responsible for his acts and doings, the follow- | *page 121, answer 121; answer to tenth [*366 ing notice, which he is also to attach to his re- cross-interrogatory. ceipts or bills of lading, to be given in all cases for goods, wares, and merchandise, and other property committed to his charge, to be transported in said crate or otherwise: "Take notice.-William F. Harnden is alone responsible for the loss or injury of any articles or property committed to his care; nor is any risk assumed by, nor can any be attached 365*] to, *the proprietors of the steamboats in which his crate may be, and is transported, in respect to it, or its contents, at any time."" Schedule I, printed rec. 128. Harnden applies for renewal of contract, by letter of date Boston, December 7, 1839, schedule I, printed rec. 129; Handy replies, by letter, of date New York, December 9, 1839, schedule K, printed rec. 130; Harnden's letter, of date Boston, December 16, 1839, schedule L, printed rec. 130; Handy's letter, of date New York, December 31, 1839, schedule M, printed rec. 130, 131. To this Harnden makes no reply, waiting until he came to New York, Harnden's deposition, printed rec. 121, answer to third cross-interrogatory. He was kept back by bad weather, Lockwood's deposition, printed rec. 104, answer to twenty-second interrogatory; but under same contract, with same advertisements, continues to transport his crate in the boats of the New Jersey Steam Navigation Company, as before; and on coming to New York, on the 24th of February, 1840, formally renews the contract as proposed by Handy in his letter of December 31, 1839. During the interval between the date of this letter and the 24th of February, 1840, the Lexington was lost. See Harnden's deposition, 120; Brigham's, 28, answers to first, second, third, and fourth crossinterrogatories; Ib. 141; Lockwood's, 104, twenty-third interrogatory; schedule N, printed rec. 131, 132. Harnden had acted as carrier for the bank before this transaction. Harnden's deposition, 120, answers to thirteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth interrogatories, and to tenth cross-interrogatory. He was not our agent, but did business for himself. They employed him, and not us, and were bound to know in what character he acted; the presumption being, that he who is employed is alone responsible for his acts and contracts. The burden is upon the libelants to show that Harnden's acts and contracts bind us, he doing business as a carrier, on his own account, in fact and appearance. We are not bound, therefore, to bring home to the libelants knowledge of the terms of his contract with us; and his notices of these terms are not our notices, but his own; stipulated for, it is true, in our contract with him, ex abundanti cautela, but our exemption from responsibility coming from our relation to Harnden and our contract with him, and not from the fact that his notices were brought home to his employers. But the Merchants' Bank actually knew that Harnden did business for himself, and was alone to be responsible. He distributed ten thousand notices to that effect, and especially sent them to the Boston banks. Harnden's deposition, 119, answers to fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth interrogatories, He advertised to that effect in the Boston newspapers, some of which this bank took. Curtis's deposition, 153; Champney's, 153; Nichols's 154; advertisement, 155; Conant's, 153–155. Harnden was not the agent of the Merchants' Bank to ship their coin with us. He was their agent to collect their drafts in New York, but their carrier to transport the proceeds to them at Boston. He used our boats under general express arrangements, for the carrying on of his own business, made between him and ourselves, by which both are bound, and which necessarily excluded all tacit agreements between us and his customers. We carried Harnden's crate for him—not its contents for his employers. We are, therefore, no carriers for the Merchants' Bank; there is no contract-no privity of contract-between them and us. Hence, we cannot be liable to the Merchants' Bank; but, if at all, only to Harnden, on our contract with him. Reynolds v. Toppan, 15 Mass. Rep. 370; King v. Lenox, 19 Johns. 235, 236; Walter v. Brewer, 11 Mass. Rep. 99; Ward v. Green, 6 Cowen, 173; Allen v. Sewall, 2 Wendell, 327; S. C. in error, 6 Ib. 335; Halsey v. Brown, 3 Day, 346; Portugal coin case, Abbott on Ship. 119; Cas. temp. Hardw. 85, 194; Butler v. Basing, 2 Carr. & Payne, 613; Citizens' Bank v. Nantucket Steamboat, Company, 2 Story, 32-34, 46. Again, in case of valuables, as jewels and precious stones, gold and silver coin, carried either by land or sea, it not being the custom of the carrier to carry such things without a special acceptance, he shall not be liable for their loss, unless he accepts them and is paid for them. Kenrig v. Eggleston, Aleyn, ~93; commented on by Lord Mansfield, in Gibbon v. Paynton, 4 Burr. 2301; Cases of baggage decided by Lord Holt, and collected in 1 Vin. Abr. 220; and see 1 Wheat. Selwyn, 301, No. 1, and cases cited; Orange County Bank v. Brown et al., 9 Wend. S5; Pardee v. Drew, 25 Ib. 459; Citizens' Bank v. Nantucket Steamboat Company, 2 Story, 32-34, 46; Statutes 11 Geo. IV., and 1 Wm. IV., ch. 38, 68, found in 2 Kent's Com. 609, note c; 2 Stephen's N. P., art. Carrier, in relation to land carriers; statutes 7 Geo. II. ch. 15; 26 Geo. III. ch. 86; 53 Geo. III. ch. 159, found in 2 Kent's Com. 606; Abbott on Shipping, part 3, ch. 4, secs. 8, 9, and in chap. 5, on Limitation of Responsibility of Ship owners; see Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Adol. & Ell. N. S. 646, reviewing obiter dicta in Boys v. Pink, 8 Carr. & Payne, 361, and in Owen v. Burnett, 2 Cromp *& Mees. [*367 353; S. C. 4 Tyrwhitt, 133, in construction of statutes 11 Geo. IV. and 1 Wm. IV. ch. 68. We neither received, were paid for, nor carried, with our knowledge, the gold and silver coin of the Merchants' Bank. The warranty of sufficiency of boat, equipments, etc., is implied in the contract of carriage in favor of him whose goods are contracted to be carried. It follows, that, if we did not contract to carry for the Merchants' Bank, we did not warrant the sufficiency of our means of carriage to them. Third point. That if in their own name, which we deny, the libelants could pursue the respondents, it could only be by virtue of and under the contract of Harnden and the respondents for the transportation on board of the boats of the respondents of Handen's express crate; and that, by virtue of this contract, Harnden was the insurer of his own crate whilst on board the respondents' boats, using said boats as his own. The contract between Harnden, by its terms, throws the whole risk of the carriage of his crate and contents exclusively on him-in any event, at any time. No policy forbids such a contract. In England it is well settled that a carrier may limit his responsibility by a special acceptance. Kenrig v. Eggleston, Aleyn, 93; Rolles, Ch. J., Southcote's case, 4 Coke, Rep. 84; Coke, Ch. J., Slue v. Morse, 1 Vent. 190, 288; Hale, Ch. J. Lyon v. Mells, 1 Smith, 484; S. C. 5 East, 428; Abbott on Ship. part 3 ch. 4, sec. 8, p. 296, ed. 1822. See old and new form of bill of lading. Abbott on Ship. part 3, ch. 2, sec. 3, p. 216, ed. 1829; 1 Bell's Com. 454, 471, 4th ed.; Gibbon v. Paynton, 4 Burr. 2301; see Yates, J. Peake's N. P. Cases, 150; 2 Taunt. 271; 1 Bell's Com. 380, 384, 4th ed. book 1, part 1, ch. 4, sec. 3, American Bills of Lading; see Gordon v. Buchanan, 5 Yerger, 71; Johnson v. Friar, 4 Ib. 48; Atwood v. Reliance Transp. Co. 9 Watts. 487; Relf v. Rapp, 3 Serg. & Watts, 35. It is well settled in England, that a common carrier may limit his responsibility by notices brought home to the knowledge of his customers. Nicholson v. Willan, 5 East, 513; Gibbon v. Paynton, 4 Burr. 2301; Yates, J. and Aston, J. Evans v. Soule, 2 M. & S. 1; Lathham v. Ratley, 2 B. & C. 20; Harry v. Packwood, 2 Taunt. 264; Leeson v. Holt, 1 Starkie, 186; Mawing v. Todd, Ib. 72; Lowe v. Booth, 13 Price, 329; Riley v. Horne, 5 Bingh. 217; Brooke v. Pickwick, 4 Bingh. 218. The same doctrine prevails in America. Gordon v. Little, 8 Serg. & Rawle, 533; Atwood v. Reliance Transp. Co. 9 Watts, 87; Orange County Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend. 115, Nelson, J.; Phillips v. Earle, 8 Pick. 182; Bean v. Green, 3 Fairf. 422. 368*] *As to the extent of a carrier's liability under such notices. Smith v. Horne, 8 Taunt. 144; Lowe v. Booth, 13 Price, 329; Brooke v. Pickwick, 4 Bingh. 218; Owen v. Burnett, 2 Cromp. & Mees. 360; Wyld v. Pickford, 8 Mees. & Wels. 443. By special contract a carrier may dispense with all responsibility; and, in this respect, a special agreement differs from notice. 1 Bell's Com. 380-384, 4th ed. book 1, part 1, ch. 4, sec. 2. or The cases of Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 280, Nowlen v. Hollister, Ib. 246, 247, Clark v. Faxton, 21 Ib. 153, and Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill, 623, are cases of lost baggage of passengers goods carried by land. See Schieffelin v. Harvey, 6 Johns, 180; McArthur v. Sears, 21 Wend. 194, which show that, as common carriers by water, under a contract for the carriage of goods, and especially valuables, deliberately made, we should be entitled to the benefit of the terms of our special agreement with Harnden, under which the libelants must claim, if at all. See 2 Kent's Com. 601, 608. But we were not common carriers of this crate and its contents. A common carrier as to some things is not necessarily a common carrier as to others. Citizens' Bank v. Nantucket Steamboat Co. 2 Story, 32-34, 46, etc. The agreement between us, as the owners of steamboats, and Harnden, a carrier, was а permanent arrangement, by virtue of which he was to have the privilege of sending his crate by our boats, and to carry on his business in our boats. This he could not exact of us as a common carrier for him, and we did not perform as a common carrier. Story on Bailments, 512, sec. 508; Ibid. 483, sec. 476; Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumner, 224, 225; Story on Bailments, 581-583, sec. 591, a, 583, n. 1; 1 Vin. Abr. 220, and cases cited. In New York it is perfectly well settled that any other bailees, except common carriers, may make what contracts, and provide for what limitations of responsibility, they will, and the courts will fairly carry out the contract. Alexander v. Greene, 3 Hill, 1; 2 Kent's Com. 608, note a. In New York a bailee, under such a contract as that between Harnden and ourselves, is liable only for fraud. Ibid. It is like a case of charter-party, in which the charter-party settles the responsibilities of the parties to it. Abbott on Ship. part 3, ch. 1, Contract of Affreightment. Fourth point. That, although under these circumstances we cannot be liable for any degree of negligence, or for want of sufficiency in our boat and equipments, to the libelants, with whom we did not contract, and for whom we did not carry, nor to Harnden for any misconduct short of fraud or wilful *in- [*369 jury, yet we deny, as a matter of fact, the charge made against us in this respect, and contend that our boat was staunch and strong, and well equipped, and that her loss by fire was not occasioned by any deficiency in her equipments, or any unskillfulness or negligence in her conduct. Admitting that we could be liable to them on this ground, the burden, as in case of every other breach of contract, is upon him who alleges and claims for a breach-the libelants here. They must prove 1st. The insufficiency, etc. 2d. That their loss was caused by that insufficiency, and not merely its abstract existence. 1 Bell's Com. 460, 4th ed. book 3, part 1, ch. 5, sec. 2, paragraph 499, L. B. 3; Pothier, Chartre Partie, Vol. I. p. 319; Havelock v. Geddes, 10 East, 555; Sharp v. Grey, 9 Bingh. 459; Alderson, J. Bremmer v. Williams, 1 Carr. & Payne, 414; Best, J. Jones v. Boyce, 1 Starkie, 495; Bell v. Reed, 4 Binney, 127; Hart v. Allen, 2 Whart. 120; Reed v. Dick, 8 Watts, 479; Amies v. Stevens, 1 Stra. 128. The question has been, whether a carrier is ever liable for a secret defect. Pothier, Chartre Partie. Vol. I. p. 319; Sharp v. Grey, 9 Bingh. 459; Alderson, J. Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 81; Bremmer v. Williams, 1 Carr. & Payne, 414; Story on Bailments, secs. 509, 562, 571, a, 592, and authorities cited. However this may be, as a general question, we contend that, under a contract by which all risk was excluded from us, we are not to be liable for secret defects in our boats, machin- | ness, her equipment, the competency of her ery, etc. Our boat, hull, engine, boiler, and general equipment were good, by the proof. [Here the counsel entered into a minute examination of the testimony.] The Act of 1838 is a penal act, imposing new duties upon carriers, and does not apply to a boat engaged in the waters in which the Lexington was employed, when lost, but only to boats voyaging "at sea," or in the specified larger lakes. See 8th and 9th sections of the Act of 1838. Compare the 8th and 9th sections of the act with the 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th sections, and it will be seen that the word "sea," in the act, does not mean "bay, river, or other navigable waters of the United States," but "altum mare," "high or open sea," in the common sense of the term. But, finally, the loss of the Lexington did not result from her not having "iron rods and chains," instead of "wheel or tiller ropes," required by the statute. The boat, when found to be on fire, should have been stopped; and this seems to have 370*] been the captain's attempt, at one *time. The parting of the wheel ropes, if occasioned by the fire, did not contribute at all to her loss. The want of the steering apparatus required by the statute, not being the cause of her loss, is no ground for damages, within the authorities above cited. Mr. R. W. Greene, for the defendants in error, argued the question of jurisdiction first and then the following points: 1. That the respondents were common carriers. 2. That common carriers are liable for all losses, except those which arise from the act of God, the public enemies, or the fault of the owner of the goods. 3. That common carriers cannot limit their liabilities by notice. 4. That even a special agreement to exempt a common carrier from the legal liabilities of his employment would be void. One cannot be a common carrier, receiving the compensation of common carriers, and yet be exempted or excused from the proper responsibilities of his employment. 5. That if there be any doubt of the correctness of the foregoing propositions, according to the law of England or other countries, there is none according to the law of New York, where the shipment in this case was made. 6. But if the libelants be wrong on the general point (viz., that common carriers cannot, in New York at least, limit their responsibility at all by notice), still the effect of notice, if any effect whatever be given to it, can only be to relieve the carrier from liability for extraordinary losses or occurrences. He is still liable for losses within his own warranty, express or implied, or occasioned by his own negligence or misconduct. The libelants contend, therefore, 7. That there is no sufficient proof of notice in this case; and, crew and commander, the mode of stowing cargo, and the navigation and general management of her as a carrying vessel. And the libelants will maintain, as a rule of evidence fit to govern this case, that if a vessel be lost in fair weather, without the presence of any external cause, or occurence adequate to the production of the loss, the legal presumption is that she was either unseaworthy or was improperly navigated, conducted, or managed; and to discharge the respondents, this presumption must be met, answered, and overthrown, by clear and satisfactory proof. *The libelants contend that there is [*371 in the case no such clear and satisfactory proof as is sufficient to overcome the legal presumption; and they insist, further, that there is proof that, in point of fact, the respondents' warranty was not complied with in various respects, and among others in these, viz.: that the furnaces were unsafe and insufficient; that there was no proper casing to the steam chimney, nor any safe lining of the deck where the chimney passed through; that dry pine wood was habitually kept in a very exposed situation; that, especially, there was a very improper stowage or disposition of the cargo on board, considering what that cargo was; that the boat had no tiller chain or rope, such as the act of Congress as well as common prudence required; that there were on board no fire-buckets, properly prepared and fitted with heaving lines; that the fire engine was in one part of the boat, while the hose belonging to it was kept or left in another, and where it was inaccessible when the fire broke out; and that in other respects the respondents were guilty of negligence, the more culpable, as the same boat had actually taken fire in her last preceding voyage, and no measure of caution had been taken to prevent a recurrence of the accident. 1st point. As to the question of jurisdiction. The counsel upon the other side have argued this question as if it were the decision of the court which vested the jurisdiction in it, immediately under the Constitution, without the intervention of an act of Congress, and that if the court were to decide with us, the jurisdiction must remain in its full extent until an alteration of the Constitution. But the Constitution vests in Congress the power to distribute this jurisdiction amongst the courts of the United States, as the public good may require. The courts only take what Congress confers. Congress may confer a jurisdiction as large as the grant contained in the Constitution, as they have done in the Judiciary Act of 1789; or they may abridge and restrict the jurisdiction within such limits as they think proper. They may enact the statutes of Richard, with my Lord Coke's construction. They may even take away the jurisdiction over seamen's wages and bottomry bonds. Congress can also regulate the forms of process and the modes of proceeding in the courts of admiralty, and can provide for the trial by jury of all issues. Upon such a construction of the grant, the people retain the whole subject under their 8. That if notice be proved, it does not re- own control, to be regulated as experience and lieve the respondents from their implied war、 the progress of events may render expedient. ranty with regard to the vessel, her seaworthi- ' If they find it too large under the Judiciary Act of 1789, they can limit it; if they prefer | the subject of pilotage, because of its impor- tance, its peculiar applicability to admiralty jurisdiction, the meritorious character of the services rendered, etc., etc.; also over the subject of material men, inasmuch as the States were foreign to each other as to jurisdiction; also over the subject of salvage, inasmuch as the English admiralty had jurisdiction over salvage only where the property of the ship wrecked was not cast ashore, see 5 Howard, 452; also over the subject of collisions in bays, harbors, and navigable rivers, which are purely a maritime subject, and more apt to occur than collisions on the high seas.] The subject of affreightment is not within the admiralty jurisdiction of England, although the subject of seamen's wages is so. But freight is the mother of wages. The whole subject of affreightment is purely maritime. and within the jurisdiction of all the continential courts, and of Scotland, to this day. I Summer, 555, 558, 559. 372*] *Whereas, by the construction con- It is said, however, in answer to this, that, if the court should now decide that it does not possess the jurisdiction, Congress can hereafter enlarge the jurisdiction. But the present grant is co-extensive with the grant of power to Congress itself in the Constitution. The words used are the same in both instruments. If, then, Congress have already exhausted their power by vesting the courts with the whole of it, how can any fund remain in reserve upon which Congress can draw for a fresh supply? But it is contended, by the counsel upon the other side, that the English system of admiralty, as it existed in 1787, became bodily transferred, just as it then stood, into the Constitution of the United States. Without inquiring, for the present, into the absurd, contradictory, and inconsistent principles upon which the common lawyers of England had placed the system, let us examine how far it would be suitable and appropriate to the United States -how far it would be adapted to our condition, and adequate to carry out one of the great objects for which the people adopted the Constitution. This object was to promote commerce. The preamble indicates this. The United States was a maritime nation, with an immense extent of sea coast, indented with bays, rivers, and harbors, the navigation of which was dangerous. A few considerations will serve to show that the limited construction contended for by the other side would eminently fail in promoting this essential object of the union. 373*] *As to pilotage. The English Admiralty had no jurisdiction over pilotage, except upon the high seas, where it was not needed. [Mr. Greene here illustrated the necessity of the supervision of the federal government over hand, given at sea, to be paid at sea, or an agreement to convey real estate, to be executed upon the voyage. Lord Kenyon admitted this to be absurd. In 3 T. R. 267, he says: "If the admiralty have jurisdiction over the subject matter, to say that it is necessary for the parties to go upon the sea, in order to execute the instrument, borders upon absurdity." The common law; as to all other than maritime contracts, is, that the law of the place of performance is to govern; but this rule is set aside as to admiralty. The general rule which governs all courts, as to their jurisdiction, is the subject matter. This is the rule in chancery, in the ecclesiastical courts, and the common law courts, upon every branch of jurisdiction except the admiralty; and in that case alone the inquiry is, not whether the contract be of a maritime nature, but whether it was made within the body of a county. The statutes of Richard are relied upon for this rule, and these statutes are declared by Lord Coke to be in affirmance of the common law. From whatever source this rule of jurisdiction was derived-whether from the statutes *of Richard or from [*374 the common law-if it be an arbitrary rule, and not founded in any just principle, it is unreasonable to suppose that the people of the United States meant to make it a part of their federal compact. But neither the common law nor the statutes of Richard are justly chargeable with this absurd rule of jurisdiction. It rests entirely upon the authority of Lord Coke, who was a great common lawyer, but no civilian. [Mr. Greene then cited the ancient commissions in admiralty, the ordinance of Edward I., confirmed by ordinance of Edward III., the statutes of Richard II. and Henry IV., to show that the object of all of them was to place the admiralty jurisdiction in the same position where Edward III. had placed it, which did not justify the rule in question.] The history of Lord Coke's controversy with | by jury. But there is a wide difference between Lord Chancellor Ellesmere shows the extent to an English admiralty judge and one appointed which he desired to push the exclusive jurisdic-| under the Constitution of the United States. tion of the courts of common law. 3 Bl. Com. The reasons for entertaining a jealousy against 44. Lord Coke's enmity to the admiralty has the former do not apply to the latter. In the been a subject of comment by the common law United States, admiralty judges, as well as judges in later times, particularly by Mr. Jus- common law judges, are appointed by and tice Buller; but they were bound by the au- responsible to the people, in some form or other. thority of his decisions, however much they There is, therefore, no political reason for remay have condemned the principle on which straining the jurisdiction of a court of admithey were founded. And now, at this late day, ralty. If our American ancestors were jealous this court are called upon to incorporate these of the jurisdiction of the vice-admiralty courts decisions into the American Constitution, and of the colonies, the reason for that jealousy thus deprive the American people of the power, ceased when we became an independent people. through their representatives in Congress, so to A vice-admiralty judge of the colonies was the regulate this jurisdiction as their interests may representative of the crown; the people of the require. colonies had no voice nor participation in his proceedings. It was a foreign tribunal, enforcing, amongst other things, the obnoxious laws of trade. But when the people of the United States came to frame a government for themselves, and to establish a judiciary which should be ultimately responsible to them, nothing can more clearly show how well the Convention and Congress understood their change of position, than the insertion into the Judiciary Act of 1789 of the clause which makes seizures upon tide water *for [*376 breaches of the revenue laws, cognizable in the courts of the United States, as courts of admiralty. No trial by jury was provided. This branch of the vice-admiralty jurisdiction was most bitterly complained of by the colonies; and yet the first Congress which sat under the Constitution invested the courts of the United States with the same power. It was composed of many of the same men who, in the Convention, had framed the Constitution, and who had also been members of the Congress whose measures led to the Revolution. The jurisdiction thus given, for penalties and forfeitures upon tide water, is in direct contradiction to the English system. But it was known to the members of the Convention that a jury trial could be prescribed by an act of Congress in the courts of admiralty. It was so in the colonial vice-admiralty of Virginia. The preservation of the trial by jury is said to be the great object for which these decisions were made. It was alleged that the admiralty had no trial by jury, that the judge was the immediate representative of the crown, and that the subject had no participation in the proceedings of this court. This was very plausible in England, but it has no application to this country; and even in England itself the reason is not sound. If the trial by jury be of such importance as to exclude the admiralty jurisdiction from certain classes of cases of a maritime character, why is the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor allowed in that country? His jurisdiction extends over the whole kingdom, and controls and annuls the judgments of the common law courts. He is the immediate adviser of the king, and keeper of his conscience. He is a member of the Privy Council, a politician, appointed and removed as his party succeeds or falls. There is no jury trial in his court, except at his discretion; and he never orders an issue to be tried before a jury, except when the evidence is so doubtful that he can come to no satisfactory conclusion, and he then 375*] *puts upon a jury the responsibility of guessing. The United States courts are invested by the Constitution with this power, and they exercise it, sitting as circuit courts in the different States. How have the common law courts of England extended their own jurisdiction, whilst so scrupulous respecting that of others? The venue was originally local in cases of contracts and personal torts, as well as in real actions. The jury must come from the vicinage; and therefore, where the transaction occurred at sea, no jury could try the case. But a videlicet gave to these courts jurisdiction over the ocean, and the defendant was not allowed to deny the fiction. This was, in fact, an encroachment upon the admiralty. The Court of King's Bench had originally no jurisdiction over contracts, but was confined to cases of trespass. But a fiction which was not permitted to be denied gave jurisdiction over matters of contract, and a similar fiction enlarged the juris diction of the Court of Exchequer also. Two arguments are urged against the jurisdiction over the present case: It may be mentioned, also, that chancery jurisdiction was given to the courts of the United States by the Constitution. There is here no trial by jury, and yet it controls and annuls the judgments of common law courts. Chancery courts existed in most of the colonies -in New York, Virginia, etc.—and their existence was never complained of, because they were established by the colonies themselves. 2d. It encroaches upon the jurisdiction of the State tribunals. This argument begs the question. It assumes that such jurisdiction would be an encroachment. We deny it. The words of the grant in the Constitution are, "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." They are words of the most comprehensive import; and from the language used, as well as from the reasonableness of the thing, we say that the people must be presumed to have intended. a jurisdiction which was needful and proper 1st. It takes away the trial by jury. 2d. It encroaches upon the jurisdiction of to carry out, or to aid in carrying out, the great the State tribunals. 1st. It takes away the trial by jury. Nothing can be clearer than that our ancestors attached a high value to the right of trial In commercial purposes of the Constitution. adopting the Constitution, the people intended to confer upon the federal government all the powers needful to accomplish the purposes for |