inquiries; in the latter, the extent of his misapprehension of the method of artistic representation— and the consequent value of Aristotle's contribution to the science of criticism—appears most clearly. The permanent element in Plato's criticism is contained in three mutually dependent principles. In literature the 'thought' is prior to the 'form'; greatness in art depends upon morality in the artist; and art and morals are mutually connected, both in the sense that the character of the artist appears in the character of his work, and in the sense that the creations of art have an influence upon the life of man which can be expressed in terms of morality. The first of these principles is most clearly stated in the message of the Phaedrus, which is addressed to literature as a whole. 'Go you to Lysias and say that we two have gone down to the fountain of the Nymphs and the seat of the Muses, and have held speech with them; and that they bade us tell him and other composers of speeches, and Homer and other composers of poetry, whether set to music or not, and Solon, too, and others who have committed political compositions to writing under the name of laws, that if, in composing these various works, they knew where the truth was, and could make good their statements in case of their being called in question, and, if they maintain that they are able to prove by word of mouth much more than their writings contain-if this be so, we must tell them they have no business to be called by any of the names appropriated to these several classes of composers-orator, poet, or legislator-but that they should be called by a name which expresses the purpose on which they have really been engaged: and this purpose is the search for "wisdom," and their name is "lover of wisdom," or philosopher.'' The principle of the interdependence of art and morals is asserted in its widest form in the third book of the Republic. Here he lays down the general standard by which the fitness of poetry and the arts for admission into the ideal commonwealth is to be tested; and he decides that a thing is beautiful just so far as it is made to be an expression of morality. 'Then excellence of thought, and of harmony, and of form, and of rhythm, is connected with excellence of character, with good nature, that is, not in the sense of the colourless character which we euphemistically term "good nature," but in that of the disposition which is really well and nobly equipped from the point of view of character. 'The qualities which are implied in this excellence of character are conspicuously present in painting and all similar arts, in weaving and embroidery and architecture, and, indeed, in the productions of all the lesser arts, and further in the constitution of bodies and of all organic growths. In all of these excellence or defectiveness of form can be discerned. And defectiveness of form and rhythm and harmony are associated with deficiencies of thought and of character, while the corresponding artistic excellences are associated with the corresponding moral excellences of self-restraint and goodness; indeed, they are directly expressive of them. 'If this be so, we must not confine our supervision to our poets. In addition to compelling the poets to embody the 1278. [The form of the passage has been slightly altered in translation]. stamp of morality in their productions as a condition of their working among us, we must exercise supervision over the whole class of art-workers. We must prevent them from embodying this expression of vice or moral obliquity or meanness or bad taste either in their representations of living things or in their buildings, or in anything else which they produce. If we cannot restrain them, we must not allow them to produce among us at all, for we are bound to prevent our 'guardians' from being bred upon the images of vice, like cattle on rank grass, gathering many impressions from many sources, day by day and little by little, and feeding upon them, and so unconsciously collecting a great mass of evil in their souls. Instead of this we must look for artists who are able out of the goodness of their own natures to trace the nature of beauty and perfection, that so our young men, like persons who live in a healthy place, may be perpetually influenced for good. Every impression which they receive through eye or ear will come from embodiments of beauty, and this atmosphere, like the health-giving breeze which flows from bracing regions, will imperceptibly lead them from their earliest childhood into association and harmony with the spirit of Truth, and into love for that spirit.'' Such a censorship is, of course, fatal to artistic freedom in general, while in respect of poetry it excludes 'the indiscriminate realist'; the man whose cleverness makes him capable of assuming every form and reproducing every object.' To such a dramatic artist the citizens of the ideal commonwealth are merciless. His talent is freely admitted, but he is told that 'one like him neither does, nor indeed can, 1 Republic, p. 400–1 (St.). exist' there. Elsewhere he may be welcome, but for their part they have profit not pleasure in view, and they will therefore require a 'more austere and less delightful poet,' who will take virtue for his model and cast his poetry into an educational mould.' Plato has already shown the need for this censorship by a consideration of the subject-matter of Homer and other poets. In the case of Homer, he selects a number of passages which attribute various kinds. of immoral conduct to the gods and heroes. He takes instances in which the characters display terror at death, sexual irregularities, cowardice, deceitfulness, insubordination, covetousness, and unmanly or immoderate emotion. Such passages he condemns, first, as 'sacrilegious and untrue,' and, secondly, 'morally hurtful to the hearers.' In addition to this, he brings against literature a general charge of immorality. 'Poets and prose-writers,' he says, 'are mistaken in dealing with human life in the most important respects. They give us to understand that many evil livers are happy and many righteous men unhappy; and that wrong-doing, if it be undetected, is profitable, while honest dealing is beneficial to one's neighbour, but damaging to one's self.'3 Thus far Plato confines himself, in the main, to a criticism of the subject-matter of poetry. All art must be an expression of morality, but poetry, he finds, so far from expressing morality, has become a vehicle for conveying immoral notions. In the tenth 2 386-391. 1 398. 3 392. book of the Republic he formulates his charges more definitely. He not only complains of the subjectmatter of the poets, but condemns the form and method of the poetic representation of the facts of life. In this fuller criticism he charges poetry with two inherent defects—unreality, and a tendency to foster the emotional element in man to the detriment of the rational. But before considering this fuller criticism it is necessary to know how far Plato agrees with Aristotle in accepting imitation (piunois) as the basis of poetry. For this purpose we may refer to a passage in the third book of the Republic, where he roughly classifies different kinds of poetic composition by reference to the use of imitation. 'In poetry,' he says, 'whether the plot be invented or consist of traditional stories, there is one style of representation which consists solely of "imitation "-to take your examples, tragedy and comedy-and another which consists of the narrative of the poet himself-dithyrambic poetry is perhaps the best example; while epic poetry is one of many instances of a third style which employs both dialogue and narrative."1 It appears, therefore, that whereas Aristotle finds in 'imitation' the basis of all creative literature, whether dramatic or not in form, Plato calls 'imitative' only so much of a literary composition as is written in character. In other words, the difference 1 |