I've only three. Also-God forgive me I've not gone to mass regularly."

Don Benedetto shook his fat head. Male figlia, mia. Very wrong. But the good God can forgive much, with the intercession of the Blessed Mother. Anything else?"

"Yes, padre." The man under the bed pressed his face roughly into his hands to keep from crying out.

"Yes, padre. You know, riverenza, I wished well to Gianbattista Pastore, and he to me? Then there was a quarrel, and he went away. I married Antonio. Poor Antonio! He wishes me very well, but he's a hard man and knows cruel words. Mamma mia, he has given me hard names! Ebbene, I did my best, but it 's ill being married to a man when-you-love another."

The old priest did not speak. He was listening but drowsily. A slight breeze had come up and was stirring the hairs on his red neck in an agreeable way.

"And I loved Gianbattista. Then Antonio went away, and-and-God forgive me! Gianbattista used to come in the evenings and see me."

"My daughter, my daughter!"

"Yes, it was wrong," went on the dying woman, a new note of energy sounding in her voice; "but that was all, padre. Once he kissed me. But-che la Santissima Madonna me senta, -that the Blessed Virgin may listen to me, -the baby was Antonio's."

The priest's platitude was unheard both by the woman and the hidden man.

"I was bad, but not so bad as that. Antonio came back suddenly and found Gianbattista here, and struck him. Gianbattista knocked him down. He is very strong, Gianbattista! And, padre, Antonio does not believe me. I have sworn, and he gives me the lie. It is dreadful. But perhaps

more dreadful for him, poverett'. I am glad the baby died."

"My daughter, you have done very wrong, and I regard you as having been peculiarly under the protection of our Blessed Mother, or you would have had even worse sins on your conscience." "Poverett'," she murmured.

"And by the grace of God, my child, I may now promise you forgiveness, as you sincerely repent. Have you told me all ?" "Si, riverenza. That is all."

"Ego te absolvo a peccatis tuis-" The priest went on to the end, then rose. "In an hour, my daughter, I will come with the blessed sacrament. Rest in peace."

Then silence fell on the poor room, and the light softened slowly as the sun sank in the sea. Antonio dared not move.

"Madonna mia and Gesù mio, San Giuseppe, and all the others, let her sleep, that I may get out! She is innocent, and I was a devil. Canaglia beast that I was!" He whispered the words into his cap, trembling from head to foot.

"May I die of an apoplexy if I ever say a rough word to her! May I die without confession and without sacrament if I do not make her happy!" Then, as he waited breathless, he muttered aves as fast as he could say them. "Six big candles for this to Our Lady of the Sea. And I will go to Naples and do the stations of the cross on my knees next Holy Week."

At last he felt a new stillness in the air, and knew that she slept. Softly he crept out, stiff and weak, and slowly rose by the door. As he straightened up, his eyes fell on the statuette, and he lifted it down reverently and kissed its feet.

"Even if she should die," he said gently, "I can beg her pardon; I can tell her— No, she must not die!"

Then he turned to the bed.

In the clear evening light she lay dead.

T

HE political boss of any State, when fully developed, is readily cognizable by the public. Not only is he known individually, but his general characteristics and powers are estimated correctly. He is not popular with the people, not even with the rank and file of his own party. The "workers" like him, the party machine yields him a cheerful obedience, the legislature does his will; but the masses distrust him. He elects mayors, governors, legislators, but he himself can be elected to no office in the gift of the people. When he attains office, as he often does, it is by executive appointment or through the agency of a legislative body. The one high office open to him is that of United States senator, as is evident from the political history of the States of Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, and Ohio.

The devil is said to be persevering, and, no doubt, finds the one good quality essential to the success of his calling. In like manner, and unquestionably for a like reason, the boss has the single virtue of being true to his word in all business transactions. Whether acting as the paid agent of an individual or a corporation, or whether dealing with sub-bosses and heelers, his promises are to be relied upon. Only in his relations to the public does the rule not hold good. The people he fools and deceives unhesitatingly and openly.

What is the cause of bossism? Why is its power constantly augmenting, its field continually widening? Or, to put the case more definitely, by what means is the State boss able to name the governor and dominate the legislature of his State?

His immediate source of power is control of the State organization of the dominant political party.

It will be observed that, with scarcely an exception, the party dominant in any State is the one which has the most money. Occasionally the impoverished opposition wins a victory, but it is temporary at best, and usually but partial. In the Southern States the Democratic party is in permanent ascendancy; in the New England, Middle, and Pacific States, the Republican party; and in a few of the Rocky Mountain States the Silver party is, or has been, dominant: but everywhere it is the richer party. This portentous situation is due to the fact that money counts more and more every year in determining the result of political campaigns. A strong party organization, covering every section of a State, entails a large expenditure. The money comes chiefly from candidates, the holders of lucrative offices, and the beneficiaries of legislation, all of whom are to be found in much greater numbers and stimulated by much higher hopes in the permanently dominant party.

The distribution of the large sums derived from these several sources is not made by the contributors themselves, but through one individual, the boss. He determines the destination of the fund, in what directions it shall be paid out, and from whom it shall be withheld. Reputable candidates, aware that their contributions to the campaign are to be used corruptly, do not desire any itemized account of expenditures. All they ask for is the delivery of the goods.

Just how a State boss controls a legislature was once explained to a company of

F. Thurston, Esq., of Providence, Rhode Island, who, when living, had an enviable national reputation as a lawyer in patent cases. The modus operandi when, for instance, the boss wished to get rid of a troublesome State senator was described as follows:

When, a few weeks before the campaign opened, a wire-puller from the obnoxious senator's town called, according to custom, to see the boss, a conversation of the following nature would ensue :

Boss: Can't you send up for senator a better man than Mr. A. ?"

Wire-puller: "Oh, no. He 's very popular, and, besides, it is the custom of our town to give senators a second term."

Boss: "It's a nice day." Wire-puller, after a long pause: "How I will it be about funds this election ?" Boss: "Oh, there will be no money this year."

Whereupon the visitor, taking his departure, indulges in a brown study; but about a week later he appears again, when the same topic of conversation is revived.

Boss: "So you are going to reëlect Senator A., are you?"

Wire-puller, hesitatingly: "I suppose so. It would be hard work to beat him in caucus."

Boss: "Can't B. defeat him in caucus ?" Wire-puller: "Perhaps so, but it would take a lot of money."

Boss: "Oh, you can have all the money you want for that purpose."

From this typical conversation it may be understood how the manager of the dominant party, by holding the pursestrings, can easily keep a majority of both branches of the legislature subservient to his will. In the event of his failing to defeat an objectionable candidate at the primary meeting, he is ready to furnish money for use against him at the polls, and in this way, not infrequently, to secure the services of his successful opponent. Every powerful boss has at his disposal, in a pinch, some members of the legislature who nominally belong to the opposition party.

With a boss at the head of a State machine, acting through sub-bosses, each of whom is intimately acquainted either with a city or with an extensive rural community, it is easy to see how he can force a

and elect a United States senator who is not only offensive to a majority of the entire electorate, but who is far from being the choice of a majority of the members of his own party. By the lavish but judicious outlay of the campaign fund, in packing caucuses, hiring workers, corrupting active opponents, bringing out the vote, and, when necessary, bribing the voters, it is manifest that the will of the people finds but a small chance of gaining its ends through an ordinary election.

Only in extraordinary times, when public sentiment is stirred to its depths, when citizens, usually indifferent, devote time and thought and some money in support of a popular movement-only on such exceptional and infrequent occasions is the supremacy of the boss really endangered. When, after a long interval of quiescence, such a period of awakening occurs, it too often happens that the immediate grievance felt by the public is a comparatively small one, and the remedy applied, though for the time effectual, is only superficial. The temporary vigilance soon passes: that slow-moving giant, the public, goes to sleep again, and the boss resumes undisputed sway.

The stronghold of the State boss is the legislature. When he selects a candidate for governor or other elective executive officer, he finds it necessary, in most States, to take into account the voters. The largest constituency in the State is the most difficult to deceive and the most costly to corrupt. Moreover, the people have something of a prejudice in favor of a respectable figurehead as candidate for governor, and even for mayor. They have been known, in so boss-ridden a State as Pennsylvania, to stampede to the opposing candidate. But the bosses are not greatly distressed at losing a governor, since the real power in a State, the legislature, is rarely carried in both branches by popular uprisings, however extended. The boss of any State, if able to retain control of either senate or house of representatives, frequently manages to carry his pet measures through the other branch; and, at the very worst, he can hold radical reforms in abeyance until after another election, at which he is quite sure to find, the energy of the public being exhausted, an easy victory all along the line.

the ticket a strong and popular member of the party would only lead to his independent nomination and probable election. Caucuses would again become, what originally they were, conferences of voters holding like political views.

Thus deprived of what has been the most effective method of using party funds, in the making of nominations, it may be thought that by concentrating all expenditure upon the hiring of workers and the buying of votes on election day the boss may still retain his supremacy. But the power of corruption at the polls will likewise be reduced to a minimum. With the people freed from party tyranny at the primaries, able to make their votes count on election day for the man of their choice, corrupt methods will lose their force, for two reasons:

1. When it becomes evident that the managers of the machine are buying votes, that large majority in every party which desires honesty in politics, being no longer confined to a choice between evils, will refuse to vote the party ticket. Corrupt expenditure, therefore, may thus have the effect of hurting rather than helping the chances of victory.

2. The number of purchasable votes will be very much lessened. Or, if it be said that most men have their price, the market price of votes will take an enormous rise. Electors now sell their votes very readily for from two to five dollars, because, so far as the voter can see, his ballot is of no appreciable benefit to himself. He has no particular choice between the parties or the candidates, and does not think it will make any perceptible difference to his future whichever of the two sides wins. But with the power given to select from two dozen candidates for the office of senator, he will certainly find one in whose election, for some definite and weighty reason, he feels a personal interest. No doubt, with the opportunities and hopes given to every candidate by such a law, the canvass conducted would be so active as to create a general public interest and, in many cases, greatly to arouse popular enthusiasm. All this would tend strongly to do away with that indifference, as to both men and issues, which, prevailing so largely under present conditions, invites and almost forces the ambitious, in order to be successful, to make use of corrupt methods.

It is, however, conceivable that an extremely rich candidate may enter the field, and even at a high market price buy the necessary quota of one thousand votes. That is true; and it is far better that all the venal vote of a multiple district should be concentrated upon one candidate rather than to have it, as too often now, hold the balance of power between the two leading candidates in many districts. In a senate nearly every member of which was elected upon his merits a candidate successful by means of a purchased constituency, as a known representative of boodlers, would find his influence nil. A senator elected by the proposed system would be both able and independent. The boss, having no power to defeat his renomination or reëlection, would be powerless to exercise control over him by any other means than that of direct bribery. If bribed to vote against the interests of his constituents, they would have the easy redress of preventing his return to office. Any people who, under such a free electoral system, cannot choose to a legislative body an incorruptible majority, are not capable of self-government.

The other important advantages to result from the election of legislators by the system here proposed necessarily cannot receive full consideration in this article. The chief objection which has been raised, in England especially, to this method of electing representatives is that it will do away with party government. Such has not been its effect in Switzerland or Belgium. That it will modify party government, as now existing in the United States, is to be expected and most devoutly desired. That a representative body composed of able men, who are genuinely representative of and amenable to public opinion, would give as bad a government as the boss rule of to-day, is beyond the bounds of possibility.

From what has preceded, two conclusions may logically be drawn:

1. That to overthrow a particular boss is but a short and ineffectual step in the direction of destroying bossism. If no radical change is made in the present electoral system, his successor will soon appear; and, judging by the past, each new boss will be more powerful, more unscrupulous, and more piratical than his predecessor.

2. That any slight reform in existing electoral methods will not put an end to bossism. Even the Australian ballot,