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COMPANY, | books and accounts of the company; and if it should appear that the net proceeds should have averaged a larger sum than twelve per cent. per annum, the judges should lessen the tolls, provided they did not reduce them so low as to prevent the proprietors from receiving twelve per cent.

V.

THE WEST RIVER BRIDGE Plaintiffs in Error, JOSEPH DIX and The Towns of Brattleboro' and Dummerston, in the County of Windham, Defendants in Error.

The remaining sections provided for the gov

THE WEST RIVER BRIDGE COMPANY, ernment of the company, for their keeping the

Plaintiffs in Error,

V.

THE TOWNS OF BRATTLEBORO' AND DUMMERSTON, in the County of Windham, and Joseph Dix, Asa Boyden, and Phineas Underwood, Defendants in Error.

Bridge erected and owned by private corporation may be taken for public highway, under general act, compensation being made, same as to natural persons.

A bridge, held by an incorporated company, under a charter from a State, may be condemned and taken as part of a public road, under the laws of that State.

This charter was a contract between the State and the company, but, like all private rights, it is subject to the right of eminent domain in the State.

The Constitution of the United States cannot be so construed as to take away this right from the States. Nor does the exercise of the right of eminent domain interfere with the inviolability of contracts. All property is held by tenure from the State, and all contracts are made subject to the right of eminent domain. The contract is therefore not violated by the exercise of the right.

The Constitution of the United States intended The Constitution of the United States intended to prohibit all such laws impairing the obligation of contracts as interpolate some new term or condition, foreign to the original agreement.

Property held by an incorporated company stands upon the same footing with that held by an individual, and a franchise cannot be distinguished from other property.

HESE cases were brought up, by a writ of writ error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, from the Supreme Court

of Judicature of the State of Vermont.

In 1795, the Legislature of Vermont passed an act, entitled, "An Act granting to John W. Blake, Calvin Knowlton, and their associates, the privilege of building a toll bridge over West River, in Brattleboro'."

The first section enacted that Blake, Knowlton, and their associates, should be and continue a body politic and corporate, by the name of the West River Bridge Company, for one hundred years; and that they should have the exclusive privilege of erecting and continuing a bridge over West River, within four miles from the place where said stream united with

Connecticut River.

508*] *The second section fixed the rate of

tolls.

The third section enacted, that, at the ex

piration of forty years from the 1st of December, 1796, the Judges of the Supreme Court should appoint commissioners to examine the

NOTE. As to what laws are void as impairing the obligation of contracts-see notes to 3 L. ed. U. S. 162; 4 L. ed. U. S. 529.

Eminent domain; what may be taken-see note

to 33 L. ed. U. S. 740; 40 L. ed. U. S. 188.

bridge in good repair, etc., etc.

During the years 1795, 1796, and 1797, the company built the bridge.

In 1799, Josiah Arms conveyed to the company a small piece of land, about two acres, lying on the south bank of the West River.

In 1803, the Legislature passed a supplement to the charter, which altered the rate of tolls,

but left the remaining parts of it unaltered. In November, 1839, the Legislature passed an act entitled, “An Act relating to highways." in and whereby it was enacted and provided, that "whenever there shall be occasion for any new highway in any town or towns in this State, the supreme and county courts shall have the same power to take any real estate, easement, or franchise of any turnpike, or other corporation, when, in their judgment, the public good requires a public highway, which such courts now have, by the laws of this State, to lay out highways over individual or private property; and the same power is granted, and the same rules shall be observed, in making compensation to all such corporations and persons, whose estate, easement, franchise, or rights shall be taken, as are now that no such real estate, easement, or franchise granted and provided in other cases; provided, shall be taken in the manner and for the purposes aforesaid, unless the whole of such real estate, easement, or franchise belonging to said | corporation shall be taken, and compensation made therefor."

On the 25th of August, 1842, Joseph Dix, and fifty-four other persons presented the following petition to the County Court for the County of Windham:

"That the public highway or stage road, leading from the stage house of Henry Smith, in Brattleboro', through the northerly part of said town, and through the town of Dummerston, to the south line of Putney, in said county, has for a long time been a subject of great complaint, both on account of the steep and dangerous hills, and the great difficulty of keeping the same in repair, as now traveled. That various and repeated *attempts [*509 have been made to improve the same, with little success. Your petitioners further represent, that, from actual survey and admeasurelaid between said termini, and made at a modment, they are confident a highway may be hills and be perfectly satisfactory to the puberate expense, which will avoid most of the lic. Your petitioners are aware that some alterations have recently been made on said route by a committee of this court, upon the petition of Paul Chase and others, and that indictments are now pending against said towns for not making the same; but your petitioners believe that said committee, in ordering said alterations, are influenced by the solicitations of interested individuals, rather than

the public good, and that if said alterations are worked, they would form but little improvements, and that the public will never be satisfied until said highway is laid on the best possible route; and further, that it will cost as much to make said alterations (which we consider to be useless), as it will to make a good traveling road on the route contemplated by the petition.

"And your petitioners further represent, that the toll bridge across West River, on said route in Brattleboro', owned by the West River Bridge Corporation, is, and for a long time has been, a sore grievance, both to the traveler and the inhabitants of the towns in the vicinity, who have occasion to pass and repass, travel and labor, on said highway; and however the Legislature in the infancy of the State may have exercised sound discretion in granting said toll bridge, yet, in the present improved and thriving condition of the inhabitants, your petitioners are unable to discover any good reason why said grievance should longer be endured, or why the wealthy town of Brattleboro' should not, as well as other towns much less able, sustain a free bridge across West River. Your petitioners therefore pray the court, by an able, judicious, and disinterested committee, to cause said route to be surveyed, and such alterations and improvements to be made in the old road, or a new one to be laid, as the public good may require; and also to take the real estate, easement, or franchise of the 'West River Bridge Company,' a corporation owning the aforesaid toll bridge, for the purpose of making a free road and bridge across said river, agreeable to the statute in such case made and provided; and as in duty bound will

ever pray.

In conformity with the above prayer, the court appointed three persons to examine the premises and make report.

In May, 1843, the commissioners reported that they had examined the premises, and were unanimously of opinion that a new road ought to be laid out over a considerable portion of the distance between the termini mentioned in 510*] the petition, *which road, they said, they had caused to be surveyed and laid out. The report then proceeded as follows:

"The said commissioners also examined the toll bridge across West River in Brattleboro', and have taken into consideration the propriety of laying a free road across said bridge, at the expense of said town of Brattleboro', as contemplated by said petition; and in this the said commissioners were unanimously of the opinion that public good required that the real estate, easement, or franchise of the West River Bridge Corporation should be taken, and compensation made therefor, that said toll bridge might thereafter become a free bridge. The said commissioners have therefore assessed to the said West River Bridge Corporation the sum of four thousand dollars, to be paid to the said West River Bridge Corporation out of the treasury of said town of Brattleboro', in full compensation for all real estate, easement or franchise belonging to said corporation, which real estate, easement, or franchise is situate in said town of Brattleboro', near the mouth of West River, and is supposed to be more particularly described in a deed from Josiah Ames

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to the West River Bridge Company, dated on the first day of April, in the year seventeen hundred and ninety-nine, and recorded in Brattleboro' records of deeds, liber D, page 203, containing two acres of land, be the same more or less, with a covered bridge, gate, toll house, barn, and other buildings thereon. "Thomas F. Hammond, "Julius Converse, "Isaac N. Cushman, "Commissioners."

To this report, the West River Bridge Company, the town of Brattleboro', the town of Dummerston, and the persons who were entitled to damages for the loss of land, etc. all filed objections.

The town of Brattleboro' filed five objections, the last of which was as follows:

"5. Because it does not appear from said report, and is not true in fact, that there was, or that said commissioners considered that there was, any occasion for any new highway on said route within a great distance, to wit, within two miles of said bridge."

The town of Dummerston filed ten objections, the first four of which are as follows:

"1. Because said commissioners proceeded in said report to discontinue the Indited Road, so called; a road of which the petition of Joseph Dix and others did not ask the discontinuance; *a road which said town was [*511 then liable to make, and has since raised money to make.

"2. Because the acceptance of said report would render the maintenance of two roads necessary through a large part of the town, while the natural difficulties are so great, that, with only one, the burdens of said town, when compared with its means, are unusually onerous.

"3. That said surveyed route, or Nurse Swamp route, so called, is a longer, more wet, and more expensive route, between the termini in question.

"4. That said commissioners were partial, prejudiced, and mistaken; and acted under the influence of misrepresentations made by interested persons."

The persons to whom damages were awarded by the report were fifteen in number. Eleven of these filed six objections, the first of which was as follows:

"1. Because the said commissioners were partial, prejudiced and mistaken, and acted under the misrepresentations made by interested persons."

The West River Bridge Company filed seven objections, the sixth of which stated the charter, their observance of it, and their desire for its continuance.

In November, 1843, the case was tried, and the report of the commissioners was accepted. The two towns were ordered to pay the damages awarded to the persons through whose lands the road was laid out, and "the town of Brattleboro', to pay to the West River Bridge Company the sum of damages, as assessed by said commissioners, by the 31st day of May, 1844; and that said bridge be opened for the free public travel by the 1st day of June, 1844."

In February, 1844, a writ of certiorari was sued out from the Supreme Court, whereby the whole proceedings of the County Court were brought up for review. Upon the argument,

the West River Bridge Company, in addition to the exceptions which they had presented to the court below, filed the two following:

“First. That the said statute of this State, having been enacted long after the said grant by the same State of the said franchise of toll to the said West River Bridge Corporation, and long after the said grant was accepted and acted on by the said corporation, is of no validity for the purpose of authorizing the taking of the said franchise against the consent of said corporation, or the laying out of a free public highway over and upon the said bridge, on the ground that the said statute, if it purports to authorize the proceedings aforesaid, is a violation of the contract of this State with the said 512*] corporation, and is *therein repugnant to that clause of the Constitution of the United States which provides that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contract. "Second. That inasmuch as it is apparent upon the said record, and proofs filed in said cause, copies of which are hereunto annexed, that there is no occasion for any new highway within the said town of Brattleboro', near said bridge; and that no new highway is in fact laid out, or adjudged to be laid out, within the distance of two miles from either terminus of said bridge; and that the damages awarded to the said West River Bridge Company are grossly inadequate as a compensation for the value of the corporate franchise, and other property adjudged to be taken; the taking of the said franchise, and laying out of the said free public highway over and upon the said bridge, by the judgment of the said County Court, under such circumstances, a mere evasion, under color of law, of the said provision of the constitution of the United States, and an exercise of authority under this State which is wholly invalid as against the said West River Bridge Company, on the ground of its being repugnant to the constitutional provisions aforesaid."

The Supreme Court passed the following judgment:

"And thereupon, after hearing the respective parties by their counsel, upon their respective allegations, and the said execptions in the said record contained, it is considered, or dered and adjudged by the court here, that the statute aforesaid was and is valid for the purpose of taking the said franchise and laying out the said free public highway over and upon the said bridge; and that the same was and is in no wise repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; and that the said proceedings of the said County Court were a lawful exercise of the authority of the State under the said statute, and neither repugnant to nor an evasion of the provisions of the said Constitution; and that there is no error in the record and proceedings aforesaid; and that the said defendant parties recover their costs."

To review this judgment, a writ of error brought the case up to this court.

It was argued by Mr. Webster and Mr. Collamer on behalf of the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Phelps for the defendants in error. On both sides argumentive briefs were filed; and although all the counsel added many illustrations and arguments, orally, to their respective briefs, in the progress of discussion, yet

the reporter thinks it the safer course to reprint the briefs themselves.

*Mr. Webster and Mr. Collamer, for [*513 the plaintiffs in error:

In the township of Brattleboro', in Vermont, A. D. 1795, there was a public highway along the west bank of the Connecticut River, and passing across West River, a tributary of the Connecticut, which public highway was resurveyed that year, and ever has, and still does, continue unaltered within said town. This resurvey was under an act of 1795. Whitney's affidavit, and copy of survey; Record, pp. 34, 35.

In 1795, by an act of the Legislature of Vermont, the plaintiffs were created a corporation for one hundred years, with the exclusive privilege of erecting and continuing a toll bridge over West River, within four miles of the place where that stream unites with Connecticut River, and the rate of toll was fixed by said act. The act provided that the bridge should be built where the road was to be surveyed, and within two years, and it was so done. Charter, Record, p. 26, sec. 4, and proviso to sec. 6, p. 28.

The act further provided, that at the expiration of forty years the outlay and income of the plaintiffs might be examined by commissioners, appointed by the Supreme Court; and, if the plaintiffs had realized more than twelve per cent. per annum, the court might reduce the tolls so as to yield only that amount. The plaintiffs, within the limited time, erected the bridge, and have ever since sustained it, having several times rebuilt it; and now, at great expense, have erected so large a part of it with stone, that to sustain it is much less expense than formerly, and the franchise and bridge are now of great value, to wit, of the value of ten thousand dollars. Record p. 56.

By the general law of Vermont relating to highways, the County Court, on petition, may appoint commissioners to lay out highways within the county, who survey the way and assess the damage to the landholders, and make report to the court, who thereupon make their orders accordingly; and the same power is given to the Supreme Court, in laying highways into two or more counties. Revised Statutes of Vermont, p. 553.

In November, 1839, the Legislature passed "An Act relating to highways," which provided, "whenever there shall be occasion for any new highway in any town or towns within this State, the supreme and county courts shall have the same power to take any real estate, easement, or franchise of any turnpike or other corporation, when in their judgment the public good requires a public highway, which such courts now have, by the laws of the State, to lay out highways over individual or private property; and the same power is granted, and *the same rules shall be observed, in [*514 making compensation to all such corporations and persons whose estate, easement, franchise, or right shall be taken, as are now granted and provided in other cases; provided that no such real estate, easement, or franchise shall be taken in the manner and for the purpose aforesaid, unless the whole of such real estate, easement, or franchise belonging to said corporation shall be taken, and compensation made therefor.”

In 1842, a petition was presented to the | tution, treaties, or laws of the United States, County Court of the County of Windham, Ver- and the decision is in favor of such their validment, praying for a resurvey and improve- ity, may be re-examined and reversed or afments in the highway, beginning in the village firmed in the Supreme Court of the United of Brattleboro', and leading north across this States upon a writ of error.” The plaintiff inbridge, and thence north to and through the sists that this power and authority exercised town of Dummerston; and in relation to this under the State of Vermont, and the statute bridge, it is represented in the petition as a of that State, passed in 1839, under which the great "grievance, and should no longer be en- power was exercised in the manner it was done, dured;" and praying that said road be resur- are repugnant to the Constitution of the Unitveyed, and the real estate, easement, or fran-ed States. chise of the "West River Bridge Company" should be taken for the purpose of making a free road and bridge across said river. On that petition the court appointed commissioners, who proceeded to examine the road and decide in the premises.

They surveyed and laid out a road in this manner (as appears, Record, p. 17), beginning at Brattleboro' village, about one mile south of this bridge, and following the existing highway to and across the bridge, and thence north of the bridge two miles, without making any alteration whatever. Record, p. 32, and Report, p. 17. They then report changes in the highway, all but fifty rods of which is in Dummerston; and, as to this bridge, the commissioners report as follows:

This court is never called on to decide a State law unconstitutional in the abstract. It must have a case before it, and the question is: Is it constitutional as construed and applied in the case by the State court? If it were not so, the State courts have but to take a State law, good on its face, and construe it to cover cases, however grossly unconstitutional, and there would be no redress, as it might be said, The law is good, but the decision is bad, but that is not within the jurisdiction of this court. The only way is to treat the State statute as the State court has treated and applied it in the case, and then to consider whether, for such a purpose, it is constitutional. Such has been the course in this court. A law may be constitutional for some purposes, and not for oth"The said commissioners also examined the ers. Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 313. toll bridge across West River, in Brattleboro', The statute of Maryland, levying a tax on any and have taken into consideration the propriety bank put in operation in that State without of laying a free road across said bridge, at the consent of its Legislature, was not decided as expense of the town of Brattleboro', as con- unconstitutional in the abstract. It was untemplated by said petition; and in this the said doubtedly good as to private banks, or those of commissioners were unanimously of opinion other States; but when it was applied by the that the public good required that the real es- State courts to a branch of the United States tate, easement, or franchise of the West River Bank, then this court decided that, for that Bridge Company should be taken, and com- purpose, it was bad, being unconstitutional. pensation made therefor, that said toll bridge McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 235. The might be made a free bridge. The commis- statute of New York, granting the exclusive sioners have therefore assessed to the said West navigation of its *waters by steam ves- [*516 River Bridge Corporation the sum of four thou- sels, was, by this court, holden as unconstitusand dollars, to be paid to the said West River|tional, as applied to vessels coming from withBridge Corporation out of the treasury of said out the State. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, town of Brattleboro', in full compensation for 209. Indeed, the words of the United States all real estate, casement, or franchise belong- statute are carefully adapted to such an obing to said corporation, which real estate, ease-ject. It provides, not merely that this court is ment, or franchise is situate in said town of to pass on the constitutionality of the State Brattleboro', near the mouth of West River." | law, but on any authority exercised under any Record, pp. 15, 16, and Ames's deed, p. 32.

This report was returned into court, and 515*] though exceptions and objections were thereto made on the part of the present plaintiffs, as well as by said town of Brattleboro', yet the court, on the hearing, decided to accept and approve said report, and established the whole of said road, and ordered that Brattleboro' pay the present plaintiff the said sum of four thousand dollars, and "that said bridge be opened for the free public travel." Record, pp. 25, 26.

This decision and these proceedings were carried before the Supreme Court of the State by certiorari, and by that court affirmed; whereupon the plaintiff brings this writ of error.

By the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of the United States, it is provided, "That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in | which a decision of the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or authority exercised under, any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Consti

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State. If, then, it appears that, in this case, the plaintiff's rights have been invaded by any authority under the State, or by any law of the State repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, the decision of the State court must be reversed.

I. It is insisted by the defendant that this is a pretended exercise of the power of the eminent domain, as an incident of sovereignty-the taking of private property for public use; when, in truth and reality, it is but an action impairing and destroying the force and obligation of a contract, contrary to the provisions of the United States Constitution.

This is attempted to be effected under the disguise of calling this grant and franchise property. It is no such property as falls with in, or can be the subject matter of, the eminent domain. The original idea of the eminent domain was the right of sovereignty, or residuum of power over the land which remained in the i sovereign or lord paramount after the fee granted to the feudatory, and was therefore confined to the realty. In the progress of arts

and commerce, when personal property became | power of sovereignty. It is said, the citizen is worthy of legal consideration, this power of safe, because, under the exercise of the eminent sovereignty was extended over that, and even domain, he is to receive compensation for whatincluded debts. But this grant to the plaintiffs ever is taken. That furnishes no security, for can fall within no such category of property. the mode and amount of compensation is fixed It is a franchise, a pure franchise. It included ex-parte by the government and its agents; the grant of no property, real or personal. It and, besides that, the prohibition of the Conlay in grant, and not in livery. It was created stitution is general, and contains no exceptions by, and had its existence in, the grant in the for this exercise of this power of eminent docontract; and it could cease only by impairing main as to contracts. and destroying that contract. If a private debt If the provision of the Constitution which or contract, as a chose in action, could be taken forbids the impairing of contracts, does not exunder the power of eminent domain, yet still tend to the contracts of the State governments, the debt is kept on foot and in force. But this and they are left subject to be destroyed by the is an attempt, not to take and keep in force this eminent domain, then there is an end of public contract, but actually to extinguish and destroy faith. It is said, by every writer, and by al| it. Even if it were true, as has been holden, most every court which has passed on [*518 that property which the corporation create or this subject, the eminent domain, that it must acquire, and the taking of which would not de- rest with "the legislative power to determine stroy the grant, might be taken in the proper when public uses require the assumption of priexercise of this power of eminent domain, yet vate property," and to regulate the mode of the grant itself, the franchise, is no property. compensation. 2 Kent's Com. 340. If to this A franchise is defined to be "a royal privilege it be holden that this extends even to contracts or branch of the king's prerogative, subsisting of the government itself, then it follows, that in the hand of a subject." the State of Mississippi, or any other State indebted, has but by law to declare that the public good requires that the State debts, bonds, etc., shall be taken for the public use, and appoint commissioners to fix their present market value to the holders, and, on payment thereof, declare them extinguished. Such is the real character of this transaction.

The State alone possessed the power to erect and sustain toll bridges across large streams in the public highway. This prerogative was duly granted to the plaintiffs as to a certain 517*] *stream; and in the plaintiff's hands, within the limitations of the grant, it could not be overthrown by the exercise of another branch of the sovereignty of only equal and no greater force. It is true, that the shares in a corporation are property, but the franchise is not. It cannot be taken to respond to any liabilities of the corporation, and can only be extinguished by forfeiture. It is entirely unlike a grant of land, to which the State court compare it, in this-this is a grant of royal prerogative, or branch of sovereignty; whereas, when land is granted, all the powers of sovereignty, to enforce the laws, levy taxes, and in all other respects, remain still in the State over the granted territory.

II. All the powers of the States, as sovereign States, must always be subject to the limitation expressed in the United States Constitution, nor can they any more be permitted to overstep such limitations of power by the exercise of one branch of sovereignty than another. What is forbidden to them, and which they cannot do directly, they should not be permitted to do by color, pretense, or oblique indirection. Among other matters limiting and restricting State sovereignty is this: No State shall pass "any law impairing the obligation of contracts." The power of eminent domain, like every other sovereign power in the State, is subject to this limitation and prohibition. Laws creating corporations, with powers for the benefit of the individual corporators, even though for public purposes, like turnpikes, railroads, toll bridges, etc., have always, and by almost every court in the Union, and by this court, been decided to be contracts between the government and the corporators. The plaintiffs' grant and franchise was a contract of the State for one hundred years, and by this Act of 1839, and the proceeding under it, that contract is not only impaired, but utterly destroyed; and this a State can no more do under the power of eminent domain, than under the law making power, or any other

III. The power or authority exercised under the State in this case was this: under the pretense of laying a new highway, where none was required, and none, in fact, laid, they have taken a franchise, and abolished the tolls of a chartered bridge. By the statute of 1839, under which this proceeding is attempted to be justified, it is provided, "whenever there shall be occasion for any new highway,” etc., etc. In this case, it appears that there had been there a highway from 1796, and this bridge was built in that highway, and this public stage road was followed by the commissioners who made this survey for more than a mile south of this bridge, across it, and two miles north of it, without variation; and this was approved by the court; thus conclusively deciding that no new highway was required there. All that was mere pretense and fiction, and shown by the record to be false. Let us now reduce to undisguised English that statute of the State, as it was construed and enforced by the authority exercised under the State in this case. Whenever any toll bridge heretofore granted becomes of any value to the proprietors, and thereby obnoxious to the inhabitants of the vicinity, they may present a petition to their County Court, and therein falsely pretend that a new highway is there needed, and the court shall appoint commissioners of their own selecting, who may pretend to lay out a new highway, but really only follow the old one across the bridge, and appraise the damage to the proprietors of the bridge; and the court may thereupon declare and adjudge, that all tolls at said bridge cease on said sum being paid, though the time of the grant has not expired, and though the sum does not equal half the value of the franchise. This would be, in substance, enacting, that, "hercafter no tolls shall be paid for passing West River Bridge,

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