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ver to relieve a virtuous family from want. Thus actions are qualified by intention: but they are not qualified by the event; for an action well intended gives pleasure, whatever the event be. Further, human actions are perceived to be right or wrong; and that perception qualifies the pleafure or pain that refults from them *.


* In tracing our emotions and paffions to their origin, my first thought was, that qualities and actions are the primary causes of emotions; and that these emotions are afterward expanded upon the being to which thefe qualities and actions belong. But I am now convinced that this opinion is erroneous. An attribute is not, even in imagination, feparable from the being to which it be longs; and, for that reafon, cannot of itself be the cause of any emotion. We have, it is true, no knowledge of any being or fubftance but by means of its attributes; and therefore no being can be agreeable to us otherwife than by their means. But ftill, when an emotion is raifed, it is the being itfelf, as we apprehend the matter, that raises the emotion and it raifes it by means of one or other of its attributes. If it be urged, That we can in idea abstract a quality from the thing to which it belongs; it might be answered, That fuch abftraction may ferve the purposes of reasoning, but is too faint to produce any fort of emotion. But it is fufficient for the prefent purpose to anfwer, That the eye never abstracts : by that organ we perceive things as they really exist, and never perceive a quality as feparated from the subject. Hence it must be evident, that emotions are raised, not by qualities abftractly confidered, but by the fubftance


Emotions are raised in us, not only by the qualities and actions of others, but also by their feelings I cannot behold a man in distress, without partaking of his pain; nor in joy, without partaking of his pleasure.

The beings or things above described, occa fion emotions in us, not only in the original furvey, but also when recalled to the memory in idea: a field laid out with tafte, is pleasant in the recollection, as well as when under our eye: a generous action described in words or colours, occafions a fenfible emotion, as well as when we fee it performed; and when we reflect upon the distress of any perfon, our pain is of the fame kind with what we felt when eye-witneffes. In a word, an agreeable or difagreeable object recalled to the mind in idea, is the occafion of a pleasant or painful emotion, of the fame kind with that produced when the object was prefent: the only difference is, that an idea being fainter than an original perception, the pleasure

or body fo and fo qualified. Thus, a fpreading oak rai. fes a pleasant emotion, by means of its colour, figurę, umbrage, &c.: it is not the colour, ftrictly speaking, that produces the emotion, but the tree coloured: it is not the figure abftractly confidered that produces the emotion, but the tree of a certain figure. And hence, by the way, it appears, that the beauty of fuch an object is complex, refolvable into feveral beauties more fimple.

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or pain produced by the former, is proportionably fainter than that produced by the latter. Having explained the nature of an emotion, and mentioned several causes by which it is produced, we proceed to an obfervation of confiderable importance in the fcience of human nature, which is, That defire follows fome emotions, and not others. The emotions raised by a beautiful garden, a magnificent building, or a number of fine faces in a crowded affembly, is feldom accompanied with defire. Other emotions are accompanied with defire; emotions, for example, raised by human actions and qualities: a virtuous action raiseth in every spectator a pleafant emotion, which is commonly attended with defire to reward the author of the action: a vicious action, on the contrary, produceth a painful emotion, attended with defire to punish the delinquent. Even things inanimate often raife emotions accompanied with defire: witnefs the goods of fortune, which are objects of defire almoft univerfally; and the defire, when immoderate, obtains the name of avarice. The pleafant emotion produced in a fpectator by a capital picture in the poffeffion of a prince, is feldom accompanied with defire; but if fuch a picture be expofed to fale, desire of having or possessing is the natural confequence of a ftrong emotion.

It is a truth verified by induction, that every paffion is accompanied with defire; and if an emotion

emotion be fometimes accompanied with defire, fometimes not, it comes to be a material inquiry, in what respect a paffion differs from an emotion. Is paffion in its nature or feeling diftinguishable from emotion? I have been apt to think that there must be such a distinction; but, after the stricteft examination, I cannot perceive any: what is love, for example, but a pleasant emotion raised by a fight or idea of the beloved female, joined with defire of enjoyment? in what elfe confifts the paffion of refentment, but in a painful emotion occafioned by the injury, accompanied with defire to chastise the guilty perfon? In general, as to paffion of every kind, we find no more in its compofition, but the particulars now mentioned, an emotion pleasant or painful, accompanied with defire. What then fhall we fay? Are passion and emotion synonymous terms? That cannot be averred; because no feeling nor agitation of the mind void of defire, is termed a paffion; and we have difcovered, that there are many emotions which pass away without raffing defire of any kind. How is the difficulty to be folved? There appears to me but one folution, which I relifh the more, as it renders the doctrine of the paffions and emotions fimple and perfpicuous. The folution follows. An internal motion or agitation of the mind, when it paffeth away without defire, is denominated an emotion: when defire follows,


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the motion or agitation is denominated a paffion. A fine face, for example, raiseth in me a pleafant feeling if that feeling vanish without producing any effect, it is in proper language an emotion; but if the feeling, by reiterated views of the object, become fufficiently strong to occafion defire, it lofes its name of emotion, and acquires that of paffion. The fame holds in all the other paffions: the painful feeling raised in a spectator by a flight injury done to a stranger, being accompanied with no defire of revenge, is termed an emotion; but that injury raiseth in the stranger a ftronger emotion, which being accompanied with defire of revenge, is a paffion : external expreffions of diftrefs produce in the fpectator a painful feeling, which being fometimes fo flight as to pass away without any effect, is an emotion; but if the feeling be fo ftrong as to prompt defire of affording relief, it is a paffion, and is termed pity: envy is emulation in excefs; if the exaltation of a competitor be barely difagreeable, the painful feeling is an emotion; if it produce defire to depress him, it is a passion.

To prevent mistakes, it must be obferved, that defire here is taken in its proper fenfe, namely, that internal act, which, by influencing the will, makes us proceed to action. Defire in a lax sense refpects alfo actions and events that depend not on us, as when I defire that my friend may have a fon to reprefent him, or that my country may


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