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sion of our military strength among the subjugating the country, and continuing the people of this country (Affghanistan,) war, the prisoners at present in Afghanistan though weakened by the occurrences at shall be exchanged for Dost Mahomed Khan, his Cabul, is not destroyed; but if we now family, and attendants, and that the issue be dependent on the sword: thirdly, in the event of neiretire, and it should again become neces-ther of those propositions being approved of, sary to advance, we shall labor under they wish to know what terms will be granted many disadvantages, the most serious of to themselves individually; whether we, in the which, in my opinion, will be a distrust of event of their submission, will confine them, send their strength among our soldiers, which them to India, take hostages from them, reduce auy admission of weakness is so well cal- their pay; in short, what they have to expect from our clemency. culated to induce; and in what other light could a withdrawal from Jellalabad or Can- General Pollock, who seems to have been dahar be viewed?" He suggests that most anxious to recover the prisoners, Jellalabad should be held in considerable urged the chiefs to release them immediateforce, and a movement be made on Cabully, as a means of facilitating further commufrom Candahar, and he strongly deprecates nication between the Governments; adding the effects which a hasty retirement would that, if money be a consideration, he was prehave on Beloochistan, and even on the pared to pay two lacs of rupees to the sirdar, navigation of the Indus. In another letter, upon the prisoners being delivered to him the general says:in camp. It appears that there was a further message from Akhbar Khan himself, Perhaps it is not within my province to observe that, in my humble opinion, an unnecessa- delivered privately by him to Capt. Macry alarm has been created regarding the position kenzie, desiring to know what he personally of our troops in this country, and of the strength might expect from our clemency, being and power of the enemy we have to contend willing to separate himself entirely from with. This enemy cannot face our troops in the the hostile faction. Lord Ellenborough, field with any chance of success, however supe- from the first, opposed the exhibition of any rior they may be in numbers, provided these pre-clemency towards Akhbar Khan, "the accautions are strictly observed which war between a small body of disciplined soldiers and a knowledged murderer of the Envoy, and who vast crowd of untrained, unorganized, and half deceived and betrayed a British army into civilized people constantly renders necessary. a position in which it was destroyed." His True, the British troops suffered a dreadful dis- lordship disapproved of the offer to ransom aster at Cabul, and it is not for me to presume the prisoners, and regretted that any neto point out why this happened, however evident cessity should have arisen of diplomatic I may conceive the reasons, and the long train intercourse with Mahomed Akhbar. With of military and political events which led to the sad catastrophe. respect to the release of Dost Mahomed Khan, the major-general was authorized to The representations of General Nott did of it " speak as an event which, under vanot induce the Governor-General to vary rious contingences of circumstances, might his instructions for his evacuation of Cannot be altogether impossible." dahar and retirement to Sukkur, though he left the time and mode of retiring to the general's discretion.

Meanwhile, the position of General Pollock at Jellalabad, and the apprehension that he meditated an advance into the country, disposed the insurgent chiefs, and especially Mahomed Akhbar Kahn, to negotiate with him. A communication was received by General Pollock from Major Pottinger (sent by Capt. Colin Mackenzie,) dated at Tazen, April 20th, to the follow ing effect :

The sirdar wishes to know, in the first place, if we will consent to withdraw the greater part of our troops, and leave an agent, with a small body of men, to act with whoever the confederates may elect as chief, in which choice they propose to be guided by the wishes of the two factions in Cabul, and wish us to release Dost Mahomed Khan: secondly, they propose that, if the British Government have determined on

The death of Shah Shooja served but to confirm the Governor-General and his Council in their resolution. In a letter to

Mr. Clerk, May 16th, Mr. Secretary Maddock gives that gentleman instructions to make known to the government of Lahore the views of that of British India, in the altered condition of Affghanistan during the past four years. He observes that the object of the tripartite treaty was "to remove from the government of Affghanistan an able chief, who had, in the course of many years, succeeded in uniting it under his rule; who was forming and disciplining an army, and was supposed to entertain, in conjunction with the powers of the West, projects of hostility to the adjoining states on the Indus." That object had been completely effected. A further object was to substitute for the authority of Dost Mahomed Khan, deemed hostile, that of Shah

Shooja, which, it was expected, would be ever terms were agreed to," and the payfriendly; but it had been proved by recent, ment of two lacs for the prisoners. The as well as all past, experience, "that a Governor-General, in his remarks (May sovereign who appears to be altogether the 21) upon the reply to Akhbar Khan's proinstrument of a foreign state cannot obtain posal, again regrets that money should the willing support of his subjects, so as to have been offered for the release of the wield their power in favor of that foreign prisoners, and still more that the general state; on the contrary, he will be an ob-" should have considered it necessary, unject of hatred or contempt to his subjects, der any circumstances, to have had any and his only resource, if he be desirous of communication whatever of a diplomatic securing their willing allegiance, will be in nature with Mahomed Akhbar Khan, in throwing himself into their arms, and as- whom it must be impossible for any one to serting his independence of the foreign place any trust." state which placed him on the throne." The object of the joint policy of the two governments should, therefore, be to maintain Affghanistan in that state in which it may be unable to do any thing against us, "foregoing the visionary design of placing it in a state in which it could, as a united monarchy, be powerful for us against an enemy advancing from the West, and yet be content to entertain no views of ambition against its neighbors in the East." This object, the Governor-General thought, "will be best effected by leaving the Affghans to themselves."

The resolution of Lord Ellenborough to withdraw the British forces from Affghanistan remained unaltered, but the mode of effecting the withdrawal became modified by unavoidable circumstances. In Mr. Secretary Maddock's letter to General Pollock, of June 1st, it is observed:—

The retirement of your army immediately after the victory gained by Sir Robert Sale, the forcing of the Khyber Pass, and the relief of Jellalabad, would have had the appearance of a military operation successfully accomplished, and even triumphantly achieved; its retirement, after six months of inaction, before a following army of Afghans, will have an appearance of a different and less advantageous character. It would be desirable, undoubtedly, that, before finally quitting Affghanistan, you seem to compel you to remain there till October, the Govenor-General earnestly hopes that you may be enabled to draw the enemy into a position in which you may strike such a blow effectually.

The directions of the Government to withdraw from the country were carried into effect by General Nott in Western Affghanistan, in May, so far as to evacuate Kelat-i-Ghilzie; but though the order applied in the same positive manner to Candahar itself, the general observed that the measure would take some time to arrange, and that this would afford the Government ample time to reconsider the order, and his objections to the measure of a hasty retreat. The Governor-General did give this order a reconsideration, and the result was that he left to the general's discretion the line by which he should withdraw his force. In his letter to General Nott, dated July 4th, Lord Ellenborough thus marks out his course of proceeding:

On the 3rd May, Major Pottinger writes again to General Pollock, apparently advising a compromise with Ahkbar Khan, and the payment of money for the release of the prisoners. He forwards another written (unsigned) memorandum from the sirdar, the effect of which is to require an amnesty for himself and Mahomed Shah Khan; that they shall not be sent out of Cabul; that if the British intended merely to revenge themselves and quit the country, the government might be conferred upon him; and that he might have a jaghire of two lacs, and eight lacs as a present! Major Pottinger considers these demands (except the money) as moderate, observing that the ruling faction at Cabul had offered the crown to Akhbar Khan, and that, under these circumstances, his conduct, in continuing the negotiation, proved his sincerity. The sirdar, in his memorandum, thus alludes to his proceeding during the retreat of the British troops from Cabul:In the time when Pottinger, Lawrence, and Mackenzie sahibs came at the stage of Bootkak, I agreed to their wishes, and did all in my power Nothing has occurred to induce me to change to protect the army, as is well known to the my first opinion, that the measure, commanded above-mentioned sahibs; but I could not save by considerations of political and military pruthem from the hands of the multitude, as the dence, is to bring back the armies now in Affnizard ("mob of Affghans ") was disorganized, ghanistan at the earliest period at which their and the British soldiers could not protect them-retirement can be effected, consistently with the selves on account of the frost; and, moreover, health and efficiency of the troops, into positions the gentlemen did not attend to my advice. wherein they may have easy and certain comGeneral Pollock's reply guaranteed no- munication with India; and to this extent the thing but an amnesty for the past, when-instructions you have received remain unaltered.

But the improved position of your army, with | in Affghanistan essential to the preservation sufficient means of carriage for as large a force of our empire in India; and, however the as it is necessary to move in Affghanistan, in-world might forgive or applaud me, I should duces me now to leave to your option the line

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by which you shall withdraw your troops from never forgive myself, if I exposed that army that country. If you determine upon moving to any material and serious danger, for the upon Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jellalabad, you will possible accomplishment of any object now require, for the transport of provisions, a much to be obtained in Affghanistan." larger amount of carriage; and you will be The determination being, therefore, formpractically without communications, from the ed not to retire the British forces without time of your leaving Candahar. Dependent en- doing something to repair the wrongs and tirely upon the courage of your army, and upon the disgrace they had suffered, the instruc your own ability in directing it, I should not have any doubt as to the success of the operations to General Pollock (July 23) were to tion; but whether you will be able to obtain pro- exert his force vigorously, giving every visions for your troops during the whole march, proof of British power which is not inconand forage for your animals, may be a matter sistent with the usages of war and the dicof reasonable doubt. Yet upon this your suc- tates of British humanity; but you will not the superior courage of the Affghans, but never forget that, after so exhibiting that want, and the inclemency of the season, which power, you are, without allowing yourself led to the destruction of the army at Cabool: to be diverted therefrom by any object, to and you must feel, as I do, that the loss of an- obey the positive orders of your Governother army, from whatever cause it might ment to withdraw your army from Affghanarise, might be fatal to our Government in India. istan. It will be your highest praise,' I do not undervalue the aid which our Government in India would receive from the successful lordship adds, "after having re-established execution by your army of a march through the opinion of the invincibility of the BritGhuznee and Cabool, over the scenes of our late ish arms upon the scene of their late misdisasters. I know all the effect which it would fortunes, to restore its armies to India in a have upon the midst of our soldiers, of our allies, perfectly efficient state, at a period when, of our enemies, in Asia, and of our countrymen I assure you, their presence in India is most and of all foreign nations, in Europe. It is an desirable." He gives the general directions, object of just ambition, which no one more than in case of the capture or surrender of Mamyself would rejoice to see effected; but I see that failure in the attempt is certain and irre-homed Akhbar Khan. "To the possession trievable ruin; and I would endeavor to inspire of that chief's person I attach very great you with the necessary caution, and make importance. You are already authorized to you feel that, great as are the objects to be obtained by success, the risk is great also. You will recollect that what you will have to make is a successful march; that that march must not be delayed by any hazardous operations against Ghuznée or Cabool; that you should carefully calculate the time required to enable you to reach Jellalabad in the first week in October, so as to form the rear-guard of Major-General Pollock's rmy. If you should be enabled by a coup-demain to get possession of Ghuznee and Cabool, you will act as you see fit, and leave decisive proofs of the power of the British army, without impeaching its humanity. You will bring away from the tomb of Mahmood of Ghuznee, his club, which hangs over it; and you will bring away the gates of his tomb, which are the gates of the temple of Somnaut. These will be the just trophies of your successful march.

In his despatch to the Secret Committee, August 16th, the Governor-General states that he adhered absolutely to his original intention of withdrawing the whole army from Affghanistan. "Some risk," he observes, "I deem it justifiable to incur for the recovery of the guns and of the prisoners, and with the view of exhibiting the triumphant march of a British army over the ground on which it once suffered defeat; but I consider the preservation of the army

give an assurance that his life shall be spared; but you will not make any other condition, nor make that lightly. I earnestly desire that that chief, the avowed murderer of Sir William Macnaghten, and the betrayer of a British army, should come into our power without any condition whatsoever." Subsequently (August 3rd), the Governor-General instructs General Pollock, in the event of the sidar coming into his hands without any previous conditions for preserving his life, to place him upon his trial, and, if he should be convicted, to deal with him as he would with any person who might be convicted, under similar cir cumstances, of the crime of murder, having regard to the jeopardy of the prisoners. "I have adopted this step upon full consideration and with a thorough conviction of its expediency," his lordship observes, in his despatch to the Secret Committee.

General Nott availed himself (July 26) of the option allowed him by the GovernorGeneral, and decided upon a march to Cabul, "having looked at the difficulties in every point of view, and reflected on the advantages which would attend a successful' accomplishment of such a move, and the

moral influence it would have throughout eral Pollock tells Sir Jasper Nicolls, the Asia. There shall be no unnecessary risk," Commander-in-Chief, that some person in he says; and, if expedient, I will mask his (Sir Jasper's) suite had communicated Ghuznee, and even Cabool; but, if an op- a secret of importance to an individual in portunity should offer, I will endeavor to the general's camp. General Nott writes strike a decisive blow for the honor of our (May 17) to Mr. Maddock: "I will not conarms. I am most anxious," he adds, "not-ceal from you that I have, and still may exwithstanding the conduct of the Affghan perience much inconvenience, in consechiefs, that our army should leave a deep impression on the people of this country, of our character for forbearance and humanity."

The two forces consequently advanced from their respective positions, and met in September at Cabul.

quence of the measures directed in your communications being made public; the subject of your letter of the 15th March was speedily known, even to the Affghan chiefs, although I have not, up to this moment, made known its contents to my old and confidential staff; and your communiThe situation of the prisoners had been a cations, now under reply, may possibly besubject of the Governor-General's "anxious come equally public, and still more seriousconsideration." So early as April 25, Mr. ly injurious." The Governor-General, in Secretary Maddock wrote to General Pol- consequence of these intimations, thought lock upon this subject. He observed that it necessary "to impress upon every officer the only safe and honorable course for a employed in the military or political service government to pursue, in such circumstan- of the Government the necessity of preserces, was to effect the release by a general ving absolute secrecy in all matters of a exchange, their ransom being a practice un-military nature which may come officially known to civilized nations; and if the Aff- to his knowledge." For this caution, conghans had no general government, there veyed in the most inoffensive terms, his should be no reservation of any prisoners lordship (if we remember rightly) received in our hands; but as they were held by indi- the severe reprehension of a portion of the vidual chiefs for their personal benefit, the Indian press. general is authorized to make such partial arrangement as he might deem most advisable. Accordingly, as before stated, the general offered two lacs of rupees for their liberation. When all negotiation on his part failed, and the army advanced upon Cabul, the Governor-General directed him (September 13) to "cause it to be intimated to Mahomed Akhbar Khan, that, in the event of any further delay taking place in their delivery, upon the proposed condition of the release of all the Affghan prisoners in our hands, it is his lordship's intention to remove Mahomed Akhbar Khan's family from Loodiana; and that it is under his lordship's consideration, whether Mahomed Akhbar Khan's wife and children should not be immediately sent to Calcutta, and eventually to England."

We cannot take leave of these papers without remarking upon another instance of that culpable practice of mutilating and falsifying official despatches which seems now to have grown into a system in the public offices. We pointed out on a former occasion the improper liberties taken with one of Sir Robert Sale's despatches, in which important passages had been omitted in the copies published at home. In the collection before us, we find proof of, perhaps, a more censurable example of similar mutilation in India. The published extract from General Pollock's despatch of October 13th† concluded thus:

Previous to my departure from Cabool, I destroyed with gunpowder the grand bazaar of that city, called the Chahar Chuttah, built in the reign of Arungzebe, by the celebrated Ali MurThese documents clear up much of the ap- dan Khar, and which may be considered to have been the most frequented part of Cabool, and parent inconsistency and vacillation which were imputed to the proceedings of the Central Asia. The remains of the late Envoy known as the grand emporium of this part of Government authorities in relation to this and Minister had been exposed to public insult measure by writers in India, and which evi- in this bazaar, and my motive in effecting its dently arose from the caution most proper-destruction has been to impress upon the Affly observed by the Governor-General in ghans, that their atrocious conduct towards a guarding his intentions as much as possi- British functionary has not been suffered to pass ble from being divulged, and from their oc- with impunity. casional disclosure by breaches of confidence in those who were intrusted with the secret. Much mischief seems to have been occasioned by this paltry treachery. Gen

In the extract amongst the papers before us, the following passage immediately follows:

Vol. xxxvii. p. 193, As. Intell. † As. Intell. p. 31.

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Within, my fire
Had died to embers, and the taper's light
Upstarted drowsily from time to time,
And thoughts skimmed silently about my brain,
Alive, but dim. I deemed all men asleep,
Fast as the fawns beneath the tangled oak,
And felt a pleasure to be watching there
With heaven upon the slumber of the world.
Unmindful man! I cried,-'tis well for thee
That there are sentinels who stand before
The everlasting doors, and, spirit-eyed,
Flash through the darkness into Nature's breast
The glance of safety! Were it thou alone
Had charge of her, before to-morrow's dawn
The moon might turn to blood, and the set sun
Swerve from th' ecliptic, and the host of heaven
Burst from their bonds, like chargers from the rein,
Abroad into immensity! But now

Behold night's hosts revealed! Across the lawn
(Mistaken oft for fairies) trip light troops
Of guardian spirits; and on every star
Sits a bright charioteer, and steers his orb
With tranquil speed, flashing a thousand beams
From the blue causeway of the firmament,
Which glance to earth, and there lie quivering,
The frozen plains one instant, ere they die.
Alas for man! Where all is quick with life,
Must he obey his destiny-and sleep?

o'er

Just then upon a gust there swept a strain, So faintly heard, 'twas scarcely more than thought, Yet full of sweetness-and then died away, Then rose, and took a tone more definiteThe peal of bells. Yet 1 could scarce believe, In that secluded place, and silent hour, Hard upon midnight, there was thought of things So much in tune with poetry and heaven. Beyond the lawn, and grove, and many a roof, The parish church lay far. 'Twas from her tower The sound leaped forth-and I was fain to muse What it might mean-when like a flash it sprung Up to my memory, that the coming stroke Of midnight ushered in the ADVENT MORN. I closed my shutter, and, ere yet the peal Had sobered to the solemn stroke of twelve, Low on my knees, and not without some tears, Had owned the selfish arrogance of heart, Which could not stand within God's temple-dome, But I must bar the door upon mankind.

SERVIA.

A serious difference has arisen, not only between Russia and Turkey, but also between Russia and Austria, respecting the principality of Servia. If a look be cast at the frontier lines and geographical forms of these countries, nothing can appear so preposterous as the claim of Russia to dominate in Servia. The mountains forming the stupendous natural bulwark of Transylvania stretch north of the Danube to no very considerable distance from its mouth, leaving a narrow neck of passage between them and the Black Sea, through which, indeed, Russian armies may descend to the conquest of Turkey; but such a march on their part must always be with the permission of the military_Power in possession of the natural fortress of Transylvania. Defiant of this, Russian powers and pretensions flow through this pass around this bulwark, and extend up the Danube to Servia, a country which Austria holds, as it were, in its hand, which is at its doors, and with which it might, by the slightest effort, prevent any other Power from interfering. A foreign Power might as well dispute the domination of the Isle of Wight with England, as Russia dispute Servia with Austria.

Then, the capital of Servia, Belgrade, has belonged to Austria. She lost it about a century back by the imbecility of her diplomatists, more than by the weakness of her arms. Yet Russia has substituted herself even here as protectress of the Christian population, in lieu of Austria. For the latter country to suffer this implies that she has sunk to the condition of a second-rate Power. Unfortunately she had when Servia liberated itself from Turkey. Austria was then in the fangs of Napoleon. The Servians in vain sent deputations receive aid and encouragement. to Vienna. From St. Petersburg alone did they The Russian Court afterwards insured their semi-independence by treaty.

But Austria, restored to her independence and to her old territorial preponderance in 1815, ought naturally to have recovered, at the same time, her influence over Servia. But Russia has been a warring, an active, and a conquering Power since that time. Her triumphant march across the Balkan has kept up and augmented her supremacy. And Austria has been thrown back to the nullity to which Napoleon reduced her.

Russia insists on preserving unimpaired her protectorate of Servia. This is the whole secret of her present diplomatic menaces and efforts; for if Turkey and other Powers can establish the precedent of effecting a revolution in any of the principalities by popular insurrection alone, and that then this is to be accepted as a fait accompli from the impossibility of Russia or other Powers marching an army into these principalities, then their independence is virtually established, or the path to it so plainly marked out as to be much the same thing.

If affairs on the Danube were likely to remain in statu quo, it would not be of much consequence; but it is an undeniable fact that the Christians of North Turkey have acquired knowledge and spirit and hope and a degree of union,

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