per month from the other property included ter his father, is a necessary party to the in the trust. bill of review. Bill of review-parties. 3. The objection that the widow of the testator's son should have been made a party to a bill to review a decree declaring that a trust created by the will in favor of the testator's grandchildren violated the rule against perpetuities is too late when first raised on the hearing of a demurrer to the bill of review, where the fact of her existence does not appear of record. [No. 179.] Argued October 9, 1906. Decided October 22, 1906. A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to review a decree which affirmed a decree of the Supreme Court of the District, modifying, on demurrer to a bill of review, a decree which declared a trust to violate the rule against perpetuities, and upholding such trust as to the party filing such bill. Affirmed. See same case below, 25 App. D. C. 291. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. John J. Hemphill argued the cause, and, with Mr. James Hemphill, filed a brief for appellants: If the trust attempted to be created by the testator covering the Washington property is void, does the provision for the ap pellee fall with it? The answer to this question depends upon the further inquiries as to whether the attempted trust embodies the main scheme or plan of the testator as to his Washing ton property; and whether the $40 per month which the trustees are directed to pay to appellee, out of the income from the trust property, is dependent upon, or connected with, his general plan or scheme. Knox v. Jones, 47 N. Y. 393; Pitzel v. Debell v. Foxworthy, 9 B. Mon. 228; Turner v. Berry, 8 Ill. 541; Bank of United States v. White, 8 Pet. 262, 268, 8 L. ed. 938, 940; Story, Eq. Pl. 420; Dan. Ch. Pl. & Pr. 6th ed. § 1580; Singleton v. Singleton, 8 B. Mon. 349; 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 264; Creed v. Lancaster Bank, 1 Ohio St. 1; Fletcher, Eq. Pl. § 925. Parties who have not appealed are not entitled to be heard in this court, except in support of the decree in the court below. The Slavers (Coggeshall v. United States) 2 Wall. 383, 17 L. ed. 911; Loudon v. Taxing District, 104 U. S. 771, 774, 26 L. ed. 923, 924; Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514, 527, 25 L. ed. 699, 702; Chittenden v. States v. Black feather, 155 U. S. 180, 186, Brewster, 2 Wall. 196, 17 L. ed. 841; United 39 L. ed. 114, 116, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 64; Bolles 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 94; 2 Enc. Pl. & Pr. pp v. Outing Co. 175 U. S. 262, 44 L. ed. 156, 157, 158. Upon a bill of review all parties in interest should be made parties defendant to the suit. Friley v. Hendricks, 27 Miss. 412; Ralston v. Sharon, 51 Fed. 703; Shields v. Barrow. 17 How. 130, 140, 15 L. ed. 158, 160; Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 563, 22 L. ed. 184. separable from, or independent of, the rights Where the complainants have no rights of persons not made parties, and where a final decision cannot be made between the parties litigant without directly affecting Schneider, 216 Ill. 87, 74 N. E. 779; Law-made parties, a court of equity will not proand prejudicing the rights of others, not rence v. Smith, 163 Ill. 149, 45 N. E. 259; ceed to a decree. Harris v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 242; Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119, 90 Am. Dec. 88; Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265; Re Christie, 133 N. Y. 473, 31 N. E. 515; Amory v. Lord, 9 N. Y. 403; 28 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 866. The rule holding that one trust may be valid and another void is applied only in aid and assistance of the manifest intent of the testator, and never where it would lead to a result contrary to the purpose of the will, or work injustice among the beneficiaries, or defeat the testator's scheme for the disposal of his property. Tilden v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29, 14 L.R.A. 33, 27 Am. St. Rep. 487, 28 N. E. 880. Mary B. Kearney, widow of Edmund Kearney, son of the testator, who died af Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wheat. 193, 198, 6 L. ed. 599, 600; Cameron v. M'Roberts, 3 Wheat. 591, 4 L. ed. 467. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a decree of the court of appeals of the District of Columbia affirming a decree of the supreme court upon a bill of review brought by Gabriella K. Jordan, the appellee. The decree under review was rendered in a suit for the construction of the will of Thomas Kearney and for the determination of the validity of a trust created by it, so far as the same concerned land in the District of Columbia. That decree declared the trust bad as attempting to create a perpetuity. Under the bill of review the decree was modified, erty and of the premises at Luray, Viron demurrer, to the extent of the interest | ginia; (2) of (90) ninety dollars per month of Gabriella K. Jordan, and the trust was to my said daughter, Constance K. Vertner, declared valid as to her. 25 App. D. C. 291. during her natural life; (3) for the support, The executors of the testator's heirs and a education, and maintenance of my said daughter of the said heir appealed to this three Vertner grandchildren until Lillie K. court. Vertner shall have arrived at the age of nineteen years, and until Edmund K. and Thomas K. shall have arrived at the age of twenty-two years respectively." Thomas Kearney died on July 5, 1896. The will disposes of land in various places. [61]In item 3 it enumerates the testator's* property in Washington. In item 5 it devises this and other property upon a trust to be continued until January 1, 1928, and there and elsewhere, with the following exception, makes a fund from the Washington rents and profits to be disposed of as directed in the will. Item 6 is as follows: The persons in whose favor were made the provisions which were adjudged bad were one of the testator's heirs, his daughter, Constance K. Vertner, and the children of Constance. The daughter pleaded that the other heir, Edmund Kearney, also provided for in the will, died, leaving her his heir, that the trust was bad, and, by implication, that she was entitled to the property which it embraced. She now is dead. By the original decree the whole trust fund, including that given to Gabriella Jordan, went to the testator's heirs as property undisposed of by the will. The only person "I hereby authorize and direct that my said trustee shall, during the natural life of my beloved niece, Gabriella K. Jordan, pay over to her regularly each month, as soon as collected, all rents and revenues collected or derived from that certain property described in the third item hereof as lot No. 611 'M' Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.; but, in case said rents and revenues shall at any time be less than the sum of $40 for any one or more months, then my said trustees are hereby authorized and instructed to add to the sum so collected a sufficient amount to make the said amount of $40 for each and every month; it being my desire that she shall have a regular income of at least $40 per month, and that the same shall be paid over to her monthly; but if the income derived from said prem-2 Wall. 191, 196, 17 L. ed. 839, 841; Field ises shall amount to a sum in excess of $40 per month, she shall have the whole thereof." (Rec. 10.) Item 7 directs the trustee to let all the Washington property, except 611 M street, and out of the rents to pay $90 a month to the testator's daughter, Constance K. Vertner, as ordered in item 5; the residue, so far as necessary, to be applied to the support and education of her three children, named, with further provisions. Item 8 gives the remainder in fee of 611 M street to the testator's grandson, provided that if Gabriella Jordan dies before January 1, 1928, he shall only receive the rents and profits, and if she dies before the grandson reaches the age of twenty-two the rents shall be disposed of as provided in item 7 as to other Washington property. In item 21, the testator, "for fear that there may be some difficulty in construing the different provisions" of the will, states his in[62]tention that all the money *arising from the Washington rents, "except that which is to go to Gabriella K. Jordan, shall be placed in a common fund for the payment (1) of taxes, insurance and repairs on said prop dissatisfied with that decree was Gabriella Jordan, and, on the other hand, the executors and the children of Constance are the only appellants from the decree on review. According to the rule that has been laid down in this court, Gabriella, as she did not appeal, cannot go beyond supporting the decree and opposing every assignment of error. Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514, 527, 25 L. ed. 699, 702; The Stephen Morgan (The Stephen Morgan v. Good) 94 U. S. 599, 24 L. ed. 266; Chittenden v. Brewster, v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 194 U. S. 618, 621, 48 L. ed. 1142, 1153, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 784. We assume this rule to be correct. Although her counsel attempted to argue the validity of the trust as a whole, and other questions, we assume, without deciding, the decree to be unimpeachable and right except so far as appealed from. Therefore we shall confine ourselves to considering whether the gift to Gabriella is so intimately connected with the failing scheme as to fail with it. "It would be a strong thing to say that[63] we gather from this will an intent that, if the trust so far as it concerns the testatator's descendants should fail because they prefer to take the property by intestacy free from the limitations of the will, therefore the one gift outside his family should be defeated also. The trust is not a metaphysical entity or a Prince Rupert's drop which flies to pieces if broken in any part. It is a provision to benefit descendants and a niece. There is no general principle by which the benefits must stand or fall together. It is true that all the Washington property was given to the trustees in one clause and that a part of the scheme in favor of the testator's grandchildren was the creation of a fund from the rents. But, as is stated in item 21, 611 M street was excepted from the scheme, and the whole income of this lot, or, in other words, an equitable estate in the specified land, is given to Gabriella Jordan for life by item 6. If that were all we see no reason for a doubt that that gift would be good, whether the gift to the other beneficiaries were good or not. The fact that the testator's daughter takes all the rest of the property; instead of her children getting a postponed interest in a part, is no ground for denying to the niece the life estate given to her in an identified and excepted piece of land. It does not make the case any worse that a part of the property thus going to the testator's daughter is the remainder in the estate given to his niece. The appellants lay hold of the instruc judgment on a policy of life insurance which 2. Notice of the denial of the death of the insured in the answer in an action on a policy of insurance is not notice of the fraud in recovering judgment on the policy while the insured was alive which will impeach such judgment as to the parties to whom the clerk of court pays over, out of the money paid into court in satisfaction of such judgment, the sums called for in certain assignments of an interest in the policy by way of contingent fees for professional services, rendered in good faith in collecting the insurance. [No. 25.] tions to the trustees to add to the rents enough to make Gabriella's income up to $40 a month, and argue as if the gift were in substance only a gift of $40 a month Argued October 15, 16, 1906. Decided Octofrom a fund that cannot be established. Such is not the fact. The gift is primarily and in any event a gift of the income of 611 M street. But whatever may be the fate of the rest of the trust we see nothing to hinder the trustees from keeping the income up to $40 from the other property devised to them. Of course, they could not derive income from property not included in the trust, and only the property in[64]cluded is charged with *the liability. The decree may be modified by inserting after the words "against his entire estate" the words "in the District of Columbia." ber 29, 1906. PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the A United States for the Northern Dis trict of Texas to review a decree enjoining the setting up of a judgment at law on policies of life insurance as to the beneficiary, but dismissing the bill as against the assignees of partial interests in the poli cies. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Maurice E. Locke argued the cause, and, with Mr. Eugene P. Locke, filed briefs for appellant: A court of equity will grant relief under such circumstances as we have here. It is objected in argument, although not in the pleadings, that the widow of EdMarshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589, 35 mund Kearney has a right of dower in the L. ed. 870, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62; Graver v. Washington estate which descended to him, Faurot, 64 Fed. 241, 73 Fed. 1022, 162 U. and that she should have been made party S. 435, 40 L. ed. 1030, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 799, to the bill of review. The fact of the wid-22 C. C. A. 156, 46 U. S. App. 268, 76 Fed. ow's existence does not appear of record as against the appellees, and we agree with the court of appeals that the objection is made too late. Decree affirmed. FIDELITY MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE V. WILLIAM H. CLARK, Morris A. Spoonts, Charles A. Culberson, and Phillips Investment Company. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 64-75.) Judgment-fraud-notice. 1. Notice of the fraud in recovering a 257; Maddox v. Apperson, 14 Lea, 596; Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch, 332, 3 L. ed. 362; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 780, 26 L. ed. 608; Coddrington v. Webb, 2 Vern. 240; Wonderly v. Lafayette County, 150 Mo. 635, 45 L.R.A. 386, 73 Am. St. Rep. 474, 51 S. W. 745; Guild v. Phillips, 44 Fed. 461; Ocean Ins. Co. v. Fields, 2 Story, 59, Fed. Cas. No. 10,406; Trefz v. Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. 8 Fed. 177; Stowell v. Eldred, 26 Wis. 504; State v. Fraker, 148 Mo. 143, 49 S. W. 1017. If one person gets possession of another's money by fraud, the law raises a promise to return it, and upon such implied promise an action may be maintained. Bishop, Contr. § 226; Moses v. Macfer lan, 2 Burr. 1005; Buller v. Harrison, 2 Cowp. 565; Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Elliott, 5 Fed. 225; National L. Ins. Co. v. Minch, 53 N. Y. 144; Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. S. 395, 28 L. ed. 466, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426; Merryfield v. Willson, 14 Tex. 224, 65 Am. Dec. 117; Michigan v. Phoenix Bank, 33 N. Y. 9. wise proper, itself should administer full relief by ordering the return of the money. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 64K-71, 456, 457; 2 Id. § 885; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 181, 231, 236; 2 Id. § 910; Roy v. Beaufort, 2 Atk. 190; Rickle v. Dow, 39 Mich. 91; Young v. Sigler, 48 Fed. 182; Ocean Ins. Co. v. Fields and Michigan v. Phoenix Bank, supra. When property has been obtained by fraud, its true owner may recover it from any person except a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice. The authorities on this subject are numerous, and are believed The fraud in this case consisted in obtaining, by wrongful means, a judgment that William A. Hunter had died, thereby .endering the plaintiff liable to Mrs. Smythe. Whether he had so died was the question directly in issue in the action at law, and to be unanimous in support of the propo the verdict and judgment therein are con- | sition. clusive between the parties and privies, save upon such direct or collateral attack as may be permissible under the circumstances. Bigelow, Estoppel, 90; Outram v. More wood, 3 East, 346; Hazen v. Reed, 30 Mich. 331; Monks v. McGrady, 71 Tex. 134, 8 S. W. 617; McGrady v. Monks, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 611, 20 S. W. 959. The Federal courts and the courts of all the states in which the various defendants reside agree in holding that a judgment cannot be collaterally attacked for fraud. Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 18 L. ed. 475; Peninsular Iron Co. v. Eells, 15 C. C. A. 189, 32 U. S. App. 348, 68 Fed. 24; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Morgan, 21 C. C. A. 468, 47 U. S. App. 1, 76 Fed. 429; Lake County v. Platt, 25 C. C. A. 87, 49 U. S. App. 216, 79 Fed. 567; Maddox v. Summerlin, 92 Tex. 483, 49 S. W. 1033, 50 S. W. 567; Anderson v. Anderson, 8 Ohio, 109; State ex rel. Klotz v. Ross, 118 Mo. 23, 23 S. W. 196. Moreover, the Federal decisions probably are controlling in this matter, as the judgment was rendered by a Federal court. Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 346, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25. The defendants Clark, Culberson, Spoonts, and Phillips Investment Company are all privies to the judgment by assignment of interests in its subject-matter, and are protected by it to the same extent as Mrs. Smythe. Bigelow, Estoppel, 142-149; 2 Black, Judgm. §§ 549, 550; Lake County v. Platt, supra; Porter v. Bagby, 50 Kan. 412, 31 Pac. 1058. Therefore, as to all the defendants, equitable relief is necessary and proper in the case, if the facts are sufficient to warrant interfering with the judgment. Buller v. Harrison, supra; Thurston v. Blanchard, 22 Pick. 18, 33 Am. Dec. 700; Devoe v. Brandt, 53 N. Y. 462. The exception relates only to those kinds of property whose purchasers for value are protected by the policy of the law from equities outstanding against their vendors of which they had no notice. Such are money, negotiable paper, land, and merchantable chattels, naming them in a descending scale of negotiability. A judg ment is not such property. The policy of the law is to protect litigants, not outsiders dealing with judgments. The assignee of a judgment takes it subject to all equities existing between the litigants, whether he had notice of the same or not, and regardless of the consideration paid therefor. 2 Black, Judgm. §§ 953, 955; 1 High, Inj. § 190; Taylor v. Nashville & C. R. Co. 86 Tenn. 228, 6 S. W. 393; Blakesley v. Johnson, 13 Wis. 530; Independent School District v. Schreiner, 46 Iowa, 172; Rea v. Forrest, 88 Ill. 275; Northam v. Gordon, 23 val. 255; Weber v. Tschetter, 1 S. D. 205, 46 N. W. 201; Ellis v. Kerr (Tex. Civ. App.) 23 S. W. 1050, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 349, 32 S. W. 444; Wright v. Treadwell, 14 Tex. 255; Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. v. Holz, 10 N. D. 16, 84 N. W. 581; Brisbin v. Newhall, 5 Minn. 273, Gil. 217; McJilton v. Love, 13 Ill. 486, 54 Am. Dec. 449; Wright v. Levy, 12 Cal. 257; Jeffries v. Evans, 6 B. Mon. 119, 43 Am. Dec. 158; Devoll v. Scales, 49 Me. 320; Padfield v. Green, 85 Ill. 529; Mulford v. Stratton, 41 N. J. L. 466; Magin v. Lamb, 43 Minn. 80, 19 Am. St. Rep. 216, 44 N. W. 675; Fred Miller Brewing Co. v. Hansen, 104 Iowa, 307, 73 N. W. 827; Ricaud v. Alderman, 132 N. C. 62, 43 S. E. 543; Frankel v. Garrard, 160 Ind. 209, 66 N. E. 687. A policy of insurance is not a negotiable In the present case, having jurisdiction instrument, and the purchaser of it takes to restrain the defendants from setting up it subject to all equities. 1 May, Ins. 386; the judgment as an adjudication, the court 3 Joyce, Ins. § 2326. The same is true of should not turn the plaintiff over to sundry an order drawn against a specific fund law courts in Texas, Ohio, and Missouri, therein named. 7 Cyc. Law & Proc. p. 578. for the recovery of its money, but, if other-Nor do we see how it can be contended that a fund of money deposited in the registry St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. 106 U. S. 447, of a court, or which it is expected will be so deposited, possesses any of the elements of negotiability. The assignee of an interest in such a fund, it seems to us, takes only the title which the assignor had. An order drawn against a particular fund constitutes an equitable assignment thereof pro tanto; and, if such be the intention of the parties it will be so held, even though the order be general in its form. The fund so assigned need not be actually in existence at the time of the giving of the order, provided it is to come into existence as the result of arrangements already made. 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 1280-1284; Fourth Street Nat. Bank v. Yardley, 165 U. S. 634, 41 L. ed. 855, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 439; Brill v. Tuttle, 81 N. Y. 454, 37 Am. Rep. 515. Any fact which clearly proves it to be unconscionable to execute the judgment, and of which the judgment debtor might have availed himself at law, but was prevented | by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or his agents, will justify an application to a court of chancery. Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch, 332, 3 L. ed. 362; Graver v. Faurot, 22 C. C. A. 156, 46 U. S. App. 268, 76 Fed. 257: Stowell v. Eldred, 26 Wis. 504; Birch v. Birch [1902] P. 62, 130; Boswell v. Coaks, 6 Reports, 167; Cole v. Langford [1898] 2 Q. B. 36; Priestman v. Thomas, L. R. 9 Prob. Div. 210; Barnesly v. Powel, 1 Ves. Sr. 119, 284; Bandon v. Becher, 9 Bligh, N. R. 532. Mr. F. M. Etheridge argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Alexander & Thompson, McLaurin & Wozencraft, Spoonts, Thompson, & Barwise, and Etheridge & Baker, filed a brief for appellees: A circuit court of the United States, sitting in equity, will not re-examine and revise a judgment at law, simply upon an allegation of fraud intrinsic in the law judg. ment. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 68, 25 L. ed. 93, 96; Greene v. Greene, 2 Gray, 361, 61 Am. Dec. 454; Pacific R. Co. v. Missouri P. R. Co. 111 U. S. 505, 28 L. ed. 498, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583; Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 13 L.R.A. 336, 25 Am. St. Rep. 159, 25 Pac. 970, 27 Pac. 537; Pepin v. Laut man, 28 Ind. App. 74, 62 N. E. 60; Homer v. Fish, 1 Pick. 435, 11 Am. Dec. 218; United States v. Gleeson, 33 C. C. A. 272, 62 U. S. App. 311, 90 Fed. 778; Friese v. Hummel, 26 Or. 145, 46 Am. St. Rep. 610, 37 Pac. 458; | Smith v. Lowry, 1 Johns. Ch. 320; Cotzhausen v. Kerting, 29 Fed. 821, 140 U. S. 678, 35 L. ed. 754, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1019; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 207, 40 L. ed. 123, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139; Vance v. Burbank, 101 U. S. 514, 25 L. ed. 929; Steele v. 27 L. ed. 226, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Dixon v. Graham, 16 Iowa, 310; Haas v. Billings, 42 Minn. 63, 43 N. W. 797; Loucheine v. Strouse, 49 Wis. 623, 6 N. W. 360; Moffatt v. United States, 112 U. S. 24, 28 L. ed. 623, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; United States v. Minor, 114 U. S. 233, 29 L. ed. 110, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 836; Gray v. Barton, 62 Mich. 196, 28 N. W. 813; Amador Canal & Min. Co. v. Mitchell, 59 Cal. 179; United States v. White, 9 Sawy. 125, 17 Fed. 561; United States v. Hancock, 30 Fed. 858; Marriot v. Hampton, 7 T. R. 269; Richards v. Symes, 2 Atk. 319; Sewel v. Freeston, 1 Ch. Cas. 65; Flower v. Lloyd, L. R. 10 Ch. Div. 327. The respondents here obtained none of the company's funds until the alleged duty of inquiry imputed to them had been prosecuted to the very highest source and exploded. Bank of United States v. Bank of Wash ington, 6 Pet. 8, 8 L. ed. 299; Holly v. Mis sionary Soc. 180 U. S. 284, 45 L. ed. 531, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 395; Merchants Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 131 Mass. 397; Walker v. Conant, 69 Mich. 321, 13 Am. St. Rep. 391, 37 N. W. 292; Langley v. Warner, 3 N. Y. 327; Stephens v. Board of Education, 79 N. Y. 183, 35 Am. Rep. 511; Justh v. National Bank, 56 N. Y. 483; Webb v. Burney, 70 Tex. 322, 7 S. W. 841; Rector v. Fitzgerald, 8 C. C. A. 277, 19 U. S. App. 423, 59 Fed. 808; Eylar v. Eylar, 60 Tex. 315; McAusland v. Pundt, 1 Neb. 211, 93 Am. Dec. 358; Steele v. Renn, 50 Tex. 467, 32 Am. Rep. 605; Wadhams v. Gay, 73 Ill. 415; Glover v. Coit, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 104, 81 S. W. 136; Gould v. McFall, 118 Pa. 455, 4 Am. St. Rep. 606, 12 Atl. 336; Macklin v. Allenberg, 100 Mo. 337, 13 S. W. 350. Wrongful conduct of the party sued is an essential element of his liability, and, without such showing, he cannot be held. Schneider v. Sellers, 98 Tex. 380, 84 S. W. 417; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1051; United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. 200 U. S. 321, 50 L. ed. 499, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282. Where the funds have become once law. fully titled in an outsider, the party injured cannot follow them, and, by his action, make illegal that which had a lawful inception. Winston v. Masterson, 87 Tex. 200, 27 S. W. 768; McDonald v. Napier, 14 Ga. 89; Little v. Bunce, 7 N. H. 485, 28 Am. Dec. 363; Wright v. Aldrich, 60 N. H. 161; Florida C. R. Co. v. Bisbee, 18 Fla. 66; Kalm bach v. Foote, 86 Mich. 240, 49 N. W. 132; Gray v. Alexander, 7 Humph. 16; Costigan v Newland, 12 Barb. 456; Butcher v. Henning 90 Hun, 565, 35 N. Y. Supp. 1006. The complainant has proceeded throughout in the prosecution of this suit upon the |