CHAP.

II.

EMOTIONS AND PASSIONS.

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F all the feelings raised in us by external objects, those only of the eye and the ear are honoured with the name of paffion or emotion: the most pleasing feelings of taste, or touch, or smell, afpire not to that honour. From this obfervation appears the connection of emotions and passions with the fine arts, which, as observed in the introduction, are all of them calculated to give pleasure to the eye or the ear; never once condescending to gratify any of the inferior fenfes. The design accordingly of this chapter is to delineate that connection, with the view chiefly to afcertain what power the fine arts have to raise emotions and passions. To those who would excel in the fine arts, that branch of know-ledge is indispensible; for without it the critic, as well as the undertaker, ignorant of any rule, have nothing left but to abandon themselves to chance. Destitute of that branch of knowledge, in vain will either pretend to foretell what effect his work will have upon the heart.

The principles of the fine arts, appear in this view to open a direct avenue to the heart of man. VOL. I.

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The inquifitive mind beginning with criticism, the most agreeable of all amusements, and finding no obstruction in its progress, advances far into the sensitive part of our nature; and gains imperceptibly a thorough knowledge of the human heart, of its defires, and of every motive to action; a science, which of all that can be reached by man, is to him of the greatest importance.

Upon a fubject so comprehenfive, all that can be expected in this chapter, is a general or flight furvey: and to shorten that survey, I propose to handle separately fome emotions more peculiarly connected with the fine arts. Even after that circumscription, so much matter comes under the present chapter, that, to avoid confufion, I find it necessary to divide it into many parts: and tho' the first of these is confined to fuch causes of emotion or paffion as are the most common and the most general; yet upon examination I find this single part so extensive, as to require a fubdivision into several sections. Human nature is a complicate machine, and is unavoidably so in or. der to answer its various purposes. The public indeed have been entertained with many systems of human nature that flatter the mind by their fimplicity: according to some writers, man is entirely a felfish being; according to others, universal benevolence is his duty: one founds morality upon sympathy folely, and one upon utility. If any of these systems were copied from nature, the

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the present subject might be soon discussed. But the variety of nature is not so easily reached : and for confuting such Utopian systems without the fatigue of reasoning, it appears the best method to take a furvey of human nature, and to set before the eye, plainly and candidly, facts as they really exist.

PART

I.

Causes unfolded of the Emotions and Passions.

SECT. I.

Difference between Emotion and Paffion. Causes that are the most common and the moft general. Passion confidered as productive of Action.

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THESE branches are so interwoven, that they cannot be handled separately.. It is a fact universally admitted, that no emotion or passion ever starts up in the mind without a caufe: if I love a person, it is for good qualities or good offices: if I have resentment against a man, it must be for fome injury he has done me: and I cannot pity any one who is under no distress of body nor of mind.

The circumstances now mentioned, if they raise an emotion or passion, cannot be entirely indifferent;

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ent; for if fo, they could not make any impresfion. And we find upon examination, that they are not indifferent: looking back upon the foregoing examples, the good qualities or good offices that attract my love, are antecedently agreeable: if an injury did not give uneasiness, it would not occafion resentment against the author: nor would the paffion of pity be raised by an object in distress, if that object did not give pain.

What is now faid about the production of emotion or paffion, refolves into a very fimple propofition, That we love what is agreeable, and hate what is disagreeable. And indeed it. is evident, that a thing must be agreeable or difagreeable, before it can be the object either of love or of hatred.

This short hint about the causes of paffion and emotion, leads to a more extensive view of the fubject. Such is our nature, that upon perceiving certain external objects, we are instantaneously confcious of pleasure or pain: a gently-flowing river, a smooth extended plain, a spreading oak, a towering hill, are objects of fight that raise pleafant emotions: a barren heath, a dirty marsh, a rotten carcafe, raise painful emotions. Of the emotions thus produced, we inquire for no 0ther cause but merely the prefence of the object.

The things now mentioned, raise emotions by means of their properties and qualities: to the eamotion raised by a large river, its fize, its force,

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and its fluency, contributes each a share: the regularity, propriety, and convenience, of a fine building, contribute each to the emotion raised by the building.

If external properties be agreeable, we have reason to expect the fame from those which are internal; and accordingly power, discernment, wit, mildness, fympathy, courage, benevolence, are disagreeable in a high degree: upon perceiving these qualities in others, we instantaneously feel pleasant emotions, without the flightest act of reflection, or of attention to consequences. It is almost unnecessary to add, that certain qualities oppofite to the former, such as dulness, pee. vishness, inhumanity, cowardice, occafion in the fame manner painful emotions.

Sensible beings affect us remarkably by their actions. Some actions raise pleasant emotions in the spectator, without the least reflection; such as graceful motion, and genteel behaviour. But as intention, a capital circumstance in human actions, is not visible, it requires reflection to difcover their true character : I fee one delivering a purse of money to another, but I can make nothing of that action, till I learn with what intention the money is given if it be given to discharge a debt, the action pleases me in a flight degree; if it be a grateful return, I feel a stronger emotion; and the pleasant emotion rises to a great height, when it is the intention of the gi