colony, except the imperial ones, I call local powers; because they have reference to the management of the local concerns of a colony, as distinguished from the common concerns of the whole empire. It is evidently of great and primary importance to this country, and to the empire as a whole, in what manner imperial powers are exercised; therefore imperial powers, as I have just said, ought to be strictly reserved to the Imperial Government, and no colonial legislature should be entitled to make any law affecting or derogating from imperial powers. On the other hand, it is evidently a matter of little or secondary importance to this country, and to the empire as a whole, in what manner local powers are exercised, provided only that the colonists are not dissatisfied with the Imperial Government on account of the manner in which the local powers are exercised. Now, it is impossible for men on one side of the globe to manage the affairs of Englishmen on the other side of the globe without producing intense dissatisfaction. On the other hand, if the colonists were to obtain the uncontrolled management of their local affairs, and if in any respect they were to mismanage their local affairs, for so doing they would have themselves to blame and nobody else. Therefore I infer that we ought to delegate to the colonies all local powers, and entitle them to pass any law affecting their local concerns. Consequently, I infer that we ought to deprive the Colonial Office of its present arbitrary power to disallow all Acts of the colonial legislatures, and to limit the power of the Colonial Office to questions affecting imperial powers. For this purpose it would be necessary

carefully to enumerate and accurately to define the powers which ought to be held to be imperial powers. Now the noble lord says that it would be impossible to draw the line of distinction between imperial and local powers. The noble lord, with his numerous occupations, cannot spare time to attend very carefully to these subjects. But I am sure that if the noble lord would apply his energies. to the question, he could draw the line of distinction. For a definition of imperial powers has not only been attempted, but made successfully, by those Anglo-Saxon statesmen who formed the constitution of the United States of America.

I proposed last Session that a Royal Commission should be appointed to prepare a measure of colonial reform. I regret much that the House did not assent to that proposal; for by this time the House would have possessed a more accurate enumeration of imperial powers than that which it can expect from me; but which I am prepared at this moment to make if the Committee would bear with me for a few minutes. The Committee must understand that I propose that the colonial legislatures shall be restricted from making any law affecting or derogating from the following powers:

[For an enumeration of imperial powers and of the restrictions proposed to be put upon the powers of the colonial legislatures, see speech of May 6, at page 365, and the constitution proposed for New South Wales, which is printed in the note.]

It is evident that a colonial legislature might inadvertently, or even intentionally, exceed its powers, and pass an enactment in contravention of the

restrictions put on its powers. I therefore propose that such an enactment shall be invalid ; and that there shall be a supreme court, which shall have both original and appellate jurisdiction in all questions touching the validity of a colonial enactment; and I propose that the Queen in Council shall be that supreme court.

I have now described the main features of the constitution which I would propose for the Australian colonies, and by which I would substitute for the arbitrary power of the Colonial Office a legally defined power. Now, there is nothing which men of our race hate more than arbitrary power, and nothing which they respect more than a legally defined power. At present the colonial legislatures do not know what laws they may and what laws they may not make. In fact, they may at present make any laws whatever, affecting imperial interests in any manner whatever, provided the Colonial Office does not disallow them within a certain period of time. On the other hand, the colonial legislatures cannot make any law which the Colonial Office may not disallow. I propose, therefore, to enable the colonial legislatures to know precisely what laws they may make, and what laws they must abstain from making; and I propose to settle all disputes upon this subject by means of the decisions of a judicial tribunal.

I have now answered the challenge of the noble lord, that those who would effect reform in our colonial system should state what in their opinion the nature of that reform should be. In order to present my principles in a practical shape, I have, with the aid of some legal friends, prepared the

outline of a constitution for New South Wales, which I will submit to the consideration of the House. In so doing I will only pledge myself to general principles. I will not pledge myself to minute details; for, in order to make a perfect measure, information would be required from the Colonial Office, and it would be necessary to consult constitutional lawyers. I must now beg pardon for trespassing so long on the attention of the Committee, but I must rest my excuse on the challenge thrown out by the noble lord.

In conclusion, I must assert that our true colonial polity is to have faith in our colonists, and to believe that they are as rational men as we are, and that they understand their own local affairs better than we can; therefore, I maintain that we ought to give them the uncontrolled management of their local affairs, as distinguished from imperial concerns. Then the colonists, freed from the hated tyranny of the Colonial Office, bearing true allegiance to the monarch of these realms, and willingly obeying the laws made by the Imperial Parliament, or by those authorities to whom the Imperial Parliament shall delegate a portion of its legislative powers, would be bound to the British Empire by the strong ties of race, language, interest, and affection.

ON THE SECOND READING OF THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT BILL.

FEBRUARY 18, 1850.

[The second reading of the Bill was passed without opposition.]

It appears to me that it would be wise policy on the part of the House unanimously to assent to the principle of this Bill, and to show to the Australian colonies that we are anxious as speedily as possible to give them the benefit of representative government. Therefore, in my opinion, it would be better to offer no opposition to the first stages of this Bill, but that all questions concerning the form of government of these colonies, and concerning the powers to be delegated to the colonial authorities, should be carefully considered in Committee. I think, if this course be adopted, it is not too much to ask the noble lord to give honourable members full opportunity to discuss the details of this measure, and to propose amendments to it. Does the noble lord assent to this? If so, it appears to me, that before this Bill is discussed in Committee, the noble lord should alter its shape and form. For in its present form many of the most important questions with regard to the government of the Australian colonies cannot be directly raised upon the clauses of this Bill, but only indirectly by reference to the clauses of a former statute upon which this Bill is founded.

The noble lord's Bill is founded upon the