mon with the real Anatolian Turks of the interior of Asia Minor. Retention of the sovereignty of the sultan over Constantinople is advocated also by those who profess to fear serious outbreaks in the Mohammedan world if the calif is expelled from the home he has occupied ever since America was discovered.

But the lessons of the last century have proved conclusively the unfitness of the Turks to rule over other races, the hopelessness of reforming the Ottoman administrative system, and above all the danger to the peace of Europe of maintaining a weak and corrupt government at Constantinople. The advocates of the status quo in Turkey have always been inspired by considerations that have nothing whatever to do with a constructive and ameliorating policy in the near East. They have hoped for favors and concessions that could not be obtained from a healthier régime; they have kept the patient alive in order to get their names in his will; they have dreamed of using their influence over the sultan as Calif of Islam to strengthen their own hold or weaken the hold of rivals upon other Mohammedan countries; or they have been simply dogs in the manger. Who will accuse me of exaggeration? European diplomacy is not regenerated. The evils of the past have already reappeared. A French friend of the old school said to me recently, “It is best for us to keep the Turks in Constantinople, so that we shall have something to offer Russia when she comes to herself and we need her again as an ally."

3. The attribution of Constantinople to Greece. In righting some of the historic wrongs of Europe, the treaties of Versailles and St.-Germain have not hesitated to go back to an earlier date than 1453. Witness Italy at Triest, the revival of Bohemia, and the new frontiers of Poland. Constantinople was a Greek city, taken from the Greeks by conquest. It is still the largest Greek city in the world, and Greeks are found in great numbers in the European hinterland of Constantinople and along both sides of the straits. No Christian nation has a better right to Constantinople historically, ethnologically, and

economically. Constantinople and the straits, despite more than four centuries of Turkish rule, have remained the center of Hellas. As in the days of the Byzantines, Constantinople is more the foyer of Greek culture than Athens. And we must not forget that if Constantinople is the religious center of Islam, it is also the religious center of the Greek Church. There was a patriarch at Constantinople before Mohammed preached, and the patriarch had become the spiritual head of an inde pendent Christian church before the Turks crossed to Europe.

I believe that when the Greek race becomes once more a great and numerous people, and for the first time in history a united nation, the return to Constantinople is inevitable. But at the present time the Greeks are not strong enough and developed enough politically to assume sovereignty over Constantinople and the straits. Greece has more than doubled her population in the last decade. She has as much as she can do to assimilate and organize administratively the territories acquired in 1913 and 1919. The solidarity created in war must be consolidated in peace. The new constitution must be proved. Finances must be put upon a sound basis. Return to Constantinople now might jeopardize the new structure. Far-seeing Greeks realize this. Their premier, one of the wisest statesmen, has not asked for Constantinople and the guardianship of the straits. He knows that much has yet to be accomplished before "Hellas is where there are Hellenes."

4.-A European mandatory. This proposition must be envisaged under two forms: limitation of the mandate to Constantinople and the straits; inclusion within the mandate of Asia Minor and the responsibility for Turks and Armenians up to the borders of Persia, Mesopotamia, and Syria.

However much its statesmen might protest, no European power would refuse to take the limited mandate. In France especially, it has been pointed out that the greatest prize of the war could be accepted by the French at much less cost than any other territories in the near East or in Africa. Syria entails a

standing army. The development of additional African colonies means sinking enormous capital that France cannot spare. Constantinople and the straits could be controlled by a fleet. This would really place no additional burden on the budget, for ships have to be maintained in the Mediterranean, anyway, and a naval station in the Gulf of Ismidt would be an excellent complement to Toulon and Bizerte. The new colony would be more than self-supporting and a wonderful base for French commerce in the near East. And think of the prestige to France from possessing Constantinople! The extension of French culture, already better established than that of any other nation; closer relations with Russia; hegemony of the Balkans; increased power in the Mohammedan world.

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But Great Britain and Italy do not want to see France at Constantinople. To the argument of France that Great Britain already has control of the two other waterways leading into the Mediterranean, Great Britain opposes simple non possumus. British sea-power is based upon the theory that no other nation, friend or enemy, can be allowed to become the preponderant power in any sea. France at Constantinople would bar Great Britain from the Black Sea and shift the naval equilibrium in the Mediterranean. It would also give France an advantage in the trade with the near East. Did Great Britain fight the war to place France where Germany hoped to be?

Italy points out to France that the Mediterranean littoral from Morocco to Tunis is enough for a rival Mediterranean power. With some reason Italy argues that if a naval power is to get Constantinople, it is her turn. Why not? France and Great Britain already have more than their share. Italy did not fight the war to make Greece a great naval nation. Nor did she fight to extend the influence of her big allies in the near East at the expense of her own influence. Italy, like Greece, can invoke historic reasons for a mortgage on Constantinople and the straits previous to those of Great Britain and France. If France goes back to the Crusades to make good her claim to

Syria, Italy can invoke the Crusades for Constantinople, throwing in centuries of Venetian and Genoese activity for good

measure.

But France is in the field only for a limited mandate. She could not, if she would, accept the burden of Asia Minor and Armenia. She limits her claims in Asia Minor to the southeastern corner, which is adjacent to Syria and easily reached by sea. The French say frankly that they cannot go into the mandate game except where they see quick financial returns for the investment of limited capital. Their interest in Armenia is confined to the cotton of Cilicia and the copper of Arghana.

Virtually all competent observers of near-Eastern affairs are in accord in asserting that the only successful mandate scheme for the Ottoman Empire, exclusive of the Arabic-speaking portions, is a single mandate. Although Italian imperialists might not hesitate to accept this responsibility, it is certain that the Italian people would never consent to it. Italy's colonizing ventures have not been happy. Her quarrel with the Jugo-Slavs is not yet settled. Opposition to accepting even the southern part of Asia Minor, accorded by the secret treaty of 1915, is growing. As for the British, inclusion of the territories comprised in the larger Turkish mandate in their share of the spoils of the World War would make them masters of the world. France and Italy, and later Russia, would never consent to this tremendous increase of the British sphere of influence. But while the British would not be displeased with Constantinople and the straits, it is certain that they do not feel able to add Turks and unredeemed Greeks and Armenians to recalcitrant Persians, Afghans, Indians, Arabs, and Egyptians. They have their hands full, and may have to throw off part of the present load, if it does n't slip off of itself!

5. The acceptance of the larger mandate in Turkey by the United States. We have not been enthusiastic about as suming the very slight responsibility of protecting Armenia, our ward. In the face of this shameful fact, it is presumptuous indeed for an American writer to

talk about the duty of his country toward the larger Turkish mandate. It is useless to dwell upon the glory of having the American flag wave over Constantinople, greatest prize of the war. We do not want Constantinople. And all of Turkey? A sad bird.

Feeling this way does not change the problem. We have examined all the various propositions for solving the Turkish question. Only the mandate to America for Constantinople and the straits, Asia Minor, and Armenia seems feasible Only this solution has the merit of avoiding complications between European powers and indigenous elements. And it is the solution that can be immediately applied.

We are the richest nation of the world, with boundless resources, our man power virtually intact, a great navy, and all the money and materials needed in the near East available without delay. We cannot plead that the proposition of a mandate is an innovation, against our instincts, incompatible with our institutions, and likely to lead us into entirely new paths. This would be true only if we took the mandate as the trust of a super-state, which would have the privilege of telling us what we should do and how we should do it. But our senate reservations provide against that. We are able to volunteer our aid in reconstructing near-Eastern countries with hands free and with no violation of our sovereignty. This we have already done in the Philippines and Cuba. We have made a success of this sort of work, both from a military and civilian point of view, under conditions vastly more difficult than would have to be faced now in the near East. Public opinion did not protest against our constructive administrative and educational work in the Philippines. We are proud of the years in Cuba after the war with Spain. We have done well by Porto Rico. We hear no widespread criticism of the activities of our Government in Haiti and San Domingo. If we have played a rôle in the far East, why not in the near East? To the argument that "we have no interests there" there is the answer that this "bigbrother" work has to be done and that we are the only nation that can do it.

Our allies are already responsible for their hundreds of millions in Africa and Asia. They have colonies and colonial possibilities beyond their power to exploit. It is easy enough for us to berate them for their imperialism and cry out against land-grabbing and denial of self-government to subject races. I have done that with a good heart myself, as readers of THE CENTURY know. But have I done it with a clear conscience as an American? I am not recanting, for I believe in the duty of publicists to defend the cause of small nations against the encroachments of European eminent domain.

But if we take the Ottoman Empire as an example, it does seem a little strong for Americans to criticize in violent terms the partition of this country when we are unwilling to suggest an alternative solution or to volunteer to play any part at all in helping former enemies and their victims through the transitional stage that must follow the breaking-up of the empire. In denying one another possession of Constantinople, our allies can hardly be blamed. They cannot by a sudden conversion go against their instincts. And perhaps these instincts are right. To which power, for instance, do we think Constantinople could be attributed without injustice or a serious disturbance of the European equilibrium? What, then? If given to Greece, are we willing to help Greece? If left to Turkey, are we willing to help Turkey and do our part in protecting Christian minorities? Are we going to desert the Armenians, who put their trust in us?

We cannot get away from these questions. They will follow us, just as the question of our duty in the matter of the submarine warfare followed us for two lost years after the Lusitania was sunk. Our indifference first, and then our tergiversation, allowed the European conflagration to spread until our splendid aid in the closing years of the struggle on the western front proved to be only a palliative. The war goes on over more than half of Europe. It is spreading in Asia as we retire our troops from Siberia. After one bitter experience, do we think we can bury our heads once more in the sand?

I have followed with keen interest the Senate debates on the ratification of the treaty, and cannot help approving the stalwart Americanism of the senators who refuse to accept the covenant of the League of Nations without reservations. On the whole, the Lodge reservations are essential to harmonious coöperation with our allies in the reconstruction of the world. We must not pledge ourselves blindly to automatic military intervention as provided by the treaty in the form presented to the Senate. The Constitution is against the idea of a super-state. Public opinion is against it. But this does not mean that we are not prepared, of our own free will and of our own initiative, to assume our part in world affairs. We held forth the promise to small nations and subject races. We assured France that we should not desert her during the critical period of rehabilitation after the war. Is it pos

sible to say now that we did not mean what we said, and that if they had studied our Constitution and our traditions, those to whom we held out hope of deliverance, with our aid, would not have made the mistake of taking what we said as gospel truth?

One day last week I sat in the nearEastern bureau of our state department. I asked an official, "What do you think will be the future of Constantinople?"

"I shall answer in the Eastern way," he said, "by telling a story. One day an expectant mother at Kharput sent for a fortune-teller. 'What sex will my child be?' she asked. 'A boy,' he answered, pocketed his fee, and retired. The stork brought a girl. The wrathful father went to see the fortune-teller, and demanded back the money paid. 'I was not wrong,' he explained; 'I knew it was going to be a girl. But I saw the woman was not well and did not want to

disappoint her. disappoint her. Go home and look over the inside of your cellar-door.' The father did so, and read in chalk, 'Your child will be a girl.' If only I had a dark cellar and a piece of chalk to write the opposite in order to cover myself, I should tell you all about the future of Constantinople."

We laughed heartily for a moment, and then I stopped. My companion, who was calling at the state department with me, was an Armenian. His eyes were filled with tears. Out there his people were dying, without hope. We, who had gone into the war with brave words and fair promises, were safely at home again. What would happen in the near East was now a joke.

Perhaps our allies, great and small, perhaps the subject races of the AustroHungarian and Ottoman empires ought not to have "misinterpreted" the meaning of our intervention. Our Constitution was open for every one to read. Mandates are not in our line.

But speaking at the tomb of Washington at Mount Vernon on July 4, 1918, President Wilson said to representatives of subject races, invited to hear him by our state department:

It is our inestimable privilege to concert with men out of every nation who shall make not only the liberties of America secure, but the liberties of every other people as well. We are happy in the thought that we are permitted to do what Washington and his associates would have done had they been in our place. . . . I stand here now to speak proudly and with confident hope of the spread of liberation to the great stage of the world itself.

No influential American lifted his voice against this interpretation of the rôle of America.