communities of a similar size in America. It is said, however, that the inhabitants of our Australian colonies are morally and intellectually inferior to the inhabitants of the backwood territories of the United States. Does that inferiority exist, and if it does, whence does it arise? If it does exist, it arises from the difference between the American mode of colonisation and that of the Colonial Office. For American colonisation consists of the migration westward of a portion of the people of the United States; a portion of all classes migrate; they carry with them in reality, and not as a legal fiction, the laws, the rights, and the liberties of American citizens; they are fit for self-government, and will have it. Also the best portion of the emigrants from England go to the backwood states and compose a large portion of the population of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Iowa. In fact, an Englishman, when he emigrates to the United States, carries with him in reality all the laws, rights, and liberties of an Englishman; but if he emigrates to our colonies, on touching colonial soil he loses some of the most precious of his liberties, and becomes the subject of an ignorant and irresponsible despot at the Antipodes. Now, Colonial Office colonisation consists in the transportation of convicts and the shovelling out of paupers. Therefore, it is said that such immoral, degraded, and unintellectual beings are only fit to be governed by the nominees of the Colonial Office; and on that plea of its own making the Colonial Office calls upon us to refuse these colonies two elective houses. I challenge the Colonial Office to substantiate that plea. It is undoubtedly an extraordinary fact, that any

respectable man, that any person of birth or education, should emigrate to a colony to be governed by the Colonial Office. Nevertheless, they do emigrate; and I maintain, from many circumstances known to me, that amongst the 32,000 inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land, and the 38,000 of South Australia, there are as many moral and intellectual persons as in any ordinary Anglo-Saxon community of the same size in the backwoods of America. I challenge the Colonial Office to prove the contrary, and I maintain that there are materials in these colonies for two elective chambers. And, in fact, by this Bill, the noble lord admits that there may be materials in these colonies for a legislature composed of four-and twenty members. I will content myself with that admission, and will propose that my two elective houses shall consist than four-and-twenty members in all. if there be materials in these colonies for the noble lord's single chamber, there will also be materials. for my two elective chambers; unless the noble lord maintain that the Colonial Office may, with propriety, appoint as its nominees men inferior in station, intellect, and character to the class of persons amongst whom the representatives of the people ought to be chosen. I presume the noble lord will not maintain this position, though it has been frequently acted upon by the Colonial Office. It follows, therefore, that if there be materials for the noble lord's plan, there will be materials for my plan.

of not more Therefore,

Sir, in conclusion, let me ask the Committee to consider what is the precise difference between the plan of the noble lord and my plan? The noble

lord proposes that there shall be established in each of these colonies a legislature, to consist of not more than four-and-twenty members, and that the number of members, the amount of their qualifications, and the amount of the franchise shall be fixed by the legislatures now by law established in these colonies. I will propose precisely the same thing, and will suppose, for simplicity of argument, that the number of members will be fixed at twentyfour. Next, the noble lord proposes that these twenty-four members shall be divided into two classes of sixteen and eight members respectively. I propose the same thing; but the noble lord proposes that the eight members shall be nominated by the Colonial Office and sit in the same house as the sixteen members who are to be elected by the people. On the contrary, I propose that both the eight and the sixteen members shall be elected by the people, and shall sit in different houses. Therefore, the question between the noble lord and myself is simply this: Is it likely or not that the Colonial Office would by nomination select, out of the materials in these colonies, eight men for each colony who would be better qualified to be members of a legislature than those which the inhabitants of these colonies would themselves elect? This is the whole question, stripped of extraneous matter, idle fallacies, and other modes of deception and mystification. This is the question for the Committee to decide. Those who vote with the noble lord, and against my motion, will vote for Colonial Office nomination and against popular election, will vote implicit confidence in the Colonial Office and no confidence in the inhabitants of these colonies,

and will vote that our Australian colonists are so morally degraded, and so intellectually despicable, that they ought not to be entrusted with institutions, which theory and experience have proved to be best adapted for the government of similar communities of Anglo-Saxon men in every other portion of the globe.

ON MOTION TO RECOMMIT AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT BILL.

MAY 6.

It was

[This motion was seconded by Mr. Adderley. defeated by a majority of 123: Ayes, 42; Noes, 165. Both Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Disraeli voted in the minority.]

SIR, I move that this Bill be recommitted, for the purpose of omitting all clauses, which empower the Colonial Office to disallow colonial acts, to cause colonial Bills to be reserved, and to instruct colonial governors as to their conduct in the local affairs of these colonies; and for the purpose also of adding clauses enumerating and defining imperial and colonial powers.

Sir, the House may remember, that in committee I waived my right to oppose the 5th and 11th clauses of this Bill, which would continue to the Colonial Office its present powers of interfering in the local affairs of the Australian colonies. I did so for the convenience of the Committee, and on an agreement with the noble lord, the Prime

Minister, that on the bringing up of the report I should be entitled to raise the important question involved in those clauses, and to take the sense of the House on that question alone. I therefore now propose to recommit this Bill. I do so, as I have already stated, first, for the purpose of omitting from it all clauses by which the Colonial Office would be empowered to interfere with the management of the local affairs of these colonies; secondly, for the purpose of adding certain clauses which I have submitted to the consideration of the House, and which would give to these colonies the uncontrolled management of their local affairs. The question, therefore, for the House now to decide is, between Colonial Office government and self-government in the local affairs of these colonies.

I must begin by observing that this Bill raises two distinct questions. First, the special question, what ought to be the form of the government of the Australian colonies? That question was fully debated and decided in committee, and I do not presume to ask the House to reverse the decision of the Committee. The other, and in my opinion the far more important question, has not been discussed. It is the great question of colonial polity, namely, what amount of self-government ought our colonies to possess, and to what extent ought they to be subject to the controlling power of the Colonial Office? Upon the answer which Parliament shall finally give to this question will depend the future constitution of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain. And I believe, according as that constitution shall be well or ill framed, our