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RTICLES galore are being written on Constantinople in these days. Pick up any magazine or newspaper Sunday supplement, and around the picture of Santa Sophia you read of Constantinople, past, present, and future. The general run of text has become as familiar as the illustrations. Domes and minarets, the Golden Horn and ships riding at anchor, slanting tombstones and straight cypress-trees, and tarbooshed Turks walking over the Galata Bridge, accompany the story of Constantine the Great, Mohammed the Conqueror, Abdul-Hamid, and Enver Pasha. You are told that Constantinople is the meeting-place of East and West, the essential link in Germany's Drang nach Osten, and Russia's outlet to the sea. It is the world's emporium, Islam's Rome, Greece's eventual capital, the age-old apple of discord of the European powers. And no writer forgets to remind his readers of what Napoleon said to Alexander at Tilsit.

All of this is excellent. It is an encouraging sign of awakening popular interest in the momentous settlement, not yet decided upon, of the nearEastern problems. The attitude of the American Senate and of American public opinion in the early months of 1920 may be hostile to our post-bellum participation in helping to administer the succession of the Osmanlis, but that is immaterial. We cannot get rid of a responsibility by refusing to see it. Sooner or later we shall have to intervene in the near East, as we had to intervene in Europe; for there will be no peace in Europe until the attribution of

the greatest prize of the war is made. But the greatest prize is at the same time the greatest problem. All the light Americans can get upon Constantinople should be welcome. The focusing of American interest upon Constantinople is a distinct step toward

peace.

Lord Curzon recently declared that the terms of the armistice with Turkey were a mistake. The collapse of the Turks was complete. We should have profited by the demoralization of the autumn and early winter of the year of victory to occupy militarily and to take over the administration of the territories we intended to detach from the Ottoman Empire. None now denies the truth of this statement. In fact, it is not a case of hindsight on the part of those familiar with the near East and with Turkish character to criticize the armistice hastily concluded by a British admiral with the Turks. In every Allied country there was a strong protest at the time, and the subject races of Turkey, especially Greeks and Armenians, instinctively felt that this armistice foreshadowed the destruction of their hopes of freedom.

Unfortunately, the Entente powers were unprepared to take advantage of the victory in the near East. The years of constant fighting on the western front had exhausted their armies, and they were still nervous about the latent powers of resistance of Germany. The military forces already in the near East were not more than sufficient to carry out the particular ambitions of Great Britain and France. The foreign offices of these two powers were not thinking of the general good or of birds in the

bush. Lord Curzon lacked the courage to admit this. Most important of all, the near-Eastern policy decided upon by the Entente in event of victory had been upset in 1917. The readjustment of war aims was left to the peace conference.

President Wilson's Christmas present to the belligerents in 1916 was a note in which the warring nations were asked to state their peace programs. On January 10, 1917, the Entente powers handed to Ambassador Sharp in Paris an explicit reply, in which they openly affirmed the objects they sought by continuing the war. The ninth paragraph of this answer stated textually that the nearEastern policy of the Entente was "the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, decidedly alien to Western civilization."

When this reply was written, the

Entente powers were acting in harmony. By secret treaties, made in 1915 and 1916, the general lines of the nearEastern settlement had been decided upon. Not only in writing, but also on a map, the Ottoman Empire had been divided into spheres of influence by Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy. There was no uncertainty in the statement that they intended to expel the Ottoman Empire from Europe. Possession of Constantinople and the guardianship of the Bosporus and Dardanelles had been promised to Russia.1

But two unforeseen events upset this arrangement. The United States entered the war on the side of the Entente, with a program that pronounced definitely against any extension of European eminent domain in the territories to be wrested by American aid from the enemy coalition. In the negotiations for the armistice with Germany, President Wilson's "fourteen points and subsequent

discourses, especially that of September 27, 1918," were made the basis of the future peace. Russia, heir presumptive of Constantinople and the straits, renounced her share of the spoils, as outlined in the secret treaties.

After the first shock of the Russian Revolution, the allies of Russia tried to make themselves believe that the anticzarist movement did not mean a betrayal of the common cause and that the secret treaties would remain in force. Their statesmen welcomed the revolution as the solution of the most embarrassing handicap of the alliance with czardom-the inability to come out openly for the independence of Poland. While M. Kerensky, minister of justice in the new régime, made a categorical statement against the continuation of the czarist policy of conquests, specifying Constantinople as an aspiration revolutionary Russia could not sponsor, M. Miliukoff, minister of foreign affairs, declared that Constantinople was as much the dream of new Russia as of old

Russia. Miliukoff was forced out of office. Kerensky in turn, anti-imperialist, but faithful to the alliance, succumbed to the Bolsheviki, who not only formally renounced Russia's share of the Ottoman Empire, but also published in the "Izvestia" the secret treaties and the confidential diplomatic correspondence between Russia and her allies.

Still other complications arose to make difficult any readjustment of the Constantinople and straits question during the rest of the war. The Ukraine, with a population of about 40,000,000 (if frontiers claimed were established), separated from the Russian Empire. If the Ukraine were to become an independent state, her interest in the straits would be greater than that of any other nation. The Entente had to be careful not to play into the hands of Germany in the Ukraine by formulating a new Constantinople policy. And then there was Greece, neutral and semi-hostile when the secret treaties were made, but now an important ally

under the wise leadership of M. Venizelos. The great leader did not demand Constantinople, but he was careful to make it clear that the Greeks were united in aspiring to the incorporation of Thrace in Greece. The realization of this war aim would deprive Constantinople of most of its European hinterland.

Of course we accept the statement of Lord Curzon that the terms of the armistice with Turkey were a mistake. Of course we realize that success in dealing with the defunct Ottoman Empire demanded strong military occupation and no hesitancy in taking over administrative control of Constantinople and the straits. Of course we know that the Turks have profited by sixteen months of uncertainty and in decision to get their second wind, to rally their friends in Paris and London, to carry on a propaganda throughout the Moslem world, to revive the hope among themselves and instill the belief among others that the status quo ante bellum is, as in 1878, the only possible solution of the Constantinople question. But, putting ourselves in the position of European statesmen in October and November, 1918, can we blame them for not knowing what to do? Given the circumstances, how could they have anticipated the decisions of the peace conference? A definite policy in regard to Constantinople and the straits presupposed agreement among the Allies or a common eagerness to use the victory for the benefit of oppressed subject races. Agreement among the Allies did not exist. It was the duty of the peace conference to achieve that. Renunciation of particular interests for the common good was a spirit that victory, won by stupendous sacrifices, did not engender.

What has happened in Constantinople and throughout the Ottoman Empire during 1919 is disastrous to the high hopes we entertained of an equitable, and hence durable, settlement in the near East. At the beginning of 1920 the outlook is disheartening for all concerned-Turks, subject races, Balkan States, and great powers. The Ottoman Empire has been for nearly a year and a half in the state of what the

French call le provisoire. In outlying portions of the empire, and at points on the sea-coast, the powers have agreed upon definite spheres of influence, or at least upon the temporary occupation by one power to the exclusion of others. But Constantinople remains under international occupation, a breeding-ground of suspicion and discord among those who hope to inherit; a hotbed of intrigue and religious and racial antagonism among the indigenous elements, working upon and being worked upon by European powers, Balkan States, Bolsheviki, and Pan-Turanians. Constantinople is producing the culture to infect Asia, Africa, and Europe with the bacteria of religious and social unrest and economic and political international rivalry. I think I am not stating the case too strongly. We need to see the danger, examine the elements of the problem, and find a quick solution.

There are many propositions for disposing of Constantinople and the straits; within the limits of a magazine article I am able to discuss them only briefly. But I hope to present the essential facts of each one in such a way that the reader may agree that there are good grounds for discarding all except the last.

1. The creation of an international state under the ægis of the League of Nations. The defenders of this idea regard it as the solution of the problem by way of elimination. Constantinople has always been a bone of contention. Whatever other solution is adopted, the apple of discord will remain. If the great powers make a mutual act of renunciation, the Balkan States will fight for Constantinople. If the Balkan States also agree to renounce Constantinople, the only safeguard is to remove the temptation by making Constantinople and the straits the ward of the League of Nations. The straits are an international waterway of prime importance. Joint control of all the states interested in a free passage to and from the Black Sea (and in these days of world trade that means everybody) will remove the danger of the ambition of one opposing the ambition of another, thus precipitating war, as has been the case in the past. The State of Constantinople

and the straits will have the EnosMidia line in Europe from the Black Sea to the Ægean and the Asiatic coast of the Bosporus, Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles. If this independent state be created, no racial or religious element will be made subject to another, and each element will participate according to its numbers in the local government. Some suggest that Constantinople be the home of the League of Nations. This would make the league truly international, and representative of Asia as well as of Europe, of Moslem and Jew as well as of Christian.

The plan is plausible, but the League of Nations, as it would have to be in accordance with this conception, is not yet born. Adoption of the proposal in the embryonic state of the league means no more than the condominium of Great Britain, France, and Italy. We have seen during 1919 the ineffectiveness of a condominium and its dangers as well. If no man can serve two masters, it is equally true that two or more masters, each striving to advance his own political and economic interests, cannot rule over one country.

It is useless to argue that we must wait and give the league a chance. Constantinople can wait no longer for the strong hand of a single and coördinated authority. The second objection is a permanent one, no matter how the League of Nations may evolve. The great city of Constantinople cannot exist and prosper unless it continues to be part of the same economic organism as Asia Minor. Its European hinterland is lost forever. Separated from Asia Minor, Constantinople would lose its raison d'être. Vienna after the treaty of St.-Germain is an example of the folly of creating new political boundaries in defiance of economic laws.

2.-Maintenance of Constantinople as the capital of Turkey. This solution is following the line of least resistance, and is advocated with increasing force in influential quarters in London and Paris. It satisfies economic laws and possibly the will of the majority, although the latter is doubtful. We may

be mistaken in relying on statistics and in supposing that the element in Constantinople known as "the Turks" has a strong national consciousness in com