowledge. **** Recollect distinctly that the condition of conformity is nothing less than that of resemblance, and that the condition of resemblance is nothing less than that of being an image, a sensible and material image; for there is no immaterial image. The question, then, resolves itself to this: whether you have, or have not a material image of the secondary qualities of bodies, that is to say, of those properties of bodies which cause in you the sensations of color, sound, taste and smell. pp. 151, 152.

Locke does indeed say, that all our knowledge of things depends upon our having ideas of them; that is, upon on our thinking of them. But so far is he from supposing, that in the case of the secondary qualities, our ideas are resemblances or images of them, or that conformity to their archetypes implies this, that he expressly says the contrary. "By real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. Our simple ideas are all real; all agree to the reality of things. Not that they are all of them the images or representations of what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities, hath been already showed." B. II. ch. xxx. § 1, 2.

Cousin's argument, from the secondary qualities, turns altogether upon manifest violence done to the statements of Locke. He would fully subscribe to the following conclusions of Cousin, substituting, however, archetype for object. "The ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble their objects, in any way, and nevertheless they contain a certain knowledge; it is not therefore true, that all knowledge supposes the resemblance of the idea to its object." p. 153. Cousin very justly observes: "The secondary qualities of bodies, smell, sound, taste, and color, are for us decidedly real properties in bodies, to which we attribute the power of exciting in us certain modifications, or sensations. We are not only conscious of these sensations, but we believe, that they have causes, and that these causes are in the bodies. We know them, I grant, only as causes of our sensations, while we are ignorant of their intimate essence." p. 151. These sensations are distinct objects of consciousness, and therefore are called, by Mr. Locke, ideas. But the properties which occasion them, being known, as Cousin says, only as causes, are simply called qualities. The sensations are affections of the mind. The qualities which occasion them are properties of matter. Mr. Locke says, "The ideas produced in us, by these secondary qualities, have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. They are only a power of producing these sensations in us." B. II. ch. viii. § 15. And what is this, but the philosophical paradox, that there is no heat in fire, no color in the rainbow, no sound in an organ? The meaning of which, in plain English, is, that although the sensations of heat, color, etc., have the same names with the external qualities which produce them, yet we have no reason for believing, that the mental affections have a resemblance to their material causes. The fire does not feel its own heat. Sugar does not taste its own sweetness. A bell does not hear its own sound. So much for the assertion, that "the theory of Locke breaks to pieces, on the secondary qualities of bodies."

In treating of the primary qualities, Cousin, as before, goes upon the groundless assumption, that according to Locke, there is a material image intervening between the mind and the object, analogous to the image on the retina, in the case of vision, intervening between the object seen and the brain. But as we understand Locke, the object itself, when in view of the mind, at least so much of it as is before the mind, is the idea. Why then, it may be asked, does he say, that the idea resembles the object? Because the idea is imperfect. It does not coincide with every portion, and particle, and quality of the object.