Puslapio vaizdai
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that divine light might be neglected and lost. And from Paul's, that a faithful use of divine illumination as to spiritual good, elevated the soul into a noble endurance of manifold wrongs. This light, cherished by obedience to its teachings, leads on to holiness, to happiness, and to God; and is a good, not limited to a few, but designed for the advantage of the world. For, saith the redeemer, "I am the light of the world, " he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but "shall have the light of life." John VIII, 12. "For "in him was life, and the life was the light of men." "And he was the true light, that enlighteneth every "man that cometh into the world." Chapter 1, 5, 9. This light of Christ, the Son of righteousness, like the light of the material sun, shines into every man, in every clime, imparting spiritual life to all who cordially receive it, with penitent believing hearts, and live conformably to its instructions. But the rejection of it, is the sole cause of their perdition. "For this is the con"demnation, that light is come into the world, but

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men loved darkness rather than light, because "their deeds were evil." John 111, 19. This agency on the heart of man, by the divine illumination of his. mind and conscience, is an agency efficient unto salvation, unto all who walk in the light thereof. "For "God who commanded the light to shine out of dark

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ness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of "the knowledge of the glory of God, in the face of "Jesus Christ." 1 Corinthians, IV, 6. But though efficient, yet not irresistible. For the heathens through self corruption, rendered it ineffectual, as St. Paul

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proves at large, in the first chapter to the Romans, and as hath been already noted. And, that it is resistible even in the very highest degree, in which it is ever conferred on men, is undeniably evident, from Hebrews VI, 4, 5, 6. "For it is impossible for those who "were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, "and have tasted the good word of God, and the pow"ers of the world to come, And yet have fallen away, (Macknight) to renew them again unto repentance; seeing they crucify to themselves the Son "of God afresh, and put him to an open shame.” And were there no other evidence in the divine word, that mankind are not saved by irresistible divine agency, this alone is sufficient. For this impossibility of renewal again unto repentance, refers not to inability of irresistible influence; but to that which may, and hath been resisted. Deity could compel, were compulsion the method of divine choice; but disapprov– ing of compulsion with any, therefore, where agency of the highest degree divinely admissible, is conferred and resisted; salvation of course becomes impossible.

Finally, from the preceding train of reasoning and discussion, it clearly and indubitably follows, that man possesses not merely ability of self exertion, but also of self determination in the exercises of his own will. The antediluvians gave evidence thereof, by sinful volitions in opposition to the strivings of the divine spirit. Unfaithful christians evince it in every volition which grieves, or quenches the divine spirit. The unbelieving Jews in the wilderness evinced it, when rebel

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ling against God, they "vexed his holy spirit." Isaiah 63, 10. The persecuting unbelievers of Jerusalem, exercised a self determined opposition, when "they resisted the Holy Ghost," as their father's had before done. Acts vii, 51. The self corrupted Gentiles, yield like evidence of self originated opposition to God. Romans I, 19, 20, 21. And yet above all others the apostates demonstrate it, who did " despite unto the spirit of grace." Hebrews x, 29. So that as to evidence arising from well authenticated facts, it is difficult to find any more powerful, than this, which here presents itself, of a power of self resistance in man; that he not only may, but unhappily too often does exert, to the resisting, grieving, quenching, and even doing despite to the spirit of grace, and thereby most miserably causing and effecting his own destruction.

But as self determining power in man, over his own acts of will if admitted, would wholly subvert necessary volition; which constitutes the fundamental principle of Hopkinsianism; the foregoing evidence and reasoning, however full and conclusive, will doubtless avail but little, with minds more disposed to doubt and to cavil, than to admit of argument however powerful, if hostile to the favourite creed: It therefore should not be deemed strange to hear that human self determination of volition, is but an absurd notion, because that if men even possess self power to will, still they are destitute of self determination how to will; for mere ability to will can never be a cause why a man in exerting his will should choose and not refuse, or refuse and not choose. That this cause if not

an immediate divine excitement on the heart, yet is from divine necessity, because, from a moral irresistible disposition, either good or evil, implanted in man by the forming hand of God himself. And that Christ's own doctrine strictly agrees herewith, "Make "the tree good, and his fruit good; or else make the "tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt: for the tree is "known by his fruit. A good tree cannot bring forth "evil fruit; neither can a corrupt tree bring forth "good fruit." Matthew x11, 33, and VII, 18. And hence, it will by Hopkinsians be deemed inferable, that neither a good man, nor a bad man, if left wholly to his own determinations, could ever change from his first moral character. The good man, would undeviatingly always act rightly, and the bad man, with equal uniformity, always act wrongly. But, as we assuredly know, that Adam and Eve were holy at first, and yet, afterwards became unholy: and as we are equally assured, that multitudes of their posterity, though undeniably sinful, do afterwards become pious and righteous; of course we have herefrom, undeniable proof, that neither our first parents, nor their posterity, were ever left to exercise a self determining power over their own wills, (even if they ever possessed any such power,) but were invariably governed by an invisible necessity, wholly independent of themselves, and of their wills: and to suppose any thing contrary to this, is but the height of folly and absurdity.

Amongst the difficulties attendant on this controversy and involving themselves there with through evéry stage of it, is that of ambiguity of words, which

by perplexing the understanding, but too often undesignedly misleads, upon each side of the question. In the objections, arguments and inferences, now to be duly noted, the compound term "self determination," is seen frequently to occur. In order, therefore, to reply with precision to what may be deemed the very marrow of objection against true freedom of will, and in favour of necessity of will, it is highly expedient that its true and undeviating sense be distinctly understood and remembered. As heretofore explained when applied to human volition, it was so used, as to be synonymous with men's being the efficients of their own volitions; or, as originating their own acts of will, or otherwise expressed, as holding in themselves the control over their own wills. So that power of self determination does not mean the will determining or governing itself, as if it were an agent distinct from the man. Nor yet, that the man produces one act of will by a previous act of will: But simply, that a man has ability of free will to choose or to refuse one of two objects, or to refuse both and choose a third, if presented before him; independently of any necessitating, extrinsick agency: although not independently of that divine agency, which at first created and conferred on him his existence and ability; and which still upholds him in being, and on whom he is also further dependent, for the moral influence of motives, of hope and fear, and for the further moral influence of resistible divine illumination, and its gracious energies.

This is the ability or freedom of will for which we contend, as indispensably essential in order to account

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