eign travel could teach this lesson so clearly as it will be taught to the average American by the plain fact that all this stately splendor was thought worth getting and worth paying for by hard-headed American business men, and for a merely temporary purpose. One constantly hears expressions of regret that buildings and sculptures so costly and beautiful should be destined to last for a few months only. But, in truth, their transitory character will vastly augment their missionary power. Even the most ignorant may dimly understand that it is worth while to take pains and spend money upon a result which is to be for all time; but at Chicago they will be told that this is worth while even for a result of almost ephemeral duration. But it is not merely the untraveled American, wholly ignorant and neglectful of art, whom the exhibition will profit and instruct. Cultivated Americans think well of their fellow-countrymen in many directions. But as a nation we have as yet too little faith in our artistic capabilities, too little respect for the American artist, too little belief that the nascent love of the public for art is genuine, vital, and strong. The Columbian Exhibition will prove to the most doubting and critical spirit that American art exists, that it is capable of great things, and that it can do great things in a way distinctively its own. Had Chicago equaled Paris, it would be greatly to our credit; but it has surpassed Paris. Had it produced a beautiful exhibition in imitation of the Paris Exhibition, it would again be much; but it has conceived an entirely different ideal, and carried it out on entirely novel lines. We shall have an exhibition more dignified, beautiful, and truly artistic than any the world has seen; and it will be entirely our own, in general idea and in every detail of its execution. It will convince all cultivated Americans, we repeat, of the vitality and vigor and independence of American art; and, we believe, its effect upon the vast public which will view it will convince them of the genuineness of the nascent American love of art.

Of course the learning of these great lessons will quickly react for good upon the American artist, opening to him wider fields, creating for him a more sympathetic public, exalting him to nobler ambitions, inspiring him to more strenuous efforts, deepening and strengthening his self-respect and his respect for art as a valued factor in the life of the nation. So wisely have the architectural types for the chief buildings been chosen that, we believe, they will do much to determine the lines of our architectural work in the future; and, at all events, no artist who visits Chicago can fail to learn the great lesson that in harmony and fraternity of effort lies our best hope of a noble artistic development.

We shall not speak of the great effect this exhibition will have in increasing the respect of foreigners for the people of the United States. This seems to us a very minor point in comparison with the effect it will have upon ourselves. Its national will be of far more vital importance than its international effect. What we chiefly wish to lay stress upon is its claim upon Americans as a very beautiful spectacle, and, still more forcibly, its claim upon Americans as a very instructive

spectacle. It will delight their eyes as nothing else has ever done. It will teach them the nature and value of art as nothing else could do. And it will affirm and increase their faith in those democratic institutions which once more, in a new field, have proved themselves capable of a magnificent, an unrivaled achievement.

Liberty, Law, and Order.

GOOD citizens are often grievously perplexed by the contemplation of those situations in life where opposing opinions or interests are brought into sharp conflict, and where the thoughtful man finds a certain amount of justice on both sides, and therefore hesitates as to the side to which he will give his sympathies. We speak now of those cases where the good citizen is an onlooker merely, not where he is necessarily a participator in the struggle on one side or the other, for then he is quicker to make up his mind. If the conflict is between the Indian and the grizzly, there is apt to be a finer balancing of motives and rights than if the grizzly happen to be in pursuit of the citizen himself.

The only way we know of whereby these doubts and anxieties can be quickly resolved into definite views is by a firm grip upon a few definite principles. These are the days of special sympathy with the poor and with the so-called- and sometimes narrowly socalled "working-classes," the days of new or renewed theories and experiments as to the relation of labor and capital. This is the present phase of the eighteenth-century revolution. Never was so much said or written and thought on these subjects. Meantime, while some are thinking, others are acting; theories are being put into practice, and in the process heads are being broken, and dynamite is destroying property and life.

Shall we not, then, says the doubting citizen, sympathize with "organized labor," and with reasoned discontent, even if these lead in extreme cases to selfinflicted misery and brutal bloodshed? Oh, yes; sympathy is right, if this does not bring infirmity of purpose, and that softness of attitude which encourages violence and crime. Yes, sympathize wherever sympathy may be justly due; but cling to the solid rock of individual liberty, of obedience to law, and the preservation of the peace! And do so for the very reason that in this world it will take so long to straighten things out in a way satisfactory to all. The readjustment of interests, the experimenting with new economical and governmental devices, will be such a slow process; there will always be so many apparent causes of discontent, that, unless by general consent these matters are arranged by peaceful methods, perpetual war, secret and bloody plots, infamous assassinations, will make life on this planet, to say the least, even much more unpleasing than it now is. Violence and crime, committed in no matter what honest name, are anarchy; and anarchy, in a free country, must be stamped out like the plague,— with the discrimination and the remorselessness of justice.

I. A SOUTHERN VIEW OF THE QUESTION.

IN THE CENTURY for March I find an article enti

after the fall of Donelson. The old regiments were rapidly filled up, new ones were formed, and throughout the South the greatest activity prevailed. By this

Army," in which the author, Mr. A. B. Casselman, expresses the opinion that it would not be difficult to prove that the total number of men enrolled in the Confederate army from the beginning to the close of the war was not far from 1,500,000. He bases this opinion upon the number of troops which, according to his estimate, North Carolina furnished to the Confederacy, his supposition being that North Carolina furnished one tenth of the strength of the Confederate army. That this estimate of Mr. Casselman is far too high is easy to see, if certain facts are taken into consideration. I purpose stating these facts and the conclusions to be drawn from them.

The total population of the eleven States that seceded was 9,100,789, of which 5,446,919 were white and 3,653,870 were colored. But West Virginia, as is well known, seceded from Old Virginia and from the Confederacy. The population of West Virginia at that time was 376,488, which, being deducted from the population of the eleven seceded States, leaves 8,724,301 as the total population of those States. As the white population of West Virginia was at that time about 361,000, the total white population of the Confederate States was 5,085,919. Now North Carolina's white population was 629,942. Only two other States of the Confederacy had so large a white population as North Carolina. These were Tennessee and Virginia, the former having 826,722 white inhabitants, and the latter 686,299 (after deducting the white population of West Virginia).

Mr. Casselman states that Major John W. Moore, late of the 3d North Carolina Battalion, made an estimate that his State furnished to the Confederacy 150,000 men; but admits that Major Moore, after the most careful investigation, changed his estimate to 125,000. Now if we take the highest estimate for North Carolina, as Mr. Casselman prefers, and assume that each of the other Confederate States furnished troops in the same ratio, we will find the total number of troops raised by the eleven Confederate States to be 1,211,000.

But there are some things to be considered which Mr. Casselman seems to have lost sight of entirely. During 1861 it was impossible for the Confederacy to put large armies into the field, because arms were not to be had. Of more than 300,000 enrolled, many thousands were in camps of instruction waiting for arms. The result was that in the early spring of 1862 the Confederate armies were so greatly outnumbered that they could do nothing but retire before the Union armies as they advanced. Had the other Union generals possessed Grant's energy, and been untrammeled by their Government, the Confederacy might have been crushed early in 1862. But when the fall of Donelson came like a thunderclap, the Confederacy was aroused to prompt and energetic action. The Con

by the blockade-runners, and others were manufactured in the newly established workshops of the South. The Southern armies were largely increased in numbers and efficiency, and, had the South retained all the territory that she held in 1861, her armies might have come somewhat nearer than they actually did to the figures claimed by Mr. Casselman for 1861 and 1862, viz., 850,000. But it must not be forgotten that before the passage of the Conscript Act the western Confederate armies had been forced back to the borders of Alabama and Mississippi; that the larger portion of Tennessee was in the grasp of the Union armies, and that before the month of May the city of New Orleans, containing more than a third of the white population of Louisiana, was also under Federal control. A large part of Northern and Eastern Virginia, containing several of the large towns of the State, was also occupied by the forces of the Union early in May. The Kentucky campaign of Bragg and Kirby Smith recovered a part of Middle Tennessee, but at least one third of the State was in Federal possession during 1862, and three fourths of it after the summer of 1863. Early in 1863 the larger part of Arkansas was occupied by the Federal armies. The first Conscript Act was passed April 16, 1862. This embraced all the white men in the Confederacy between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. On September 27 of the same year all white men between the ages of thirty-five and fortyfive were placed in the military service for three years. On February 11, 1864, the Conscript Act was further extended to embrace all white men between the ages of seventeen and fifty. By this time almost the entire State of Tennessee was occupied by the Federal armies. Surely it will not be claimed that every man or boy capable of bearing arms throughout all this lost territory was enrolled in the Confederate armies. The eleven seceded States furnished to the Union 54.000 white troops, of whom 31,000 were furnished by the State of Tennessee. Of course they should be deducted from the aggregate of the Confederate armies. Making all proper allowances, the South lost the services of more than 200,000 men, who otherwise might have been enrolled in her armies. One million men is therefore a liberal estimate for the total enrollment in the Confederate armies, counted at the very highest figures. But in reality 125,000 men is a liberal estimate for the number of troops furnished by North Carolina. On this basis, making the same calculations and allowances as before, the Confederacy could not have brought into the field, from first to last, including all sorts of troops, much more than 800,000 men.

Mr. Casselman says that the people of the border slave States-Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri — "were not unevenly divided, and gave about an equal number of men to each army." If Mr. Casselman will

give this assertion careful thought, he will be convinced that it is not borne out by the facts. Maryland gave 34,000 men to the Union armies, Kentucky 51,000, and Missouri 100,000. Maryland was too firmly held by the Federal armies to furnish any considerable number of men to the cause of the South. The same is true, for the greater part of the war, of Kentucky and Missouri. While there were earnest Southern sympathizers in Kentucky and Missouri, the great mass of the people in those States stood firmly on the side of the Union. General Albert Sidney Johnston, in a letter to Mr. Davis written in March, 1862, says that no enthusiasm for the Confederacy, but hostility, was manifested during his stay in Kentucky: hence but few Kentuckians joined his standard. We have the testimony of Union and Confederate officers for the statement that the Bragg and Kirby Smith expedition did not add more than a brigade to the Confederate strength. Search the published records of the composition of the respective armies, and it is easy to see how greatly the number of Union regiments from those States exceeded the number of Confederate regiments. There was never a possibility of enforcing the Conscript Act in those States, and but very little chance after February, 1862, for any of their citizens who desired so to do, to enlist in the armies of the Confederacy. As to Maryland, there was exceedingly small opportunity for such a thing even in 1861. I cannot find from the records that these three States furnished even as high as 60,000 men to the Confederacy.

"The principal ex-Confederate historians . . who held high civil or military rank in the Confederate government" were as high-minded and honorable men as any that this world can boast, and would not stoop to misrepresent facts. Their estimate of Confederate strength (viz., about 700,000 men) comes much nearer the mark than the excessive estimates made by some writers on the other side. The Confederate armies reached their maximum effective strength for the field during 1862. After that year there was a steady decline in their numbers, and all the efforts of the Confederate government to fill up their depleted ranks were unavailing. Adjutant-General S. Cooper says that for the last two years of the war the active force present in the field was nearly one half less than the returns called for. As to the incompleteness of Confederate muster-rolls, is not this mainly due to losses of official papers that must have occurred on the sudden collapse of the Confederacy? But the rolls in possession of the officers in the field, on which depended the necessary knowledge of the condition of their commands, were correct, and the official reports of Confederate strength in the several battles of the war, as made by their commanders, can be relied upon as accurate.

The thought that one is standing between his loved home and war's desolation will nerve even a timid heart, and make strong a feeble arm. What wonder then that brave men fired by such a conviction should so often have proved more than a match for superior numbers of men equally as brave, but without the same conviction of ruin threatening their homes and loved ones? It was the conviction that on them depended the very existence of Southern civilization, and the salvation of their homes from utter ruin, that caused the thousands of raw recruits in the Seven Days' Battles around Richmond to rival the valor of seasoned veterans. It was

II. MR. CASSELMAN'S REJOINDER.

IN my original paper I alluded to the well-known fact that the records of the Confederate army are so incomplete that it is impossible to state exactly, or even to estimate very closely, its total strength; which, however, I expressed the opinion was not very far from 1,500,000. I alluded also to the fact, equally well understood, and specifically referred to by General Grant in his "Memoirs," that Confederate historians have always understated its strength,—a fact which is further shown, I think, by Mr. Derry's article. In the absence of sufficient available data for a close estimate, I should not now add further argument but for the reason that the subject plainly deserves more attention than it has ever received, and hence any discussion which serves to bring into prominence the salient facts must result, eventually, in benefit to the cause of historical truth.

Mr. Derry estimates that the total strength of that army could not have been much above 800,000. This is a gain of 200,000 over the figures of A. H. Stephens. But in this estimate he excludes altogether all of the troops furnished by four Southern States - West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland. He seeks to justify this by asserting that the number of Confederate troops from those States did not more than equal the 54,000 Union troops from the other Southern States, 31,ooo of whom were from East Tennessee; and that "the great mass of the people of those States were firmly on the side of the Union." Other Southern writers likewise assume that the border slave States furnished only a few thousand troops to the Confederate army,— far less than to the Union army: an assumption which is certainly contrary to the fact, as I shall undertake to show.

In the Senate of the United States at this time, West Virginia is represented by two ex-Confederate soldiers; Missouri is represented by an ex-Confederate soldier and an ex-member of the Confederate Senate; Kentucky, by an ex-Confederate soldier. Thus, five of the eight United States senators from those States are exConfederates. Not one of the eight was a Union soldier, nor otherwise distinctively identified as a Unionist. It is remarkable, therefore, that ex-Confederates should be thus preferred for offices of trust and honor, if, as Mr. Derry contends, "the great mass of the people of those States were firmly on the side of the Union."

Four fifths of the people of those States were of Southern birth. Socially and politically their sympathies were all with the South, with which they were likewise identified in their material interests, in the institution of slavery. Whatever cause existed to justify the South in the war affected the border slave States as well as those of the interior. They had a slave population of 427,000, representing a value of two hundred million dollars. In

1861 the governors of Kentucky and Missouri both at heart favored secession; the latter renounced his office, left his State, and gave his personal services to the Confederacy; and subsequently the Confederate Congress admitted both of those States as members of the Confederacy, to which, with their slaves, they would certainly now belong, had the South succeeded. Politically, these States constitute, at this time, parts of the “Solid South," the same as Georgia and Virginia, and for the same reason,- because of the race question, growing out of the freeing and enfranchisement of their slaves. It is indeed true that in the beginning the people of the border States strongly opposed secession; but the same was also true of Virginia, North Carolina, and other Southern States.

The census of 1860 shows that the three States, Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland, had white males of military age―i. e., between 18 and 45-to the number of 516,000. Allowing for the youths who attained to the military age from 1861 to 1864 inclusive, the number would reach nearly 600,000. Of these, 180,000 served in the Union army. There were, therefore, fully 400,000 Southern men of military age in those three States, who were not in the Union army, as against 180,000 who were. In the year 1861, most of the important military operations were those in the border States; and throughout the war they were overrun or infested by partizan troops, so that the war spirit was more intense in those States than elsewhere.

These facts, when fairly considered, leave room for only one of two conclusions: either those States furnished, at the lowest calculation, as many men to the Southern as to the Northern army, or else the men whose sympathies and interests were with the South, in those States, were greatly wanting in military spirit, and were without the courage to fight for their convictions. The latter conclusion I do not entertain. On the contrary, I doubt not the truth of the famous declaration of a Kentucky senator, that "Kentucky has its quota full on both sides." And the same was doubtless true, at least so far as the South was concerned, of all the border slave States. The fact that there are no complete records of the Southern troops proves nothing, and is not a fair or legitimate argument.

Mr. Derry, after having excluded from his estimate all the troops from four Southern States, deducts from my estimate the further number of 200,000 upon the assertion that in certain portions of Virginia, Tennessee, and in the city of New Orleans, which early in 1862 were occupied by the Union forces, the Confederate government could not enforce the conscript laws. In this statement he makes little or no allow ance for volunteers, but seems to assume that none served in the Confederate army except the conscripts. Virginia and Tennessee were in great part the battlegrounds of the war, and they were overrun and occupied in turn by both armies. The men in those States, more than those of any other, were compelled to serve on one side or the other, and they did so to the last man, as everybody knows. To assert that 200,000 men, principally of Virginia and Tennessee, either from cowardice or want of convictions, looked idly on at the heroic struggle that was being waged upon the soil of those States, taking no part on either side, is so manifestly unreasonable, and the accusation is so new, that it seems scarcely necessary to deny it.

Two of Mr. Derry's arguments appear to be inconsistent. In one he assumes, what I concede, that the Confederate army was composed in a great measure of conscripts, whose service in that army, therefore, was involuntary. But on the other hand he contends that this army was inspired by such lofty convictions of duty that, under this inspiration, they "often have proved more than a match for superior numbers of men equally as brave, but without the same conviction of ruin threatening their homes and loved ones." I regret that Mr. Derry has repeated an argument, which is not uncommon with Southern writers, in which he sets up this comparison which seeks to disparage the patriotism and sense of duty of the Union army. I have tried in vain to comprehend how brave and honorable men of the South can insist upon such a comparison. Let us consider a few facts touching the question of the patriotism of the Confederate army. It is an undoubted fact that tens of thousands of the men in that army had opposed, and voted against, secession, and in their hearts believed it to be wrong. The State of North Carolina, for instance, never adopted an ordinance of secession by direct popular vote. It was once submitted to the people of that State, who voted against it; although it is true that when the war was fairly begun they were well united in its support.

In 1863 and 1864 six regiments of United States troops, organized for service against the Indians, were composed entirely of Confederate prisoners, who thus returned to an allegiance which in their hearts they had never wholly forsaken.

In the great battles which decided the war, "the thought of loved ones at home" wrought no greater effect with one army than with the other; and a majority of the troops on either side were not natives of the State on whose soil the battle was fought. The Southern troops displayed as magnificent courage on the soil of Pennsylvania, at Gettysburg, as they ever did in Virginia; and why should they not?

Putting aside this argument as to the comparative devotion of the opposing armies, let us turn again to the legitimate argument of figures.

The State of North Carolina furnished, in the year 1861, forty-two regiments of Confederate volunteers, the minimum number in a regiment, according to the regulations, being one thousand. Moore's roster preserves the names of over 32,000 of those who enlisted in that year; but allowing for the numerous admitted deficiencies in the rolls, the number doubtless exceeded 40,000. In that first year, after the war had fairly begun, the South displayed a zeal and enthusiasm in the conflict beyond that which was then shown in the North. Counting the troops from the border States, who were all or nearly all volunteers, and who enlisted early in the war, the forty-two regiments of North Carolina troops constituted perhaps less than a tenth part of the Confederate army for that first year. The act of the Confederate Congress of August 8, 1861, authorized a call for 400,000 volunteers; and without doubt the army for that year comprised over 400 regiments and upward of 400,000 men,—all volunteers.

Before the end of 1862, under the conscript laws then in force, the North Carolina contingent had more than doubled. Moore's roster preserves the names of about 85,000 men who were enrolled in the years 1861 and 1862. But this roster omits thousands of names; the

actual number, therefore, must have been almost 100,000. And what reason is there to doubt these figures, when, after 40,000 volunteers had enlisted from that State, the Confederate government called for all who remained between the ages of eighteen and thirtyfive years? These figures indicate, unmistakably, a Confederate army of more than 800,000 men, before the war was half over, and before that army had met its first great defeat. In the last two years of the war, all know what heroic measures were adopted to fill the ranks of that army: how regiments were organized of stripling boys and aged men; and how the "slaves," the "free negroes," and "other free persons of color " were conscripted under the act of February 17, 1864, for the performance of “ auxiliary military duty.”

The eleven States had, in 1860, a free colored population of 132,660. Of these there were probably 25,000 males of military age. In 1864, owing to contraction of the Confederate lines, the number was less. This item in itself, therefore, is insignificant. But the fact that the Confederate Congress enacted a law to conscript the few scattering free colored men of the South, as well as the slaves, serves to illustrate the desperate measures that were employed to utilize the services of every human being within the Southern territory who was capable of carrying a gun or digging a trench.

Mr. Derry's estimate takes, as the basis of his calculation, 125,000 as the number of troops furnished by North Carolina. But that is the lowest possible estimate for the troops of that State. I am certain it is too low, even if the estimate of 150,000 is too high.

After a careful review of Mr. Derry's article, I think it will be seen that upon the whole it confirms my main conclusions, in which, however, I do not assume to have been exact. It shows that, starting with the lowest basis of calculation, excluding all the troops of four Southern States, and then deducting 200,000 more upon an assumption which seems to impeach the courage and manhood of a large proportion of the men of the South, it still leaves, according to his figures, an army of "not much more than 800,000."

This, it seems to me, concedes much of what I claim. If impartial investigators shall ever be able fairly to count all the Confederate troops, without such manifestly unreasonable deductions, I still think it will be found that the number was not very far from 1,500,000. In any close estimate, due allowance must be made for the 54,000 Union troops from the seceding States.

One thing seems clear. The statements commonly made by leading Southern writers, that the Confederates numbered in all only six or seven hundred thousand, against over two million Federals, are widely at variance with the facts, and are more extraordinary because they are made by those writers who, above all others, ought to know the truth. It is impossible that

The Happy Poet.

the men of the South, whose courage and honor have never been called in question, can sanction the efforts which some have made to juggle with this question, or to disparage the patriotism and courage of the brave men who opposed them. A. B. Casselman.

"The Century's" American Artists Series.

WYATT EATON.

IT is hard to realize the change which has taken place in American art during the last fifteen years. In 1877 the principal exhibition of the country, the National Academy of Design, admitted three works which, although different in style, were each equally revolutionary: "The Dowager," by William M. Chase; “A Brittany Woman," by Alden Weir; and "Revery," by Wyatt Eaton. The first of these bore the stamp of Munich, the last two that of Paris. Each was the work of an American who, unknown in our art circles, had been long enough abroad to assimilate the newest art movements of Europe. This was the beginning of the change. In 1877 Wyatt Eaton had been studying art for eleven years: the first five in New York as a student of the National Academy of Design, and as a pupil of the late J. O. Eaton, who had befriended him when, a lad of eighteen, he had left his native village on the shores of Lake Champlain for New York; later, from 1872 to 1876, as a pupil of Gérôme at L'École des Beaux Arts, Paris. During this period he painted the "Revery" and "Harvester at Rest," both of which were exhibited at the Salon, the latter being now in Smith College, Northampton, Mass.

Some of his first work after his return home was done for this magazine, including a series of remarkable portraits of Bryant, Emerson, Longfellow, Whittier, and Holmes, for which these gentlemen gave him sittings, and which were engraved by Cole. These were perhaps as remarkable for their engraving as for their drawing, and were a veritable new departure in magazine work. He also made a drawing from life of Dr. J. G. Holland.

In 1877 Wyatt Eaton, with Walter Shirlaw, Augustus St. Gaudens, and Helena de Kay Gilder, founded the Society of American Artists, of which Mr. Eaton was the first secretary and Mr. Shirlaw the first president.

Although Wyatt Eaton is an accomplished landscapepainter and a brilliant painter of the nude, he is known principally by his portraits. Among those who have sat to him are the Right Rev. Horatio Potter, Mr. Roswell Smith, and Sir William Dawson. He also painted a portrait of Garfield (after the President's death) for the Union League Club of New York. "The Man with a Violin" (a portrait of the engraver Timothy Cole), which is printed on page 882 of the present number, was painted in Florence, Italy.

W. Lewis Fraser.

Mistaken Magnanimity.

THE storm of words was past, the air was cleared,
When "I forgive you!" thus he volunteered.
"If any one forgives," she said, " 't is I!"—
The storm returned, and murky grew the sky.

Edith M. Thomas.