self-government to work out its own solution. In one of his most penetrating dispatches he analysed the mentality of the 'loyal' rioters. For his position he made neither defence nor excuse. He made it perfectly clear that a minority had had their feelings hurt, and that the turmoil was only due to a peculiar type of loyalty which claimed a right to regulate by violence what could not be gained by constitutional means. In the hands of others this was rebellion, with them it was accounted righteousness. The bill was the reductio ad absurdum of family compact' claims. Every possible constitutional force was on Elgin's side, and tory loyalty was proved to be only the older monopoly of privilege in a newer setting. As privilege receded down the democratic tide, loyalty and imperialism were not so conspicuous. When the annexation movement was at its height not a few of the loyalists' longed for the flesh-pots of Egypt and joined with extremists in promoting a movement opposition to which had been the strongest force in their political raison d'être. This aspect of the episode needs little comment, but the measure had a most important influence. Responsible government was vindicated. French Canada was convinced of the sincerity of the concession, and the 'reds' never acquired any lasting influence. The family compact' was dissolved in political death, and John A. Macdonald was already beginning to see in the future a combination of parties in which race and privilege were to surrender their places to constitutional nationalism. In the house of commons the whole affair was canvassed. Russell and Grey defended Elgin and acknowledged the right of Canada to legislate on the matter. The majority of the Peelites voted with the government. The tories reproduced the 'loyalist' cry of compensating rebels' and 'French domination'. Gladstone pleaded that, as virtual rebels might receive public funds, the Act be either disallowed or an amendment. passed in Canada to provide for clearer definitions. He appeared

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1 Elgin to Grey, April 30, 1849, Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 579 ff.

to believe that the measure was beyond colonial legislative competency. The debates led to a letter from Hincks, then in London, in the columns of The Times, which deserves a distinct place in Canadian history. He poured scorn on the trite meaningless phrases, the party shibboleths which passed for arguments. He claimed a share for the Canadian government and their supporters in the loyalty which British and Canadian tories seemed to consider their peculiar monopoly. He pointed out that imperial criticism would need to rely on facts and on judicial estimates of colonial feeling, otherwise it was very unsafe for parties at a distance of three thousand miles to interfere in Canadian affairs'. The letter was a polite but firm request to England to mind its own business.

Another delicate situation arose out of inconsiderate and inconsistent imperial actions. The Canadian Corn Act of 1843 had given Canadian wheat and flour preference in the British market. Large quantities of American wheat were imported to Canada, which gained preferential treatment when sold as Canadian flour. Canadians had invested much capital in making provision for handling the extensive trade. Like a bolt from the blue, with no thought of the consequences in component parts of the empire, the imperial government annulled colonial preference and lowered the walls of protection. As a consequence, bankruptcy swept over Canadian business life and economic gloom settled down on the country. Property became utterly worthless and the public credit of the province ceased to exist. Elgin confessed that he did not know how the Canadians kept their heads. Peaceful annexation, however, was openly advocated. and with the political crisis over the rebellion losses bill it gained wide support.3 Elgin blamed the unskilled policy which 2 Walrond, op. cit., p. 60.

1 The Times, June 20, 1849.

3 The annexation manifesto and Elgin's dispatches connected with it are in Egerton and Grant, op. cit., pp. 336 ff. Consult C. D. Allin and G. M. Jones, Annexation, Preferential Trade, and Reciprocity: An Outline of the Canadian Annexation Movement of 1849-50 (Toronto, 1911), and C. D. Allin, The British

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adopted free trade in 1846 and retained the navigation acts till 1849. Hedealt summarily with manifestoes, and officials who had signed them were removed from office. But there was no doubt that a serious mistrust of Great Britain was widespread. He finally rallied the commercial classes by negotiating a reciprocity treaty with the United States and by convincing the imperial government of its necessity. Even then his difficulties did not disappear. When he was doing his utmost to bind Canada to the empire and to drive in double harness a colonial and an imperial cabinet, the prime minister of England was addressing the house of commons on the empire and began to anticipate a day when responsible government would have prepared the colonies for decent but inevitable independence. Elgin took up the challenge, which almost moved Baldwin to tears. You must renounce the habit', he wrote to Grey, of telling the colonies that the colonial" is a provisional existence; you must allow them to believe that, without severing the bonds which unite them to Great Britain, they may attain the degree of perfection and of social and political development to which organized communities of freemen have a right to aspire. . . . Is not the question at issue a most momentous one? What is it indeed but this: Is the queen of England to be the sovereign of an empire, growing, expanding, strengthening itself from age to age, striking its roots deep into fresh earth and drawing new supplies of vitality from virgin soils? Or is she to be, for all essential purposes of might and power, monarch of Great Britain and Ireland merely-her place and that of her line in the world's history determined by the productiveness of 12,000 square miles of a coal formation, which is being rapidly exhausted, and the duration of the social and political organization over which she presides dependent on the annual expatriation, with a view to its eventual alienation, of the surplus swarms of her born

North American League, 1849' (Ontario Historical Society, Papers and Records, vol. xiii, Toronto, 1915).

subjects? '1 'I have been possessed (I use the word advisedly, for I fear that most persons in England still consider it a case of possession) with the idea that it is possible to maintain on this soil of North America and in the face of republican America, British connexion and British institutions, if you give the latter freely and trustingly. Faith, when it is sincere, is always catching; and I have imparted this faith more or less thoroughly to all Canadian statesmen with whom I have been in official relationship since 1848 and to all intelligent Englishmen with whom I have come in contact since 1850.' 2

Before considering the new colonial policy in the Maritime Provinces, it is necessary to take a closer view of some other aspects of Canadian life, in order to understand the reorientation of parties which took place before Elgin left Canada. The La Fontaine-Baldwin ministry was baffled by two questions. The clergy reserves, in spite of Sydenham's legislation, remained a bone of contention and the demand for their secularization gained strength. On the one hand, Bishop Strachan was compassing heaven and earth to maintain a privileged place for his communion; on the other, George Brown was leading an attack on the status quo in the Globe, which was in reality the first blast of a new radicalism. The ministry was divided. La Fontaine favoured Baldwin against secularization, and they seem to have had Elgin's support; but the executive contained many who were opposed to their leaders. The moderation of the government came in for increased criticism both in the legislature and outside. Secondly, seigniorial tenure had become an anachronism as the alienation fines were a heavy burden with land a commercial commodity. La Fontaine felt that he could not handle the matter, and this lent further weakness to the party in power. A new political alinement, slow but sure, was also going on in the province. The liberal party in Canada

2

1 Elgin to Grey, March 23, 1850, Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 583 ff.

Elgin to Cumming Bruce, September 1852, ibid., pp. 589 ff.

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West was breaking into moderate reformers and radicals or 'clear grits'. When George Brown finally brought his fiery personality to the service of the latter and linked up extreme anti-papal views with extreme reform it was clear that party changes lay near at hand. In Canada East a similar but lesspronounced cleavage was visible. A rouge' group arose, who were virtually republicans. Never numerically strong, they possessed fine debating powers and often brilliant gifts, which, however, failed to move the French-Canadians, whose liberalism, now that their place in the sun had been secured, took on its natural conservative colour. Finally La Fontaine and Baldwin felt that their work had been accomplished, and in October 1851 'the great administration' closed. Hincks and Morin reconstructed the ministry with two clear grits', Malcolm Cameron and John Rolph. Like most similar movements, the scheme failed in its object. The clear grits 'refused to rally to the support of the government. The government was sustained in the elections at the close of the year and by practical legislation they staved off defeat. A Canadian Reform Bill' was passed which increased the representation of each division of the province to sixty-five and made provision for a redistribution of constituencies. An address was carried praying for freedom to reconstruct the legislative council on an elective basis, which was finally embodied in an imperial Act. The legislative council, however, rejected a bill on seigniorial tenure. There were soon signs of disintegration. Hincks became involved in financial transactions which brought public discredit to the ministry, and he was no more prepared to deal with the clergy reserves than his predecessors, although he had reformed the cabinet with that as an issue. The fall of Lord John Russell and the advent of the Derby ministry provided, an excuse for delay. When the Aberdeen ministry promised enabling legislation he was as little ready as before. A sudden

1 Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 592 ff. (17 & 18 Victoria, c. 118).