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LY IN G.

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OWEVER coarse a Title this Section may seem to have, as the Vice is of fo mean and contemptible a Nature, as not only to be nnworthy of a Gentleman, but even of an honest Man, and a Difgrace to a Christian; yet, as by Custom and Fashion, it is grown epidemical, as the Sin of it is flighted and over-look'd, and Convenience has made it a current Faculty, I think it entitled to a Place in my Collection; that I ought to fet its Malignity to View, and enter fome Cautions against an Offence that is a Stain to our Nature.

There is a Spirit reigns too largely in the World, that feems to have an Antipathy to Truth, and runs from it without Intereft or Provocation; that delights to make Lying a Diverfion, banter Companies, and pafs Fables for Fact. It is a juft Matter of Complaint, that Sincerity and Plainness are out of Fafhion, and that our Language is

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running into a Lye; that Men have almoft quite perverted the Use of Speech, and made Words to fignify nothing; that the greatest Part of the Converfation of Mankind is little elfe but driving a Trade of Diffimulation; infomuch that it would make a Man heartily fick and weary of the World, to fee the little Sincerity that is in Ufe and Practice in it.

Amongst too many other Inftances of the great Corruption and Degeneracy of the Age wherein we live, the general Want of Sincerity in Converfation is none of the leaft. The World is grown fo full of Diffimulation and Compliments, that Mens Words are hardly any Signification of their Thoughts: That generous Integrity of Nature, and Ho nefty of Difpofition, which always argues true Greatness of Mind, and is ufually accompained with undaunted Courage and Refolution, is in a great meafure loft among us. In Truth, it is hard to fay, whether it should more provoke our Contempt, or our Pity, to hear what folemn Expreffions of Respect and Kindness will pass between Men, almost upon no Occafion; how great Honour and Esteem they will declare for one whom perhaps they never faw before; and how entirely they are all on the fudden devoted to his Service and Intereft for no Reafon; how infinitely and eternally obliged to

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him, for no Benefit; and how extremely they will be concerned and afflicted for him too, for no Caufe! I know it is faid in Juftification of this hollow Kind of Conversation, that there is no real Harm, no Deceit, in Compliment; but the Matter is well enough, fo long as we understand one another; Verba valent ut Nummi, is now the Philofophy; Words are like Money, and when the cur rent Value of them is generally understood, no Man is cheated by them. How unlike is this to the Notions of Antiquity, and how repugnant to the Tenor of this Moral, ἔτι λόγω ἔργα σκιὰ παρὰ τοῖς σωφρονεστέροις πεπίστευαν, That wife Men take Words for the Shadows of Things. Indeed, Words now-adays are Shadows; but fuch as have no Relation to the Substance.

There is fo much Mifchief and Meannefs in the Practice of Falfehood, that, methinks, we fhould hate it above all Things. Lying in Difcourfe is a Difagreement between the Speech and the Mind of the Speaker. When one Thing is declared, and another meant, and Words are no Image of Thoughts, it makes the Marks of Speech infignificant, and the Meaning of one Man unintelligible to another: This is a Breach of the Article of Commerce, and an Invasion upon the Fundamental Rights of Society. Words, as far as they reach, are defigned for Windows to

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the Breaft; their Bufinefs is to let in the Light, and make the Mind transparent.

St. JOHN, in decifive Language, pronounces, That no Lye is of the Truth: Some Commentators would have this relate plainly to falfe Doctrine; but St. Augustine has laid a great Strefs upon this Place, and conftrues it to a general Precept against Lying. Upon this Ground he concludes all wilful Deviations from Truth unjustifiable. All Lyes must be Breaches upon the Divine Law, and Stretches of Iniquity; and to affirm Lying warrantable in any Cafe, is, upon the Matter, to maintain that some Sorts of Injustice are juft. The fame Father quoted is of Opinion, That when one Thing is faid, and another meant, with an Intention to deceive, that Expreffion is a direct Lye. This cuts off the Doctrine of Equivocation, which is a Principle that allows the Ufe of ambiguous Expreffions; and thus the Hearer takes them in one Senfe, and the Speaker in another. What an Expedient is here found for fliding from the Truth, and not coming within the Verge of a Lye, as they fuppofe? and how are thefe Equivocations furthered with another Piece of Sophistry, called Mental Refervations; a Man may fwear, according to the Tenets of thefe Cafuifts, that he never did a Thing which he had certainly done, if he has but the Difcretion to keep

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thefe Provifo's in his Mind, that he did not do it fuch a Day, or before he was born; or by referving to himself fome other refembling Circumftance, which can never be difcovered by the Language of his Dif course. What a Latitude is this for downright Lying, and Perjury to boot? what a Contrivance to undermine the Foundations of Truth, and eradicate the very Effence of Sincerity! I am fo far from allowing thefe Referves and pernicious Difguifes, that I am of Opinion a Man's Countenance may be un true, as well as his Tongue. When the Signs of Affirmation or Denying, of Affent or Refufal, of Pleasure or Diflike, appear counter to our Thoughts; this is hanging out falfe Colours: 'Tis being one Thing without, and another within. A Mute may be guilty of this Sin; for a Man may point or look a Lye, as well as speak one.

The Confequences of Lying are of a fatal Nature, and ftrike deep: To wave infisting on the Injury it does our Souls in our future Being, it is a Quality deftructive to Society. Truth is the Band of Union, and the Bafis of human Happiness. Without

this Virtue, there is no Reliance upon Language, no Confidence in Friendship, no Security in Promifes and Oaths. If there was nothing but Ambiguity and Ambush in Words; if they were made ufe of only to

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