grant admits of two interpretations, one of | long to him, or to them, at the time of the rewhich is more extended, and the other more moval; and, furthermore, that the right of rerestricted, so that a choice is fairly open, and moval was unrestricted as respects time, and either may be adopted without any violation could have been made at any time heretofore, of the apparent objects of the grant, if, in such or could be made hereafter. case, one interpretation would render the grant inoperative, and the other would give it force and effect, the latter, if within a reasonable construction of the terms employed, should be adopted. Testing the contract by these rules, and what are the complainants entitled to, under the acts of 1819 and 1821? By the first act, Wiggins was to establish the ferry near the town of Illinois, "and to run the same from lands at said place which may belong to him." At the time the act was passed, Wiggins owned no land near the town of Illinois, and if the grant was in the present tense, and extended only to land 582*] *that was then the property of the grantee, the act of Assembly had no operation, and was worthless. But we suppose the words employed were not restricted to the time when the act was passed; the grantee was allowed eighteen months to put the ferry into operation, and he was to run his boat from his own lands, that is, from lands which might belong to him at the time the running commenced; and for this there was great reason, as the opposite shore lay within another State, and there, also, a ferry landing had to be secured. The matter was one of speculation; and lands could not, with propriety, be purchased at high prices before the privilege was secured on both banks. And this construction, as we apprehend, is the one that the Legislature of Illinois put on the Act of 1819 by that of 1821; by which it was admitted that a ferry had been established according to the first act, and the grantee was authorized to remove it to another point, because a sand bar had been formed in front of the landing. We therefore feel ourselves constrained to differ from the carefully prepared and able opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, found in the record, which holds the first grant to have been inoperative. We come next to consider the Act of 1821. When it was passed, Wiggins had land fronting on the river for nearly a mile, extending both above and below Illinois town, and lying between it and the river. It was all the land he then could desire for the purposes of his ferry and at the end of his road. Indeed, it is doubtful whether, under the grant, Wiggins could have gone below his first purchased tract and been "near the town of Illinois," because his land extended considerably below the town. As the Act of 1821 recognized the fact that Wiggins had complied with his contract under the Act of 1819, and had established a ferry on land that belonged to him, and that it was established "near the town of Illinois," it is fair to presume that both parties to the contract, as modified and enlarged by the Act of 1821, understood what land it was that Wiggins owned at that time, and the boundaries thereof; and also the extent of his interest, being two sevenths of the tract. The Act of 1821 was treated by the bill, and was relied on in argument, as conferring a perpetual privilege on Wiggins, and on his assigns, to remove the ferry to any land that might be That the act is somewhat obscure, in regard to the place to which the ferry could be removed, must be admitted; and in *seek- [*583 ing its true construction, several considerations present themselves. In the first place, that the act operated in the present tense, and was a mere enlargement of the privileges conferred by the Act of 1819, and must be taken as a part of the first contract, cannot be denied; second, when we take into consideration the fact that Wiggins had a specific tract of land at that time, at the proper place-that is to say, lying in front of Illinois town, and extending above and below it-a reasonable conclusion is, that some place on such tract was referred to by the Act of 1821; and, third, as the Act of 1819 reserved authority in the Legislature to repeal so much of the law as secured to Wiggins an exclusive ferry right for two miles on the river front, such reservation could only mean that rival ferries might be established, at discretion, by the Legislature. Nor can it be assumed, with any claim to a plausible construction, that the power of removal had no limitation of time or place, as this would confer a right to remove to the same landing with a newly established ferry, set up as a rival, and drive it away; and thus the public convenience would again be reduced to a single ferry. Now, in view of these facts and consequences, and applying them to language of an ambiguous character, and seeking assistance from a settled rule of construction in case of doubt, and finding that rule of construction to be, that when two constructions are equally open to the court, the one shall be adopted most favorable to the government, the consequence must be, on this construction, that Wiggins was confined to the tract of land partly owned by him when the Act of 1821 was passed; and that when the ferry was removed to other land, lower down the river, it was an act not within the contract, nor protected by it. This disposes of the first and principal ground of relief sought by the bill. Whether Wiggins, or those claiming under him, had the right after he had established his new ferry, under the Act of 1821, to remove it to another place on the tract of land he then owned, and whether the State of Illinois may not authorize another ferry on the same tract of land, not interfering with the operations of the one established by Wiggins, are questions which the record does not bring before us, and upon which, therefore, we express no opinion. A second ground of relief is relied on by the bill, and was most earnestly and ably urged in argument here, and which it is incumbent on us to dispose of also. The first special prayer would seem to conclude an inquiry into any ground of interference by this court, other than the *ques- [*584 tion arising on the acts of 1819 and 1821, standing as a contract, claimed to have been violated by the Act of 1839. But the bill has also a general prayer; and on this, as well as upon the special prayer, the Supreme Court of Illinois ordered, "that it be certified in this case, that, action at law, like any other illegal trespass, there was drawn in question the validity of the done under assumed authority; as, for instance, statute of the State of Illinois entitled, 'An a trespass by a younger grantee on land held Act to authorize St. Clair County to establish a by an elder patent depending for support on a ferry across the Mississippi River,' approved | State law of later date than the first grant. But March 2, 1839, on the ground that it was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and that the decision of the court was in favor of the validity of said statute;" from which certificate it is manifest that the Act of 1839 was upheld against each state of facts set forth by the bill; and if it was apparently re-tract," in the sense and meaning of the Constipugnant to the Constitution on either ground assumed, this court has jurisdiction of the cause; and having jurisdiction, the plaintiffs in error were entitled to be heard, and are entitled to our judgment, on both grounds presented, and relied on to reverse. it is not an evasion and illegal seizure of private The bill sets forth that gross abuses were im-regulations necessary to the well-being and exposed on complainants by the Act of 1839, and by the commissioners and their lessee, under the act; that the said three hundred feet include a wider space, and more land, than is necessary or convenient for a road, and but a small portion of it has been used and appro-stitutional protection by our decision in case of priated by the said County of St. Clair to that purpose, leaving a strip on either side to be used by the said County of St. Clair and its lessees, for private property, for building lots, and other private purposes; and that that portion of the said three hundred feet which is not included in said road, and which is now used for private purposes, or is left to be thus used, will yield an annual ground rent larger than the hole amount of the damages assessed as aforesaid for the whole of said three hundred feet; and furthermore, that only the condemned land was valued, and no compensation awarded or tendered for the ferry franchise and landing taken from complainants. As the bill was demurred to, and the demurrer sustained in the State courts, and in this form the case comes before us, all charges of abuse and oppression on the part of the authorities of Illinois are admitted, to the extent alleged; and the question presented here on these facts is, whether this court has power to redress the injuries complained of, under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. A new For the reasons above stated, it is ordered that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Il Mr. Justice McLean dissented. The Constitution having declared that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, it becomes our duty to in-linois be affirmed. quire whether the State law, and the acts done under it, violate a contract. If any contract 585*] was violated under the *Act of 1839, it must have been a grant to land vesting the fee-simple title; and such title complainants exhibit. To the width of needful roads and ferry landings, property can undoubtedly be taken, for the purposes of such easements; and necessarily, the State authorities must decide (as a general rule), how much land the public convenience requires. That the power may be abused, no one can deny; and that it is abused, when private property is taken, not for public use, but to be leased out to private occupants to the end of raising money, is too plain for reasoning to make it more so. Such an act is mere evasion, under pretense of an authorized exercise of the eminent domain; and if it be an evasion, it is void, and may be redressed by an' Order. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said Supreme Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs. JOSEPH J. KENNEDY, Trustee of Henry, mar, Mr. McAllister and Mr. Johnson (AttorShultz, an Insolvent debtor, and for the ney-General) representing the Bank, and Mr. Creditors of the said Henry Shultz, and Sergeant representing the city of Augusta. Henry Shultz, Appellants, V. THE BANK OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, The City Council of Augusta, John McKinne, and Gazaway B. Lamar. Bill to set aside final decree in insolvency parties-barred by lapse of time-amendments allowed in this court-judgments and decrees of circuit courts binding until reversed-insolvency in South Carolina-suit pending in U. S. Circuit Court for Georgia assignee barred by final decree. Some of the distinctions stated between bills of review, of revivor, and supplemental and original bills in chancery. purpose. This court, as an appellate court, has the power to allow amendments to be made to the record before it, although the general practice has been to remand the case to the Circuit Court for that When a cause is brought before this court on a division in opinion by the judges of the Circuit Court, the points certified only are before it. The cause should remain on the docket of the Circuit Court, and at their discretion may be prosecuted. If the jurisdiction of a Circuit Court be not shown in the proceedings in the case, its judgment is erroneous, and liable to be reversed; but it is not an absolute nullity. But when an amendment to the record was made by consent of counsel in this court, which amend ment set forth the jurisdiction, a mandate containIng that amendment ought to have prevented any subsequent objection to the jurisdiction in the Circuit Court. A decree for a sale, made with the approbation of counsel filed in court, removes all preceding technical objections. The arguments of the counsel continued for several days, and it is therefore impossible to give a full report of them, or to do more than merely state the points and authorities. The points raised on behalf of the appellants were the following, as stated in the briefs of Mr. Webster and Mr. Thompson: On the 9th day of May, 1821, one Christian Breithaupt and the said Henry Shultz_filed their bill in the Circuit Court against the Bank of the State of Georgia, praying that the bridge across the Savannah River at Augusta, and other property therein named, might be decreed to be first liable to the redemption of the bills issued by the Bridge Company aforesaid, and for an injunction restraining the Bank of Georgia and other creditors of the said John and Barna McKinne, as well as the creditors of the said Bridge Company, from enforcing executions and selling the bridge and other property of the said Bridge Company. Amongst various interlocutory orders in said be sold by two commissioners therein named; cause, was one ordering the bridge aforesaid to and it was sold accordingly, and the Bank of the State of Georgia became the purchaser. The said Henry Shultz consented to the sale in writing; but the said John McKinne refused to give such assent. On the 6th day of May, 1830, a decree, drawn up by the consent of counsel, was signed by will be found in the record. the Hon. W. Johnson and J. Cuyler, which will be found in the record. It is alleged by the present complainant, the Where a party interested consented to the sale of assignee of Henry Shultz, that the order of sale property, afterwards took the benefit of the insolvent law, and at a subsequent period counsel repre- aforesaid is not binding, in *so far as [*588 senting him filed a consent decree to complete the those whom he represents are concerned. First, sale, the trustee having taken no steps for two because John McKinne, the joint tenant of the years to connect himself with the proceedings in court, and then having suffered fifteen years more said Henry Shultz, refused his consent. And to elapse without moving in the business, it is too second, that the creditors of the Bridge Comlate for such trustee to object to the consent decree. pany were not parties to said suit; and that the So, also, the holders of bridge bills, who have no specific lien upon a bridge, must be considered to decree of the 6th of May, 1830, presents no bar have lost their right to impugn the sale as fraudu-to the claim of your orator, John W. Yarlent, after so long a lapse of time. borough,1 as it purports on its face to have been 587*] *THIS HIS was an appeal from the Circuit made by the consent of the counsel of the said Court of the United States for the Henry Shultz, two years after he had made an District of Georgia sitting as a court of equity. assignment of all his estate, and specifically of As the decision of the court turned upon the benefit of his creditors, and therefore he had the bridge aforesaid, to Thomas Harrison, for some collateral points, it is not necessary to state all the facts in the case, which were ex-because the court had no jurisdiction of the no power or authority in the premises, and also tremely complicated. The Reporter therefore refers the reader to the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Mr. Justice McLean, and which contains a recital of all the facts necessary to an understanding of the points de cided. It was argued in conjunction with another case between the same parties, involving the same principles of law, and with nearly the ame state of facts. The two cases were argued by Mr. Waddy Thompson, Mr. Butler, and Mr. Webster, for the appellants, and upon the part of the appellees by Mr. Davis, representing La NOTE.-Nature of bill of review; when may be brought; who may maintain; time within which; what it should contain. See note to 8 L. ed. U. S 891. Who may maintain bill of review. See note to 36 L.R.A. 386. cause. property of the Bridge Company may be deThe bill prays that the bridge and other creed to be first liable for the redemption of the bills issued by the said Bridge Company, and Shultz, the amount, with interest, which he paid afterwards to refund the creditors of Henry for the redemption of said bills after his retirement from the Bridge Company. To this bill of complaint John McKinne anthe bill. The other defendants filed demurrers. swers, admitting all the material allegations of The complainant submits to this honorable court, that the sale of the bridge, by the interlocutory order of the court, is void as to him, and those whom he represents, the creditors of 1.-Yarborough was the original trustee of Shultz, in whose place Kennedy was now acting. Henry Shultz, who were not parties to the suit. | purchaser at a judicial sale, under a decree of a 2d. That the said sale was made without the court having jurisdiction of the cause, the parconsent of the said John McKinne. 3d. That ties, and the subject matter-the sale being unthe court, at the time of the said order, had no impeached for either fraud or irregularity, and jurisdiction of the case, as proper parties were so entitled to the bridge, and to convey it to not before the court. Lamar. 2. That the consent decree of the 6th of May, 1830, has no binding efficacy on the complainant or those he represents, as they were not parties in said suit, and that the consent of the said Henry Shultz was without authority, as regards the claims of his creditors, as he had previously assigned all his interest in the premises, under the insolvent debtor law of South Carolina, to Thomas Harrison, Esq.; and because the court had not jurisdiction of the case. 3. That the mortgage by John and Barna McKinne to the Bank of Georgia was void, as, violating a statute of Georgia, and second, as appropriating the assets of the partnership to the payment of the individual debts of the partners, in violation of the general law on that subject, as well as the special terms of this particular copartnership. 589**] *4. That if the said mortgage be valid, the defendants, never having foreclosed, are to be regarded as mortgagees in possession, and chargeable with rents, issues, and profits. 5. That if the court should be of opinion that, as regards the interest of the said Henry Shultz, the sale made under the interlocutory order aforesaid be valid, it is void as to the interests of the said John McKinne, the joint owner of said bridge. 6. That the mortgage, if a valid lien, has been more than paid off, and the residue is subject to division amongst the creditors of Henry Shultz. 7. That a release by the Bank of Georgia to John McKinne, one of the two joint owners of the bridge, and partners with the Bridge Company, is, in law, a release of the said Henry Shultz. The following authorities will be relied on in the argument: 3 Ves. Jun. 255; 2 Kent's Com. 400; 2 Story's Equity, 304, secs. 446-449, 463, 1039, 1040; Jac. Law. Dict. tit. Estate; 3 Mod. 46; 2 Story's Eq. 527, sec. 1287, 240, sec. 976; 2 Treadway, S. C. Re. 674; 3 Taunt. 976; 2 Story's Eq. 491; sec. 1244; Mill on Eq. Mort. 123; Law Library, 47; 1 Story's Eq. 383, sec. 395; Mill on Eq. Mort. 76, 79, 80, 81; 1 Story's Eq. 625, sec. 675; 2 Story's Eq. 500, sec. 1253; 3 Kent's Com. 65; 1 Story's Eq. 588, sec. 633; 3 Laws United States, 482, sec. 6; 10 Wheaton, 1, 20; 2 Cranch, 33; 3 Wheaton, 591; 2 Marsh. 11; 1 Bland, 20; 6 Leigh, 400; Story's Eq. sec. 10; 13 Peters, 691, 729; 8 Cranch, 9, 22; 2 Peters, 157, 163; 10 Peters, 449, 475; 10 Wheaton, 199; Gov. Deg. 974-976; 9 Pick. 259; Story's Eq. secs. 329, 330, 349, 380, 403, 425, 354; Mit. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 97, 98; 7 Paige, 287, 290; Story's Eq. secs. 466, 499, 500, 503, 505, 507, 508, 513, 519, 521, 526; Barton's Suits in Equity, 131; 1 Peters, 329; 2 Term Rep. 282; 4 Ves. Jun. 396; 3 Atk. 809, 811; 5 Ves. Jun. 3; 2 Stat. at Large, 159 and note; Story's Eq. Pl. 443; 1 Ves. & Beames, 536; 19 Ves. 184; 2 Story's Eq. Jur. 1520 and note; 1 Peters, 329; 10 Ib. 480; 11 Wheaton, 1. Mr. Davis contended, on behalf of Lamar, that the Bank of the State of Georgia was a To this it is replied, in substance, that the decree was erroneous, considered as pronounced in adversum. Lamar rejoins I. That the decree of the 21st of December, 1821, was by *consent of all parties in [*590 interest-Shultz and McKinne, joint owners and partners, the Bank as mortgagee, and Breithaupt and others, creditors of said Shultz; and, 1. That they and all claiming under them are estopped, by such consent, to insist on error in the decree. Webb v. Webb, 3 Swanst. 658; Bradish v. Gee, Ambler, 229; 2 Daniell's Ch. Pr. 617; Downing v. Cage, Eq. Cas. Abr. 165, sec. 4; Toder v. Sansam, I Bro. P. C. 469, 473, 476; Harrison v. Rumsay, 2 Ves. Sen. 488; Wall v. Bushby, 1 Bro. Ch. 484, 485, 489; Norcot v. Norcot, 7 Vin. Abr. 398; Bernal v. Donegal, 3 Dow. P. C. 133; Mole v. Smith, 1 Jac. & Walk. 665. 2. That there is no sufficient averment that McKinne did not consent to the decree of De- . cember, 1821, but only that he never consented to, or executed any power or authority to the commissioners to make said sale, or to execute any title to the purchaser; and that, after consent to the decree, his objection could not stop the sale, nor was a power of attorney requisite. Bradish v. Gee, Ambl. 229; Webb v. Webb, 3 Swanst. 658. 3. The language of the bill, on the contrary, imports an express averment that the decree was in fact made "by consent of the parties, complainants and defendants." 4. Were there a direct denial, still a party cannot controvert the consent recited in the decree-unless, perhaps, for fraud in its insertion. Downing v. Cage, Eq. Cas. Abr. 165, sec. 4; Norcot v. Norcot, 7 Vin. Abr. 398; Mole v. Smith, 1 Jac. & Walk. 665; Biddle v. Watkins, 1 Pet. 686. 5. A fortiori, not as against a purchaser under the decree, such party never having objected to the decree or sale, nor moved to have the "consent" stricken out, though before the court always, after twenty-four years from the decree of sale, and fifteen from its formal ratification and final decree. Voorhees v. Bank of United States, 10 Pet. 449, 473; McKnight v. Taylor, 1 How. 161; Lupton v. Janney, 13 Pet. 385. 6. McKinne not seeking as complainant the avoidance of the decree and sale on that ground, Shultz cannot avail himself of the error, as against McKinne, to enable him to avoid his own consent and acts. Thomas v. Harvie's Heirs, 10 Wheat. 146; 6 Cond. R. 44, 47; Whiting v. Bank of United States, 13 Pet. 6. II. If the denial be adequate and allowable in itself, and available for Shultz, still, 1. No error, or omission, or false recital, or want of proof, or other error behind or on the face of the decree, the court having jurisdiction, can effect a purchaser under it. Simmes & Wise v. Slacum, 3 Cranch, 300; 1 Cond. R. 539, 541; Thompson *v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. [*591 157, 167, 168, 169; United States v. Arredondo, [ 6 Pet. 729; Bank of United States v. Bank of Washington, 6 Pet. 8, 16; Voorhees v. Bank of United States, 10 Pet. 449, 472, 478; Shriver's Lessee v. Lynn, 2 How. 43, 58; Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 340-343; 10 Wheat. 192, 199; 6 Cranch, 267. 2. The denial of the consent is such-for consent is in lieu of evidence or law authorizing such a decree; and it is to deny a fact recited as the foundation of the decree; and if it be as recited-a sufficient foundation for it. 3. The inference that McKinne's refusal avoided the whole sale, impeaches the judgment of the court, ordering and confirming the sale in spite of such want of consent; i. e., the court erred in decreeing, upon consent of one, the sale of the whole, or of any part of the bridge. | 4. The allegation of the invalidity of the mortgage to the bank is likewise controverting the opinion of the court, that it was valid, so far as to authorize, a sale, or it is entirely irrelevant. So none of them avail, to impeach the title of the bank or of Lamar. 2 How. 43, 58; 2 Pet. 168; 10 Pet. 472, 473; Bennett v. Hamill, 2 Sch. & Lef. 577, 578. (d) If such pledge avoided Shultz's consent and sale of his interest, it must likewise avoid his assignment of his share under the South Carolina insolvent laws; and so the trustee has no interest in the suit. IV. The sale, being regular, passed the whole interest of Shultz in the property; and, 1. Its confirmation binds McKinne also. (a) It was virtually confirmed by payment and acceptance of the purchase money, and possession of the bridge; all which were acquiesced in. (b) By express decree. (c) Both Shultz and McKinne are estopped from alleging error by consent to the decree. (See cases cited above.) (d) There is no suggestion that the counsel of "defendants" assenting thereto did not then represent McKinne. (e) Even as to Shultz, it is not averred that his solicitor had ceased to be such; but only that he by his consent could not bind the fund nor the interests of the creditors. 2. This decree is not shown to be void by any sufficient averment; for, (a) Being by consent, without dispute, no error can be alleged against it other than such as shall go to the jurisdiction of the court which gave it. (b) This decree was rendered by the Circuit Court in which the suit was brought; and it is not averred that it had not jurisdiction. The denial of the consent recited does not show the decrees to be nullities; the consent is not the decree, but only waiver of objection to it; the decree is the act of the court-valid as | a decree on the subject matter till reversed, in spite of the want of consent. So denial of consent removes that estoppel, only against show-Court does not involve the denial of that of the ing errors in the decree. III. The absence of McKinne's consent would not avoid the sale of the bridge. 1. (a) The parties had a chattel interest, an estate for years only, in the franchise. (b.) It was partnership property; and therefore one partner could dispose of the whole interest, so as to bind his copartner. Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch, 289; 2 Cond. R. 260-263; Anderson v. Tompkins, 1 Brock. 456; Robinson v. Crowder, 4 McCord, L. R. 519. (c) McKinne being party to the suit with his copartner, and having never moved to avoid the sale, has, by his acquiescence and knowledge, ratified his partner's act. Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. 166, 169, 172; Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Ib. 354. (d) McKinne is barred by lapse of time from avoiding the sale for want of his consent; and so are Shultz and his assignee, when relying on McKinne's refusal. 592*] *2. The supposed pledge of the bridge is a legal nullity; for (a) It was, if anything, a private understanding merely of the partners, that this fund should remain as security for the bills, which did not affect their power of disposal, as to third parties. Hawker v. Bourne, 8 Mees. & Wels. 710. (b) If publicly notified, it gave no lien on the bridge passing with the notes into each holder's hands. (c) The denial of jurisdiction in the Supreme Circuit Court, nor show that its decree is void; for on certificate of division, the points certified alone are before the Supreme Court; the cause remains below, and may be proceeded in there. 2 Stat. at Large, p. *159, sec. [*593 6; Ogle v. Lee, 2 Cranch, 33; Harris v. Elliot, 10 Pet. 25, 56; Davis v. Braden, 10 Pet. 286, 289; Adams & Co. v. Jones, 2 Pet. 207, 213, 214; White v. Turk, 12 Pet. 239, 240; United States v. Baily, 9 Pet. 267, 273, 274; Perkins v. Hart, 11 Wheat. 237; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1; United States V. Briggs, 5 How. 208. Therefore, if the Supreme Court had jurisdiction, the cause was regularly remanded, and it was competent for the Circuit Court to render any decree it saw fit. If the Supreme Court had not jurisdiction, the cause remained before the Circuit Court, with like power of proceeding to decree. (d) But the facts averred do not show that the Supreme Court had not jurisdiction at January Term, 1830; for though its opinion was ordered to be certified, it had not been done; and till it had been done, it was competent for counsel to ask for its re-instatement by consent. It was also within their power to agree to, and of the court to allow, an amendment of the pleadings, not stating new points, but obviating obstacles to the decision of those certified. Bank of Kentucky v. Ashley, 2 Pet. (c) There is no direct averment of any legal 327, 328, 330; Woodward v. Brown et ux. 3 pledge creating a lien on the bridge for holders How. 1, 2; Union Bank of Georgetown v. Geary, of bridge bills, before other social creditors; 5 Pet. 99, 111, 113; Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch, nor of any disposition of, or agreement with 436, 456; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 reference to, the bridge, restraining the power Wheat. 738; Jackson v. Stewart, 6 Johns. 34, of both or of either to sell it—even were there 37, 296, 300; Henck v. Todhunter, 7 Harr. & one as to the application of its proceeds. Johns. 275, 278. |