the domiciled and resident within the dominions of Her Britannic Majesty, such is also the proper and rightful domicil of his wife and child, and he has a legal right to remove them thither. The child being detained from the father, its natural guardian and protector, without ausubjiciendum is his appropriate legal remedy for its restoration to him from its present illegal detention and restraint. Constitution United States, art. 3, sec. 2; Judiciary Act, 1789, sec. 11; Inglis v. Trustees Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Peters, 99; 7 Anne, cap. 5; 4 Geo. III. cap. 21; Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Clar. & Fin. Ap. Ca. 523; Story's Confl. Laws, 30, 36, 43, 74. 160; Shelford on Marriage, Ferg. Rep. 397, 398. case, and authority to issue the writ of habeas | making any present election, follows corpus under the Constitution, at the common legeance of its father, partus sequitur patrem, law, by implication, and by statute; and con- and is a British subject. The father being sequently committed error in deciding that it had not such jurisdiction and authority. The petition on the record presents a prima facie case for the award of such writ, and the court below committed error in denying it to the plaintiff in error, to whom it belonged as a writ of right by the "law of the land;" his title rest-thority of law, the writ of habeas corpus ad ing, in debito justitiæ, on probable cause shown by affidavit. 36 Edw. III. cap. 9; 42 Edw. III.; 8 Henry IV.; 8 Henry VI.; 28 Edw. I.; 3 Car. I.; 16 Car. I. cap. 10; 31 Car. II.; Bac. Abr., title Hab. Corp.; Greenhill's case, 4 Adolph. & Ellis, Eng. Com. Law Rep. 624; United States v. Green, 3 Mason, 482; Rex v. Winton, 5 D. & E. 89; Rex v. Isley, 5 Adolph. & Ellis, 441; Constitution United States; Yates's case, 6 Johns. 422, 423; Bollman and Swartwout, 4 Cranch, 75; Ex-parte Randolph, 5. If the laws of the proper domicil of the 2 Brock. C. C. R. 447; 3 Bl. Com. 132; 3 Bac. plaintiff (and by necessary consequence that of Abr. 421; Judiciary Act, 1789, sec. 14; United his family), applicable to the case on the recStates Stat. 2 Mar. 1831, sec. 39; Kearney's ord, be not repugnant to the laws or policy of case, 7 Wheat. 38; Crosby's case, 3 Wilson, this country, and this be proved to the court, 172; 1 Kent's Com. 301; Wood's case, 3 Wilson; the case is one proper for the exercise of the 3 Bac. Abr. 3; In re Pearson, 4 Moore, 366; comity of the American nation-not of the Mag. Char. cap. 29; United States v. Bain-court, but of the nation; and the court below bridge, 1 Mason, 71; 1 Kent's Com. 220; United States Supreme Court, Ex-parte Barry, 2 How. 65; 19 Wendell, 16, and cases cited; Vernon v. Vernon, MS. case, New York Chancery, 11th June, 1839; Ahrenfeldt's case, Ch. New York, July, 1840; Commonwealth v. Briggs, 16 Pick. 204; In re Mitchell, Charl-mouth College v. Woodward, Con. Rep. United ton's Rep. 489; State of South Carolina v. Nelson, MS. case, 1840; Prather's case, 4 Desaus. 33; 25 Wendell, 72, 73; Gov. Seward's Mess. to Senate, Albany, 20th March, 1840; 5 East, 221; 12 Vesey, 492; 2 Russell, 1; Review of D'Hauteville's case, 30; 2 and 3 Victoria, cap. 54; 11 Vesey, 531; People v. Mercein, 3 Hill, 399; Ex-parte Burford, 3 Cranch, 449. 1. The writ of habeas corpus is not issued as 110*] 3. The court below, if it had jurisdic-matter of course, upon the application, but is tion by implication, committed error in assuming that the Court for the Correction of Errors, by its decision on the case of the plaintiff on two former writs of habeas corpus, in 1840 and 1842, had either "supplied the rule of law," or given "evidence of the common law rule" which King v. Hobhouse, 2 Chitty, K. B. Rep. 207, was to be the rule of decision in the case on marg. note. "The writ of habeas corpus, this record, two years after-a case entirely whether at common law or under the 3 Car. II., de novo-in 1844. And the court below com- does not issue as a matter of course in the first mitted further error in deciding, that by such instance, upon application, but must be assumed rule of law or evidence of the common grounded on affidavit, upon which the court law rule, the plaintiff in this cause was not en-are to exercise their discretion whether the suit titled, on the case made by him, to the custody shall issue or not." See, also, The Spanish of his child-the same being a prejudication on Sailors, 2 Sir W. Blackstone, 1324. the merits-no argument being had before the court in respect of either such assumed rule, or the evidence thereof, or on the merits. No such rule existed in point of fact, and conse-instance. quently no evidence thereof could exist. De- Ex-parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38. In this case cision Supreme Court New York, 1842, 3 Hill, the application was ex-parte, and in the first 399; MS. Opinion, Chan. New York, April, instance denied by the court, and in subsequent 1844. 4. The plaintiff in error being of legeance to the crown of England, his child, though born in the United States during his father's temporary residence therein-twenty-two months and twenty days-notwithstanding its mother be an American citizen, is not a citizen of the United States. It is incapacitated by its infancy from will extend that comity to the plaintiff, not only by awarding him the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, the appropriate legal remedy sought, but also by deciding the case on its merits, at the hearing, agreeably to the law of his domicil. In re Wilkes, 1 Ken. 279; DartStates, 577; Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Clar. & Fin. Par. Rep. 529; 9 Bligh. N. S. 110; *Bill for Protection of Minors, Senate [*111 of New York, 1840; Gov. Seward's Message to Senate, 20th March, 1840. Mr. Rockwell, for the motion to dismiss, in reply and conclusion: addressed to the discretion of the court, and may be refused if upon the application itself it appears that, if admitted to be true, the applicant is not entitled to relief. 2 Bl. Com. 132, 133, n. 16; 3 Bulstr. 27; 2 Roll. Rep. 138. King v. Barnard Schiever, 2 Burr. 765. Habeas corpus for a prisoner of war taken on board an enemy's prize ship denied in the first cases. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 353. The court declared it a matter of discretion whether to grant or refuse a writ of habeas corpus to discharge an apprentice from military service on application of the master. Ex-parte Tobias Watkins, 3 Peters, 193. Petition denied in the first instance. 2. A writ of error does not lie to review | powers at common law as a high court of recthe decision of a court, except upon final judg- ord. ment, and the order of a court, denying in the 2. The only power conferred on the Circuit first instance an ex-parte application for a writ | Court is in the Judicial Act of 1789: of habeas corpus, cannot be reviewed by writ of error. The People v. President of Brooklyn, 13 Wend. 130, Court of Errors, Mandamus, marg. note. "A writ of error does not lie upon the refusal of the Supreme Court to grant a peremptory mandamus when application is made by motion. It only lies for the relator when judgment is pronounced after issue joined upon plea or demurrer interposed upon the coming in of the return of the alternative mandamus." Boyle v. Zacharie et al. 6 Peters, 648, marg. note. "A writ of error will not lie to a Circuit Court of the United States, to revise its decision in refusing to grant a writ of venditioni exponas, issued on a judgment obtained in that court." Per Story, J. p. 657: "A very strong case, illustrating the general doctrine, is, that error will not lie to the refusal of a court to grant a peremptory mandamus upon a return made to a prior mandamus which the court allowed as sufficient. 3 Bro. Parl. Cas. 505. 112 *] *The Dean and Chapter of Dublin v. King, 1 Bro. Parl. Cas. 73. Application to the King's Bench for mandamus to admit Robert Dugdale to his office as clerk, upon which there was an award of a peremptory mandamus; held, writ of error not to lie, there being no plea and judgment. Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Peters, 449. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Peters, 540. "I do not intend to examine the question whether proceeding upon a habeas corpus is a 'suit,' within the meaning of the twenty-fifth section; or whether writ of error will lie to review proceedings upon a habeas corpus, although the case on these points is not free from doubts," etc. Per Thomson, J., 550; Judge Baldwin's opinion, 622, 625. Columbian Insurance Co. v. Wheelwright, 7 Wheat. 534. Mandamus valuation of office. II. The Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter. 1. That court derives all its jurisdiction from the Constitution of the United States and the acts of Congress, and is strictly confined to the acts of Congress conferring jurisdiction, and defining the powers of the court. 1 Kent's Com. 294. "With judicial power, it may be generally observed, as the Supreme Court declared in the case of Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 8, that the disposal of the judicial power, except in a few specified cases, belongs to Congress; and the courts cannot exercise jurisdiction in every case to which the judicial power extends, without the intervention of Congress, who are not bound to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts to every subject which the Constitution might warrant." McIntyre v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504, to the same effect; United States v. More, 3 Cranch, 159; 6 Cranch, 305; 3 Dall. 321; 1 Cranch, 212. Mr. Barry. The Circuit Court must enlarge their jurisdiction, as the Circuit Court has the residuum of authority inherent, and incidental Sec. 14. "That all the before mentioned courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. "And that either of them, as well as judges of the district court, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus, for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment. "Provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in jail, unless when they are in custody under or by order of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify." *1. This statute provides that "all [*113 the before mentioned courts," etc., referring to the supreme, circuit, and district courts, and conferring like powers on all. The original jurisdiction of all these courts, and the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme and circuit courts had been all defined. The court derives all its power from this statute, and the limitations of it are to be precisely followed, expressio unius exclusio est alterius. Ex-parte Ballard; Ex-parte Swartwout, 4 Cranch, 75, per Marshall, Ch. J. 93. "Courts which originate in the common law possess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by the common law, but the courts which are created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot transcend their jurisdiction." "The power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States must be given by written law." Page 95. "If the power be denied to this court, it is denied to every other court of the United States." Ex-parte Tobias Watkins, 3 Peters, 193, by Marshall, Ch. J. p. 201. "The judicial act authorizes this court, and all the courts of the United States, and the judges thereof, to issue the writ for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment." Ex-parte Barry, 2 Howard, 65, marg. note. "The original jurisdiction of this court does not extend to the case of a petition by a private individual for a habeas corpus to bring up the body of his infant daughter, alleged to be unlawfully obtained from him." Why not? If not conferred on the Supreme Court it is not conferred on the circuit or district court by this statute. 2. The object of this section was not to confer upon any of these courts a general authority to issue this writ. It was designed as auxiliary-"Which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions." The scire facias is a writ of execution, in all cases founded upon a record, and is a necessary incidental power to the exercise of the jurisdiction of any court. So of habeas corpus, without which power the court would not be able even to protect suitors or witnesses attending court from a writ, etc., etc. 3. That part of the section conferring the | though any other exercise of the power was not power upon the judges in vacation to issue the in express terms denied, yet in a number of writ "for the purpose of inquiring into the them the court proceed upon the assumption cause of commitment," as does the proviso, in- of its being so limited, and in no instance form dicates that reference was only had to confine-a contrary opinion: Ex-parte Wilson, 6 Cranch, ment under a United States process, or "under 52; Ex-parte Kearney, 7 Wheaton, 38; Excolor of authority of the United States." parte Randolph, 2 Brock. 476, 477; 3 Dall. 17; 4 Dall. 412; 3 Cranch, 447; 4 Cranch, 75; 3 Peters, *201; 9 Peters, 704; 1 Mason, [*115 71; 2 Brock. 6, 447; 1 Wash. 277. The case in 3 Mason, 482, of United States v. Green, the only case where granted and point not then raised. 31 Car. I. ch. 2, provides, "That on complaint and request in writing by or on behalf of any person committed and charged with any crime (unless," etc.), "the Chancellor, etc., shall award a writ of habeas corpus," etc. The powers of the section had doubtless reference to the English statute, and to confer 3. Although in numerous decisions infants a limited and not general authority. are doubtless under the control of courts of 114*] *The decisions of the United States law as to their custody, and courts having jucourts in relation to writs of mandamus are en-risdiction may issue writs of habeas corpus, yet tirely analogous. They are both prerogative writs, and the defining and limiting the power to issue writs of habeas corpus by statute restricts them more than the others. 1 Kent's Com. 294. "It has been decided that Congress has not delegated the exercise of judicial power to the Circuit Court but in certain specified cases. The eleventh section ernment. of the Judicial Act of 1789, giving jurisdiction to the Circuit Court, has not covered the whole | 52-66, Ld. Chan. in conclusion, p. 66. "I ground of the Constitution, and these courts cannot, for instance, issue a mandamus but in those cases in which it may be necessary to the exercise of their jurisdiction." McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504; McClung v. Silliman, 6 Wheaton, 598; Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524-618. If this is considered one of "the other writs not specified by statute" (sec. 14, Judiciary Act), the term is very properly used-"necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions"—giving a judicial construction to the meaning of the latter term. Ex-parte Colura, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 232, marg. note. "The courts of the United States and the justices thereof are only authorized to issue writs .of habeas corpus to prisoners in jail under color of the authority of the United States, or committed by courts of the United States, or required to testify in a case depending in a court of the United States." "The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is limited; and the inferior courts can exercise it only in cases in which it is conferred by act of Congress." United States v. French, 1 Gallison, 1 marg. note. "The Circuit Court has no authority to issue a habeas corpus for the purpose of surrendering a principal in discharge of his bail, when the principal is confined in jail merely under process of a State court. Per Curiam. "We have no authority in this case to issue a habeas corpus. The authority given by the Judicial Act of 1789, chap. 20, sec. 14, is confined to cases where the party is in custody under color of process under authority of the United States, or is committed for trial before some court of the United States, or is necessary to be brought into court to testify." N. B.-The party in this case was confined under a penal law of Congress (2 Statutes at Large, 506), in which State courts have, by repeated decisions, no jurisdiction. the courts, representing the sovereign power of the State, adopt the course which they may deem for the benefit of the child at their discretion. It is an extension of the original purposes of the writ, and not contemplated by the powers of the Judicial Act, nor consistent with the limited authority of the general govDe Manneville v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. must either give the child to the father, when I know not what he proposes to do if it remain with him; or to the mother, to which, upon some principles, there is great objection; or I must take some middle course; and I shall take care that the intercourse of both father and mother with the child, so far as is consistent with its happiness, shall be unrestrained.” Ordered that the child should not be removed out of jurisdiction. King v. Grenhill, 4 Adol. & Ellis, 624, "Nor will this rule be departed from on the ground that the father has formed an adulterous connection, which still continues, if it appear that he has never brought the adulteress to his house, or into contact with his children, and does not intend to do so." Marg. note. The general government is one of defined and limited powers. It is the design of the Constitution that the judicial should be co-extensive with the legislative authority, but not to exceed it. These powers are comparatively free and well defined, and are exceptions to the authority residing in the State, and subject to their judicial authority. The great mass of authority remains in the States, and is governed by and dependent upon State authority. All questions arising out of the domestic relations are peculiarly and appropriately within the province of the State governments; and the court will be slow in countenancing any principle, or giving any construction of the Constitution and laws that shall decree to itself this branch of local authority. In relation to husband and wife, parent and child, the various and diversified and vexed questions that arise concerning the custody of children, the court will not be anxious by any doubtful construction to enlarge their jurisdiction. The court exercising that jurisdiction cannot dispose of the various questions involved, as in ordinary questions of pecuniary In all the following cases habeas corpus was value, by a judgment and execution. They issued, where the party was confined under must enter the nursery and inquire as to the color of process of the United States, and al-'character and habits of the respective parents -the wishes of the child-and make such or- child can have no settlement separate from the ders from time to time as may be required by husband and father." Shirley v. Watertown; the ever changing circumstances of all the par- Sears v. City of Boston, 1 Met. 242, absent a ties concerned. What portion of these ques-number of years, etc. The petitioner himself 116*] tions *would this court have to take declares (p. 4), "That the said Eliza Ann, by charge of, and what new set of rules or officers her intermarriage with your petitioner, became for these wards of the court? a denizen of the British empire, and entitled to If the writ of error is sustained, and the case inherit within the said realm as though she remanded, and the Circuit Court ordered to is- were a British subject. All the privileges, adsue the writ, it will be the duty of the Circuit vantages, and immunities, being supervenient Court to make such orders as will be for the upon those of her domicilium originis as an benefit of the child, and vary them from time American citizen." If so, can anything but a to time. Can these be reviewed by this court? divorce or death deprive her of these rights? This proceeding is really a question as to the He speaks of her going "to her own proper custody of an infant child, and of guardianship | home at Liverpool"; and (p. 6) that his wife on the part of the courts of the United States; should "return to her own proper home and and although called habeas corpus ad subjicien- | duties." dum, it is so by fiction of law. It is not a ques 3. The Supreme Court have their appellate tion of the personal liberty of the child, but of jurisdiction only in those cases in which it is its custody and nurture. It is not in substance affirmatively given by the acts of Congress, and at all that great writ of English or American no such appellate jurisdiction is given in this liberty, but a great extension, if not entire per-case. Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dall. 321; Clarke version, of its object. Master and Servant.-Are the relative rights and duties of the master and servant a matter of local or national jurisdiction? Suppose a servant from Kentucky flies to Ohio. His master pursues him and takes him. He is ordered to bring his writ of habeas corpus before the Circuit Court. The court denies the application. He brings his writ of error to this court. Has the court jurisdiction? Will it order the Circuit Court to issue the writ? If not, why not? If in obedience to the order the Circuit Court issues the writ, and refuses to discharge the person, a writ of error lies to this court. v. Bazadone, 1 Cranch, 212; Court of United States Territory northwest of the Ohio, United States v. More, 3 Cranch, 159, criminal case from Circuit Court of District of Columbia; Ex-parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38. No appeal from Circuit Court in criminal cases. IV. The Supreme Court has not jurisdiction, as the matter in dispute does not amount to $2,000. Ex-parte Bradstreet, 7 Pet. 634. "In cases where the demand is not for money, and the nature of the action does not require the value of the thing demanded to be stated in the declaration, the practice of this court and of the courts of the United States has been to allow the value to be given in evidence." In this case evidence was offered in the court below between Martha Bradstreet and Apollos Cooper, a writ of right of the value of the land Petition for Divorce.-It is not embraced in the tenth section of the Judicial Act of 1789. 1. The power of the court to issue the writ at all is given by statute, in the fourteenth sec-in dispute; but that value not appearing on the tion, and must be limited to the purposes, and by the restriction in the act. 2. It is not a "suit of a civil nature at common law or in equity, when the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $500.” 3. The phraseology in the twenty-fifth section is different “in any suit.” The object is different, to have the power of the United States, in relation to treaties, Constitution, laws, or authority of United States. The term is used in its most general sense-civil, criminal, equity, and all others. The object is to control the decisions of State courts on national questions. See Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Peters, 2. III. The court has not jurisdiction of the parties. One of the defendants in error, Mrs. Barry, has no domicil in the United States, but follows that of her husband. 1. In order to give the court jurisdiction all the defendants must be liable to be sued before the United States court. 1 Kent's Com. 324; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch, 267. 2. "A married woman follows the domicil of her husband. This results from the general principle, that a person who is under the power 117*] *and authority of another possesses no right to choose a domicil." Story on Conflict of Laws, 45, and authorities there cited. Greene v. Greene, 11 Pick. 410. "The domicil of the wife follows that of the husband." 14 Pick. 181. So in settlement cases. "A wife and minor record the court dismissed the proceedings. Mandamus issued to re-instate the case. Per Marshall, Ch. J., p. 647: "Every party has a right to the judgment of this court in a suit brought by him in one of the inferior courts of the United States, provided the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars. "In cases where the demand is not for money, and the nature of the action does not require the value of the thing demanded to be stated in the declaration, the practice of this court and of the courts of the United States is to allow the value to be given in evidence. In pursuance of this practice, the demandant in the suits dismissed by order of the judge of the District Court had a right to give the value of *the property demanded in evidence at [*118 or before the trial of the cause," etc. United States v. More, 3 Cranch, 172, per Marshall, Ch. J., p. 172. "But as the jurisdiction of the court has been described, it has been regulated by Congress, and an affirmative description of its powers must be understood as a regulation under the Constitution, prohibiting the exercise of other powers than those described." "Thus the appellate jurisdiction of this court from the judgments of the Circuit Court is described affirmatively; no restrictive words are used. Yet it has never been supposed that a decision of a circuit court could be reviewed, unless the matter in dispute should exceed the value of two thousand dollars. There are no words in the act restraining the Supreme Court from taking cognizance of causes under that sum; their jurisdiction is only limited by the legislative declaration, that they may re-examine the decisions of the Circuit Court when the matter in dispute exceeds the value of two thousand dollars." The words "matter in dispute" seem appropriate to civil cases, when the subject in contest has a value beyond the sum mentioned in the act. Wilson v. Daniel, 3 Dall. 401. "The verdict or judgment does not ascertain the value of the matter in dispute," etc. All the judges, in giving their opinions, proceed upon the ground that the case must be one of pecuniary value. United States v. Brig Union, 4 Cranch, 216, marg. note. “It is incumbent on the plaintiff in error to show that this court has jurisdiction of the cause. "This court will permit viva voce testimony to be given of the value of the matter in dispute." Gordon v. Ogden, 3 Peters, 33. The plaintiff claimed two thousand dollars; had judgment for less; writ of error by defendant below; court held no jurisdiction; aliter where writ in such case is by plaintiff below; action for violating a patent. Ritchie v. Mauro & Forrest, 2 Peters, 244, per Marshall, Ch. J. of Supreme Court, p. 244. "In the present case the majority of the court are of opinion that the court has no jurisdiction of the case; the value in controversy not being sufficient to entitle the party by law to claim an appeal. The value is not the value of the minor's estate, but the value of the office of guardian. The present is a controversy merely between persons claiming adversely as guardians, having no distinct interest of their own. The office of guardian is of no value, except so far as it affords a compensation for labor and services, thereafter to be earned." Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court: This case is brought up by writ of error to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. It appears from the record that the plaintiff in error is a subject of the Queen of Great Britian, and resides in Liverpool, Nova Scotia. 119*] *In April, 1835, he intermarried with Eliza Ann Barry, one of the defendants in error, who is the daughter of the late Thomas B. Mercein of the city of New York; and upon some unfortunate disagreement between the plaintiff in error and his wife, a separation took place in the year 1838, and they have ever since lived apart; she residing in New York, and he at Liverpool. They have two children, a son and a daughter. The son is with his father; and the daughter, now about ten years of age, is with her mother. the other defendant in error; and prayed that the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum might issue, commanding the said Mary Mercein and Eliza Ann Barry to have the body of his daughter, Mary Mercein Barry, by them imprisoned and detained, with the time and cause of such imprisonment or detention, before the Circuit Court to do and receive what should then and there be considered of the said Mary Mercein Barry. The petition was supported by the usual affidavits and proofs. The case came on to be heard in the Circuit Court, and it was then ordered and adjudged by the court that the petition be disallowed, and the writ of habeas corpus denied. It is upon this judgment that the writ of error is brought. A motion has been made to dismiss the writ of error for the want of jurisdiction in this court. In the argument upon this motion, the power of the Circuit Court to award the writ of habeas corpus, in a case like this, has also been very fully discussed at the bar. But this question is not before us, unless we have power by writ of error to re-examine the judgment given by the Circuit Court, and to affirm or reverse it, as we may find it to be correct or otherwise. And the question therefore to be first decided is, whether a writ of error will lie upon the judgment of the Circuit Court in this case refusing to grant the writ of habeas corpus. It is an important question; deeply interesting to the parties concerned; and we have given to it a full and mature consideration. By the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court possesses no appellate power in any case, unless conferred upon it by act of Congress; nor can it, when conferred, be exercised in any other form, or by any other mode of proceeding, than that which the law prescribes. The Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 22, provides that final judgments and decrees in civil actions and suits in equity in a circuit court, when the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court. And it [*120 is by this law only that we are authorized to re-examine any judgment in a circuit court by writ of error. Before we speak more particularly of the construction of this section, it may be proper to notice the difference between the provisions contained in it and those of the twenty-fifth section, in the same act of Congress, which gives the appellate power over the judgments of the State courts. In the latter case, the right to re-examine is not made to depend on the money value of the thing in controversy, but upon the character of the right in dispute, and the judgment which the State court has pronounced upon it; and it is altogether immaterial whether the right in controversy can or can not be measured by a money standard. The plaintiff in error filed his petition in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, at April Term, But in the twenty-second section, which is 1844, stating that his wife had separated from the one now under consideration, the provision him without any justifiable cause, and refused is otherwise; and in order to give this court to return and unlawfully detained and kept jurisdiction to re-examine the judgment of a from him his daughter; that she was harbored, circuit court of the United States, the judgcountenanced, and encouraged in these unlaw-ment or decree must not only be a final one, ful proceedings by her mother, Mary Mercein, in a civil action or suit in equity, but the |