unless a volition was produced by a previous volition, it must of necessity arise from an involuntary cause; but as it hath been already made manifest, that volition and voluntary cause are wholly dissimilar, (the latter consisting not in acts of will, but in ability to will uncontroled by any other being than the agent himself) I shall not here repeat what was there observed. And thirdly. We discover how grovling are all his ideas of the freedom of volition, by his re mark from his own mistaken conceptions of voluntary and involuntary. "And if it proceeded from an involuntary cause, it matters not whether that cause was within or without himself." That is, if Adam's acts of will did not spring from previous acts of will, they must have sprung from an involuntary cause; and if so, no matter whether this cause was within or without himself. It is sometimes remarked, that when great men mistake, they mistake greatly. If this rule will hold good in all cases, then we must have alted opinion of our author's talents, for his mistake is great indeed. What! of no consequence to Adam! whether the perception and reason, the powers of conscience, the hope and fear, the love or hatred, or the cravings of bodily appetites, which stimulated him to will and act, were those, that were within himself, and under his own control; or were those that dwelt in some other person, who held him in willing bondage, and controled his every action of soul and body. To this, the doctor gravely replies. As “ mind cannot act any more than matter can move, without a divine "agency, it is absurd to suppose, that men can be left

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"to the freedom of their own will, to act, or not to "And it

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act, independently of divine influence."*

"is equally certain, that Adam could not be the effi"cient cause of his own volition. He was a depend"ent creature. He lived, moved, and had his being "in God; and without him he could do nothing. "Such a dependent creature could no more produce "his own volitions, than his own existence. A self "determining power is an independent power, which "never was, and never could be given to Adam."+ Mind and matter according to the doctor's definition, most strikingly resemble each other. Mind cannot act of itself, nor matter move itself. So impotent is mind, that it is as unable to exert of itself a single volition, as to give itself existence. Had Priestly but discovered such a mind in human form, he undoubtedly would have taken it for one of his materialized men. And, perhaps, have subjected it to the scrutinizing torture of a decomposition. This accommodation of the powers of mind, to the powers of matter, was designed as descriptive of Adam's ability to will, and to do. But Adam's ability to will and do, was not circumscribed within the narrow circle of mere mental ability. A mere thinking and perceiving being might not be able to do more than barely to perceive and think. But where are such beings to be found? Angels, whether good or evil, are not such; for they can both love and hate, as well as think.

* Sermon on Genesis XLV, 5, page 41.

Sermon on Ecclesiastes VII, 29, page 281.

Adam and all his rational posterity, possess affections as really as angels do. And Adam, and all his posterity, while inhabiting this world, were, or are endued with excitements to action, which no angel ever possessed. For the human soul being invested with a body composed of an organization transcending the deepest research, is thereby susceptible of pains and pleasures, and is endued with appetites, which none but incarnated spirits feel. And in addition to all this complicated stimulus to action, which neither angels, nor matter ever felt, we should annex the tender, melting, attractive and powerful excitements of natural affections, in all their complication of operations, on husband, wife, parent, child, and similar relative connexions. When, therefore, we contemplate a human being, as required to will, and to act, we do not consider his mentality as containing and furnishing all his ability for such action. We allow him indeed, his full portion of perception, viz. imagination, memory and reason; we annex to these, the faculty of conscience, as well as that of the will; and with these we combine the passions of love, hatred, hope, fear, &c. and from these we cannot separate either the appetites or the natural affections. And when we contrast such a being so endowed, with a parcel of mere matter, whether a stick, a stone, or a clod of earth, we cannot conceive how the great doctor Emmon's could have supposed that the former was no more capable of acting, without a divine agency, than the latter was of moving, without the like agency,

(

Common sense most certainly dictates, that an hungry, or a thirsty man, with food or drink within reach, needs no exciting divine impulse to induce him to satisfy the cravings of nature. And as common sense in these instances teaches, in direct contradiction to Hopkinsian sense, so it does likewise in all other cases in which the living soul is capable, through means of its mind and conscience, of its passions and affections, and of its appetites and propensions, to exert its will, by originating its own volitions, where suitable occasions offer. But to this it is objected, that, "a "self-determining power, is an independent power, "which never was, and never could be given to Adam, "who lived, moved, and had his being in God; and "without whom he could do nothing. "" And besides, "if it were possible, for moral agents to act, without "any divine influence upon their wills, it is easy to 'perceive, that their actions would be solely their

own and could not in any sense be ascribed to "God, nor considered as under his providential con“trol."* Absurdity crowds here upon absurdity. For if man's self exertion in volition, thereby rendering his actions solely his own, and not God's actions, could spring only from an independent power, impossible to be communicated to any creature: then the same reasoning will, in like manner, apply to every thing else besides volition, which is solely a man's own act, and not God's. It will apply to his perceptions, his reasonings, his memory, his conscience, his affec

*Page 41-Sermon on Genesis, XLV, 5.

tions and passions. Yea, and to his sensations of see. ing, hearing, feeling, smelling and tasting. These cannot be solely a man's own; for if they were, they could not in any sense be ascribed to God. But would arise from an independent power impossible ever to be confered on any man. Therefore, all these belong to man only through a divine influence, which primarily makes them belong to God, more properly than to man. Therefore, it is God, who perceives for man, reasons for him, remembers for him, performs for him the office of conscience, loves, hates, hopes, fears, sees, hears, smells, tastes, and wills for him. In a word, man's soul and spirit, are so far decomposed, and their place so far supplied by such a portion of divine actuation, as causes all the perceptions, passions, affections, and actions of all men, to belong more properly to God than to themselves. But turning with indignation from this inevitable, disgusting, and apparently blasphemous result; permit me, sir, to solicit your attention to this subject in a less offensive point of view. A self determining power is deemed impossible to be communicated to creatures, because they "live, move, and have their being in God, and with out him can do nothing." This reasoning we will test, by applying it to a case, at which already slightly hinted: viz. To the subsisting relation betwixt an incorporate society, and the legislature which confered thereon incorporate existence. The persons composing such society, although neither created nor upholden as men, by said legislature, yet so as respects incorporate capacity, and continuance therein, they are