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mind to the most enticing fort of logic: the prac tice of reafoning upon fubjects fo agreeable, tends to a habit; and a habit, strengthening the reafoning faculties, prepares the mind for entering into fubjects more intricate and abstract. To have, in that refpect, a juft conception of the importance of criticifm, we need but reflect upon the ordinary method of education; which, after fome years spent in acquiring languages, hurries us, without the leaft preparatory difcipline, into the most profound philofophy. A more effectual method to alienate the tender mind from abftract fcience, is beyond the reach of invention and accordingly, with respect to fuch fpeculations, our youth generally contract a fort of hobgoblin terror, feldom if ever fubdued. Those who apply to the arts, are trained in a very different manner: they are led, ftep by step, from the cafier parts of the operation, to what are more difficult; and are not permitted to make a new motion, till they are perfected in thofe which go before. Thus the fcience of criticifm may be confidered as a middle link, connecting the different parts of education into a regular chain. This fcience furnisheth an inviting opportunity to exercife the judgment; we delight to reafon upon fubjects that are equally pleafant and familiar: we proceed gradually from the fimpler to the more involved cafes; and in a due courfe of difcipline, cuftom, which improves all our faculties, beftows acutenefs on that of rea

fon,

fon, fufficient to unravel all the intracies of philofophy.

Nor ought it to be overlooked, that the reafonings employed on the fine arts are of the fame kind with thofe which regulate our conduct. Mathematical and metaphyfical reasonings have no tendency to improve our knowledge of man; nor are they applicable to the common affairs of life: but a juft tafte of the fine arts, derived from rational principles, furnishes elegant subjects for converfation, and prepares us for acting in the focial state with dignity and propriety.

The fcience of rational criticism tends to improve the heart no less than the understanding. It tends, in the first place, to moderate the selfish affections by fweetening and harmonizing the temper, it is a strong antidote to the turbulence of paffion, and violence of purfuit: it procures to a man fo much mental enjoyment, that, in order to be occupied, he is not tempted to deliver up his youth to hunting, gaming, drinking*; nor his middle age to ambition; nor his old age to avarice. Pride and envy, two difguftful paffions, find in the conftitution no enemy more formidable than a delicate and difcerning tafte:

If any youth of a fplendid fortune and English education fumble perchance upon this book and this paffage, he will pronounce the latter to be empty declamation. But if he can be prevailed upon to make the experiment, he will find, much to his fatisfaction, every anticle well founded.

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the man upon whom nature and culture have bestowed this bleffing, delights in the virtuous difpofitions and actions of others: he loves to cherish them, and to publish them to the world: faults and failings, it is true, are to him no less obvious; but these he avoids, or removes out of fight, because they give him pain. On the other hand, a man void of tafte, upon whom even striking beauties make but a faint impreffion, indulges pride or envy without controul, and loves to brood over errors and blemishes. In a word, there are other paffions, that, upon occafion, may disturb the peace of fociety more than those mentioned; but not another paffion is fo unwearied an antagonist to the sweets of focial intercourfe: pride and envy put a man perpetually in oppofition to others; and difpofe him to relish bad more than good qualities, even in a companion. How different that difpofition of mind, where every virtue in a companion or neighbour is, by refinement of tafte, fet in its strongest light; and defects or blemishes, natural to all, are fuppreffed, or kept out of view!

In the next place, delicacy of tafte tends no lefs to invigorate the focial affections, than to moderate thofe that are felfifh. To be convinced of that tendency, we need only reflect, that delicacy of tafte neceffarily heightens our feeling of pain and pleasure; and of courfe our fympathy, which is the capital branch of every focial paf

fion. Sympathy invites a communication of joys and forrows, hopes and fears: such exercise, foothing and fatisfactory in itself, is neceffarily productive of mutual good-will and affection.

One other advantage of rational criticism is referved to the last place, being of all the most important; which is, that it is a great fupport to morality. I infift on it with entire fatisfaction, that no occupation attaches a man more to his duty, than that of cultivating a taste in the fine arts: a just relish of what is beautiful, proper, elegant, and ornamental, in writing or painting, in architecture or gardening, is a fine preparation for the fame just relish of these qualities in character and behaviour. To the man who has acquired a tafte fo acute and accomplished, every action wrong or improper must be highly disgustful: if, in any instance, the overbearing power of paffion fway him from his duty, he returns to it with redoubled refolution never to be swayed a fecond time he has now an additional motive to virtue, a conviction derived from experience, that happiness depends on regularity and order, and that disregard to justice or propriety never fails to be punished with fhame and remorfe *.

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Genius is allied to a warm and inflammable conflitution, delicacy of tafte to calmnefs and fedatenefs. Hence it is common to find genius in one who is a prey to every paffion; but feldom delicacy of tafte. Upon a man pof

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Rude ages exhibit the triumph of authority over reafon: Philofophers anciently were divided into fects, being Epicureans, Platonists, Stoics, Pythagoreans, or Sceptics: the fpeculative relied no farther on their own judgement but to chufe a leader, whom they implicitly followed. In later times, happily, reafon hath obtained the afcendant men now affert their native privilege of thinking for themselves; and difdain to be ranked in any fect, whatever be the fcience. I am forced to except criticifm, which, by what fatality I know not, continues to be no less flavish in its principles, nor lefs fubmiflive to authority, than it was originally. Boffu, a celebrated French critic, gives many rules; but can difcover no better foundation for any of them, than the practice merely of Homer and Virgil, fupported by the authority of Ariftotle: Strange! that in fo long a work, he fhould never once have stumbled upon the question, Whether, and how far, do these rules agree with human nature. It could not furely be his opinion, that these poets, however eminent for genius, were entitled to give law to mankind; and that, nothing now remains, but blind obedience to their arbitrary will if in writing they followed no

felfed of that bleffing, the moral duties, no lefs than the fine arts, make a deep impreffion, and counterbalance every irregular defire: at the fame time, a temper calm and fedate is not eafily moved, even by a strong tempta tion.

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