from a speech he delivered in the House of Representatives, on March 27, 1826: "The amount of it (Mr. Monroe's declaration) was that this Government could not look with indifference on any combination to assist Spain in her war against the South American States; that we could not but consider any such combination as dangerous or unfriendly to us; and that if it should be formed it would be for the competent authorities of this Government to decide, when the case arose, what course our duty and our interest should require us to pursue." The Panama Congress.-When Simon Bolivar proposed the assembling at Panama of a congress of the American nations to agree upon some continental policy, President John Quincy Adams laid before Congress, in his annual message of 1826, the question of the representation of the United States at that Congress. The coalition against the Adams Administration, which ultimately became the Jacksonian party, made its first great fight on this measure. It called forth long debates and aroused great excitement in the House of Representatives, because it was not an ordinary mission, and seemed to have far greater importance than any question of foreign relations that had previously come under discussion. It was believed to be an attempt to make a confederation or league of all the American countries, and thus to a certain extent to extinguish the individuality of the United States. This discussion lasted from February 3 to April 21, 1826, when the Committee on Foreign Affairs reported a resolution declaring that it was expedient to appropriate the necessary funds to send representatives to the Panama Congress. This resolution was approved by a vote of 143 to 54, and passed the Senate by a vote of 24 to 19. The United States delegates to the Panama Congress were instructed to attend the Congress merely in a diplomatic character, without discussing or accepting any proposition of alliance binding the United States. These restrictions had been embodied in an amendment presented both in the House and Senate, which had passed the House, but was finally rejected, because it was considered an infringement upon the prerogatives of the Executive. As it expressed the views of Congress, however, its provisions were embodied in the instructions to the Commissioners. I understand that one of the objects of that Congress was to accomplish the independence of the island of Cuba, but the idea did not meet with the approval of the United States, and that fact prevented the Panama Congress from arriving at any practical result. Mr. Buchanan, a Member of Congress from Pennsylvania, and afterwards President of the United States, introduced in 1826 a resolution which passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 99 to 95, and which reads as follows (see Wharton, International Law Digest, Volume I., Chapter III., paragraph 57, page 282): "It is, therefore, the opinion of this House that the Government of the United States ought not to be represented at the Congress of Panama, except in a diplomatic character; nor ought they to form any alliance, offensive or defensive, or negotiate respecting such alliance, with all or any of the South American Republics; nor ought they to become parties with them, or either of them, to any joint declaration for the purpose of preventing the interference of any of the European powers with their independence or form of government, or to any compact for the purpose of preventing colonization upon the continents of America; but that the people of the United States should be left free to act, in any crisis, in such manner as their feelings of friendship towards these Republics, and as their own honor and policy, may at the time dictate." It is interesting to quote here what Mr. J. C. B. Davis says in his Notes on Treaties of the United States, in regard to the Panama Congress, and which appears in Wharton's International Law Digest, Vol. I., Chapter II., paragraph 57, page 279. "The Congress of Panama in 1826 was planned by Bolivar to secure the union of Spanish America against Spain. It had originally military as well as political purposes. In the military objects the United States could take no part; and indeed the necessity for such objects ceased when the full effects of Mr. Monroe's declarations were felt. But the specific objects of the Congress, the establishment of close and cordial relations of amity, the creation of commercial intercourse, of interchange of political thought and of habits of good understanding between the new republics and the United States and their respective citizens, might perhaps have been attained had the Administration of that day received the united support of the country. Unhappily they were lost; the new States were removed from the sympathetic and protecting influence of our example, and their commerce, which we might then have secured, passed into other hands unfriendly to the United States. **In looking back upon the Panama Congress from this length of time it is easy to understand why the earnest and patriotic men who endeavored to crystallize an American system for this continent failed. One of the questions proposed for discussion in the conference was 'The consideration of the means to be adopted for the entire abolition of the African slave trade,' to which proposition the Committee of the United States Senate of that day replied: The United States have not certainly the right, and ought never to feel the inclination, to dictate to others who may differ from them upon this subject; nor do the Committee see the expediency of insulting other States with whom we are maintaining relations of perfect amity, by ascending the moral chair, and proclaiming from thence mere abstract principles, of the rectitude of which each nation enjoys the perfect right of deciding for itself.' The same Committee also alluded to the possibility that the conditions of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, still the possessions of Spain, and still slave-holding, might be made the subject of discussion and of contemplated action by the Panama Congress. If ever the United States' (they said) ' permit themselves to be associated with these nations in any general congress assembled for the discussion of common plans in any way affecting European interests, they will, by such act, not only deprive themselves of the ability they now possess of rendering useful assistance to the other American States, but also produce other effects prejudicial to their interests.' "The printed correspondence respecting this mission will be found in the fifth volume of the Foreign Relations, folio edition, pages 834-905. It was the subject of animated discussion in Congress, which will be found in the second part of the second volume of the Register of Congressional Debates for the Year 1826." Conclusion.-Circumstances have made this paper much longer than I expected, but it was necessary to speak of several subjects, all of which were closely connected with the independence of Mexico and the other Spanish colonies in America. I hope that this statement of facts will serve to show that the Spanish colonies in America achieved their independence by their own efforts and without the aid of any foreign nation, and that if some of them expected such aid from England they never got it, and they had to rely upon the native element. I trust, also, that it will dispel some errors prevailing on that subject. The Government of the United States maintained during the War of Independence a strict neutrality, although the recognition of belligerency of the revolted colonies was a decided advantage to them. But the people of the United States heartily sympathized with them, and in some cases personally assisted the cause of independence. |