years longer than the Celts and Teutons; AMOUNT OF CRIME NORMAL AMONG in the country were Germans, a third of the bakers and cabinet-makers, a fifth of the saloon-keepers and butchers, a sixth of the hatters, tailors, and coopers, and a seventh of the musicians and teachers of music. Yet only one male breadwinner out of nineteen was a German. The sons of Germans are a sixteenth of our male labor force; but they furnish a quarter of the trunk-and-satchel-makers, a fifth of the bottlers, stove-makers, and engravers, and a sixth of the upholsterers, bookbinders, paper-box makers, butchers, brewers, and brass-workers. In our cities the German baker, tailor, butcher, cabinet-maker, or engraver is quite as characteristic and familiar a figure as the Irish drayman, fireman, brakeman, section boss, street-car conductor, plumber, or police man. THE striking thing about the abnormality of the Germans is its normality in amount. Among the foreign-born, the Germans have just about their due share of insanity, neither less nor more. Likewise, the marked feature of German crime in this The immigrant German women begin country is simply its featurelessness. rather higher in the scale of occupation Among the twelve thousand-odd aliens in than the Irish, but their daughters do not our prisons, the German prisoners run a rise in life with such amazing buoyancy as little above the average in their bent for do the daughters of the Irish. Between gainful offenses and a little below the the first-generation and the second-generaaverage in their crimes of violence. In tion Germans the proportion of servants and waitresses fell from a third of all female breadwinners to a quarter. For the Irish the drop is from fifty-four per cent. to sixteen per cent. The second-generation Germans do not show such an advance on their parents as do the secondgeneration Irish, who bob up like corks released at the bottom of a stream. their leaning to other offenses they come close to the mean. Among the twenty nationalities that figure in the police arrests of Chicago, the German stands, with respect to almost every form of misconduct, near the middle of the list. The French and the Hebrews stand out in bad eminence as offenders against chastity, the Italians lead in murder and blackmail, the Americans in burglary, the Greeks in kidnapping, the Lithuanians in assault, the Irish in disorderly conduct. But the German lacks distinction in evil, never coming near either the top or the bottom of the scale in predilection for any form of crime. On the whole, his criminal bent is very close to that of the native Amer ican. WIDE VARIETY OF OCCUPATION THE Germans brought us much more in the way of industrial skill and professional training than the Irish; besides, they were much more successful in planting themselves upon the soil. They tended far more to farming and manufacturing, far less to domestic and personal service and transportation. The second generation shows no marked drift away from the farm. In 1900, three fifths of all brewers TEUTONIC TRAITS PHYSICALLY the German is strong, but often too stocky for grace. A blend with the taller and thinner American is likely to give good results in figure. Being slow in response, he makes a poor showing in competitive sports. His forte is gymnastics rather than athletics, and he is to be found in the indoor, sedentary trades rather than in the active, outdoor callings. Not often will you come upon him riveting trusses far up on the sky-scraper or the railway bridge. His pleasures he takes sitting rather than moving, so that he haunts summer-garden and picnic-ground rather than base-ball diamond and bowling-alley. For all his traditional domesticity, he is a sociable soul, and will lug off his entire family to a public resort, when an American would prefer a pipe by the fireside. He is fond of the delights of the table, and loves to enjoy talk, music, or drama while eating and drinking. In comparison with the native Americans, or the Celts from the British Isles, the Germans in America have the name of being materialistic. If this be true, it is doubtless due to the small representation among them of that noble leavening type that has made the spiritual greatness of Germany. Any one who has lived in the old country knows that there is a kind of German thats one very rarely sees among our fellowcitizens. Of such were the "Forty-eighters"; but as their influence fades, the ideal ism they fanned dies down, and visitors from the Fatherland complain that America has stamped its dollar-mark all over the souls of their kinsmen here. Professor Hugo Münsterberg, an impartial observer, judges that "the average GermanAmerican stands below the level of the average German at home." But if he chases the dollar, let us grant that he does it in his own way. Honest and stable, he puts little faith in short-cuts to riches, such as "scream" advertising, commercial humbug, "faked" news, thimblerig finance, or political graft. He does not count on skipping many rungs in the ladder of success. German business enter prises grow slowly, but if you probe them, you find a solid texture. The German is hard-headed, and is not easily borne off his feet by the contagion of example. To speculative fever and to mad panic he is rather immune. Because he is less mobile than the American and does not shift from one thing to another, he is more apt to gain skill and turn out good work. Then, too, he is not so keen to get on that he does not find the artist's enjoyment and pride in the practice of his craft. In a word, the Germans act in American society as a neutral substance moderating the action of an overlively ferment. Since the universal eagerness to be "wide-awake" and "up-to-date" has deposed habit, tradition, and external authority as lords of life. among us, the addition of the heavy, slowmoving German blood benefits us by counteracting a certain hair-trigger quality in the American temperament. The German is lasting in his sympathies and his antipathies and leisurely in his mental processes. It takes him long to make up his mind and longer to get an idea out of his head. In his thinking he tries to grasp more things at a time than does the Celt. Not for him the simple logic that proceeds from one or two outstanding factors in a situation and ignores all the rest. He wants to be comprehensive and final where the Latin aims to be merely clear and precise. It is this very complexity of thought that makes the German often silent, his speech heavy or confused. But just this relish for details and this passion for thoroughness make him a born investigator. This is the reason why, on the practical side, the GermanAmerican has most distinguished himself in work that calls for long and close observation, such as gardening, viticulture, breeding, forestry, brewing, and the chemical industries. Thirty years ago there was an outcry that the Germans were introducing into this country the virus of anarchism and socialism. It is now clear that the born anarchist, "the reformer in a hurry," is not at all of the sluggish Teutonic temperament, and that German socialism, instead of being a shattering type of thought, is in fact highly constructive. However bold and iconoclastic he may be in his thinking, the German, with his respect for authority, his slow reaction to wrong, and his love of order and system, is a conservative by nature. The children of revolutionary immigrants are milder than their fathers were; and, as a body, the GermanAmericans are now very far from leading the van of radicalism. ARE WE HONEST WITH JAPAN? TH BY JAMES DAVENPORT WHELPLEY Author of "The Trade of the World," etc. HE question of the admission or exclusion of Japanese labor is a matter of yes or no. Diplomacy may spar for time, and gain delay for the moment, but finally and at no distant date this question will have to be unequivocally settled by the American people in Congress assembled. It avails nothing at this stage of the controversy to present the arguments for and against Japanese exclusion. There are excellent reasons why they should be admitted, and convincing reasons why they should be kept out; but the academic phase of the matter is past. To take definite action along lines dictated by public opinion is the only way to put an end to confusion caused by the play of crosspurposes which now befogs the public mind in Japan and the United States and the diplomatic relations of the two countries. The American Government is now playing with the question as would a cat with a mouse, knowing all the time that in the end the decision will be against the mouse. It is reasonable and conservative to assume that if the question of Japanese exclusion was submitted to a referendum of all the voters, it would carry by a considerable majority. There would be strong and intelligent influences against this action, but as the mass of the vote is cast by those whose economics would be adversely affected by a Japanese invasion, theory and ethics would go by the board. This being the case, the outcome of the present controversy is inevitable; in the end Japanese labor will be warned off. It is diplomatic cowardice on the part of the United States not to admit the truth frankly, notify the Japanese they are not wanted for the reason that popular will is opposed to their admission, and endeavor with the best skill at the disposal of the Government to arrive at some working basis for a continuation of the trade and official friendship between the two peoples, as has been done in the case of China. The strain would be great, the situation difficult, but it would be honest; peace would prevail in the end, and all relations would adjust themselves more quickly and permanently than under the present course, which means constant friction and never-ending suspicion, conflict, and disturbance. The difficulties are not all on the American side, -in fact, it is only one of a number of important questions with which the American people have to deal, but it is a tremendous political and economic issue with the Japanese. The present attitude of the United States is making matters extremely difficult for the Japanese Government at home. Relations with the United States are an ever-present question, subject to misrepresentation, and giving rise to false hopes, based upon temporizing methods doomed inevitably to final failure. The foundations of anti-American sentiment in Japan were laid by the Japanese Government itself within the last ten years. To satisfy the people that great armaments were necessary, and thereby reconcile the taxpayers to increasing burdens, cause had to be shown. Possible war with the United States was the only available bogy-man, and anti-American sentiment was sedulously cultivated by government agents throughout the length and breadth of Nippon. In later years this has died away to a large extent, and the Government has tried to undo the work of the past; but it still bears fruit when controversial matters arise between Japan and the United States, and the Government is now paying the penalty for erstwhile expediency in the difficulty experienced in keeping the present-day populace in hand. The answers made by Washington to Japanese demands can never be entirely satisfactory, and the fear that a frank avowal of the truth would lead to trouble, even to war, is no reason for evading the responsibility which rests seventh in strength among all navies. Her with the United States. If war is to come, it will come, if not now, later on; but the chances are against such an unfortunate and unnecessary result. The only danger of actual conflict lies in the present political situation in Japan. To divert the minds of the people from high taxation, naval scandals, social disturbances, and other troubles at home, to employ and possibly kill off a percentage of the surplus population, to save its political face, to put an end to interior disorders, and to justify the nation in its present armament on land and sea, the Japanese Government might again resort to the expediency of war talk. The danger of this is not averted, however, by a temporizing policy on the part of the United States. In fact, it is increased, for the frantic efforts on the part of the American Government to maintain peace on a basis of false premise are far more apt to encourage the idea in Japan that fear rather than wisdom is dictating American policies, and the longer this controversy is drawn out the greater the danger becomes. Japan is now dictator of the far East. This position has been achieved by the most rapid and remarkable military expansion recorded in history. The war with Russia was the first ocular demonstration of progress made, and while at no time was Japan in danger of defeat, the rest of the world was so little informed as to what had been taking place in the East, or as to the far-reaching ambition of this island empire, that the victory was hailed as a miracle. The war with Russia came in 1904. Japan began her preparation for that war, and the pursuit of her desired destiny to command the far East, in 1895. When war came, Japan was ready to give this preliminary demonstration of her fitness as dictator, and the results were effective and thoroughly convincing. The Anglo-Japanese alliance which followed served as a most striking testimonial. No country in the world can to-day dispute the dominance of Japanese power in the Orient. Even England, with all her naval strength, could not do so; for to subjugate Japan would require such exodus of British war-ships from Western waters as to leave England virtually undefended at home. Japan has a modern navy, at least the army is larger than that of England, and equally modern in equipment and training. Both army and navy are stronger in proportion than those of other countries, for they are concentrated on virtually a single base, and no colonies or questions of balance of power elsewhere draw her ships or soldiers from the home establishment. To secure such an ally was the wish of England, France, and Germany. Japan preferred an alliance with England, in view of possible war with the United States. Her statesmen so played Russia and Germany against England that an Anglo-Japanese treaty was secured that later on led to many nervous moments for the English Government. The course of Japan during these negotiations inspired Count Hayashi to remark, "Japan has won Great Britain's support, but lost the respect of Russia and other European countries." The treaty was, on renewal a short time ago, so emasculated as to make it extremely improbable that England would be compelled by its terms to do more than remain neutral in case of trouble between Japan and the United States, although unquestionably England would do her utmost to prevent war. One of the best-known international bankers of the world once said that lack of money had never prevented a nation from going to war. This may be true, but in the present financial condition of Japan it is recognized by her statesmen that it would mean ultimate ruin to the Japanese nation to enter into any such serious expenditure as would be involved in an armed conflict of any importance at this time. The Japanese Government and the people do not want war. They want money, and that is the secret of present insistence on the part of Japan that her people shall be allowed to share in American possibilities for labor and for profit. Financial and economic conditions have been extremely bad in Japan for years. They have been getting worse ever since the Russo-Japanese War. Commerce and employment have not kept pace with the increasing cost of living, growing taxes, and multiplying population. During the last year the country has had a number of set-backs. Famine has afflicted some of the northern provinces, disasters by sea and land have ravaged entire communities, a number of the ablest of the Elder Statesmen have passed away, socialism and radicalism have increased among the people, and corruption in politics has become so great as to arouse to retaliation even a people heretofore disinclined, through fear, discipline, and tradition, to interference in the affairs of the governing class. Immigrants from Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and other countries now resident in the United States send annually to their home countries a sum of money probably reaching the vast total of $250,000,000. To Italy alone goes about $100,000,000. This sum constitutes a large factor in the interior economics of Italy. Had the Japanese the same outlet for surplus population and a similar source of income, it would solve many of the most pressing problems with which the Japanese Government and people are now confronted. America is the only country which offers itself as a possibility in this direction. There is little doubt that if emigration to the United States from Japan were unrestricted at this time there would be a very large movement of population seeking employment from which to earn money to send back to the people at home. To send the Japanese to Korea or Manchuria means they must either be employed by the Government or must have some money to exploit land or business. Formosa is a negligible factor in taking care of surplus population; China offers a considerable field for Japanese enterprise, but not for Japanese immigration. The population of Japan is about sixtyseven millions, or approximately the same as Germany. The area of Japan is also about the same in square miles as the German Empire. The comparison is enlightening, for while the foreign commerce of Germany is about five and a half billion dollars, that of Japan is something over one billion, and a vast percentage of the Japanese trade, export as well as import, is raw material. The largest import is raw cotton, and the largest export raw silk. The national debt of Japan is one and a quarter billion dollars, and the fixed charges on this debt amount to over seventy million dollars per year, or one quarter of the total national expenditure. To maintain the seventh strongest navy in the world and a standing army of 250,000 men, as many as England maintains, even including the 76,000 regulars stationed in India, is no small task for a nation of such comparatively limited resources. These symbols of power were necessary, however, as the first step toward a premier position in the East. They were used effectively against Russia, and they induced the Anglo-Japanese alliance, although the latter is now of doubtful value to either country, however useful it may be deemed by the rest of the world as a governor upon a new-comer into the group of the powers. These symbols are still necessary for the carrying out of Japanese ambitions upon the Asiatic mainlandambitions which are being far more rapidly realized than the Western world comprehends. The national structure is top-heavy, however. A vast modern armament is maintained by a partly developed, industrially and socially weak nation. In taking the plunge into greatness, deep water has been quickly reached. In the advent of the open door came not only Western ideas, developing and stimulating in their influence, but there also entered all those vexing problems which are still puzzling the Western nations, and which found the Japanese people still less prepared for successful solution. It is said that the Japanese are fighting for equality of recognition in all things the world over. This is true, for they are a proud and spirited people; but they are fighting for more than that in their controversy with America. They need America to help them out of the deep water into which they have plunged in their haste to acquire the title of dictator of the far East. In past years, when there were no restrictions upon Japanese immigration into the United States, there was not so much need for them to come, and the spirit of far adventure was not as rife among the Japanese people as it is to-day. A few years ago the tide began to rise, however, and it was this increase in the inward flow from Japan that led to the antiJapanese movement that has since kept the Washington Government in hot water. The Japanese Government, for various and obvious reasons, did not want an exclusion policy adopted by the United States, and coöperated effectively in restricting the number of its people who |