ent; for if fo, they could not make any impreffion. And we find upon examination, that they are not indifferent: looking back upon the foregoing examples, the good qualities or good offices that attract my love, are antecedently agreeable: if an injury did not give uneafinefs, it would not occafion refentment against the author: nor would the paffion of pity be raised by an object in diftrefs, if that object did not give pain.

What is now faid about the production of emotion or paffion, refolves into a very fimple propofition, That we love what is agreeable, and hate what is difagreeable. And indeed it is evident, that a thing must be agreeable or difagreeable, before it can be the object either of love or of hatred.

This short hint about the causes of paffion and emotion, leads to a more extenfive view of the fubject. Such is our nature, that upon perceiving certain external objects, we are instantaneously conscious of pleasure or pain: a gently-flowing river, a fmooth extended plain, a fpreading oak, a towering hill, are objects of fight that raise pleafant emotions: a barren heath, a dirty marsh, a rotten carcafe, raise painful emotions. Of the emotions thus produced, we inquire for no other caufe but merely the prefence of the object.

The things now mentioned, raife emotions by means of their properties and qualities to the emotion raised by a large river, its fize, its force,

and

and its fluency, contributes each a fhare: the regularity, propriety, and convenience, of a fine building, contribute each to the emotion raised by the building.

If external properties be agreeable, we have reason to expect the fame from those which are internal; and accordingly power, difcernment, wit, mildness, fympathy, courage, benevolence, are difagreeable in a high degree: upon percei ving these qualities in others, we instantaneously feel pleasant emotions, without the flightest act of reflection, or of attention to confequences. It is almost unneceffary to add, that certain qualities oppofite to the former, fuch as dulnefs, pee* vifhnefs, inhumanity, cowardice, occafion in the fame manner painful emotions.

Senfible beings affect us remarkably by their actions. Some actions raise pleasant emotions in the spectator, without the least reflection; fuch as graceful motion, and genteel behaviour. But as intention, a capital circumftance in human actions, is not vifible, it requires reflection to dif cover their true character: I fee one delivering a purfe of money to another, but I can make nothing of that action, till I learn with what intention the money is given if it be given to discharge a debt, the action pleases me in a flight degree; if it be a grateful return, I feel a ftronger emotion; and the pleafant emotion rifes to a great height, when it is the intention of the gi

ver to relieve a virtuous family from want. Thus actions are qualified by intention: but they are not qualified by the event; for an action well intended gives pleasure, whatever the event be. Further, human actions are perceived to be right or wrong; and that perception qualifies the plea fure or pain that refults from them *.

Emotions

* In tracing our emotions and paffions to their origin, my first thought was, that qualities and actions are the primary causes of emotions; and that these emotions are afterward expanded upon the being to which these qua• lities and actions belong. But I am now convinced that this opinion is erroneous. An attribute is not, even in imagination, separable from the being to which it belongs; and, for that reason, cannot of itself be the cause of any emotion. We have, it is true, no knowledge of any being or fubftance but by means of its attributes; and therefore no being can be agreeable to us otherwife than by their means. But ftill, when an emotion is raifed, it is the being itself, as we apprehend the matter, that raifes the emotion; and it raises it by means of one or other of its attributes. If it be urged, That we can in idea abstract a quality from the thing to which it belongs; it might be answered, That such abstraction may ferve the purposes of reasoning, but is too faint to produce any fort of emotion. But it is fufficient for the prefent purpose to anfwer, That the eye never abstracts : by that organ we perceive things as they really exist, and never perceive a quality as feparated from the subject. Hence it must be evident, that emotions are raised, not by qualities abftractly confidered, but by the fubftance

or

Emotions are raifed in us, not only by the qualities and actions of others, but also by their feelings I cannot behold a man in distress, without partaking of his pain; nor in joy, without partaking of his pleasure.

The beings or things above described, occafion emotions in us, not only in the original furvey, but also when recalled to the memory in idea: a field laid out with tafte, is pleasant in the recollection, as well as when under our eye: a generous action described in words or colours, occafions a fenfible emotion, as well as when we see it performed; and when we reflect upon the distress of any perfon, our pain is of the fame kind with what we felt when eye-witneffes. In a word, an agreeable or difagreeable object recalled to the mind in idea, is the occafion of a pleasant or painful emotion, of the fame kind with that produced when the object was prefent the only difference is, that an idea being fainter than an original perception, the pleasure

or body fo and fo qualified. Thus, a fpreading oak raifes a pleafant emotion, by means of its colour, figure, umbrage, &c. it is not the colour, ftrictly speaking, that produces the emotion, but the tree coloured: it is not the figure abftractly confidered that produces the emotion, but the tree of a certain figure. And hence, by the way, it appears, that the beauty of fuch an object is complex, refolvable into feveral beauties more simple.

or pain produced by the former, is proportionably fainter than that produced by the latter.

Having explained the nature of an emotion, and mentioned several causes by which it is produced, we proceed to an obfervation of confiderable importance in the fcience of human nature, which is, That defire follows fome emotions, and not others. The emotions raised by a beautiful garden, a magnificent building, or a number of fine faces in a crowded affembly, is feldom accompanied with defire. Other emotions are accompanied with defire; emotions, for example, raised by human actions and qualities: a virtuous action raifeth in every spectator a pleafant emotion, which is commonly attended with defire to reward the author of the action: a vicious action, on the contrary, produceth a painful emotion, attended with defire to punish the delinquent. Even things inanimate often raife emotions accompanied with defire: witness the goods of fortune, which are objects of defire almost univerfally; and the defire, when immoderate, obtains the name of avarice. The pleasant emotion produced in a fpectator by a capital picture in the poffeffion of a prince, is feldom accompanied with defire; but if fuch a picture be expofed to fale, defire of having or poffeffing is the natural confequence of a strong emotion.

It is a truth verified by induction, that every paffion is accompanied with defire; and if an emotion