'Do you think that, if there should arise a truly imperial sovereign, he would collect the princes of the present day and put them all to death? Or would he admonish them, and then, on their not changing their ways, put them to death? Indeed to call every one who takes what does not properly belong to him a robber, is pushing a point of resemblance to the utmost, and insisting on the most refined idea of righteousness1.'

Here again we must admire the ingenuity of Mencius; but it 'amuses us more than it satisfies. It was very well for him to maintain his dignity as 'a Teacher,' and not go to the princes when they called him, but his refusal would have had more weight, if he had kept his hands cleau from all their offerings. I have said above that if less awe-ful than Confucius, he is more admirable. Perhaps it would be better to say he is more brilliant. There is some truth in the saying of the scholar Ch'ăng, that the one is the glass that glitters, and the other the jade that is truly valuable.

Without dwelling on other characteristics of Mencius, or culling from him other striking sayings,-of which there are many,-I proceed to exhibit and discuss his doctrine of the goodness of human

nature.

Mencius's view

of human nature; that of Bishop

its identity with

Butler.

5. If the remarks which I have just made on the intercourse of Mencius with the princes of his day have lowered him somewhat in the estimation of my readers, his doctrine of human nature, and the force with which he advocates it, will not fail to produce a high appreciation of him as a moralist and thinker. In concluding my exhibition of the opinions of Confucius in the former volume, I have observed that he threw no light on any of the questions which have a world-wide interest.' This Mencius did. The constitution of man's nature, and how far it supplies to him a rule of conduct and a law of duty, are inquiries than which there can hardly be any others of more importance. They were largely discussed in the Schools of Greece. A hundred vigorous and acute minds of modern Europe have occupied themselves with them. It will hardly be questioned in England that the palm for clear and just thinking on the subject belongs to Bishop Butler, but it will presently be seen that his views and those of Mencius are, as nearly as possible, identical. There is a difference of nomenclature and a combination

1 Bk. V. Pt. II. iv.

of parts, in which the advantage is with the Christian prelate. Felicity of illustration and charm of style belong to the Chinese philosopher. The doctrine in both is the same.

View of

The utterances of Confucius on the subject of our nature were few and brief. The most remarkable is where he says:- Man is born for uprightness. If a man be without uprightConfucius. ness and yet live, his escape from death is the effect of mere good fortune'. This is in entire accordance with Mencius's view, and as he appeals to the sage in his own support, though we cannot elsewhere find the words which he quotes, we may believe that Confucius would have approved of the sentiments of his follower, and frowned on those who have employed some of his sayings in confirmation of other conclusions3. I am satisfied in my own mind on this point. His repeated enunciation of the golden rule,' though only in a negative form, is sufficient evidence of it. The opening sentence of The Doctrine of the Mean,'-' What Heaven has conferred is called THE NATURE; an accordance with this nature is called THE PATH; the regulation of the path is called INSTRUCTION,'-finds a much better illustration from Mencius than from Tsze-sze himself. The germ of his doctrine lies in it. We saw reason to discard the notion that he was a pupil of Tsze-sze; but he was acquainted with his treatise just named, and as he has used some other parts of it, we may be surprised that in his discussions on human nature he has made no reference to the above passage.

View of Taze-sze.

Prevalent view

Mencius's time.

What gave occasion to his dwelling largely on the theme was the prevalence of wild and injurious speculations about it. In nothing did the disorder of the age more appear. of man's nature in Kung-tú, one of his disciples, once went to him and said, 'The philosopher Kão says:-" Man's nature is neither good nor bad." Some say :-" Man's nature may be made to practise good, and it may be made to practise evil; and accordingly, under Wăn and Wût, the people loved what was good, while, under Yu and Li, they loved what was cruel." Others say :-"The nature of some is good, and the nature of others is bad. Hence it was that under such a sovereign as Yâo there yet appeared Hsiang; that with such a father as Kû-sâu there yet appeared Shun; and that

1 Analects, VI. xvii.

Bk. VI. Pt. I. vi. 8; viii. 4.

See the annotations of the

editor of Yang-tsze's (楊子, the 楊 is often written 揚) Work, 脩身篇 in the +(vol. i. proleg. p. 132).

with Châu for their sovereign, and the son of their elder brother besides, there were found Ch'i, the viscount of Wei, and the prince Pi-kan." And now you say :-"The nature is good." Then are all those opinions wrong 1?'

'The nature of man is good,'-this was Mencius's doctrine. By many writers it has been represented as entirely antagonistic to Christianity; and, as thus broadly and briefly enunciated, it sounds startling enough. As fully explained by himself, however, it is not so very terrible. Butler's scheme has been designated 'the system of Zeno baptised into Christ.' That of Mencius, identifying closely with the master of the Porch, is yet more susceptible of a similar transformation.

View of the philosopher Kão.

But before endeavouring to make this statement good, it will be well to make some observations on the opinion of the philosopher Kao. He was a contemporary of Mencius, and they came into argumentative collision. One does not see immediately the difference between his opinion, as stated by Kung-tâ, and the next. Might not man's nature, though neither good nor bad, be made to practise the one or the other? Kao's view went to deny any essential distinction between good and evil,—virtue and vice. A man might be made to act in a way commonly called virtue and in a way commonly called evil, but in the one action there was really nothing more approvable than in the other. Life,' he said, 'was what was meant by nature. The phenomena of benevolence and righteousness were akin to those of walking and sleeping, eating and seeing. This extravagance afforded scope for Mencius's favourite mode of argument, the reductio ad absurdum. He showed, on Kâo's principles, that 'the nature of a dog was like the nature of an ox, and the nature of an ox like the nature of a man.'

Mencius's

ex

The two first conversations between them are more particularly worthy of attention, because, while they are a confutation of his opponent, they indicate clearly our philosopher's own posure of Kao's theory. Kâo compared man's nature to a willow tree, and benevolence and righteousness to the cups and bowls that might be fashioned from its wood. Mencius replied that it was not the nature of the willow to produce cups and bowls; they might be made from it indeed, by bending and

errors, and state

ment of his own doctrine.

1 Bk. VI. Pt. I. vi. 1-4.

3 Bk. VI. Pt. I. iii

2 Wardlaw's Christian Ethics, edition of 1833, p. 119.

+ Bk. VI. Pt. I. i. ii.

cutting and otherwise injuring it; but must humanity be done such violence to in order to fashion the virtues from it? Kao again compared the nature to water whirling round in a corner;open a passage for it in any direction, and it will flow forth accordingly. 'Man's nature,' said he, 'is indifferent to good and evil, just as the water is indifferent to the east and west.' Mencius answered him:- Water indeed will flow indifferently to the east or west, but will it flow indifferently up or down? The tendency of man's nature to good is like the tendency of water to flow downwards. There are none but have this tendency to good, just as all water flows downwards. By striking water and causing it to leap up, you may make it go over your forehead, and, by damming and leading it, you may force it up a hill; but are such movements according to the nature of water? It is the force applied which causes them. When men are made to do what is not good, their nature is dealt with in this way.'

Mencius has no stronger language than this, as indeed it would be difficult to find any stronger, to declare his belief in the goodness of human nature. To many Christian readers it proves a stumblingblock and offence. But I venture to think that this is without sufficient reason. He is speaking of our nature in its ideal, and not as it actually is, as we may ascertain from the study of it that it ought to be, and not as it is made to become. My rendering of the sentences last quoted may be objected to, because of my introduction of the term tendency; but I have Mencius's express sanction for the representation I give of his meaning. Replying to Kung-tu's question, whether all the other opinions prevalent about man's nature were wrong, and his own, that it is good, correct, he said:'From the feelings proper to it, we see that it is constituted for the practice of what is good. This is what I mean in saying that the nature is good. If men do what is not good, the blame cannot be imputed to their natural powers 1.' Those who find the most fault with him, will hardly question the truth of this last declaration. When a man does wrong, whose is the blame,—the sin? He might be glad to roll the guilt on his Maker, or upon his nature, which is only an indirect charging of his Maker with it;-but it is his own burden, which he must bear himself.

The proof by which Mencius supports his view of human nature

1 Bk. VI. Pt. I. vi. 5, 6.

Proofs that human nature is formed for virtue -First, from its moral constituents.

as formed only for virtue is twofold. First, he maintains that there are in man a natural principle of benevolence, a natural principle of righteousness, a natural principle of propriety, and a natural principle of apprehending moral truth. These,' he says, 'are not infused into us from without. We are certainly possessed of them; and a different view is simply from want of reflection. In further illustration of this he argued thus:All men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others;-my meaning may be illustrated thus;---Even now-a-days,' i. e. in these degenerate times, 'if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. They will feel so, not as a ground on which they may gain the favour of the child's parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbours and friends, nor from a dislike to the reputation of having been unmoved by such a thing. From this case we may see that the feeling of commiseration is essential to man, that the feeling of shame and dislike is essential to man, that the feeling of modesty and complaisance is essential to man, and that the feeling of approval and disapproval is essential to man. These feelings are the principles respectively of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and the knowledge of good and evil. Men have these four principles just as they have their four limbs".'

Let all this be compared with the language of Butler in his three famous Sermons upon Human Nature. He shows in the first of these: First, that there is a natural principle of benevolence in man; secondly, that the several passions and affections, which are distinct both from benevolence and self-love, do in general contribute and lead us to public good as really as to private; and thirdly, that there is a principle of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions3.'

1 Bk.VI. Pt. I. vi. 7.

6

2 Bk. II. Pt. I. vi. 3, 4, 5, 6.

'I am indebted to Butler for fully understanding Mencius's fourth feeling, that of approving and disapproving, which he calls the principle of knowledge,' or wisdom. In the notes, Bk. II. Pt. I. vi. 5, I have said that he gives to this term ‘a moral sense.' It is the same with Butler's principle of reflection, by which men distinguish between, and approve or disapprove, their own actions.—I have heard gentlemen speak contemptuously of Mencius's case in point, to prove the existence of a feeling of benevolence in man. This,' they have said, ‘is Mencius's idea of virtue, to save a child from falling into a well. A mighty display of virtue, truly !' Such language arises from misconceiving Mencius's object in putting the case. 'If there be,' says Butler, ‘any affection in human nature, the object and end of which is the good of another, this is itself benevolence. Be it ever so short, be it in ever so low a degree, or ever so unhappily confined, it proves the assertion and points out what we were designed for, as