COUNT TOLSTOI.

arrested on the frontier. On the 1st of December, 1710, war was decided upon in a solemn session of the Divan, and Tolstói, with his suite, was immediately imprisoned in the Seven Towers. It was decided that the grand vizier, with a large army, should begin the campaign in the following spring.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE CAMPAIGN ON THE PRUTH-1711.

AS SOON as Peter received news of the rupture of peace by the Turks, he ordered Prince Michael Galítsyn to move toward the Moldavian frontier with ten regiments of dragoons, and watch for any movement of the Turks or Tartars. Sheremétief was sent thither from Livonia with twenty-two regiments of infantry, Prince Michael Ramodanófsky advanced to Putivl with the regiments of the nobility, and Prince Michael Galitsyn was intrusted with the supervision of the Zaporovians. On the 8th of March, 1711, the "war against the enemies of Christ" was solemnly proclaimed to the people, in the Cathedral of the Assumption, at Moscow.

On the 17th of March, Peter left Moscow for the Polish frontier. In Yavrov, near Lemberg, where the Tsar remained during the month of May, he received news that the Tartars who had attacked the Ukraine had been repulsed with heavy loss, that the country beyond the Dniester had been re

duced to submission, that the poor Christians in Turkey were eagerly turning to him, and that the Turks were in trouble. While at Yavrov, Peter signed the treaty, so long in negotiation, for the marriage of his son Alexis to the Princess Charlotte of Wolfenbüttel.

In the little town of Yaroslav, Peter had an interview with King Augustus, and concluded a treaty with him for action against the Swedish troops in Pomerania. As the success of the Turks might give hopes to the party of Stanislas, he obtained from Augustus the promise that a force of Poles should be ready to coöperate with him.

The Tsar, however, did not expect so much assistance from the Poles as from the Moldavians. The relations of Brancovano, hospodar of Wallachia, to Peter were known at Constantinople, and it was desired to remove him; but, as he was rich, and had troops at his disposition, it was necessary to proceed cautiously. Demetrius Cantemir, who had been educated from childhood at Constantinople, who was known to be a personal enemy of Brancovano, and who was thought to be devoted to the Turks, was, in December, 1710, made hospodar of Moldavia, with the promise that, if he succeeded in seizing Brancovano, he should be rewarded with the sovereignty of Wallachia as well.

Cantemir no sooner reached Jassy than he formed other plans, and began to enter into negotiations with the Tsar. On April 24th, he concluded a secret treaty with the Russians, by which he agreed to furnish ten thousand troops during the campaign. By the terms of this treaty, Moldavia was to be an independent state, under Russian protection. The Tsar promised to conclude no peace with Turkey by which Moldavia should be returned under Turkish rule, and agreed that, in case of an unfortunate issue of the campaign, Cantemir should receive refuge and property in Russia. The Tsar wrote again and again to Sheremétief, urging him to hasten his march, because, if he could prevent the Turks from crossing the Danube, much would be gained, and the Bulgarians and Serbians would rise. Cantemir begged Sheremétief to send him four thousand men. When he knew that these, under the command of Kropótof, were already on the Pruth, he called his more faithful boyárs, and informed them that he had invited the Russians into Moldavia. "The boyárs," says Neculce, "were beside themselves with joy at this news."

Sheremétief crossed the Dniester, near Soroki, on the 10th of June, and on the 16th, in spite of the difficulty of the march, was on the Pruth, near Jassy. The grand vizier, with the Turkish troops, had arrived on the Danube at Isaktcha, but hearing of the invasion of Moldavia by the Russians, he hesitated to cross. He had not yet heard of the treachery of Cantemir, and, in order to guarantee his rear, sent him word immediately to arrest Brancovano. When he learned the true state of things, his rage had no bounds.

Peter's plan had been for Sheremétief to march southward to the Danube, and Sheremétief, in yielding to the request of Cantemir, and going to Jassy, had changed this. He excused himself on the ground that, owing to the heat and want of forage, the march to the Danube, on the east side of the Pruth, would have been difficult, and he could not have reached there before the Turks had crossed, whereas Moldavia would have been entirely given up to the Turks. In order to keep the troops together, it was necessary for the Tsar to accept this change, and follow in the footsteps of Sheremétief. He reached the Pruth on the 5th of July, and, leaving his troops there, went to Jassy. Here he was met by two leading Walla

chians-one, George Castriota, the accredited envoy of the hospodar, with propositions of peace from the grand vizier; the other, General Thomas Cantacuzene, with accusations of treachery against Brancovano. The propositions of peace, which even hinted at the possibility of a cession of Turkish territory, were unfortunately rejected by the Tsar, who did not feel sure of their authenticity, and who feared to encourage the enemy by a willingness to treat.

When Brancovano found the grand vizier approaching rapidly with a large Turkish army, he began to waver. He sent some boyárs to Peter, reminding him of certain articles of their treaty, and begging him to send troops as soon as possible into Wallachia. Encouraged by the reported alarm of the grand vizier, and influenced by Cantemir and Cantacuzene, Peter felt strong enough to refuse Brancovano's request for troops, and to order him to carry out the stipulations of the treaty. Brancovano was so offended at the tone of Peter's letter and the credit which he seemed to give to his enemies, that he sent word that he no longer considered himself bound by the treaty, should cease all relations with him, and made terms with the Turks. As soon as the grand vizier entered Moldavia, he

went to meet him, and delivered to the Turks all the provisions which he had prepared for the Russians. The treachery of Brancovano had a great influence upon the fortunes of the campaign. The Moldavians had prepared no stores of provisions and forage, and, unfortunately, that summer the whole face of the country was eaten up by grasshoppers.

Provisions being scarce, and a report having come that the Turks had already crossed the Danube, it was decided to cross the Pruth, march over the western branch of the river to Faltchi, and then to Seret, where it was said that quantities of provisions, collected for the Turks, lay without guard. General Rönne, with twelve thousand cavalry, was sent to capture Braïla and destroy the bridge over the Danube. Rönne and Cantacuzene set out on the 11th of July, while the main army crossed the Pruth and began its march, in three divisions, on the 18th. That evening, General Janus, who had been instructed to destroy a bridge a few miles down the river, sent word to the Tsar that it was too late, that the grand vizier was already on the western side of the Pruth, and that his army was crossing. It was necessary to

concentrate, but the march was so difficult that it was easier for Janus to retreat than for the rest to advance. This he accomplished, without loss, during the night. The Turks had at first been frightened, and had stopped their crossing with the thought of retreating, but the next morning they began the pursuit. The Tsar had taken up a position along a marsh on the little river Prutets, and during the whole of this Sunday he had to defend himself against repeated attacks of the Turks. The Moldavians under Cantemir, in spite of their inexperience and their bad arms, did good service. Peter was alarmed by the non-appearance of Répnin's troops, which could get no farther than Stanilesti. Another council of war was held that evening, and in view of the lack of provisions, the absence of cavalry,-for all had been sent to Braila,and the overwhelming forces of the enemy, which were estimated at one hundred and twenty thousand Turks and seventy thousand Tartars, while the Russians had only thirty-eight thousand two hundred and fortysix men, it was decided that retreat was imperative. Neculce, the commander of the Moldavian troops, relates that the Tsar asked him to convoy Catherine and him

self to the Hungarian frontier, but that he refused, on the ground that the whole of Upper Moldavia was already occupied by the Tartars, and in case of an unfortunate result he did not wish to bring down upon his head the curses of all Russia. There is nothing improbable in this. It shows to what straits the Tsar was reduced-how severe a blow he felt it would be to Russia if he were taken prisoner with his army. The loss of the army could be repaired if his energy should still have free play. Besides this, the danger, though great, was not inevitable. The cattle for food might be sent down from Jassy, Rönne and his cavalry might return, and he might hurry up the Polish auxiliaries through Czernowitz.* Indeed, Neculce says that he intended to

* The pretended letter of Peter to the Senate, urging them to pay no attention to his orders in case he were taken prisoner, but to choose the worthiest

of their number as his successor, has been proved to be a forgery.

order Sheremétief and Cantemir to hold out in Moldavia till he could bring fresh troops. The circumstances were similar to those which caused Peter's hurried departure from his troops before the first battle of Narva.

The retreat was begun during the night, but it was late the next afternoon, Monday, July 20th, before all the Russian forces, after losing part of their baggage and treasure, were united at Stanilesti, where they hastily intrenched themselves. The Turks had followed them closely, greatly harassing their rear-guard, and, when the grand vizier came up, they made a terrific onset on the still unfinished camp. The Janizaries were beaten back with considerable loss, and in their turn began to throw up an intrenched line, in which they placed over three hundred guns, around the Russian camp. The Tartars, who had long been watching the Russians, together with the Poles and Cossacks, completely guarded the other side of the river. The position of

the Russians then became most perilous. | They were completely surrounded, wornout by the battle and by the heat, with a very small quantity of provisions, and with no chance of aid. There was no supply of water, and the soldiers were driven back from the river by the firing of the Tartars. The earth-works were unfinished,-one whole side was protected only with dead bodies and chevaux-de-frise. The women were protected by baggage-wagons and slight earth-works, in the center, but their clamor and weeping caused confusion.

On Tuesday morning, July 21st, there was a sharp cannonade, with so little effect that the Moldavian Costin said: "Great as a man is, he seems a small point to aim at in a battle." The Janizaries, who had greatly suffered the night before, could not be brought to attack the Russian camp, but the Russians made a sortie with great effect. After an hour's sharp fighting, in which General Weidemann was killed and Prince Volkonsky wounded, they were driven back. Hearing from a prisoner of the disinclination of the Turkish troops for further fighting, and thinking that possibly reasonable terms might be obtained, Peter, urged by Catherine and opposed by Cantemir, sent a trumpeter to the Turkish camp with a letter from Sheremétief to the grand vizier, suggesting that, as the war had been brought about, not by the desire either of the Turks or of the Russians, but wholly by the intrigues of other parties, it would be well to stop further bloodshed and make peace, with an allusion to the proposition made through Brancovano and the negotiations of the English and Dutch embassadors. No answer came, and Sheremétief then sent a second letter to the same effect, but adding that he was quite prepared to recommence the attack. It had been agreed that, in case of refusal, a last attempt should be made to break through the Turkish lines. The answer was delayed, and the Russian troops began to advance. Immediately Tcherkess Mehemed Pasha, the amrokhor of the grand vizier, came to the Russian camp, saying that the grand vizier was not averse to a good peace, and requesting the Tsar to send somebody with power for negotiation. The grand vizier had heard of what the Tsar was still ignorant-the capture of Braïla by General Rönne.

The vice-chancellor Shafirof, accompanied by Savva Raguzínsky, was sent to the Turkish camp with full powers, in the evident belief that the treaty would include

the settlement of all disputes with Sweden as well as with Turkey. Peter was willing to give back all places captured from the Turks, to give up to the Swedes Livonia, and even little by little to cede everything he had taken in the war except Ingria and St. Petersburg; he would instead give up Pskof, and if that were not sufficient, other provinces, which it would be better not to name, but to leave to the discretion of the Sultan. He was ready to recognize Stanislas as King of Poland. In general, Shafírof was ordered to make concessions to the Sultan rather than to the Swedes. He was allowed also, if necessary, to promise the vizier and other influential persons large sums of money-one hundred and fifty thousand rubles to the vizier, sixty thousand to his kehaya, ten thousand to the tchaushbashi, ten thousand to the aga of the Janizaries, etc. Such offers, which included all the conquests and the successes of Peter's reign, showed the desperation to which he was reduced. Shafirof sent back word that, although the Turks were ready enough for peace, they were wasting time. To this Peter replied the next morning, telling him to use his discretion, to agree to everything the Turks asked except slavery, but by all means to give him an answer that day, so that they might begin their desperate march, or attack the Turkish trenches. The same day, July 22d, Shafirof returned to the camp with the following conditions: 1. To surrender Azof in the same state in which it was taken, and to destroy Taganrog and the other newly established fortresses on the Turkish border. 2. Not to interfere in Polish affairs or trouble the Cossacks. 3. To allow the merchants of both sides to trade freely, but not to keep an envoy at Constantinople. 4. To allow the King of Sweden a free passage back to his dominions, and conclude a peace with him if an agreement could be reached. 5. No loss to be occasioned to the subjects of either country. 6. That all former hostile acts should be forgotten, and the troops of the Tsar have free passage to their country. It was demanded that Shafirof and the son of Sheremétief should remain with the Turks as hostages. Shafirof was at once sent back to the Turkish camp, with orders to conclude peace immediately on these conditions. The treaty was signed and ratified on the 23d of July, and Sheremétief informed Peter that the Russian army could retreat at once without opposition.