rant men. In the other States, where there was no lack of educated men in the dominant party, the appointments consisted generally of swaggerers, dependants, decayed gentlemen and others, 'fit for nothing else,' which always turned out to be utterly unfit for any military purpose whatever. These were the men who, on the return of peace, became the 'unscarred braggarts of the war,' a heavy burden to the Government and, as beggars, to the country. Such were the results of Mr. Jefferson's low estimate of, or rather contempt for, the military character, the consequence of the old hostility between him and the principal officers who achieved our independence."

After making all allowance for the exaggeration due to Scott's prejudices, this is probably not very far from the truth. It

is universally admitted that the appointments of all grades at this time and until after the War of 1812 were based almost wholly on political considerations. The commanding general was Brigadier-General James Wilkinson, who had a varied and picturesque career. He was Gates's adjutant-general at Saratoga, and was a member of the Conway Cabal. In a convivial moment he disclosed this to Lord Stirling, by whom it was communicated to Washington; and after challenging both Gates and Stirling and then withdrawing the challenges, he was forced to leave the army. At the close of the war he entered into commercial arrangements of a dishonorable character at New Orleans, but succeeded in getting back into the army in 1791, served in Wayne's campaigns against the Indians, 1793-95, and in 1796 succeeded Wayne in command of the army. In 1801 he took part in Burr's conspiracy, although the proof of this was not discovered until long after his death. In 1807 he turned state's evidence against Burr at his trial; but was himself tried for conspiracy and treason in 1811, being acquitted for lack of evidence. He was a conspicuous failure as a general in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814, and in 1815 he was discharged from the army and passed the few remaining years of his life in Mexico.

With such a man as commanding general, it could hardly be expected that the tone of the army would be high; the offi

cers were divided into his partisans, who were in the majority, and those of his next in command, Brigadier - General Wade Hampton, of South Carolina. In 1809 Scott expressed the opinion that he "believed Wilkinson to have been equally a traitor with Burr." For this he was tried by court-martial, and sentenced to a year's suspension.

The war for which this army was organized did not come until four years later. Meanwhile the troops served in the Northwest and the Southwest. When war seemed imminent in the winter of 1808-9, Wilkinson was ordered to New Orleans with 2,000 of the new troops, to organize them and defend the place. The inefficiency of his administration was extraordinary, his camp abounded with "filth and nastiness of almost every kind," his men were badly organized and poorly equipped, and in a few months nearly forty per cent. of them had died of disease. When he moved up to the high ground of Natchez in the autumn of 1809, of the survivors fully three-fifths were on the sick list.

There were no actual wars with the Indians during Jefferson's administration, but in the new territory of Indiana, of which Harrison was made governor in 1807, the tribes under Tecumseh and his brother were restless and discontented; they feared the advance of the whites, there were frequent murders of the settlers, and the chiefs were making an effort to unite all the tribes into one great federation. To keep the Indians in check, Harrison was authorized to erect a fort in the vicinity of their village of Tippecanoe on the Wabash River, near the present town of Lafayette. For this purpose he organized an expedition at Vincennes of about 1,100 men, consisting of the 4th Infantry, which was sent to him from Pittsburg, and of militia and volunteers from Indiana and Kentucky. With these he marched up the Wabash Valley, in October, 1811, stopping to build a fort on the present site of Terre Haute, and arrived near Tippecanoe on November 6th. We probably never had in the service a better Indian fighter or one who more thoroughly understood the Indian character than Harrison. He was then thirtyeight years of age, had served with dis

tinction as a young officer in Wayne's campaigns on the Maumee, eighteen years before, and had since lived on the frontier with the exception of one year when he was a delegate in Congress. The Indians used every art to lead him into an ambush, but without success; his camp and his march were always well guarded. The night of November 6th was dark and rainy; his little force was camped about a mile and a half from the village, fully protected by sentries. Harrison himself was up before four o'clock in the morning of the 7th, and at that hour a shot was fired, followed by a rush of the Indians upon the angle of his camp. A sharp fight ensued at close quarters, lasting about two hours until day broke, when the troops took the offensive and the Indians fled. The losses were heavy, amounting to 188, of whom 61 were killed; of the officers nine were killed and twentyfive wounded. The Indians left thirtyeight bodies on the field, but carried off the rest of their dead and all their wounded. The village was burned, and Harrison then began his return march, carrying his wounded with him, and reaching Vincennes on November 18th.

This was one of the most decisive defeats ever inflicted on the Indians. It gave Harrison great reputation. Although he served with distinction throughout the War of 1812, and afterward was a senator and a foreign minister, yet the chief source of his popularity was this battle with the Indians, and nearly thirty years after it the campaign song which carried him into the Presidency was "Tippecanoe and Tyler too."

The declaration of war against England was signed on June 12, 1812. In anticipation of it and subsequently, laws were passed for raising the necessary military forces as follows: In January, 1812, an act was passed increasing the regular army from 10,000 to 35,000 men, to consist of two regiments of dragoons, four of artillery, one of riflemen, and twenty-five of infantry. The men were to serve for five years, to receive $5 per month in pay, $16 in bounty, and on discharge, three months' extra pay and 160 acres of land. In February, a second act was passed, authorizing the President to accept the services of 50,000 volunteers, to serve twelve

months, to be officered by the States, and to have the same pay as the regulars. In April, a third act was passed authorizing the President to call out 100,000 militia to serve six months, and while in service to have the same pay as regulars. In the same month another act was passed, for the purpose of filling up the new regiments, by which it was provided that 15,ooo men might be enlisted to serve for eighteen months. A man desiring to serve in the war had thus a variety of options open to him, and he usually chose the most favorable, which was undoubtedly the service in the militia.

The next year, between January and March, 1813, a somewhat different programme was adopted. The law authorizing volunteers was repealed, and the regular army was increased by twenty additional regiments of infantry, carrying its total strength to 58,000 men; the enlistments were to be for twelve months, the pay was increased to $8 per month, with three months' pay in advance in addition to the bounty, and a promise of invalid pensions at the rate of $5 per month.

In the following year, January, 1814, the regular army was again increased by about 5,000 men, consisting of three additional regiments of riflemen and one of infantry, carrying its nominal strength to 63,000 men; at the same time the term of enlistment was changed back to five years, the pay was increased to $10 per month, the bounty raised to $124, the land grant to 320 acres, and recruiting agents were to be paid $8 for each recruit. The President was also authorized to accept the services of volunteers in such number as he thought proper, and on the same terms as the regulars.

None of these laws was effective; at no time during the war was the strength of the regular army as great as one-half of what the law authorized; a bill was even introduced in Congress, in 1814, providing for conscription, but it failed to pass. It was impossible to get recruits for the regular army.

While we achieved splendid and unexpected success on the sea during this war, our operations on the land were in the main unsuccessful and at times disgraceful. Inadequate laws in Congress, incompetence in the War Department,

inefficiency in the field, were the characteristics of the three-years campaigns. There was no Washington to counteract the defects of the militia system by his profound wisdom and sound judgment. Within sixty days after the declaration of war the Western posts at Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis and Mackinac had been captured, and those at Fort Wayne, Fort Harrison, and Vincennes were besieged by the Indians. In New York it was planned to attack Montreal by the Champlain route, to attack Kingston from Sackett's Harbor, and to cross the Niagara River and attack Queenston. The Montreal expedition went no farther than Plattsburg, the Kingston expedition did not start at all, and the attack on Queenston resulted in a most shameful defeat. For these disasters the commanding general, Henry Dearborn, was largely responsible. He had served through the Revolution as a young officer, had afterward been a Representative in Congress, Secretary of War and Collector of the Port of Boston. From the latter position he was appointed Senior Major-General of the army in January, 1812, an office for which he was hopelessly incompetent.

In 1813, we were not so entirely unsuccessful. At the beginning of the year Dearborn captured and burnt York (Toronto) and seized Lewiston and Fort George, and later in the year Harrison relieved the Western posts, defeated the British and Indians in the battle of the Thames, and regained Detroit. In the South Jackson conducted a successful campaign against the Creek Indians. But at the close of the year the British not only regained control of their own side of the Niagara River but occupied the American side from Fort Niagara to Buffalo; and an expedition under Wilkinson, which moved down the St. Lawrence toward Montreal, resulted in a complete fiasco and defeat at Chrystler's Farm. The events of the year led to the retirement from active service of Dearborn, Wilkinson, Hampton and Lewis, the senior officers of the army and all about equally incompetent.

In 1814, the army for the first time acquitted itself creditably. Under the command of Brown, with Scott and Ripley as brigadiers, it fought a series of

engagements at Chippewa, Lundy's Lane, and Fort Erie, on the Canadian side of the Niagara River, against the best British regulars just arrived from Europe. The fighting was severe, the losses large in proportion to numbers engaged, and the advantage lay with the Americans. At Plattsburg, chiefly owing to McDonough's great naval victory, the British troops were defeated and fell back to Montreal. On the other hand, in the South, the city of Washington was captured, the public buildings burned, and the Government put to flight. This disaster was in a measure redeemed in the following month by the defeat of the British at Baltimore and the death of their commander, Lord Ross. In the extreme South Jackson had carried his campaign against the Creeks to a successful conclusion, and was then ordered to the defence of New Orleans where, on January 8, 1815, he gained the one really great victory of the war-one of the most brilliant achievements in all our history.

Meanwhile the treaty of peace had been signed at Ghent two weeks before. The war settled nothing; the objects for which it was undertaken were not even mentioned in the treaty. It had been in progress for nearly three years. The number of regulars enlisted is said to have been 85,000, and the number of militia called out over 470,000, although at no time were more than 30,000 regulars under arms, and not as many militia in the field. In none of the battles were more than 4,000 men actually engaged on our side. The aggregate of all the losses on the American side was about 1,900 killed and 3,700 wounded.

During this war, two questions of a fundamental character were raised in regard to the militia. The Constitution gives Congress power, "To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions." In April, 1812, a law was passed authorizing the President to call out 100,000 militia. When he issued the call the Governors of three New England States: Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, flatly refused to obey the call; and similar action was taken by the Governor of Vermont in 1814. They were sustained by the legislatures and courts of their respective States. The Supreme

Court of Massachusetts decided that the President had no power to determine whether any one of the three conditions named in the Constitution had arisen; that decision rested with the Governor of each State, and as the Governors of the New England States were of opinion that neither invasion, insurrection, nor defiance of the laws existed, they declined to order out the militia. This decision was squarely overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1820 in the case of Martin vs. Mott, in unequivocal language as follows: "We are all of opinion that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen belongs exclusively to the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons." In another case, Houston 7's. Moore, the United States Supreme Court also decided that "The President's order may be given to the Chief Executive magistrate of the State, or to any militia officer he may think proper." The law in the case was thus settled in such a manner that no doubt concerning it has since existed.

The other question was the right to order the militia beyond the limits of their respective States, or of the United States. At the battle of Queenston, the New York militia, although they had clamored to be led into battle, refused to cross the Niagara River on the ground that they could not be ordered out of the United States.

At

that time, as now, the act of February 28, 1795, was in force prescribing penalties for any officer, non-commissioned officer, or private of the militia, when called into the service of the United States, who fails to obey the orders of the President, and this would seem to give ample authority to order them wherever he saw fit. But the precise question of his right to order. them out of the limits of the United States has never, so far as I know, been passed upon by the Supreme Court.

The question has never arisen since the War of 1812. With that war the militia, as it had been understood for several generations, passed into well-merited contempt, and it has never since been called out by the President. In subsequent wars the President has been authorized to call for volunteers, who have been individually enlisted and mustered into the service of the United States, and for the time being constituted part of its army, subject to the articles of war, and bound by the enlistment oath to obey the orders of the President and the officers appointed over them.

The National Guard regiments of New York and other States which were ordered out for temporary service during an emergency in 1861, 1862, and 1863 were organized military bodies, uniformed, equipped, and drilled. They were totally different from the militia as understood in the Revolution and in the War of 1812.