THE DYNAMICS OF MOBILIZATION OF HUMAN

RESOURCES

BY MILES MENANDER DAWSON, LL.D.,
New York City.

The prerequisite of solving the problem of mobilization of human resources is that the forces operating should be understood. This does not mean that, even with an imperfect understanding of these forces, complete mobilization might not be approximated; but that, in order that the means may be best adapted to accomplish this, the nature of the problem must be comprehended, for which accurate knowledge concerning the forces at work is absolutely essential.

The use of money to marshal and direct them, causes them to be covered out of sight by the persistent illusion, most difficult to shake off, that money is itself that which gives the impulse. It is necessary therefore, first of all, to strip off this illusion. Unless thus simplified, the problem is well-nigh incapable of a solution satisfactory from a theoretical standpoint and the results from a practical standpoint must also be unsatisfactory. Resources could be marshaled, if there were no money.

It is worth while, since this paper is intended to be merely an introduction to the consideration of all the special phases of the problem before us, to consider somewhat closely how this force operates in ordinary times and with what result. Obviously it calls one sort of utility after another into existence, as the volume of the surplus food increases, so that more and more persons may be spared from food production to engage in supplying other wants. This brings about the complex and interdependent economic conditions with which we are already so familiar, although many phases of them are so very new that we really forget that life was ever a simpler thing, more closely associated with the cultivation of the soil.

The money which we use as a medium of exchange and, therefore, as a means of marshaling the forces and directing them in production, transportation, distribution and other activities, rests upon a commodity, used as a measure of value, which is demon

strably of the nature of a "marginal utility"-that is, one of the utilities successively called into existence for the use of mankind and still kept in use by reason of the fact that, after supplying himself with other utilities which he esteems of greater importance for his well-being, he is able to afford them in turn. All such marginal utilities are susceptible of great changes in exchange value according as standards of living expand or contract. Such changes may range from no further demand for production of a given utility because of shrinkage in standard of living, to a demand increasing to such an extent that a price is willingly paid therefor, which causes the most unprofitable field, from the standpoint of the amount of product per unit of force expended, to be exploited.

One of the confusions which employment of money has introduced, is that it is often thought, because it creates so great a demand for the commodity which is used as its basis, that, even when all which can be supplied is in use, there is still an extraordinarily heavy demand for money, in consequence of which bills of exchange, bank notes and other devices are employed as forms of credit currency. Many have supposed that this fact tends to hold the value of the commodity used as a basis for money stable or very nearly so, but credits would be given, if there were no money.

It is not true, however, that the exchange value of money is stable. In fact, a general rise in prices could not possibly be explained except by assuming that what really takes place is the fall in price of the one commodity used as a basis for money. It is quite clear also, when the matter is considered narrowly, that the marginal utility employed as money must, in view of the failure of its volume to vary directly with the volume of the force actually at work to marshal human resources, vary in exchange value per unit in a manner roughly approximating the inverse of the ratio of its quantity to the quantity of the force actually operating.

This becomes evident, when we consider what is the primary force brought to bear in directing human resources to supplying human needs. The case stands thus: If there were but one man in the world, he would have to obtain the force necessary to enable him to supply other needs by first supplying his need for food; and the time and force which he would be enabled to apply to satisfying other wants, would be strictly limited by the surplus food which he could. produce over that which he consumed while producing it. Given a

community, it is evident, also, that the time and force which they will be able to apply to producing commodities or services to supply wants, other than subsistence, will in like manner be strictly limited to the surplus food produced by those engaged in such production, over their own requirements while producing it.

If, therefore, in a nation cut off from other nations there were a change from producing food in amount over the requirements of those engaged in such production, to the condition that only by the entire population applying itself to food production could such population be sustained, the condition would be approximated that the country's money would have no value as respects mobilizing human resources and directing their energies to producing anything else. There might be much money, but there would be no such resources or energies to direct.

It may be argued with plausibility that, even though such condition were arrived at, there would exist many utilities already produced and money could and would be used in their exchange. But money would have lost its character as a medium of exchange by means of which human resources are mobilized and directed, because it would no longer command the forces called into being by a supply of food above the requirements of those engaged in producing food. It is this control which gives to money its general acceptability, not the mere fact that it is this commodity or that; if that were all, only those in need of that commodity would accept it. But, when one can, by thus commanding a portion of the surplus food product, direct how that force shall be employed in producing other commodities which he desires, he is of course able to purchase whatever is purchasable. When this quality disappears, the reason for money's general acceptability as money disappears and such acceptability vanishes with it.

These things are brought forward here, not to reason out their full significance in connection with our banking and credit system, but merely to strip off illusions which prevent most people from noting the forces operating. These forces, then, may be defined as follows: the food produced by those engaged in food production, beyond their food requirements while so engaged, is the energy transmuted into applying human force, both mental and physical, to supplying other wants. Its productivity may be increased by invention of labor-saving machinery and discovery of better processes

of production; but the amount of the force itself is strictly limited to this surplus food and its direction primarily rests in control over it. This fact has been rendered very plain during the present war, the outcome of which has more and more tended to depend on skillful mobilization and direction of human resources, primarily by means of enlarged food production per man engaged in such production and in addition by means of its skillful and economical distribution with the purpose of making the efforts of the nation more and more effective, both in offense and in defense.

The first problem encountered is a reduction in the volume of surplus food. It may be that this will not have its full, natural effect of reducing to merely nominal value one set of marginal utilities after the other, these being the ones which people most willingly do without if compelled to reduce their standard of living; for there may be, and indeed in modern times usually is, as a result of the tendency toward larger and larger production of surplus food, a considerable accumulation of surplus which has not been directed to the production of other utilities. This is possible because certain foods may be stored for a considerable time and also because methods of preserving other forms of food for considerable periods have been invented; there is, therefore, failure to divert to other forms of production all the human beings who could be supported by the whole volume of the surplus food. It is possible, and indeed almost inevitable, that this be somewhat slowed up in what may be called good times as compared with the increase in the production of surplus food which thus affords an accumulated surplus to act as a buffer to tide over downward fluctuations in production of surplus food which are of course inevitable; but when there is a sharp and big diminution, so that this accumulation either disappears or is very greatly reduced, it is necessary to reverse the process, i.e., to enlarge food production and to reduce production of other utilities.

This being true, it is well to consider what takes place when a nation in these modern days goes to war. The phenomenon which immediately forces itself upon the attention is that a vast number of persons, some engaged in producing food and some in producing other utilities, are taken out of these occupations and set to work in the actual business of war, that is, in the military or naval service. These persons must be fed and supplied with other utilities needful for them that they may be in condition to perform the service re

quired of them. From this it follows, first of all, that, unless still others are diverted from occupations which they are following to agriculture, there will be diminished production of surplus food, notwithstanding the fact that, until war begins to cut down the number of the population, there is as large a demand for surplus food as before, and indeed, taking into account the strenuous work which the men must do in such times, probably a considerably larger demand per person counted in units of nutrition. This necessity for diverting more persons to agriculture may be somewhat qualified by the invention of labor-saving machinery or its wider use; but, even so, in order that there may be the amount of primary force necessary to marshal the human resources for war, it is absolutely indispensable that there should be a considerable diversion of those who are engaged in other occupations to the occupation of agriculture. The very first move, therefore, after calling upon those so engaged for their quota to help carry on the war, must be to replace them in agriculture with persons who are not subject to military duty, and also to increase the number so engaged.

Up to this point no doubt there would scarcely be any difference of opinion; neither can there be difference of opinion as to the absolute necessity for diverting men to industries engaged in producing, transporting and distributing munitions of war of all kinds. This is likewise necessary and even those who have not given careful thought to the fundamentals of the subject understand it quite well.

This involves a sharp and sweeping reduction in the production of marginal utilities of sorts that can best be dispensed with. It calls for great reduction in the standard of living because such standard of living consists first, of the maintenance of life by food and second, of the consumption of a share of all the other utilities which are called into existence by the application of surplus food applied to the maintenance of men at work in producing other utilities. When the men engaged in producing these utilities are so greatly reduced in numbers by transferring many of them to military and naval service, to producing munitions and to agriculture, it follows necessarily that the standard of living must fall and marginal utilities that can best be dispensed with, must no longer be produced.

This process, when operating in a moderate degree, as when a nation is not at war, is attended with much distress of which the outcry against what are known as hard times, whether occasioned