Chap. 2. continued. Part. Sect. Pag. 81 88 6. Caufes of the Paffions of Fear 7. Emotions caufed by Fiction, 3. Interrupted Existence of Emotions and 5. Influence of Paffion with respect to lief, afforded for computing time and 105 115 124 152 165 178 181 195 210 250 258 272 278 Chap. 4. Grandeur and Sublimity, 5. Motion and Force, 6. Novelty, and the unexpected appearance of Objects, 7. Rifible Objects, 8. Refemblance and Diffimilitude, Chap. 9. Uniformity and Variety Appendix. Concerning the Works of mity and Variety, 10, Congruity and Propriety, 11. Dignity and Grace, 12. Ridicule, 13. Wit, 14. Custom and Habit, Pag. 305 325 333 352 366 381 400 3. Beauty of Language from a refem- cation, 4. Verfification, 19. Comparisons, 45I 494 3 6 18 83 98 183 Chap. 5. A figure which, among related Ob jects, extends the Properties of one 1. Subjects expreffed figuratively, 305 2. Attributes expreffed figuratively 312 21. Narration and Defcription, 325 25. Standard of Tafte, Appendix. Terms defined or explained, 487 505 INTRODUCTION. T WHAT nothing external is perceived till firft it make an impreffion upon the organ of fenfe, is an obfervation that holds equally in every one of the external fenfes. But 'there is a difference as to our knowledge of that impreffion in touching, tafting, and fmelling, we are fenfible of the impreffion; that, for example, which is made upon the hand by a stone, upon the palate by an apricot, and upon the noftrils by a rofe it is otherwife in feeing and hearing; for I am not fenfible of the impreffion made upor my eye, when I behold a tree; nor of the impreffion made upon my ear, when I listen to a fong That difference in the manner of perceiving external objects, diftinguisheth remarkably hearing and feeing from the other fenfes ; and I am ready to fhow, that it diftinguifheth ftill more remarkably the feelings of the former from that of the latter; every feeling, pleafant or painful, muft be in the mind; and yet, becaufe in tafting, touching, and fmelling, we are fenfible of the impreffion made upon the organ, we are led to place there alfo the pleafant or painful feeling See the Appendix, § 13. Vol. I: caufed caused by that impreffion *; but, with respect to feeing and hearing, being infenfible of the organic impreffion, we are not mifled to affign a wrong place to the pleasant or painful feelings caused by that impreffion; and therefore we naturally place them in the mind, where they really are: upon that account, they are conceived to be more refined and fpiritual, than what are derived from tafting, touching, and smelling; for the latter feelings, feeming to exift externally at the organ of fenfe, are conceived to be merely corporeal. The pleasures of the eye and the ear, being thus elevated above those of the other external senses, acquire fo much dignity as to become a laudable entertainment. They are not, however, fet on a level with the purely intellectual; being no lefs inferior in dignity to intellectual pleasures, than fuperior to the organic or corporeal : they indeed organ. * After the utmost efforts, we find it beyond our power to conceive the flavour of a rose to exift in the mind: we are neceffarily led to conceive that pleasure as exifting in the noftrils along with the impreffion made by the rofe upon that And the fame will be the refult of experiments with refpect to every feeling of tafte, touch, and fmell. Touch affords the moft fatisfactory experiments. Were not that the delufion is detected by philofophy, no perfon would hefitate to pronounce, that the pleasure arifing from touching a smooth, foft, and velvet furface, has its existence at the ends of the fingers, without once dreaming of its exifting any where else. resemble |