AMENDMENTS AMENDMENT 1. RELIGION AND FREE SPEECH Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. AMENDMENT 2. BEARING ARMS A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed. AMENDMENT 3. QUARTERING SOLDIERS No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. AMENDMENT 4. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. AMENDMENT 5. RIGHTS OF PERSONS No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Notes of Decisions Power of eminent domain-In general.— Necessity and propriety of taking private property for public use, extent of taking, and procedure to be followed are legislative questions subject only to constitutional requirement of just compensation. U. S. v. McIntosh et al. (D. C., 1932), 2 F. Supp. 244. Fifth Amendment prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without just compensation implies that national Government has power of eminent domain. U. S. v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville (D. C., 1935), 9 F. Supp. 137. Power of eminent domain is inherent in sovereignty and is possessed by the national Government within the field prescribed by the National emergency may afford a reason for the exercise of power of eminent domain by the national Government, but the power must exist independently of the emergency (Const., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3; Amend. 5). Id. Purpose of taking.-National Government may condemn private property only for a "public use," which means a use by the Government for legitimate governmental purposes, or a use open to all the public, even though available to only a part of the public, whether the property is held by the Government or by some private agency, and this public right to use must result from the law itself, rather than from the will of the governmental agency upon which the power is conferred (Const., Art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3; Amend. 5). U. S. v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville (D. C., 1935), 9 F. Supp. 137. National Government has power to condemn private property for ordinary governmental purposes, such as for post offices, forts, arsenals, locks and dams on navigable streams, courthouses, lighthouses, memorials, public parks, and national highways (Const., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3; Amend. 5). Id. Scope of taking.-Government may institute omnium gatherum condemnation suit to acquire rights and claims of every person, known or unknown, to land. U. S. v. Crary et al. (D, C., 1932), 2 F. Supp. 870. United States held not precluded from condemning, as post office site, property already set apart as part of Los Angeles public plaza, under evidence showing site was necessary and proper for proposed use. Patten & Co. v. U. S. (C. C. A., 1932), 61 F. (2d) 970. All condemnations by United States are subject to constitutional prohibition forbidding taking of "private property" without compensation; "private property" including property which is ordinarily considered public property, such as streets or highways. U. S. v. Wheeler Township (C. C. A., 1933), 66 F. (2d) 977, 978. Compensation for taking private property; in general.-Protection of constitutional provision prohibiting taking of private property for public use by United States without just compensation cannot be denied (Const. Amend. 5). U. S. v. Wheeler Township (C. C. A., 1933), 66 F. (2d) 977, 978. The obligation of the United States to pay just compensation for private property taken under its power of eminent domain rests upon the Fifth Amendment, independent of statute or express promise. Jacobs et al. v. U. S. (1933), 290 U. S. 13, reversing (C. C. A., 1933), 63 F. (2d) 326. A promise to pay is implied because the duty is imposed by the Amendment. Id. Constitutional requirement of just compensation for property taken for public use was not suspended by war. U. S. v. McIntosh (D. C., 1932), 2 F. Supp. 244. Company in building railroad along bank of navigable river had right to rely upon continued maintenance of natural level, width, and flow thereof, and right to increase artificially such level, width, and flow to railroad's injury beyond that provided by nature could be obtained by United States only by exercise of right of eminent domain, and payment of just compensation (33 U. S. C. A. 591, Act Jan. 21, 1927, 44 Stat. 1010; Const. Amend. 5). U. S. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (C. C. A., 1936), 82 F. (2d) 131. Amount and elements. Under Constitution requiring "just compensation" only damages to residue of tract are allowable besides value of parcel taken by Government. U. S. v. Crary et al. (D. C., 1932), 2 F. Supp. 870. If fixtures can be removed without substantial injury either to realty or to fixtures, they remain personalty, and need not be taken as part of realty as respects liability therefor in Federal condemnation proceedings. Futrovsky et al. v. U. S. (App. D. C., 1933), 66 F. (2d) 215. In absence of legislation by Congress, costs and attorneys' fees incurred by landowner in condemnation proceeding brought by Government held not allowable against Government as part of "just compensation" for property taken. U. S. v. Certain Lands in Washington and Dakota Counties et al. (D. C., 1932), 2 F. Supp. 324. Just compensation for property taken for war purposes included interest for period between time of taking and full payment. Act of July 1, 1918 (40 Stat. 704, 724). U. S. v. McIntosh et al. (D. C., 1932), 2 F. Supp. 244. In a suit under the Tucker Act to recover just compensation for property taken by the Government, there may be claimed and allowed, in the form of interest, such addition to the value of the property at the time of the taking as will produce the full equivalent of that value paid contemporaneously with the taking. Jacobs et al. v. U. S. (1933), 290 U. S. 13. Plaintiffs allowed just compensation for the exclusive use and occupation of their land as a camp site and artillery range. taken over by the Government under its military powers in time of war. Interest allowed as part of just compensation from the date of relinquishment of the property by the Government to the date of payment. Included also in just compensation is the cost of locating, excavating, and removing or exploding unexploded shells left buried in the ground. West v. U. S. (1931), 73 Ct. Cl. 201. Where the use of plaintiff's property was taken by the Government and thereafter the fee, the plaintiff is entitled to just compensation for the use in addition to that for taking of the fee, and the just compensation to be awarded includes interest at a proper rate from the termination of the use (acquirement of the title) to the date paid. HamburgAmerican Co. v. U. S. (1932), 74 Ct. Cl. 360. The fact that the statute under which the taking was accomplished made no provision for just compensation does not affect plaintiff's right thereto, which arises under the guaranty of the Fifth Amendment, out of an implied contract to pay just compensation. Id. In condemnation proceeding, compensation is allowable for proximate damages to remaining parts of parcel of land when some part thereof has been actually taken (Const. Amend. 5). U. S. v. Chicago, B. and Q. R. Consequential damage. -The owners of the "Tarbert" and "Receiver" sand and gravel bars in the bed of the Mississippi River are not entitled to compensation for the sand and gravel taken by the United States from these bars and used for the improvement of the navigation of the river by revetting its banks, so as to confine the waters of the river to its natural channel. (1916), 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 67. Where a dam was constructed in a navigable stream under statutory authority providing for its construction in aid of navigation. the purpose of its construction as expressed in the statute may not be questioned by the court. The holder of a qualified title to lands in the bed of a navigable stream is not entitled to recover as for a taking thereof by the Government because of the Government's authorization and construction of a dam in the stream in aid of navigation having resulted in the impounding of a surplus of water in the river and pool over such lands, which surplus was licensed by the Government for use by private parties. Buchanan et al. v. U. S. (1934), 78 Ct. Cl. 791. In action against the United States for damages caused to land by overflow of river because of construction of dam, damages in tort could not be allowed (Jud. Code, sec. 24 (20), U. S. C. A. 28:41 (20); Const. Amend. 5). Christman v. U. S. (C. C. A., 1934), 74 F. (2d) 112. United States held not liable for consequential damages to land from overflow of river because of construction of dam, where damages resulted also from self-efficient cause, by freshets running down creek (Jud. Code, sec. 24 (20), U. S. C. A. 28:41 (20); Const. Amend. 5). Id. "Indirect" or "consequential damages" are those which do not arise as an immediate or natural and probable result of the act of the party, but as an incidental consequence. Damages are either "direct" or "consequential" The former are such as result from an act without the intervention of any intermediate controlling or self-efficient cause, and the latter are such as are not produced without the concurrence of some other event attributable to the same origin or cause. Id. Ordinarily, "consequential damages" are those which do not arise as immediate, natural, and probable result of act done, but arise from interposition of additional cause, without which act done would have produced no harmful result, while "proximate damages" are those which accrue directly and natural sequence, and as specific result from act done, without intervention of independent cause. U. S. v. Chicago. B. & Q. R. Co. (C. C. A.. 1936), 82 F. (2d) 131. in In applying the constitutional provision for just compensation for the taking of private property by the Government for public use. there is a marked distinction between a taking, and mere resulting damage to the property; and where the Government exercises its paramount right to control and improve navigation, and a riparian owner's damage therefrom is merely consequential, there is no redress under the constitutional provision. Marret, Admr. et al. v. U. S. (1936), 82 Ct. Cl. 1. Where the very act of improvement of navigation necessarily results in damages to riparian owners, they may not recover from the government, except where damage is so great as to amount to confiscation or appropriation of property, in which event the gov ernment, and not its agent, is liable to pay the fair value thereof under the Constitution. Evans v. Massman Const. Co. (Mo., 1938), 115 S. W. (2d) 163. Where damage to riparian owners because of improvement of navigation is consequential only, the government is not liable, since consequential damages are, at most, but tortious, and the government cannot be sued in tort. Id. Where consequential damages to riparian owners necessarily follow from improvement of navigation, and the government's agent is not guilty of negligence, and acts within the law and his instructions, the exemption from liability of the government extends to the agent. Id. Direct da ma g e.-Where, in the making of public improvements, the Government closes a roadway over which the owner of adjacent lands had an established and recognized easement or right-of-way between his lands and the public highway, there is an implied contract or agreement on the part of the Government to pay the owner just compensation for the loss and damage sustained by him, including interest as a part thereof. Federal Real Estate Co., etc. v. U. S. (1934), 79 Ct. Cl. 667. The overflowing of adjacent lands and private roadways thereon resulting from the construction by the Government of a dam in a navigable river in aid of navigation constitutes a taking of such property by the Government, and the owners are entitled to recover just compensation therefor, including as a part of such compensation interest on the value of the property from the time of the taking until payment is made. Johnson v. U. S. (1934), 80 Ct. Cl. 367. Time of payment.-Fifth Amendment does not require that taking private property for public use by United States must be accompanied or preceded by payment. Lee et al. v. U. S. (App. D. C., 1932), 58 F. (2d) 879. Validity of statutes.-Statute authorizing advance taking of private property for public use in District of Columbia, and providing for judgment against United States, with interest, held not violative of Fifth Amendment. Lee et al. v. U. S. (App. D. C., 1932), 58 F. (2d) 879. Owner accepting compensation for property taken in condemnation cannot thereafter question validity of act under which property was taken or regularity of procedure. U. S. v. McIntosh et al. (D. C., 1932), 2 F. Supp. 244. Statute authorizing President to take land for Marine Corps post held constitutional as providing ultimately for judicial ascertainment of just compensation. (Act of July 1, 1918, 40 Stat. 704, 724.) Id. AMENDMENT 6. CRIMINAL TRIALS In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. AMENDMENT 7. CIVIL TRIALS In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. AMENDMENT 8. PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. AMENDMENT 9. RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. AMENDMENT 10. RESERVED STATE POWERS The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. AMENDMENT 11. SUITS AGAINST STATES The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. AMENDMENT 12. ELECTION OF PRESIDENT The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as VicePresident, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate ;The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.-The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States. As to date of beginning of terms of President and Vice President, see Twentieth Amendment, post. AMENDMENT 13. SLAVERY SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. AMENDMENT 14. RIGHTS OF CITIZENS Section 1. Citizenship; Due Process; Equal Protection All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Notes of Decisions Abridgement of privileges and immunities. The "privileges and immunities" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are those that belong to the citizens of the United States as distinguished from citizens of the States those that arise from the Constitution and laws of the United States as contrasted with those that spring from other sources. If the refusal by a State to allow its citizen to exercise the privilege of attending the State's university, except upon condition that he take military training, to which he objects on religious and conscientious grounds, is not repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an undue deprivation of liberty, it does not violate the privileges and immunities clause. The liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer upon a consci entious and religious objector to war and military training the right to attend a State university without taking a course in military training required by the State as part of the curriculum. Hamilton v. Regents (1934), 293 U. S. 245; affirming (Calif., 1934), 28 P. (2d) 355. Due process by States.-Neither Federal Constitution nor Texas Constitution limits reasonable and just exercise of State's police power (Const. Amendments 5, 14). Hulen v. City of Corsicana (C. C. A., 1933), 69 F. (2d) 969. State in exercise of police power may take, damage, or destroy private property without compensation when public necessity, health, or safety requires (Const. Amendments 5, 14). Id. It is for the court to determine whether taking of private property by State is proper |