therefore, assume that we are all agreed that in a Bill for the better government of the Australian colonies there ought to be some provision empowering the colonies to alter the institutions which we are, in the first instance, to frame for them. The question at issue is, therefore, what is the best form of government for these colonies to commence with? With what constitution ought we to start them into representative existence? I repeat, with that constitution which theory and experience have proved to be the best for similar communities.

The right honourable gentleman seems to contest this almost self-evident position; for he proposes to start these colonies with a legislature composed of a single chamber, in which one-third of the members are to be nominated by the Colonial Office, and, in fact, are to hold their seats at the will of the Colonial Office; that is to say, the noble lord at the head of the Government, the illustrious author of the Reform Bill, proposes to start these colonies with a house of legislature similar to what the House of Commons would be if we were to repeal the Reform Bill, reinstate 110 Gattons and Old Sarums, and place the 220 seats at the disposal of the Minister of the day! Such a constitution is absurd in theory; all experience testifies against it, and I believe every authority condemns it. But the right honourable gentleman the President of the Board of Trade says that these colonies are to have the power to amend their constitutions; that is to say, he proposes to start them with a bad constitution on the plea that they will have power to blunder into a good constitution at some future period. Is this the policy of a statesman? There

is an old and true maxim, applicable to the colonies, namely, "Rear up a child in the way it should go." This maxim her Majesty's Government propose by this Bill to reverse; and the noble lord at the head of the Government would rear his colonial children in the way they should not go, and trust to the chapter of accidents for setting them right.

In opposition to the single chamber proposed by this Bill, the honourable and learned member for Midhurst proposes that the legislature of the Australian colonies shall consist of two chambers. I agree with the honourable and learned gentleman, in preferring two chambers to one, and shall vote for his motion, which, if carried, would only pledge the Committee to the opinion that the legislature to be constituted in the Australian colonies should consist of two chambers, and would not in any way pledge the Committee with regard to the form of the two chambers. The honourable and learned gentleman intends subsequently to propose that one of the chambers shall be nominated by the Crown: on that point I entirely disagree with him; and I intend to move an amendment, that both chambers shall be elective.

First, with regard to the general question, whether a legislature composed of two chambers is, or is not, a better form of government than a legislature composed of a single chamber, I assert that every high authority is in favour of two chambers: for instance, in this House, the noble lord at the head of the Government, the right honourable gentleman, the President of the Board of Trade, and the honourable gentleman, the Under - Secretary for the

Colonies; and out of this House, the Governor of New South Wales, the Governor of Van Diemen's Land,' the Governor of New Zealand,2 and the noble earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies, have all of them acknowledged that a legislature composed of two chambers is the better form of Government. For instance, Earl Grey, in his despatch of the 31st of July, 1847, to the Governor of New South Wales, stated that the "practical working" of the system of the single and partly nominated chamber did not "by any means justify the conclusion that it was an improvement upon the system of two houses"; and the noble earl added, that "he saw many reasons for belief that two distinct houses were best calculated to ensure judicious and prudent legislation." Sir C. Fitzroy, Governor of New South Wales, in a despatch of 6th of January, 1848, said that "he could have no hesitation in stating his own opinion, founded upon long practical experience, that two separate chambers would be a decided improvement upon the present form of legislation in that colony." And he repeated that opinion in the strongest terms in the despatch of the 11th of August, 1848. The Governor of Van Diemen's Land, in a despatch dated the 15th of August, 1848, "strenuously recommends the adoption of a second or upper chamber." And the Governor of New Zealand, in despatch dated the 29th of November, 1848, stated that "the reasons which induced him to recommend that a legislature should consist of two chambers were so obvious that he need not trouble the noble 1 Sir W. Denison.

2 Captain (afterwards Sir George) Grey.

earl with stating them." Thus every one who is deemed an authority by the Colonial Office is in favour of two houses of legislature being established in the Australian colonies.

The right hon. gentleman, the President of the Board of Trade, affirms that there are special reasons why, in the Australian colonies the legislatures should consist of a single chamber. These special reasons, as far as New South Wales alone is concerned, may be stated in a very few words. The right honourable gentleman asserts that the constitution of a colony ought to be framed in accordance with the wishes of its inhabitants; that the inhabitants of New South Wales are well satisfied with their constitution, and prefer it to any other form of government; and that if they should wish to change it, they would be able to gratify their wishes under the provisions of this Bill. These arguments are clear and distinct; whether they are valid or not, I will presently consider. I will suppose, however, for a moment, that they are valid, and I then ask by what process of reasoning is the conclusion arrived at, that Parliament ought to give the constitution of New South Wales to the other Australian colonies? It may be a fair argument to say, that as Parliament has given a constitution to New South Wales (though in so doing it has committed a great mistake and framed a very bad constitution), it ought not to change that constitution without the consent of the inhabitants of that colony. That may or may not be a fair argument; but surely it is most absurd to argue that because Parliament has made a mistake with regard to New South

Wales, it ought to make four similar mistakes with regard to four other colonies. I repeat, it cannot be wise policy to start a colony with a bad constitution, that is in a wrong direction, on the plea that it will have the power to blunder hereafter into a right direction. The wise policy I repeat would be, to give a colony, from the beginning, those institutions which reason and experience have proved to be the best; and then, if with deliberate folly, the colony should wish to change them for the worse, permission to do so should be granted. It cannot be pleaded that it is of importance that all the Australian colonies should have identically the same institutions, because by this bill they are to be empowered to change their institutions, and therefore to make them differ if they please. And it cannot be affirmed that either Victoria or Van Diemen's Land, or South Australia, or Western Australia, wish for the constitution of New South Wales, for there is not one tittle of evidence to that effect. I do not deny that these colonies would prefer any form of representative government to no representative government at all; for Victoria is most anxious to be separated from New South Wales; Van Diemen's Land, hopes by means of representative institutions to get rid of transportation; and South Australia and Western Australia long for some control over their own affairs. I acknowledge, therefore, that they would rather have this bill than no bill at all; but I maintain they would prefer to this bill a measure founded upon sound principles, and which would be calculated to give not a momentary but a permanent satisfaction to

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