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The emotions raised by mufic independent of words, must be all of this nature: courage roufed by martial mufic performed upon inftruments without a voice, cannot be directed to any object; nor can grief or pity raised by melancholy mufic of the fame kind have an object. For another example, let us figure fome grand and heroic action, highly agreeable to the spectator befide veneration for the author, the fpectator feels in himself an unusual dignity of character, which difpofeth him to great and noble actions and herein chiefly confifts the extreme delight every one hath in the histories. of conquerors and heroes.
This fingular feeling, which may be termed the fympathetic emotion of virtue, resembles, in one respect, the well known appetites that lead to the propagation and prefervation of the fpecies. The apetites of hunger, thirst, and animal love, arife in the mind before they are di rected to any object; and in no case whatever is the mind more folicitous for a proper object, that when under the influence of any of thefe appetites.
The feeling I have endeavoured to unfold, may well be termed the Sympathetic emotion of virtue; for it is raised in a spectator, or in a reader, by virtuous actions of every kind, and by no other fort. When we contemplate a virtuous action, which fails not to prompt our
love for the author, our propenfity at the fame time to fuch actions is fo much enlivened, as to become for a time an actual emotion. But no man hath a propenfity to vice as fuch: on the contrary, a wicked deed difgufts him, and makes him abhor the author; and this abhorrence is a ftrong antidote against vice, as long as any impreffion remains of the wicked action.
In a rough road, a halt to view a fine country is refreshing; and here a delightful profpect It is indeed wonderful to obopens upon us. ferve what incitements there are to virtue in the human frame: juftice is perceived to be our duty; and it is guarded by natural punishments, from which the guilty never escape to perform noble and generous actions, a warm fenfe of their dignity and fuperior excellence is a moft efficacious incitement *. And to leave virtue in no quarter unfupported, here is unfolded an admirable contrivance, by which good example commands the heart, and adds to virtue the force of habit. We approve every virtuous action, and beftow our affection on the author; but if virtuous actions produced no other effect upon us, good example would not have great influence the fympathetic emotion under confideration beftows upon good example the utmost influence, by prompting us
*See Effays on morality and natural religion, part 1. eff. 2. ch. 4.
to imitate what we admire. This fingular emotion will readily find an object to exert itself upon and at any rate, it never exists without producing fome effect; because virtuous emotions of that fort, are in fome degree an exercife of virtue; they are a mental exercife at leaft, if they appear not externally. And every exercise of virtue, internal and external, leads to habit; for a difpofition or propenfity of the mind, like a limb of the body, becomes stronger by exercise. Proper means, at the fame time, being ever at hand to raise this sympathetic emotion, its frequent reiteration may, in a good measure, fupply the want of a more complete exercise. Thus, by proper difcipline, every perfon may acquire a fettled habit of virtue intercourse with men of worth, hiftories of generous and difinterested actions, and frequent meditation upon them, keep the fympathetic emotion in constant exercise, which by degrees introduceth a habit, and confirms the authority of virtue with respect to education in particular, what a fpacious and commodious avenue to the heart of a young perfon is here opened!
In many instances one Emotion is productive of an other. The fame of Paffions.
N the first chapter it is obferved, that the relations by which things are connected, have a remarkable influence on the train of our ideas. I here add, that they have an influence, no lefs remarkable, in the production of emotions and pasfions. Beginning with the former, an agreeable object makes every thing connected with it appear agreeable; for the mind gliding fweetly and easily through related objects, carries along the agreeable properties it meets with in its paffage, and beftows them on the prefent object, which thereby appears more agreeable than when confidered apart *. This reafon may appear obfcure and metaphyfical, but the fact is beyond
Such pronenefs has the mind to this communication of properties, that we often find a property afcribed to a related object, of which naturally it is not fufceptible. Sir Richard Grenville in a fingle fhip, being furprised by the Spanish fleet, was advifed to retire. He utterly refused to turn from the enemy; declaring," he would
rather die, than dishonour himself, his country, and "her Majesty's fhip." Hakluyt, vol. 2. part 2. p. 169. To aid the communication of properties in instances like the prefent, there always must be a momentary perfonification: a fhip must be imagined a fenfible being, to make it fufceptible of honour or difhonour. In the battle
beyond all difpute. No relation is more intimate than that between a being and its qualities and accordingly, every quality in a hero, even the slightest, makes a greater figure than more substantial qualities in others. The propenfity of carrying along agreeable properties from one object to another, is fometimes fo vigorous as to convert defects into properties: the wry neck of Alexander was imitated by his courtiers as a real beauty, without intention to flatter: Lady Piercy, speaking of her husband Hotspur,
-By his light Did all the chivalry of England move, To do brave acts. He was indeed the glafs, Wherein the noble youths did dress themselves. He had no legs that practis'd not his gait : And speaking thick, which Nature made his blemish; Became the accents of the valiant :
For those who could speak flow and tardily,
Second part, Henry IV. act 2. fc. 6.
The fame communication of paffion obtains in the relation of principal and acceffory. Pride,
of Mantinea, Epaminondas being mortally wounded, was carried to his tent in a manner dead: recovering his fenfes, the first thing he inquired about was his fhield; which being brought, he kiffed it as the companion of his valour and glory. It must be remarked, that among the Greeks and Romans it was deemed infamous for a foldier to return from battle without his shield.