rule, why should they be imitated? If they ftudied nature, and were obfequious to rational principles, why should these be concealed from us?

With respect to the present undertaking, it is not the author's intention to compofe a regular treatise upon each of the fine arts; but only, in general, to exhibit their fundamental principles, drawn from human nature, the true fource of criticism. The fine arts are intended to entertain us, by making pleasant impreffions; and, by that circumstance, are distinguished from the useful arts: but, in order to make pleasant impreffions, we ought, as above hinted, to know what objects are naturally agreeable, and what naturally disagreeable. That fubject is here attempted, as far as neceffary for unfolding the genuine principles of the fine arts; and the author affumes no merit from his performance, but that of evincing, perhaps more diftinctly than hitherto has been done, that these principles, as well as every just rule of criticism, are founded upon the sensitive part of our nature. What the author hath discovered or collected upon that fubject, he chooses to impart in the gay and agreeable form of criticifm; imagining that this form will be more relifhed, and perhaps be no less instructive, than a regular and laboured difquifition. His plan is, to afcend gradually to principles, from facts and experiments; inftead of beginning with the former, handled abstractedly,

and

and defcending to the latter. But, though criticism is thus his only declared aim, he will not difown, that all along it has been his view, to explain the nature of man, confidered as a fenfitive being capable of pleasure and pain: and, though he flatters himself with having made fome progress in that important science, he is, however, too fenfible of its extent and difficulty, to undertake it profeffedly, or to avow it as the chief purpose of the present work.

To cenfure works, not men, is the just prerogative of criticism; and accordingly all personal cenfure is here avoided, unless where neceffary to illuftrate fome general propofition. No praise is claimed on that account; becaufe cenfuring with a view merely to find fault, cannot be entertaining to any person of humanity. Writers, one should imagine, ought, above all others, to be reserved on that article, when they lie fo open to retaliation. The author of this treatise, far from being confident of meriting no cenfure, entertains not even the flighteft hope of fuch perfection. Amusement was at first the fole aim of his inquiries proceeding from one particular to another, the subject grew under his hand; and he was far advanced before the thought ftruck him, that his private meditations might be publicly useful. In public, however, he would not appear in a flovenly drefs; and therefore he pretends not otherwife to apologise for

his errors, than by obferving, that in a new fubject, no less nice than extenfive, errors are in some measure unavoidable. Neither pretends he to justify his tafte in every particular that point must be extremely clear, which admits not variety of opinion; and in fome matters fufceptible of great refinement, time is perhaps the only infallible touchstone of taste to that he appeals, and to that he chearfully fubmits.

N. B. THE ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM, meaning the whole, is a title too affuming for this work. A number of these elements or principles are here unfolded: but, as the author is far from imagining that he has completed the list, a more humble title is proper, such as may number of parts lefs than the whole. This he thinks is fignified by the title he has chofen, viz. ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM.

express any

ELEMENTS

ELEMENTS

O F

CRITICISM

CHAPTER I.

PERCEPTIONS AND IDEAS IN A TRAIN.

A

MAN, while awake, is conscious of a continued train of perceptions and ideas paffing in his mind. It requires no activity on his part to carry on the train : nor can he at will add any idea to the train *. At the fame time, we learn from daily experi

For how fhould this be done? what idea is it that we are to add? If we can specify the idea, that idea is already in the mind, and there is no occafion for any act of the will. If we cannot specify any idea, I next demand, how can a person will, or to what purpose, if there be nothing in view? We cannot form a conception of fuch a thing. If this argument need confirmation, I urge experience whoever makes a trial will find, that ideas are linked together in the mind, forming a connected chain; and that we have not the command of any idea independent of the chain.

VOL. I.

B

ence,