kan States and the Ottoman Empire, the powers will not admit, at the end of the conflict, any modification in the territorial status quo in European Turkey.

The Balkan States, which had waited in vain during thirty-four years of oppression and suffering for the application of Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, knew that no faith could be put in promises of the great powers. They knew, too, that suspicion of bad faith of each power toward each other power made the last statement of the note ridiculous and meaningless. Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, united for the first time in their history, went ahead, and accomplished the work of emancipation in defiance of the will of the great powers. They would probably have divided the territories wrested from Turkey without serious friction had not the ambassadorial conference of London and the underhand intrigues of at least four of the six powers forbidden Serbia the access to the Adriatic that she had won by her arms. Edward Grey afterward said that his part in this disgraceful and disastrous decision. was justified by his desire to avoid a European war. By implication at least.

Sir

British writers have since tried to establish the fact that Austria-Hungary was directly responsible for barring Serbia from the sea, and that Germany was the real culprit. Wilhelmstrasse, so we are told, was instigating and backing up Ballplatz. This is true; but it is only half the truth. Italy was equally responsible, and Russia played an ignoble rôle in the affair.

The world has moved too fast during the last three years to waste time and energy in lamenting what might have happened and did n't. But the duty is none the less incumbent upon us to keep in mind the Balkan tragedy of 1913 in order. that a repetition of it may be avoided. For none of the participants in the European interference of that year has abandoned the great-power attitude toward the Balkans. One can see in the Balkan events since the outbreak of the present war no desire in any European foreign

office to forsake the deplorable diplomacy that has soaked Europe in blood. Where is the statesman in any belligerent country who dares to come out openly and call a spade a spade?

The facts are painful. At the beginning Serbia was the only Balkan country involved in the European War. It was the desire of the other Balkan States to remain neutral. All of them, with the exception of Rumania, had suffered heavily in the two preceding wars and needed a long period of peace for recuperation. None had the equipment in heavy artillery, ammunition, and aëroplanes to engage in war against a great power.

Serbia resisted with admirable skill and courage the first Austro-Hungarian invasion. Her armies routed the invaders completely. But the victory had been dearly purchased, and precious stores of ammunition expended. Serbia's powerful allies were in honor bound to take steps to protect her against a second invasion. Since Turkey had entered the war, interest also dictated the necessity of reprovisioning in war material, and reinforcing the armies of, the country that stood between the Central powers and their Ottoman ally. But the Entente powers were thinking of themselves and their own territorial ambitions. They hoped to force Turkey into a separate peace very speedily, and when that moment arrived they planned to have in their possession the portions of Turkey they wanted to keep. Until the critical days came, no attention was paid to Serbia and Montenegro. Then the Entente powers, who had some months previously showed their unwillingness to accept Greek advice and aid in the campaign against Turkey or to promise to protect Greece against Bulgarian aggression, suddenly called on Greece to go to the aid of Serbia. At the same time negotiations were carried on with Bulgaria and Rumania. In all the Balkan capitals, including that of their faithful little ally, the ministers of the Entente powers bullied and blundered and bluffed without being able to offer any tangible reward for Balkan aid. The

Balkan States knew well what rewards France and Great Britain had guaranteed to Russia and Italy. What was left for them? Russia balked at giving Rumania even as much as Bukowina, let alone Bessarabia and Transylvania. Italy refused to yield one iota of her imperial ambitions, which could be realized only at the expense of Greece and Serbia. Bulgaria could not be promised the return of her Macedonia irredenta, because the veto of Italy prevented the Entente powers from promising Serbia compensation on the Adriatic for giving up Macedonia to Bulgaria. Great Britain and France could not assure to Greece effective protection against an invasion of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish armies. It was diplomatic incoherence and military impotence.

If

The events in the Balkans of the second and third years of the war have saved the Central powers from a humiliating defeat and Turkey from dismemberment. public opinion in France and Great Britain persists in believing that the debacle of the Entente cause is due to the stubbornness of Serbia, the pro-German sentiment of King Constantine and his general staff, the cowardice of the Greeks, the treason of Bulgaria, and the foolhardiness and lack of military virtues of Rumania, the Central powers will have won definitely the war in the East, no matter what happens on the Western front, and the Berlin-Bagdad dream will be as much of a reality as Mitteleuropa. German domination in the Balkans may be a justifiable ambition from the German point of view, but not from the point of view of the Balkan races. No races have ever been happy under German control, and the events of this war have not given the world reason for believing in a change in the selfish and barbarous attitude of Germans toward other nations, especially when those other nations are weaker. We know the German theory of national expansion. It has been set forth over and over again by the ablest German scientists and historians, especially in relation to the Drang nach Osten: the weak in the

path of the strong must be exterminated or amalgamated.

.

Without ignoring or denying the existence of a number of contributory factors, we can get to the very heart of the Balkan problem when we are willing to see and set forth the most important reason of Balkan lukewarmness for the cause of the Entente powers. While recognizing the Teuton menace, because fully aware of Teuton aspirations, Balkan nations attribute the same conception of national expansion to Russia and Italy. The statesmen of Rumania and Serbia and Montenegro, and the leaders of thought in these three Balkan countries allied to the Entente powers, think on this point exactly as do the statesmen and leaders of Bulgaria and Greece. So does M. Venizelos, head of the Greek revolutionary government at Saloniki. Before the conquest of Serbia, M. Pachitch was unable to prevent embarrassing interpellations concerning Italy's intentions in the Nish Skupshtina. In fact, the premier of Serbia has not had a happy moment since Italy joined the Entente. The statesmen of broad vision in Rumania fought bitterly to the very last hour the irresponsible forces at Bukharest that were bent upon the destruction of their country through following blindly the Transylvanian willo'-the-wisp. When M. Venizelos, humiliated and discredited, feels that it is time to speak out the truth, he will have a sad story of betrayal to tell. On the platform of the station at Lyons, King Nicholas, coming to France for the exile that may have no end, declared, "Francis Joseph struck me on the head, but Victor Emmanuel has struck me in the heart." The King of Montenegro has no illusions about the part his son-in-law's government played by abstention in the crushing of his kingdom.

Russia's pretensions to Constantinople, and the general opposition of the Balkan races to Russian ambitio..s, have been dealt with in an earlier article. In exposing to President Wilson their aims in the war and their ideas of the bases of a durable peace, the Entente powers evaded a defi

nite statement on this important question. They spoke only of driving the Turks from Europe. None denies the justice of assuring Russia's passage to the open sea, but it is difficult to reconcile Russian control of Constantinople with the principle of the rights of small nations to self-government. Russia is ruled by a cruel, despotic, and irresponsible bureaucracy. Even the Liberal Nationalists in Russia have proved themselves as intolerant of the rights of subject nationalities as have the Young Turks. From the Balkan point of view, Russia at Constantinople and the straits (which would mean also a large portion of Thrace) would bring into the peninsula a powerful country who is hated because she is feared by all the Balkan nations.

Five years ago much was written by Occidental observers on the subject of Italian imperialism; but when the present war broke out, the criticism of Italy ceased. Berlin hoped to keep Italy neutral. Paris and London wanted to detach Italy from her former allies, and get her to enter the war on the side of the Entente. The result was disastrous for Italy, who began to feel that destiny was calling upon her to play the decisive rôle in European history. The hope of extending her sovereignty over the Trentino and Triest, and the making of the Adriatic an Italian sea, could be realized only by intervening on the side of the Entente. But the price of intervention mounted at Rome each month as the importunity of the Entente increased. Italy wanted her full share in the partition of the Ottoman Empire. After the failure of the Dardanelles and the Saloniki expeditions, the appetite of Italian imperialism was whetted. does not know how much Italy has been promised in the event of an Entente victory; but one does know that the French and English statesmen who promised anything at all to Italy beyond the Trentino and possibly Triest did so in wilful disregard of the ideals they had set before them, and for the triumph of which they had solemnly proclaimed to the world that the sword of justice and liberty was drawn.

The contemporary school of Italian imperialists have lost their heads entirely. If the statesmen of the Entente powers had studied closely the literature and the programs of the Dante Alighieri Society and the Dalmatian League, and followed the development of the colonial and irredentist propagandas during the last decade, they would have supported with all their power Signor Giolitti and the non-intervention elements in the spring of 1915. Italy's neutrality was a valuable asset to the Entente. Italy's refusal to march with her central European allies, and the assurance to France that there was nothing to fear on the Alpine frontier, helped incalculably the Entente cause, and was for Italy herself the course dictated by national interest. But active participation in the war on the side of the Entente has been beneficial neither to the Entente nor to Italy. The statesmen of France, Great Britain, and Russia have come to realize that Italian irredentists and imperialists are without shame or limit in their ambitions, and are incapable of constructive political vision. They have had to yield to Italian demands, though, in order to keep the coalition intact. The result has been the sacrifice of the Serbians and the loss of Greek aid. Inside the Austro-Hungarian Empire the increased military handicap from taking on a new enemy has been offset by the strengthening of the loyalty of Iugo-Slavs to the Hapsburg crown. Italy, who needed all her resources for internal development and for the completion of the conquest of Tripoli, is spending herself in the pursuit of illegitimate aspirations.

The men who are controlling Italian policy could not subscribe to Mr. Balfour's conditions for a durable peace any more than the men who are controlling the policy of Germany. Italy wants to make the Adriatic an Italian sea, to retain the Greek islands she has occupied since the Treaty of Ouchy and get more Greek islands, and to win a generous slice of Turkey by extending her sovereignty over the whole Mediterranean littoral of Asia Minor from the corner of the Ægean

I would enter the reading-room, seize half a dozen new magazines, and sit on five while I read one. Whenever I needed an ash-tray, I took it from a table where two or three men sat smoking. I'd glower at them as I bore it away. I would elbow them roughly as they waited for their coats in the check-room. I tried every objectionable trick of which I am master, hoping that some one would get 'mad and ask who the devil was.

I failed completely.

When the last hours of my two weeks arrived I was a nervous wreck. For thirteen days I had lived in torment. All my life I had longed to be a member of a club and sign checks and give orders to waiters and never give tips. The chance had come and gone, and it had been such an experience as I never wished to duplicate.

Too jumpy to enjoy myself, too tired to try any new scheme, I spent the last evening crouched on a lounge in the readingroom, trying to digest a treatise on automobile engines. It was the night before the big foot-ball game, and I and a servant were alone in the room.

The servant was a big fellow, the biggest and most formidable one I had seen around the house. For a time I watched him straighten up the magazines on the long library table.

And then I saw him heading for me.

"It 's come," I gasped; "it 's come. He knows that if I were a Cambridge man I'd be in the bar on such a night."

I fumbled in an inside pocket for my guest-card. It was n't there. I fumbled in an outside pocket; it was n't there. I fumbled in all my pockets; it was n't anywhere. I had left it in another suit.

It was too late to run. The fellow was upon me; in fact, he had me cornered. I trembled slightly as he picked up the empty ginger-ale bottle at my elbow. He looked just the sort who would break it over my head first, and ask questions afterward.

"Well-" I gurgled. I intended to protest that I was entitled to one more hour.

"Beg pardon, sir," he said; "but I suppose you'll be going up to the game with all the other old Cambridge men, sir."